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Abstract 
This thesis advances from the conjecture that Jean-Luc Nancy's work demands to 
be interpreted according to the logic it describes. For Nancy unity is irreducible 
from exposure, because a distinct entity cannot be abstracted from its boundary 
conditions. It is my contention, therefore, that Nancy's work must be treated 
accordingly, as a syntactic unity that can only be understood in its exposure to 
other syntactic unities. Two interrelated claims are therefore made. First: that the 
current literature on Nancy’s work fails to identify that an inheritance from Plato 
and from Greek philosophy more widely is a key to the specificity of Nancy’s 
thinking, and second that only by retrieving this connection can Nancy’s 
contribution to contemporary ontological debates be made out. 
 
The thesis attempts to take a preliminary step in this direction by positioning 
Nancy’s work within a contemporary philosophical scene definitively characterised 
by its exposure to Ancient Greek philosophy. This investigation places a 
conceptual focus on the Platonic terms μίμησις and μέθεξις, terms which bear a 
rich history of implications in philosophies of immanence, transcendence, 
production, and art. I argue that in showing that there is never μίμησις without 
μέθεξις, and vice versa, Nancy shows that there is never immanence without 
transcendence, and vice versa. Furthermore, I argue that this mutuality places 
sensibility at the core of Nancy’s thought, and determines the artwork to be a 
privileged site at which the reciprocity of immanence and transcendence is 
presented. In this much, I suggest Nancy’s work offers an alternative to the 
demand for some mutually exclusive decision between immanence and 
transcendence. 
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With regard to the μέθεξιν it was only the term that he changed; for 
whereas the Pythagoreans say that things exist by μιμήσει of numbers, 
Plato says that they exist by μεθέξει - merely a change of term. As to 
what this μέθεξιν or μίμησιν may be, they left this an open question.1 
ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 
 
That no mimesis occurs without methexis (under threat of being nothing 
but a copy, a reproduction): here is the principle. Reciprocally, no doubt, 
there is no methexis that does not imply mimesis, that is, precisely 
production (not reproduction) in the form of a force communicated in 
participation.2 
NANCY, The Image: Mimesis and Methexis
                                                          
1 Aristotle, Aristotle in Twenty-Three Volumes, XVII: The Metaphysics, trans. by 
Hugh Tredennick (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1989) (Greek elements from: 
Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, ed. by William David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 1924)), 987b. 
2 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’ (2007), trans. by Ron Estes 
& Jean-Christophe Cloutier, in Theory@Bufallo, 11 (2007), 9-26 (pp. 10-11). 
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1.1 Introduction: the arrival of μίμησις and μέθεξις 
The concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις3 first appear in combination in Nancy’s work 
in 1980, in ‘Le mythe nazi’ [‘The Nazi Myth’], a paper co-authored with Philippe 
Lacoue-Labarthe4 and delivered at Schiltigheim that May, at a colloquium entitled 
Les Mécanismes du fascisme.5 There the two thinkers state: 
 
German tradition adds something to the classical, Greek theory of 
mythic imitation, of mimesis - or develops, very insistently, something 
that, in Plato for example, was really only nascent, that is, a theory of 
fusion or mystical participation (of methexis, as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl will 
say), of which the best example is the Dionysian experience, as 
described by Nietzsche.6 
 
The word μίμησις, literally “imitation” or “mimicking”, is already a loaded term at 
this juncture, both for Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, and for the wider conversation 
in which they are working.7 In their co-authored 1978 work L'Absolu littéraire: 
theorie de la litterature du romantisme allemand [The Literary Absolute: The 
                                                          
3 Due to the many different ways in which Greek terms are transliterated 
throughout the literature, including in many of the quotes I have embedded within 
this thesis, I have opted to write them in Greek wherever they appear in my own 
prose to avoid confusion. 
4 The concept of μίμησις is a central theme of Lacoue-Labarthe’s work, but what I 
am pointing to here is the inflection it takes on when said alongside μέθεξις. See 
for example: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics 
(1979), ed. by Christopher Fynsk (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).  
5 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’ (1980), trans. by 
Brian Holmes, Critical Enquiry, 16.2 (Winter 1990), 291-312 (p. 291). 
6 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’, p. 302. 
7 At least since its central place in 1972’s La dissemination, the word μίμησις 
implicates a conversation with Derrida. Indeed in 1975, both Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy contributed essays to the collection Mimesis: des articulations, which 
contains Derrida’s essay ‘Economimesis’. Nancy’s paper, ‘Le ventriloque (A mon 
père, X.)’, sets the tone for his future interrogations by approaching the status of 
the concept in the dialogues of Plato. See: Jacques Derrida, Dissemination (1972), 
trans. by Barbara Johnson (London: Athlone, 1981); Various, Mimesis: des 
articulations (Paris: Aubier-Flammarion, 1975); and the English translation: 
Jacques Derrida, ‘Economimesis’ (1975), trans. by Richard Klein, in Diacritics 11.2 
(Summer 1981), 2-25. 
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Theory of Literature in German Romanticism], for instance, Nancy and Lacoue-
Labarthe had already pursued what they refer to there as the mimetic 
‘ambivalence’8 that problematises literature’s and philosophy’s mutual reliance 
upon one another, an ambivalence that Nancy asserts, many years later, is given 
rise to for the reason that in μίμησις ‘the non-given must be sought through the 
given’.9 For ‘[a]s Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has repeated and articulated 
throughout all his work’, Nancy goes on, ‘the true character of mimesis is to be 
without model’,10 that is, a copy or a copying without an original. 
 
The word μέθεξις, literally rendered “participation” or “sharing”, invokes a family of 
problematics as old as philosophy, particularly when said in combination with 
μίμησις. Two years after the 1980 seminar paper, in a rich text entitled Le Partage 
des voix [‘Sharing Voices’], Nancy asserts of Plato’s dialogue Ion (a dialogue 
which, in fact, never explicitly names μίμησις within its concerns11), that it 
demonstrates the way in which μίμησις, copying, when bereft of a given original, is 
revealed as ‘active, creative, or re-creative’,12 which is to say, it re-produces only 
insofar as it produces both itself and an original, neither of which pre-exist the 
operation, and this means that μίμησις ‘proceeds from methexis’, participation, or 
conversely, that ‘mimesis is the condition of this participation’.13 
                                                          
8 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, The Literary Absolute: The Theory 
of Literature in German Romanticism (1978), trans. by Philip Barnard & Cheryl 
Lester (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), p. 68. 
9 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing (2007), trans. by Philip Armstrong 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 61. 
10 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, p. 61. 
11 Plato, ‘Ion’, in Plato With an English Translation, III: Statesman, Philebus, Ion, 
trans. by Walter Rangeley Maitland Lamb (London: Heinemann, 1962), pp. 407-47 
(including parallel Greek text). 
12 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’ (1982), trans. by Gayle L. Ormiston, in 
Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, ed. by Gayle L. 
Ormiston & Alan D. Schrift (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), pp. 
211-60 (p. 238). 
13 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 238. 
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This moment signals the entrance of a specific trajectory in Nancy’s work, one 
which, I would like to suggest, constitutes a response to the extensive ontological 
determinations given to both μίμησις and μέθεξις throughout the entire tradition of 
philosophy, and a response to an ambiguous connection between the terms which 
is already documented in the texts of philosophy’s nascency. To understand 
Nancy’s response, this history requires charting, up to its arrival and interpretation 
in Nancy’s work. However this thesis would fail if it attempted to fulfil such a 
grandiose challenge. Instead, I will focus on the way in which these concepts and 
the questions surrounding them have already been reactivated within a 
contemporary philosophical scene fundamentally oriented towards its own history, 
and given over to Nancy’s interrogations already full with meaning. 
 
The next chapter of this thesis attempts to set the scene of this reactivation by 
focusing on two contemporary philosophers, Martin Heidegger and Gilles Deleuze, 
who, I argue, not only maintain very specific orientations to the history of 
philosophy, but, in specific relation to this thesis’ questions, also offer strong 
interpretations of the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις. This chapter reveals an 
unlikely agreement between the two thinkers, through which a notion of the 
contemporary context of a reception of Greek philosophy may be constructed. 
Such a construction enables the next chapter to locate Gadamer’s and Nancy’s 
responses to the inheritance of μίμησις and μέθεξις in a space of contemporaneity 
which opens out between Heidegger’s (1889-1976) and Deleuze’s (1925-95) 
responses to the Greeks. Both, I will suggest, replace μέθεξις with μίμησις, albeit in 
different ways. Even in light of the brief allusions to Nancy just made, it is already 
clear that for Nancy there will be no such exclusive choice between the two. 
Furthermore, I will argue that both Heidegger and Deleuze reject μέθεξις for what 
12 
 
they interpret as its Platonic implication of a transcendent or dualistic ontology, 
replacing it with μίμησις for the reason that, they claim, μίμησις describes the 
distribution and connection of beings on an immanent horizon. In light of Nancy’s 
affirmation of the mutuality of the two concepts, this thesis’ argument, 
concomitantly, is that the newly interpreted concepts form a central part of the 
apparatus with which an idiosyncratically Nancean ontology of mutual immanence 
and transcendence is described. 
 
In chapter three, an alternative, affirmative account of μέθεξις is documented in the 
texts of an equally historically-oriented philosopher, Hans-Georg Gadamer.  I will 
suggest that this account, in which Gadamer affirms the transcendent aspects of 
μέθεξις and instead rejects μίμησις as a deficient concept with which to make 
ontological descriptions, represents an alternative trajectory in the thinking of 
μέθεξις and μίμησις. In this chapter too, I aim to show that Nancy responds by 
demonstrating the impossibility of disconnecting μίμησις from μέθεξις, or 
transcendence from immanence. Unlike Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s accounts of 
μίμησις and μέθεξις, however, I will suggest that Nancy does not outright reject, but 
rather radicalises Gadamer’s account. Namely, I will suggest that Nancy 
completes and totalises Gadamer’s reorientation of the vertical μέθεξις of a 
dualism between the sensuous and suprasensuous, into a horizontal μέθεξις 
between beings. Gadamer’s accommodation of transcendence within an 
immanent horizon, I will suggest, in this way forms an incomplete prototype for 
Nancy’s ontology of mutual immanence and transcendence. 
 
Finally, chapter four approaches from the contraposition by investigating what in 
turn becomes of mimetic theories of art, once the concept of μίμησις has been 
shown to be entirely inseparable from μέθεξις and its ontological force. Focusing 
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specifically on those philosophies of art that assign the artwork a foundational role 
in the formation of political or ideological identities, that is, those that make art the 
principle of a people’s communal immanence, I will suggest that because for 
Nancy this μίμησις is inseparable from μέθεξις, Nancy therefore reconceives of this 
aesthetic origin as inherently plural. As such, I suggest, the repeated turns to 
considerations of art within the Nancean corpus can be understood as ways in 
which Nancy’s work approaches the question of origin without reducing the 
necessarily multiplicitous nature of a mutually transcendent and immanent 
ontology.  
 
Here in this introductory chapter I would like only to introduce the concepts of 
μίμησις and μέθεξις, their history and their appearance in Nancy’s work, in a very 
general way. Beginning by marking out the terminological transformation of the 
everyday Greek concepts in the formative texts of philosophy, I note in a 
preliminary way the objections levelled at the terms, namely that μέθεξις is either 
logically inconsistent, or that it is only ambiguously and problematically 
differentiated from μίμησις. I then trace the way the two concepts are invoked 
together across diverse texts in the Nancean corpus, and point out that their uses 
in his work are always linked to Nancy’s long running interrogation of the opposing 
topological figures of immanence and transcendence. 
 
Proceeding to note the central place an encounter between these tropes takes 
within contemporary philosophical debate, I suggest that Nancy’s analyses of the 
natures of μίμησις and μέθεξις, and immanence and transcendence, therefore 
constitute a contribution to this recent dialogue by connecting its terms back to 
their Ancient Greek inception. The focus brought about by the terminological lens 
of μίμησις and μέθεξις, however, also concomitantly brackets the discussion. As 
14 
 
such, the thesis makes no claim to directly tackle the broader questions of 
immanence and transcendence which are ever present throughout the various 
strands and histories of philosophy. Rather, I make a more localised claim 
concerning Nancy’s interpretation of immanence and transcendence. I claim that 
for Nancy, at their most simple and fundamental level, the terms operate as 
relational topological concepts for describing the separation of beings or lack 
thereof, and, moreover, are but dual facets abstracted from one primordial figure. 
 
This figure Nancy introduces in 1993’s Le sens du monde [The Sense of the 
World] under the neologism ‘transimmanence’,14 Nancy’s word for an ontological 
law of spacing wherein the shared boundaries that distinguish all beings from one 
another determine both their extension and exposure along the same border, such 
that separation is always mediated and contact is always exclusive. This notion of 
a transimmanent world that is the sum total of exposed surfaces, in which 
immanence is the touch of that which transcends, and that which transcends is 
never out of touch, is introduced in more detail in section (1.4). By focusing the 
discussion on those places in the Nancean text that enquire around μίμησις and 
μέθεξις and their deployment in the philosophical scene, Nancy’s notion of 
transimmanence as an elemental topological law is not situated within the broader 
debate on transcendence and immanence, but rather in the context of a series of 
specific territories. 
 
The next section of this introductory chapter concerns one of these territories. I 
argue there that Nancy’s affirmation of the inseparability of immanence and 
                                                          
14 Here the French term is incorporated in the English translation. See for 
comparison: Jean-Luc Nancy, Le sens du monde, (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1993), 
pp. 91 & 94; and Jean-Luc Nancy, The Sense of the World (1993), trans. by 
Jeffrey S. Librett (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), p. 55. 
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transcendence from the limit at which they meet and codetermine places the study 
of the aisthetic sensibility, the limit that connects human immanence and 
transcendence, at the heart of Nancy’s philosophical investigations. The upshot of 
this for Nancy, I argue, is that not only does the obstinacy of μίμησις interrupt the 
ontological discourses whose interrogations of μέθεξις had always fallen 
exclusively on one side of the division between immanence and transcendence, 
but in philosophies of aisthetic sensibility as well as aesthetic projects and 
philosophies of art, μέθεξις for Nancy stubbornly imposes upon any theory in which 
μίμησις would have been the law of a unilateral operation of copying or 
representing. Moreover, in this parallel an important principle that recurs 
throughout the thesis is exposed, that for Nancy the study of the aesthetic cannot 
be separated from the study of the aisthetic sensibility, which is to say, the 
essence or singularity of art cannot be disconnected from the plurality of sensuous 
events and contacts that, for Nancy, constitute it. 
 
In the remaining sections of this introductory chapter, I indicate the place at which 
this thesis enters the extant literature on Nancy’s work, and, furthermore, argue for 
its necessity. After noting the lingering impression precipitated by an early phase 
in Nancy scholarship, I suggest there are three key themes around which the 
commentary is currently structured: community, writing, and emergent accounts of 
ontology, art and the connection Nancy identifies between them. After describing 
the agreements and disagreements both within and between these regional 
dialogues, I state that this thesis is largely in conformity with the available texts on 
Nancy’s ontological and aesthetic commitments. My contribution to the current 
body of knowledge, I maintain, comes in initiating a project of tracing these 
commitments back to the birth of philosophy in Ancient Greece, via the genealogy 
of thoughts borne by the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις, specifically, in the 
16 
 
instance of this thesis, in their reawakened form handed over for interrogation by 
certain contemporary philosophies. This chapter then closes by outlining the 
structure of the forthcoming chapters. 
 
 
  
17 
 
1.2 A terminological background of μίμησις and μέθεξις 
The common usage of the word μέθεξις and its derivatives is recorded in the plays 
of Euripides, an immediate predecessor of Plato, and also of Aristophanes, Plato’s 
contemporary. In Euripides’ Helen, the Dioskouroi, Kastor and Polydeukes, 
declare to Theoklymenos that Helen, their sister, his runaway fiancée, will be 
taken by fate and made a goddess and ‘shall partake [μεθέξεις] with us the rich 
oblations, and receive the gifts of men: for thus hath Jove decreed’.15 Likewise in 
his Ion, the word again refers to a shared reception, when an attendant of Creusa, 
the raped mother of Ion, warns her fellow attendants that they will all ‘share 
[μεθέξεις] the punishment’16 of stoning, for conspiring with Creusa to poison Ion, 
ignorant that he is in fact her son. In the Ecclesiazusae, written after Plato’s death, 
Aristophanes satirises a sexually socialist Athens in which all men can claim their 
‘share [μεθέξει] of the common property’, the women, but only on the proviso that 
they first take a share of the ‘ugliest and the most flat-nosed’.17 
 
With Plato, μέθεξις takes on a philosophical weight. In the early dialogues,18 in 
which, according to Vlastos, Plato depicts Socrates as an exclusively moral 
                                                          
15 Euripides, ‘Helen’, trans. by Percy Bysshe Shelley, Henry Hart Milman, Robert 
Potter & Michael Wodhull, in The Plays of Euripides, vol. I (London: J. M. Dent & 
Sons, 1910), pp. 100-158 (Greek elements from: ‘Helen’, in Euripidis Fabulae, ed. 
by Gilbert Murray, vol. III (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902)), 1668. 
16 Euripides, ‘Ion’, trans. by Deborah H. Roberts, in Euripides, ed. by David R. 
Slavitt & Palmer Bovie, vol. IV (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
1999), pp. 1-92 (Greek elements from: ‘Ion’, in Euripidis Fabulae, ed. by Gilbert 
Murray, vol. II (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1913)), 1115. 
17 Aristophanes, ‘Ecclesiazusae’, trans. by anonymous, in The Complete Greek 
Drama, ed. by Whitney J. Oates & Eugene O’Neill, Jr. (New York: Random House, 
1938), pp. 1007-62 (Greek elements from: ‘Ecclesiazusae’, in Aristophanis 
Comoediae, ed. by Frederick William Hall & William Geldart, vol. II (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1907)), 612. 
18 Vlastos’ list of early dialogues is: Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, 
Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I. See: Gregory 
Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 46. 
18 
 
philosopher,19 μέθεξις is used concordantly, with all the emphasis placed on the 
word’s second element εξις,20 the word Plato uses for human habit in the 
Republic,21 and Aristotle uses for disposition in the Nicomachean Ethics.22 In the 
Charmides, for instance, Socrates asks Charmides if he considers himself to 
‘partake [μετέχειν] sufficiently of temperance’.23 In the Laches also, Socrates 
announces that if judged ‘in deeds I think anyone would say that we partook 
[μετέχειν] of courage’,24 and in the Gorgias, Callicles speaks of education requiring 
one ‘to partake [μετέχειν] of philosophy.25 But in the Protagoras, the concept of 
μέθεξις is given its strongest ethical definition, when it is used to describe the 
disposition that is fundamentally definitive of the human, the very fact that the 
human is dis-posed at all. 
 
Protagoras relays the story that Epimetheus implored his brother Prometheus to 
let him allocate every living creature its proper δύναμιν εἰς σωτηρίαν, the innate 
strengths, camouflages, speeds, buoyancies, or armours that will allow the 
creature to survive, and that when he was granted his wish he forgot about the 
human, forcing Prometheus to compensate by stealing ἔντεχνον σοφίαν σὺν πυρί, 
                                                          
19 Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, p. 47. 
20 We see in chapter three that Gadamer translates and transposes this etymology 
from μετά-εξις into Mit-Dasein. 
21 Plato, The Republic, vols. I-II, trans. by Paul Shorey (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1937) (including parallel Greek text), 433e & 435b. 
22 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans, by James Alexander Kerr Thomson 
(London: Penguin, 2004) (Greek elements from: Aristotle’s Ethica Nicomachea, 
ed. by Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894)), 1098b & 1103a.  
23 Plato, ‘Charmides’, trans. by Rosamond Kent Sprague, in Plato: Complete 
Works, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis & Cambridge: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1997), pp. 639-63 (Greek elements from: ‘Charmides’, in Platonis 
Opera, ed. by Burnet, vol. III, pp. 153-76), 158c. 
24 Plato, ‘Laches’, trans. by Rosamond Kent Sprague, in Plato: Complete Works, 
ed. by Cooper, pp. 664-686 (Greek elements from: ‘Laches’, in Platonis Opera, ed. 
by Burnet, vol. III, pp. 178-291), 193e. 
25 Plato, ‘Gorgias’, trans. by Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by 
Cooper, pp. 791-869 (Greek elements from: ‘Gorgias’, in Platonis Opera, ed. by 
Burnet, vol. III, pp. 447-527), 485a. 
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technical wisdom and fire, from Hephaestus and Athena, and allocating them to 
the human creature.26 Protagoras tells Socrates that this stolen gift gave the 
human a ‘share [μετέσχε] of the divine [θείας] dispensation’.27 This share, 
Protagoras explains, situates the human in a between place, facing the gods in 
one direction although only able to worship them by proxy through ‘sacred images 
[ἀγάλματα θεῶν]’,28 and in the other direction facing the surroundings with which 
he or she can again only interact at a remove, dividing his or her surroundings 
linguistically by taxonomy,29 and dwelling with the technical objects he or she 
creates.30 Here, then, even in an early dialogue, μέθεξις is already tied up with the 
fact that to be human is to find oneself somewhere between heaven and earth, 
between the immanent and the transcendent, with only a mediated relation to 
each. 
 
From the middle dialogues onwards,31 Vlastos explains, Socrates is portrayed as 
the exponent of an all-encompassing philosophical system, ‘a grandiose 
metaphysical theory of “separately existing” Forms and of a separable soul which 
learns by “recollecting” pieces of its pre-natal fund of knowledge’.32 In perhaps the 
most unsubtle presentation of the dualism that has become synonymous with 
                                                          
26 Plato, ‘Protagoras’, trans. by Stanley Lombardo & Karen Bell, in Plato: Complete 
Works, ed. by Cooper, pp. 746-90 (Greek elements from: ‘Protagoras’, in Platonis 
Opera, ed. by Burnet, vol. III, pp. 309-62), 320e-1d 
27 Plato, ‘Protagoras’, 321d. 
28 Plato, ‘Protagoras’, 322a. 
29 ‘φωνὴν καὶ ὀνόματα ταχὺ διηρθρώσατο τῇ τέχνῃ’. Plato, ‘Protagoras’, 322a. 
30 ‘οἰκήσεις καὶ ἐσθῆτας καὶ ὑποδέσεις καὶ στρωμνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐκ γῆς τροφὰς ηὕρετο’. 
Plato, ‘Protagoras’, 322a. 
31 Vlastos lists: Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, 
Parmenides and Theaetetus as middle dialogues, with Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, 
Politicus, Philebus and Laws constituting the final sequence. Vlastos, Socrates: 
Ironist and Moral Philosopher, p. 47. 
32 Vlastos’ divisions are not as sheer as I have portrayed them above, because his 
reading emphasises that the philosophical opinions ascribed to Socrates in the 
dialogues receive strong qualification by way of the dialogues’ narrative quality, 
opening a dialogical space between Socrates’ speeches and his interactions. 
Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher, p. 48. 
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Plato’s philosophy, in the Phaedo a strong differentiation is drawn between, on the 
one hand, those who accept that their souls partake [μετέχειν] in embodiment (an 
ontological determination of the concept), but nevertheless choose not to partake 
[μετέχειν] in the pleasures this offers (an ethical determination of the concept), and 
on the other, the hedonist who cares only for these pleasures [ἡδονὰς].33  
 
In line with the broadened terms of Socrates’ engagements, in the Phaedo the 
concept of μέθεξις describes not only a human disposition, but now also the 
connection between the sensible entities the human encounters and their 
metaphysically ideal counterparts. For Socrates asserts to Cebes, quite 
definitively, ‘if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty it is beautiful for no 
other reason than because it partakes [μετέχειν] of absolute beauty; and this 
applies to everything’.34 In this way, the μέθεξις that names the human’s limited 
access to the divine, given in recompense for Epimetheus’ error, mirrors the 
μέθεξις by which sensible entities are what they are by their limited participation in 
perfection. 
 
In the Cratylus, Socrates even goes as far as to discuss the very terminology of 
this dualism. Suggesting that the wise ancients who first named the goddess 
Hestia derived her name in accordance with her theological supremacy, from an 
etymological association with concepts of being, Socrates states: 
 
Well, it’s obvious to me that it was people of this sort who gave things 
names, for even if one investigates names foreign to Attic Greek, it is 
equally easy to discover what they mean. In the case of what we in Attic 
                                                          
33 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, in Plato With an English Translation, trans. by Harold North 
Fowler, I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus (London: Heinemann, 
1914), pp. 193-404 (including parallel Greek text), 64e-5a. 
34 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, 100c. 
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call ‘ousia’ (‘being’), for example, some call it ‘essia’ and others ‘ōsia’. 
First, then, it is reasonable, according to the second of these names, to 
call the being or essence (ousia) of things ‘Hestia’. Besides, we 
ourselves say that what partakes of [μετέχοντ] being ‘is’ (‘estin’), so 
being is also correctly called ‘Hestia’ for this reason. We even seem to 
have called being ‘essia’ in ancient times. And, if one has sacrifices in 
mind, one will realize that the namegivers themselves understood 
matters in this way, for anyone who called the being or essence of all 
things ‘essia’ would naturally sacrifice to Hestia before all the other 
gods. On the other hand, those who use the name ‘ōsia’ seem to agree 
pretty much with Heraclitus’ doctrine that the things that are are all 
flowing and that nothing stands fast - for the cause and originator of 
them is then the pusher (ōthoun), and so is well named ‘ōsia’.35 
 
However, the concept of μέθεξις is not always afforded an uncritical presentation in 
Plato’s texts. In both the Sophist and the Parmenides, Plato subjects his 
ontological hierarchy of perfection, and the concept of μέθεξις that connects its 
degrees, to lengthy dialectical investigations designed to draw out the aporetic. In 
the Sophist, the Stranger shows Theaetetus that logical troubles arise when one 
apparent thing is said to partake in contradictory modalities, for instance, when 
non-existence is predicated in the plural,36 or when motion, under examination, 
reveals itself as relationally transient but autonomously self-same,  such that 
‘motion would be at rest and rest would be in motion; in respect of both, for 
whichever of the two became “other” would force the other to change its nature 
into that of its opposite, since it would participate [μετασχὸν] in its opposite’.37 
Parmenides raises similar challenges to the character of the young Socrates in the 
                                                          
35 Plato, ‘Cratylus’, trans. by C. D. C. Reeve, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by 
Cooper, pp. 101-56 (Greek elements from: ‘Cratylus’, in Platonis Opera, ed. by 
Burnet, vol. I, pp. 383-440), 401b-d. 
36 Plato, ‘Sophist’, in Plato With an English Translation, II: Theaetetus, Sophist, 
trans. by Harold North Fowler (London: Heinemann, 1914), pp. 259-459 (including 
parallel Greek text), 238a-e. 
37 Plato, ‘Sophist’, 255a-b. 
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Parmenides, adding to them a question of how a plurality of sensible entities 
sharing similar attributes could all be said to partake in the same ideality, if this 
ideality, as a perfect original, is by definition singular.3839 The internal tension of a 
dialogical text, that is, the difference between the content of the speeches 
recorded by Plato, and the space opened in the interlocution, gives these 
interrogations to interpretation, opening up the possibility of the rich history of 
responses, affirmations, and objections that follows. 
 
One of the many objections raised against Platonic μέθεξις is that it has an 
ambiguous relationship to the concept of μίμησις. As Jaspers points out, in some 
places Plato describes μέθεξις as the quasi-presence of the Form and 
corresponding sensible being in one another, their παρουσίᾳ,40 an intimate 
connectivity, but in others,41 ‘the Idea is likened to an archetype or prototype 
                                                          
38 Plato, ‘Parmenides’, in Plato, IV: Cratylus, Parmenides, Greater Hippias, Lesser 
Hippias, trans. by Harold North Fowler (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1926), pp. 193-332 (including parallel Greek text), 131a-d. 
39 This aporia, first raised by Plato, goes on to be the basis of two closely related 
critiques of Platonic philosophy. The first, Aristotle’s so-called “Third Man 
Argument”, asserts that if many things partake in one form, then for Plato the 
singularity of a higher form must not be individual but instead generic, which, for 
Aristotle, means that a higher form will always require a yet-more perfect form to 
account for its identity, thus leading to infinite regress. The second, Plotinus’ 
development of the “Sailcloth Dilemma”, implies instead that separating one level 
of perfection from another in turn creates internal separations mirroring the 
individuation of sensible things. We will see in chapter 3 that Gadamer offers a 
different interpretation of this “dilemma”. See: Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 990b; 
and: Plotinus, On the One and Good being the Treatises of the Sixth Ennead, 
trans. by Stephen Mackenna & B. S. Page (Boston: Charles T. Branford Company, 
1928), 4.7. 
40 See for example: Plato, ‘Sophist’, 247a, and: Plato, ‘Phaedo’, 100d. 
41 See for example: Plato, Plato With an English Translation, IX: Laws in Two 
Volumes, vols. I-II, trans. by Robert Gregg Bury (London: Heinemann, 1914) 
(including parallel Greek text), 2.668b & 7.817b, and: Plato, ‘Timaeus’, trans. by 
Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John M. Cooper (Indianapolis & 
Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), pp. 1224-92 (Greek elements 
from: ‘Timaeus’, in Platonis Opera,  ed. by Burnet, vol. IV, pp. 17-105), 39e. 
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(paradeigma), [and] the thing to a copy or imitation (mimēsis)’.42 This reservation 
dates back to Aristotle, who, in the Metaphysics, asserts that μίμησις and μέθεξις, 
according to their deployment in Plato’s philosophy, are but two words for the 
same thing.43 For Aristotle, the ambiguity of the terms reflects the ambiguity of the 
philosophical system under examination.44 Yet, as with μέθεξις, μίμησις already 
has a pre-philosophical semantic content. Herodotus, an immediate predecessor 
to Plato, records forms of the word in his historical chronicles as used in reference 
both to the imitative arts, when writing of the Egyptians’ ‘painted likenesses [γραφῇ 
μεμιμημένα]’,45 and also to cultural emulation, such as when he finds the Asbystae 
to ‘imitate [μιμέεσθαι] most of the Cyrenaean customs’.46 Moreover, in 
Aristophanes we find these two usages combined in the theatrical, the artistic 
emulation of playing a role, donning the ‘trappings [σκευὴν]’,47 or the ‘outfit 
[στολή]’, 48 in order to ‘imitate [μιμήσομαι]’.49 
 
These employments are not replaced in the Platonic text, only enriched, for while, 
as Jaspers suggests, Plato does indeed in some places refer to μίμησις as an 
ontological function akin to μέθεξις, he more often speaks of it as something the 
human does. Indeed, the oft-cited example, from Book X of the Republic, in which 
                                                          
42 Karl Jaspers, Plato and Augustine (1957), trans. by Ralph Manheim (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962),  p. 30. 
43 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 987b. 
44 ‘As to what this "participation" or "imitation" may be, they left this an open 
question’. Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 987b. 
45 Herodotus, Herodotus with an English translation by A. D. Godley, ed. by Alfred 
Denis Godley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920) (including parallel 
Greek text), 2.86. 
46 Herodotus, Herodotus with an English translation by A. D. Godley, 4.170. 
47 Aristophanes, ‘Frogs’, trans. by Gilbert Murray, in The Complete Greek Drama, 
ed. by Oates & O’Neill, Jr., pp. 919-1006 (Greek elements from: Aristophanes, 
‘Frogs’, in Aristophanis Comoediae, ed. by Hall & Geldart, vol. II), 110. 
48 Aristophanes, ‘Thesmophoriazusae’, trans. by anonymous, in The Complete 
Greek Drama, ed. by Oates & O’Neill, Jr., pp. 867-918 (Greek elements from: 
Aristophanes, ‘Thesmophoriazusae’, in Aristophanis Comoediae, ed. by Hall & 
Geldart, vol. II), 851. 
49 Aristophanes, ‘Thesmophoriazusae’, 850. 
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Plato banishes the μίμησις of the painter and poet from the ideal city state for 
producing deficient copies distant from the ideal,50 is prefaced in Book III by a 
much more balanced critique of the theatrical version of μίμησις. As Gebauer and 
Wulf show, the purpose of Plato’s criticism in this earlier passage is not to pass 
judgment over μίμησις qua μίμησις, but rather to identify whom the best role-model 
should be if we accept that παιδείᾳ,51 education, does often happen by way of 
emulation and role-playing. On Gebauer’s and Wulf’s reading, the clear answer 
Plato gives is that the philosopher, rather than the poet, should take up this 
position.52 
 
Why the object of emulation should be the philosopher rather than the poet, Plato 
attempts to demonstrate in a thought experiment: if we take away the poet’s multi-
voiced style, that is, remove the way he or she speaks in character, but leave the 
words, then ‘simple narration results’, but take away the words and leave the 
‘alternation of speeches’ and ‘the opposite arises.’53 Plato makes it clear that it is 
not in the words of the poet that Athenians should fear for the corruption of their 
students, but the way in which they are said. That is to say, the content of the 
poetry might be entirely accurate and just as enlightening as the teachings of the 
philosopher (just as the works of the photo-realist artist might be indiscernible from 
the “real” thing), but so long as the poet speaks in multiple voices while concealing 
their own, ‘effect[ing] their narration through imitation [μιμήσεως]’,54 their teaching 
remains deficient. 
 
                                                          
50 Plato, The Republic, 597c-e. 
51 Plato, The Republic, 416c. 
52 Gunter Gebauer & Christoph Wulf, Mimesis: Culture, Art, Society (1992), trans. 
by Don Reneau (California: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 33-7. 
53 Plato, The Republic, 394a-b. 
54 Plato, The Republic, 393c. 
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By Plato’s account it is therefore not theatrical or educational μίμησις in itself that 
is problematic, but rather, for the same reason that in Book X the artist is accused 
of failing to copy the ideal directly, the entire critique stems from the subjugation of 
μίμησις to μέθεξις. The only reason μίμησις is judged to be inauthentic in each 
case is that it has no μέθεξις, whereas to copy the philosopher, or to copy the ideal 
is a different story entirely, for there the imitation’s meaning is firmly oriented 
toward perfection, rather than deferred along a chain of further copies. As much as 
Aristotle criticises Plato’s reasoning on this point, he nevertheless echoes its 
imperative in his Politics, when he states that ‘The Directors of Education, as they 
are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for the sports 
of children are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and 
should be for the most part imitations [μιμήσεις] of the occupations which they will 
hereafter pursue in earnest’.55 
 
In his Poetics, aside from classifying a number of different genres of μίμησις, ‘Epic 
poetry and Tragedy, as also Comedy, Dithyrambic poetry, and most fluteplaying 
and lyre-playing’,56 according to the ways in which they exaggerate or exemplify, 
mock or exalt, Aristotle makes the rather more general claim that the pleasure 
[εὐφράνειεν] we find in art is a direct result of its mimetic quality.57 What this 
means, first of all, is that for Aristotle the pleasure of art has little to do with beauty: 
 
though the objects themselves may be painful to see, we delight to view 
the most realistic representations of them in art, the forms for example 
                                                          
55 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Politics, trans. by Benjamin Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1926) (Greek elements from: Aristotle, Aristotle's Politica, ed. by William 
David Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1957)), 1336a. 
56 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, trans. by Ingram Bywater (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1920) (Greek elements from: Aristotle, Aristotle's Ars Poetica, ed. by Rudolf 
Kassel (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966)), 1447a. 
57 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry,1450b. 
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of the lowest animals and of dead bodies. The explanation is to be 
found in a further fact: to be learning something is the greatest of 
pleasures not only to the philosopher but also to the rest of mankind, 
however small their capacity for it; the reason of the delight in seeing 
the picture is that one is at the same time learning - gathering the 
meaning of things, e.g. that the man there is so-and-so; for if one has 
not seen the thing before, one’s pleasure will not be in the picture as an 
imitation of it, but will be due to the execution or colouring or some 
similar cause.58 
 
Not only does art have little to do with the beautiful then, for Aristotle, imitation, 
μίμησις, also has little to do with the imitated. Rather, in something like a piece of 
tragic theatre, Aristotle explains, its characters and plot constitutes ‘an imitation 
[μίμησίς] not of persons but of action and life [βίου]’,59 such that one does not need 
to recall its characters or happenings as people or events already experienced, 
rather ‘the reason of the delight in seeing the picture [εἰκόνας]’60 comes not from 
recollection or even direct comparison, but from μανθάνειν, learning, in the form of 
συλλογίζεσθαι, the syllogistic reasoning by which the audience makes the 
connection, transforming an artistic implication into a determinate representation, 
thus making representation an internal cognitive function rather than a genuinely 
existing relationship between entities.61 
 
Although Aristotle can stay with Plato’s definition of the emulative, educational 
mode of μίμησίς, stating that ‘[i]mitation [μιμεῖσθαι] is natural to man from 
childhood, one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the 
most imitative [μιμητικώτατόν] creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation 
                                                          
58 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, 1448b. 
59 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, 1450a. 
60 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, 1448b. 
61 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, 1448b. 
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[μιμήσεως]’,62 he cannot qualify it by or analogue it to μέθεξις, because for Aristotle 
there is no original, perfect or otherwise, to which the mimetic correlates. The 
audience is the correlate, but only insofar as they project themselves upon the 
artwork and delight in the way it modifies and reflects them back: a hermeneutic 
circle. Here then, in philosophy’s formative years, the mimetic ambivalence Nancy 
and Lacoue-Labarthe affirm is already presented. 
 
In 1983’s ‘Le mythe interrompu’ [‘Myth Interrupted’] Nancy draws the conclusion 
from mimetic ambivalence that ‘[t]he myth of myth’, that is, the story we tell 
ourselves of an outmoded epoch of stories, which in its own way becomes our 
own founding myth, our narrative of the absence of grand narratives,63 ‘is in no 
way an ontological fiction; it is nothing other than an ontology of fiction or 
representation’, because ‘[m]imesis is the poesis64 of the world as true world of 
gods, of men, and of nature’.65 What this means is that our myth, the myth of the 
absence of myth, in which the very word “myth” comes to ‘mean the negation of 
something at least as much as the affirmation of something’,66 for example, when 
we recount Protagoras’ story of Prometheus and Epimetheus as, in the same 
breath, a lore for one world and an obsolete fable for another, misses the fact that 
‘to speak of myth has only ever been to speak of its absence’, because, like 
                                                          
62 Aristotle, On The Art of Poetry, 1448b. 
63 This is a reference to Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern. See: Jean-François 
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (1979), trans. by 
Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1984, pp. 37-41. 
64 This seems to be a mistake in the English translation of ‘Myth Interrupted’, as 
Nancy spells the word poiesis in the original, see: Jean-Luc Nancy, La 
Communauté désœuvrée (1983) (Paris: Christian Bourgois éditeur, 1999), p. 139. 
65 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Myth Interrupted’ (1983), trans. by Peter Connor, in The 
Inoperative Community, ed. by Peter Connor (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 43-70 (p. 55). 
66 Nancy, ‘Myth Interrupted’, p. 52. 
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μίμησίς, ‘the word "myth" itself designates the absence of what it names’.67 We 
know nothing of what it would have been like to live in a time of myth because at 
that point our word “myth” becomes inadequate. As Nancy puts it three years later 
in L’oubli de la philosophie [The Forgetting of Philosophy]: 
 
There was another day, then, upon which we cannot confer the 
meaning of any of our days or nights. The question of an order exterior 
to signification cannot be posed under the conditions or in the terms of 
signification (thus all our conceptions of "myth" have never made us 
accede to a "life in myth," if this expression means anything; or else, on 
another level, all our thoughts of mimesis set themselves the task of 
thinking the fact that it is impossible to signify what the West's first 
models were, or, more radically, whether there was or is a model for the 
logic of mimesis).68 
 
What this amounts to for Nancy is that the mythical worldview is not determinable 
as that which has been left behind, for what is exterior to our epoch simply cannot 
be spoken of without determining it as a negative correlate, projecting upon it a 
fullness of meaning that would simulate a dialectical counterpoint to mimetic 
ambivalence. But it is precisely the unspeakability or unknowability of origin that in 
turn defines our (and Aristotle’s) μίμησίς, both in its instances (as we saw in 
Aristotle’s theatrical hermeneutics, wherein the given gestures towards the non-
given), and its general logic, according to a “myth of myth”, by which μίμησίς 
determines itself as deficiency, according to the nostalgia it projects. In ‘Myth 
Interrupted’, Nancy goes on: 
 
                                                          
67 Nancy, ‘Myth Interrupted’, p. 52. 
68 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Forgetting of Philosophy’ (1986), trans. by François 
Raffoul & Gregory Recco, in The Gravity of Thought (New York: Humanity Books, 
1997), pp. 7-74 (p. 28). 
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Myth is not simple representation, it is representation at work, producing 
itself - in an autopoetic mimesis - as effect: it is fiction that founds. And 
what it founds is not a fictive world (which is what Schelling and Lévi-
Strauss challenged), but fictioning as the fashioning of a world, or the 
becoming-world of fictioning. In other words, the fashioning of a world 
for the subject, the becoming-world of subjectivity.69 
 
In 1990’s ‘L'insacrifiable’ [‘The Unsacrificeable’], Nancy ties together his analyses 
of myth and μίμησίς with the critique of communitarianist and immanentist politics 
he had presented in the principal essay70 of La communauté désoeuvrée [The 
Inoperative Community]. There he points out that in the same way that the 
impossibility of recovering original myth tempts us to conceive it as the polar 
opposite of our rational logos, that is to say, something in which meaning is wholly 
given and lived in immediacy, likewise, ‘we know precisely nothing about early 
sacrifice’,71 and the attendant provocation is again to imagine something has been 
lost, or, according to a Christian eschatology, that something has been gained – 
an authentic Christ-like self-sacrifice which retrospectively denotes the bloody 
variety of sacrifice as a weak precursor, but which is, nevertheless, entirely 
incomprehensible. Whichever way you wish to look at it, that is, whichever is 
considered a μίμησίς of its more authentic counterpart, Nancy asserts that the 
presupposition in each case is that that which the sacrifice mimes is a communion, 
                                                          
69 Nancy. ‘Myth Interrupted’, p. 56. 
70 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’ (1983), trans. by Peter Connor, 
in The Inoperative Community, ed. Connor, pp. 1-42. The English translation 
replaces chapter four, ‘L'être-en-commun’, and chapter five, ‘L'histoire finie’, with 
‘Shattered Love’, a translation of ‘L'amour en éclats’, from 1990’s Une pensée 
finie, and ‘Of Divine Places’, from 1987’s  Des lieux divins: Suivi de Calcul du 
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désoeuvrée show up as ‘Finite History’, trans. by Brian Holmes, in The Birth to 
Presence, pp. 143-66, and ‘Of Being-in-Common’, trans. by James Creech, in 
Community at Loose Ends, ed. by The Miami Theory Collective (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 1-12. 
71 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’ (1990), trans. by Richard Stamp & Simon 
Sparks, in A Finite Thinking, ed. by Simon Sparks (California: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), pp. 51-77 (p. 73). 
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a transgression of boundaries between the people and each other and between 
the people and their gods, the miming of the presence of each in the other, μέθεξις 
as παρουσίᾳ, the miming of an immanent participation of a community by way of a 
transcendent transgression of the absolute boundary between the finite and 
infinite. But, Nancy asks: 
 
why shouldn't we grasp mimesis on the basis of a methexis, a 
communication or contagion that, outside the West, has perhaps never 
had the meaning of a communion, which we have tended to give it? 
What escapes us, and what "Western sacrifice" at once misses and 
sublates, is an essential discontinuity of methexis, an in-communication 
of every community.72 
 
A participation by imitation then, which modulates the intimacy of μέθεξις against 
the externality of μίμησίς by taking seriously a claim Nancy attributes to Bataille, 
explored at length in The Inoperative Community, that the “co” of community is not 
that of communion, a subsumption of all into each other or the one, but the “co” of 
communication, an activity that is predicated upon heterogeneity, a movement of 
meaning between distinct parts.73 Grasping μίμησίς and μέθεξις on the basis of 
discontinuity means conceiving of an intersubjective relation constituted neither by 
transmissions across a gulf of absolute disconnection, and nor as an absolute 
immediacy and indiscernibility in which everything is given and nothing happens.  
 
Nancy describes this discontinuity in The Inoperative Community as ‘the sharing 
[partage74] that divides and that puts in communication bodies, voices, and 
                                                          
72 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, 327 n. 30. 
73 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’, p. 12. 
74 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Communauté désœuvrée (1983) (Paris: Christian Bourgois 
éditeur, 1999), p. 25. 
31 
 
writings’,75 and in the ‘Unsacrificeable’ as ‘[t]he horizon [that] holds existence at a 
distance from itself’.76 It is the thought, as Nancy puts it in the community essay, 
that ‘singularity never has the nature or the structure of individuality’,77 a thought 
that I will suggest connects the long heritage of μίμησίς and μέθεξις, the terms’ 
many varying invocations of a relationship between matter and meaning, via their 
transformation in Nancy’s work, to a contemporary discussion over the priority of 
immanence, or transcendence in philosophy, which I would like to introduce in the 
following section. 
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77 Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’, p. 6. 
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1.3 Immanence and transcendence as contemporary philosophical themes 
To transcend means to climb (scandere) beyond (trans-). To be immanent means 
to dwell (manere) in. Not only do these antithetical images move us into a Latin 
based etymology, but according to Giorgio Agamben they govern two distinct 
trajectories in the genealogy of twentieth century thoughts about the nature of life. 
As advocates of the centrality of the transcendent, Agamben names Derrida78 and 
Levinas, whose emphases on the primacy of an ethical responsibility to other 
persons organises their philosophical investigations around the irreducible 
transcendence of ethical alterity. On the immanent path are Deleuze and Foucault. 
Deleuze, Agamben explains, separates a transcendental horizon from any 
‘cent[re] of individuation’79 or consciousness, rendering it an ‘impersonal zone’80 
immanent only to itself. Foucault, according to Agamben, separates life from 
‘confrontation with death’,81 drawing it back from the moment of absolute 
transgression. 
 
In a diagram, Agamben illustrates the passage of these thoughts into the 
contemporary, the transcendent schema travelling via Kant and Husserl, and the 
immanent via Spinoza and Nietzsche. At the centre of the diagram, the name 
through which nearly all of Agamben’s trajectories pass into the contemporary, 
and the sole name to take up a position between transcendence and immanence, 
                                                          
78 In a footnote to the opening section of 2005’s Déconstruction du christianisme: 
Tome 1, La Déclosion [Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity], Nancy 
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79 Giorgio Agamben, ‘Absolute Immanence’ (1996), trans. by Daniel Heller-
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University Press, 1999), pp. 220-242 (p. 225). 
80 Agamben, ‘Absolute Immanence’, p. 225. 
81 Agamben, ‘Absolute Immanence’, p. 238. 
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is “Heidegger”.82 It is the contention of this thesis that Nancy’s thought should also 
be understood as positioned on this middle path, the path that refuses an 
exclusive choice between the immanent and the transcendent. As has already 
been stated, I am going to argue that a negotiation between immanence and 
transcendence can be traced all the way to philosophy’s Ancient Greek origins, 
and that in order to fully understand Nancy’s commitments, his work requires 
positioning in relation to this long problematic, specifically in light of Nancy’s use of 
the concepts of μίμησίς and μέθεξις. 
 
In 1990’s ‘L'amour en eclats’ [‘Shattered Love’], Nancy writes that ‘[t]ranscendence 
is the disimplication [désimplication83] of the immanence that can come to it only 
from the outside’.84 Implication, in both English and French, is rooted in implicare, 
the verb for entwining. To implicate is to bring something other into a necessary 
involvement. It forms an inductive proposition. Disimplication, the reverse, 
describes the dialectical process of the disentwining or diaeresis of terms whose 
mutuality is already latent. Castoriadis, for example, writes of the analytic 
connection between cause and effect, that ‘[i]t is self-evident and well known that 
logical implication is an elaborated identity, that the conclusion is simply a 
disimplication of what is already in the premises’.85 
 
                                                          
82 Agamben, ‘Absolute Immanence’, p. 239. 
83 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘L'amour en eclats’, in Une pensée finie (Paris: Galilée, 1990), 
p. 248. 
84 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Shattered Love’ (1990), trans. by Lisa Garbus & Simona 
Sawhney in A Finite Thinking, ed. by Sparks, pp. 245-274 (p. 261). 
85 Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Social Imaginary and the Institution’ (1975), trans. 
by David Ames Curtis, in The Castoriadis Reader (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), pp. 
196-217 (p. 212). 
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Lyotard demonstrates this with reference to Hegel. For Hegel, who, Lyotard writes, 
‘understands meaning as signification’,86 the triangular image of the Christian 
Trinity is ambiguous because it both signifies and symbolises simultaneously87 and 
‘does not carry with it the index of its functions or the formula for its usage’.88 For 
Hegel, by Lyotard’s account, it is in the discursive ‘désimplication’,89 that the 
mingled metaphor of God and triangle, problematically ‘intertwined in the symbol’ 
[my italics],90 is translated into simile as ‘two concepts laid out on the surface of 
the linguistic order’.91 ‘Thus truth is placed into discourse as discontinuous’,92 that 
is, Lyotard explains,  the identity of the symbol is represented under the regime of 
signification as externally related elements, and the disimplicated, the figurative, is 
placed under a negative determination. 
 
For Nancy, the transcendent and the immanent are dichotomous elements 
produced by the disimplication of the limit that simultaneously distinguishes and 
exposes all beings from, and to, one another. Nancy’s is a thought ‘of a world 
whose matter is the very fraying [frayage] or fractality of fragments, places, and 
takings-place’,93 a world of objects divided by (transcendent to) an intricately 
folded limit that is also the site of their touch (immanence), a world that is nothing 
before or beyond the sum total of these divisions and exposures. This does not 
mean, as Harman incorrectly asserts, that in a Nancean ontology, all objects are 
reducible to the function of their relations, that for Nancy ‘there can be only 
                                                          
86 Jean François Lyotard, Discourse, Figure (1971), trans. by Antony Hudek & 
Mary Lydon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2011), p. 46. 
87 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, p. 45. 
88 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, p. 46. 
89 Jean François Lyotard, Discours, figure (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1971), p. 
49. 
90 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, p. 47. 
91 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, p. 47. 
92 Lyotard, Discourse, Figure, p. 47. 
93 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 58. 
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relational forms, not substantial forms’.94 Rather, for Nancy objectuality and 
relation are absolutely unthinkable in abstraction from their pairing. 
 
For Nancy, objectuality is distinction, and distinction is distinction from other 
distinct beings, and thus a relation to other beings. Neither is appended to the 
other, because enclosure and exposure happen at the same boundary. Harman’s 
definition of the object as ‘a concrete reality that has specific determination or form 
quite apart from its relations with anything else, and quite apart from its purely 
accidental way of being on the stage at any moment’,95 is unintelligible according 
to the tenets of Nancy’s topology, for it demands the distinct be distinguished from 
nothing. And the ‘pure immanence of a pure transcendence’, Nancy writes in The 
Sense of the World, ‘does not even go so far as to take place’.96 
 
For Nancy there is nothing other than beings, no indeterminate substratum from 
which they arise or within which they chance upon one other, for as Nancy puts it 
in a lecture of 2000, ‘[t]he singular implies its limit. It does more than implying it: it 
posits it with itself; it posits itself as its limit, and it posits the limit as its own […a]n 
interval separates the singular in order for it to be singular’.97 And in 1996’s Être 
singulier pluriel [Being Singular Plural], Nancy writes: 
 
From one singular to another, there is contiguity but not continuity. 
There is proximity, but only to the extent that extreme closeness 
emphasizes the distancing it opens up. All of being is in touch with all of 
                                                          
94 Graham Harman, ‘On Interface: Nancy’s Weights and Masses’, in Jean-Luc 
Nancy and Plural Thinking: Expositions of World, Ontology, Politics, and Sense, 
ed. by Peter Gratton & Marie-Eve Morin (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2012), pp. 95-107 (p. 103). 
95 Harman, ‘On Interface’, p. 102. 
96 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 30. 
97 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Banks, Edges, Limits (of Singularity)’ (2000), trans. by Gil 
Anidjar, in Angelaki, 9.2 (2004), 41-53 (p. 43). 
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being, but the law of touching is separation; moreover, it is the 
heterogeneity of surfaces that touch each other. Contact is beyond 
fullness and emptiness, beyond connection and disconnection.98 
 
Consider the equal and adjacent checkering of squares on a chessboard. Fold the 
edges of the chessboard together to form a sphere, the two dimensional surface of 
which is entirely populated by contiguous squares, cleaved by one continuous 
boundary-line interlaced in a web. Every square is immanent to its four 
neighbours; it touches them, is enclosed by them and exposed to them. As gestalt 
theory tells us, each square’s inside is in fact a function of its exposure to the other 
squares, and theirs to its, for they are each each-other’s backgrounds, mutually. 
Adjust this externally shared limit and the very internal constitutions of the 
neighbouring squares are reconfigured. They are intimately connected, immanent, 
and yet nevertheless transcendent, separate in their contact. 
 
No square escapes exposure, that is, there is no absolute transcendence, but 
neither is every square exposed to every other square, that is, there is no absolute 
immanence. This is what Nancy means when he demands immanence be 
wrenched away from its confusion with immediacy.99 The squares are all in-touch, 
but this touch is mediated, not by some substratum or milieu, but by each other. 
There is no unclaimed territory between the squares, no neutral space, because 
space (or time100) is not something that lies in wait for objects to enter it, it is 
opened by the limits that share it out. Neither does the chessboard have an 
                                                          
98 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’ (1996), trans. by Robert D. 
Richardson & Anne E. O'Byrne, in Being Singular Plural (California: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), pp. 1-100 (p. 5). 
99 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Heart of Things’ (1989), trans. by Brian Holmes & Rodney 
Trumble, in The Birth to Presence (California: Stanford University Press, 1993), 
pp. 167-88 (p. 182). 
100 See for example: Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 61. 
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outside edge, an absolute circumscription from being, the ideal, or oblivion, rather, 
the totality of squares is contained only by the internal border of each one upon 
the other: 
 
What is a singularity? It is that which occurs only once [c’est ce qui n’a 
lieu qu’une fois], at a single point (out of time and out of place, in short), 
that which is an exception. Not a particular, which comes to belong to a 
genre, but a unique property that escapes appropriation - an exclusive 
touch - and that, as such, is neither extracted or removed from, nor 
opposed to, a common ground.101 
 
The common for Nancy is nothing beneath, before, between or beyond the 
plurality of singulars in touch with one another, the ‘transimmanence, or more 
simply and strongly, [the] existence and exposition’102 of the world. Unlike 
Agamben’s examples of Derrida, Levinas, Deleuze and Foucault, all of whom 
Agamben cites as connecting the figures of immanence and transcendence to 
human life, for Nancy, “that which occurs only once”, the singular that is both 
enclosed and exposed by its transimmanence, by ‘the original singularity of 
being’,103 applies just as much to humans, dogs, and stones,104 as it does to ‘the 
first stone that's thrown, a sheet of paper, galaxies, the wind, my television screen, 
a quark, my big toe, a trapped nerve, prostheses, organs planted or grafted 
beneath my skin, placed or exposed inside, all things exposing themselves and 
exposing us, between them and between us, between them and us, together and 
singularly’.105 The whole world, human and inhuman, is made up of its own 
transcendence of its own immanence. When it comes to being, to the stubborn but 
                                                          
101 Nancy, ‘Banks, Edges, Limits’, p. 41. 
102 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 55. 
103 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 18. 
104 Nancy. ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 18. 
105 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Res ipsa et ultima’ (1999), trans. by Steven Miller, in A Finite 
Thinking, ed. by Sparks, pp. 311-28 (p. 316). 
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shared resistance of limits that distinguish and expose, ‘a mere rock "responds" 
just as much as a man named Peter: there is being-exposed in a crowded 
world’,106 the rock pushes back against Peter’s touch, asserting itself, articulating 
itself as one necessary part of the incalculably complex and vast network of 
mutual exposures that makes ‘the world as the network of all surfaces’.107 
 
Nancy’s example of a rock is meant to recall Heidegger’s famous assertion that 
‘the stone is worldless, the animal is poor in world, man is world-forming’.108 Earlier 
in The Sense of the World, before the discussion of Peter’s encounter with the 
rock, Nancy writes of Heidegger’s words: 
 
These statements do not do justice, at least, to this: that the world 
beyond humanity - animals, plants, and stones, oceans, atmospheres, 
sidereal spaces and bodies - is quite a bit more than the phenomenal 
correlative of a human taking-in-hand, taking-into-account, or taking-
care-of: it is the effective exteriority without which the very disposition of 
or to sense would not make… any sense. One could say that this world 
beyond humanity is the effective exteriority of humanity itself if the 
formula is understood in such a way as to avoid construing the relation 
between humanity and world as a relation between subject and object. 
For it is a question of understanding the world not as man's object or 
field of action, but as the spatial totality of the sense of existence, a 
totality that is itself existent, even if not in the mode of Dasein.109 
 
                                                          
106 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 71. 
107 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 61. 
108 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, 
Solitude (1929-30), trans. by William McNeill & Nicholas Walker (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 185. 
109 Nancy, The Sense of the World, pp. 55-6. 
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In ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, Nancy writes that Dasein is not differentiated from 
other beings as a ‘true existence’ opposed to ‘a sort of subexistence’,110 because 
Dasein only exists inasmuch as it has a body, meaning that it is a singularity, 
transimmanently distinct and exposed, in accordance with the same logic of being 
that governs every object. But it is, nevertheless, differentiated. While Nancy 
avoids making any definitive claims about a hierarchy of awareness that might 
classify Dasein, different species of animals, or indeed rocks, he does venture to 
echo Aristotle111 in stating that ‘”articulated comprehension”’ is exclusively a 
property of Dasein.112 But the comprehension articulated is a comprehension of 
the pre-articulated sense of the world, which is precisely the constantly circulating 
and fluctuating renegotiation and reconfiguration of the shared limits of 
transimmanence, to which, as a singularity, Dasein is also subject. Dasein 
experiences and comprehends singularities as singularities, and thus 
comprehends the pre-linguistic configuration of the world, but Dasein is one 
singularity of this world, and this world of singularities, while it is in no place 
interrupted by an absolute transcendence, nevertheless stretches far beyond 
Dasein’s immediate access, so that the meaning Dasein attempts to articulate 
always exceeds the articulation. It is in this sense that Nancy can claim, in ‘Of 
Being Singular Plural’, that ‘humanity speaks existence, but what speaks through 
its speech says the whole of being’.113 
 
Insofar as Dasein is, by Nancy’s account, a singularity, and as such implies, 
posits, or simply is its limit, the limit that encloses and exposes, Nancy is able to 
                                                          
110 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 18. 
111 In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle differentiates humans from other animals, 
not by denying animals αἰσθητική, sensibility, but the means to communicate it, 
λόγον ἔχοντος. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics,1098a. 
112 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 56. 
113 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 17. 
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say that while ‘Heidegger clearly states that being-with114 (Mitsein, 
Miteinandersein, and Mitdasein) is essential to the constitution of Dasein itself’,115 
‘[i]n his analytic of Mitsein, Heidegger does not do this measure justice’.116 
Because he holds to the disimplicated opposition of absolute immanence and 
absolute transcendence, for Nancy, Heidegger leaves himself only two options by 
which to conceive of the community of Dasein, either as the mere contingency of 
wholly distinct agents chancing upon each other within a pre-existing world, an 
‘”uncircumspective tarrying alongside”’,117 or, as Nancy puts it in 2003, the 
opposite, ‘a Being-with unlike the putting together of things, but an essential with 
[…] introduce[d by] the category of the people which will come to crystallize the 
possibility of Dasein to historicize itself’:118 
 
In other words, we have pure exteriority and pure interiority at both 
extremities. Between those two another regime appears, one that is 
hard to name. However, one must immediately note that the two 
extreme regimes are a priori at least potentially detracting from the 
principle of the essentiality of the with: the former insofar as it seems to 
fall back into the simple contiguity of things, the latter one insofar as it 
seems to suppose a single communal Dasein beyond the singulars. In 
fact, it is exactly this double potentiality that is mobilized in Being and 
Time, and this happens precisely because the intermediary regime 
remains underdeveloped in this work and will remain so in the rest of 
Heidegger’s work.119 
 
                                                          
114 See Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (1927), trans. by John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp. 149-68. 
115 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 26. 
116 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 82. 
117 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 82. 
118 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’ (2003), trans. by Marie-Eve 
Morin, in Continental Philosophy Review, 41 (2008), 1-15 (p. 3).  
119 Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’, p. 4. 
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The long-running interrogation of community, being-with and being-together which 
thematises an extensive portion of the Nancean text pursues the “hard to name” 
middle ground between the two regimes of absolute immanence and pure 
interiority, and absolute transcendence and pure exteriority. Understood as a 
singularity, subject to the complex network of transimmanence distinguishing and 
exposing all things, for Nancy Dasein quite simply is Mitsein. Returning to Nancy’s 
lecture on singularity, there he asserts that ‘[t]o be jemeinig is to be “mine” or 
“one’s,” not “each time” in the sense of all the times and of always, but on the 
contrary according to the discontinuity and the discretion of times [fois], of space-
times [espaces-temps] or of taking-places [des avoirs-lieux]’.120 Existing through 
and as its limit, both spatially and temporally, Dasein is exposed at this limit, and is 
as such nothing reducible from its exposition or openness to others. Absolute 
transcendence would withdraw the resistance against which Dasein encloses itself 
as singular; absolute immanence would empty-out every Dasein’s jemeinigkeit in 
sacrifice to total communion. ‘[B]eing-in-common’, is thus neither exclusively a 
relation of exteriority nor interiority, it is ‘what makes us and founds us’, such that 
the question of the ‘”social nature of man”’ is for Nancy neither a question of ethics 
nor politics, it is a question of ontology, for being-with is not added on to being, it is 
its fundamental condition, plural singularity’s adherence to the law of the limit that 
encloses and exposes: 
 
"Self" does not mean in itself, or by itself, or for itself, but rather "one of 
us": one that is each time at a remove from immanence or from the 
collective, but is also each time coessential to the coexistence of each 
one, of "each and every one."121 
 
                                                          
120 Nancy, ‘Banks, Edges, Limits’, p. 43. 
121 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 66. 
42 
 
The questions of community, being-in-common, and being-with, arrive early 
in the eighties in Nancy’s work and have been ever-present since, and are 
treated at length in the secondary literature.122 Here, however, the focus on 
Nancy’s mediated relation to Greek philosophy precludes any detailed review 
of the commentary’s rich moments. 
  
                                                          
122 Beyond the two texts just referenced, see also Nancy’s ‘Of-Being-in-Common’ 
and The Inoperative Community, which prefigure their direct interrogation of 
Heidegger. For a full-length exploration of these themes and their context in the 
secondary literature, see: Ignaas Devisch, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Question of 
Community (London: Bloomsbury, 2013). 
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1.4 Sense 
When next Nancy appeals to the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις, in the main 
essay of 1994’s Les muses [The Muses], ‘Pourquoi y a-t-il plusieurs arts et non 
pas un seul?’ [‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’], they are written 
as a pair, ‘mimēsis/methexis’,123 signifying that Nancy’s accounts of the 
equiprimordiality of singularity and its limit, presented in the texts leading up to 
1994, have rendered untenable any fully separating distinction between externality 
and intimacy. Particularly in 1988’s ‘Le rire, la presence’ [‘Laughter, Presence’124], 
1990’s A Finite Thinking, 1992’s Corpus,125 and 1993’s The Sense of the World, 
Nancy develops a description of sensibility to match the transimmanence of 
singularity, a description of the organs of sense, the bodily apparatuses by which 
we are exposed to the world, as obeying the law of the limit, which determines 
them to be irreducible from that which they expose. 
 
By rethinking sensibility as the transimmanent limit that encloses and exposes the 
human body, and thus also as an aspect of the excessive limit that is unendingly 
                                                          
123 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’ (1994), 
trans. by Peggy Kamuf, in The Muses (California: Stanford University Press, 
1996), pp. 1-39 (p. 24). 
124 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Laughter, Presence’ (1988), trans. by Emily McVarish, in The 
Birth to Presence, pp. 368-92. 
125 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (1992), trans. by Richard A. Rand, in Corpus (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2008), pp. 1-121. A much shorter version of 
‘Corpus’ was presented in 1990, before the International Association of Philosophy 
and Literature at The University of California, Irvine. When this version came to be 
published some years later, it appeared only in English translation, included in the 
first Anglophone collection of Nancy’s essays, The Birth to Presence. By this point, 
however, a lengthier version bearing the same title had already spent a year in 
circulation as a standalone issue in its native French. Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus 
(Paris: Diffusion Seuil, 1992). It was this version that went on to be updated in a 
second edition in 2006 with the inclusion of adjoining work and commentary, 
taking an opportunity to bring together Nancy’s writing on the body with a piece he 
had penned recounting the experience of his own embodiment during the near-
terminal illnesses which punctuated the separating years. The 2006 structure 
provides the template for the 2008 translation cited here. These translations are 
henceforth referred to in chronological order as versions (a) and (b). 
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redistributed in the circulation of pre-linguistic meaning that constitutes the world 
as the sum total of exposed surfaces, Nancy can load the French word sens, 
which is even more homographic than its English counterpart, with all of the 
connotations of its various everyday uses at once: sensuousness and sensation, 
meaning and common-sense, and, exclusively to the French word, direction and 
directedness, which is to say, the ‘being-to or being-toward [être à]’126 each other 
of singularities. In this way, both hermeneutics as the study of sens (meaning), 
and ontology as the study of sens (being-toward, the exposure that singularises), 
become fundamentally connected to aesthetics as the study of sens (sensibility or 
αἴσθησις127) in Nancy’s philosophy: 
 
The general rhythm128 of the sensuous or of sense is the movement of 
this mimēsis/methexis “among” forms or presences that do not pre-exist 
it, definitively, but that arise from it as such. It is, right at [à même]129 the 
forms or the presences, the mobility that raises them up as such – and 
that raises them much less in relation to a “ground” (perhaps there is no 
ground for all these figures, no other “ground” than their differences) 
than it raises some in relation to others, all of them being thus grounds 
or figures for one another.130 
                                                          
126 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 8. 
127 See for example: Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1047a. 
128 In a footnote Nancy points the reader towards Émile Benveniste’s structural 
analysis of the word “rhythm”, which raises its deployment in the Pre-Socratic 
atomism of Leucippus and Democritus, where it is a mode in which atoms differ 
from each other by way of the internal fluctuation of the world, against Aristotle’s 
teleological locomotion and Plato’s reduction of rhythm to measure. See: Émile 
Benveniste, Problems in General Linguistics (1966), trans. by Mary Elizabeth 
Meek (Florida: Miami University Press, 1971), p. 287; Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 
1073a, and: Plato. Laws in Two Volumes, 728e. 
129 Raffoul notes that Nancy’s ‘attempt to think a radical immanence to this 
movement of an existence (transcendence) passing to the limit is conveyed by 
Nancy's frequent use of the expression à même-which could be rendered as "at 
the very level of," "right at," "right on," "in the same element as," or "immanent to," 
that is, not taking place before, beneath, or beyond that to which it is related, but 
"at" it.’ François Raffoul, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Jean-Luc Nancy, The Gravity of 
Thought (Amherst: Humanity Books, 1997), pp. vii-xxxii (p. xvi). 
130 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, p. 24. 
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The play of μίμησις and μέθεξις, the interdependence of external exposure and 
internal intimacy fluctuating at the limit all singularities share, describes the 
sensuously structured human body as something that happens, a ‘return of the 
“outside” that is to this “inside” that it isn’t’,131 the ec-stasis of that which does not 
pre-exist its dichotomous exposition, and the “raising” of forms and presences that 
do not pre-exist the body’s contact. It is, Nancy writes in The Muses: 
 
neither a relation of external homology nor an internal osmosis, but 
what might be described, with the etymology of re-spondere, as a 
pledge, a promise given in response to a demand, to an appeal: the 
different touchings promise each other the communication of their 
interruptions; each brings about a touch on the difference of the other 
(of an other or several others, and virtually of all others, but of a totality 
without totalization).132 
 
Moreover, Nancy writes, in The Sense of the World, ‘[t]he five senses are not the 
fragments of a transcendent or immanent sense’, rather, ‘[t]hey are the 
fragmentation or the fractality of the sense that is sense only as fragment’.133 This 
μίμησις/μέθεξις across presences, at the sensuous limit, does not resolve the 
many sensory organs to form one discrete unity modulated at the limit of other 
singularities, rather the ‘general play’ is ‘mixed together across all the senses’,134 
and ‘synesthesia’ is precisely not a synthesis,135 for each sense is singular only 
insofar as it is one of many,136 and in their interlacing and inter-exposure, a 
                                                          
131 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 67. 
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133 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 129. 
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multiplicity of registers invoke one another in making a ‘dis-located generality’137 of 
αἴσθησις. 
 
The philosophy of art emerging from Nancy’s transformation and prioritisation of 
sensibility, is likewise governed by ‘the truth of the singular plural’,138 but not at all 
in the sense that the truth or essence of art is given as a homological principle 
tying the spectrum of disciplines to the distribution of human senses. Not only, 
Nancy points out, is there no such correlation between traditional genres and 
traditionally defined senses (where, for example, would the difference lie between 
painting and sculpture, if both kinds of artworks are made to be seen by the eye?), 
but  furthermore, there are long and not entirely determinable lists both of leftfield 
art practices (‘cooking, perfumery’…139)  and non-traditional forms of sensibility 
(‘“thermoreceptors,” “photoreceptors,” “chemoreceptors,” “electroreceptors,”’…140), 
not to mention the fact that for Nancy the senses come to be what they are only in 
their dynamic heterology, their μίμησις and μέθεξις. To the contrary, Nancy writes, 
‘the truth of the singular plural of art [is] in the fact that the arts are themselves 
innumerable, and of their forms, registers, calibers, touches, exchanges through 
mimēsis and methexis’.141 Which is to say, the arts are not plural instances of an 
artistic essence, conversely, the plural is the principle of art.142 
 
However the importance of art for Nancy goes far beyond its irreducibility from the 
multiplicity of its instances (which could be seen as nothing more than another 
application of the laws of singularity), by providing a privileged site for a 
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transgressive phenomenological enquiry. Nancy criticises phenomenology for 
stopping short of the excess it opens onto, that while it crucially ‘opened up to us a 
new access to the world’, by ‘delineating it as the absolute horizon of  sense that is 
no longer subordinated either to a beyond-the-world or to mere representation’, 
nevertheless in approaching the phenomenon always according to ‘a "subject" of 
the vision of phainein’ (Dasein’s un-concealing or the Ego’s apperception), the 
absolute horizon reinstalls the absolutely transcendent as a correlate of the 
immanent moment of phenomenological disclosure.143 ‘[A]ll types of 
phenomenology’, Nancy writes, ‘indeed all types of beyond-phenomenology, do 
not open sufficiently to the coming of sense, to sense as a coming that is neither 
immanent nor transcendent’.144 
 
There are times, however, Nancy observes, that ‘phenomenology itself reaches its 
limit and exceeds it’,145 as, for example, when Husserl asserts in the Cartesian 
Meditations that the ‘temporal co-existence’146 of monads engaged in their own 
independent temporalizing activities, is guaranteed by ‘the intrinsically first being, 
the being that precedes and bears every worldly Objectivity […] transcendental 
intersubjectivity’.147 However, for Nancy, the phenomenological transgression of 
the phenomenon is all too often annexed by a compensatory move, such as when 
Husserl determines this intersubjectivity as ‘transcendental solidarity rather than 
[as] empirico-transcendental simultaneity’.148 Nancy’s countermove is to pursue 
these moments, moments in which the sensibility gestures beyond its immediate 
                                                          
143 Nancy, The Sense of The World, p. 17. 
144 Nancy, The Sense of The World, p. 17. 
145 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, 200 n. 53. 
146 Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations (1931), trans. by Dorion Cairns (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982), p. 139. 
147 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 156. 
148 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 76. 
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exposure, not, of course, to the absolutely transcendent, but to the 
transimmanence that exceeds, but indirectly bears on, every contact. 
 
In the analysis of the audible149 provided by Nancy in 2002’s A l'écoute [Listening], 
he makes the claim that ‘the visual is tendentially mimetic, and the sonorous 
tendentially methexic (that is, having to do with participation, sharing, or 
contagion)’.150 Although quick to remind the reader that this metaphorical 
distinction cannot obscure the necessarily mutual μίμησις and μέθεξις of sensory 
registers with each other, it does nonetheless point to a certain access point for a 
transgressive phenomenology, because while on the optic register, the μίμησις 
and μέθεξις of sensory exposure happens both instantaneously, and without trace 
of hiatus or transmission (we perceive the light of the television as a phenomenon 
on the screen, not as a beam that connects us to it), the sonorous quite literally 
resonates and echoes, disclosing the distinction of singularities along with their 
communication: 
 
Sensing (aesthesis) is always a perception, that is, a feeling-oneself-
feel: or, if you prefer, sensing is a subject, or it does not sense. But it is 
perhaps in the sonorous register that this reflected structure is most 
obviously manifest, and in any case offers itself as open structure, 
spaced and spacing (resonance chamber, acoustic space, the 
distancing of a repeat), at the same time as an intersection, mixture, 
covering up in the referral of the perceptible with the perceived as well 
as with the other senses.151 
  
                                                          
149 Nancy discussion here also opens onto a discussion of Husserl, this time the 
lectures on time consciousness. 
150 Jean-Luc Nancy, Listening (2002), trans. by Charlotte Mandell (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 2007), p. 10. 
151 Nancy, Listening, p. 8. 
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A sonorous phenomenology therefore holds a latency for disclosing not only how 
the phenomenon presents itself for itself, but how the exposure of singularities that 
constitutes the arrival of a phenomenon is also constitutive of a “subject”, a 
sensing and referring between two singularities that are irreducible from their 
exposure. That is to say, rather than the phenomenological reflection finding that 
‘the subject is referred back to itself as object’, stable recipient of an optical image, 
it rather finds that it is ‘to itself that the subject refers’, which means, a referring to 
a referring, a reflection upon the constitutive reflecting of aesthesis.152 Such a 
phenomenology opens up to the transimmanent dynamics of sense that is always 
closed down in an opticentric analysis. 
 
Art, for Nancy, operates in a very similar way to the sonorous, for it does not 
simply show the experiencer a meaning, it ‘makes us feel […] a certain perception 
of self in the world’,153 that is, the artwork does not signify, but ostends towards the 
networking and circulation of meanings and possibilities, the fluctuation of the limit 
of singularity, a circulation in which the viewer is implicated, not as a spectator, but 
as a player. In 1994’s ‘Peinture dans la grotte’ [‘Painting in the Grotto’], Nancy 
describes the birth of humanity in the caves of Lascaux as consisting in just such 
an act, of making an image that refers to a referring, showing the world and the 
human in exposure to one another, which means a presentation of a separation, 
but a separation in touch, that allows things to be what they are. ‘For the first time’, 
Nancy writes, the human ‘touches the wall not as a support, nor as an obstacle or 
something to lean on, but as a place’.154 What art comes down to, then, is not a 
presentation of the trace of the auteur, nor of a specific meaning or formation of 
                                                          
152 Nancy, Listening, p. 10. 
153 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Art Today’ (2006), trans. by Charlotte Mandell, in Journal of 
Visual Culture, 9.91 (2010), 91-99. 
154 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Painting in the Grotto’ (1994), trans. by Peggy Kamuf, in The 
Muses, pp. 69-79, (p. 75). 
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the world, but simply ‘the fact that there is world’,155 which means, that singularities 
are exposed and continue to be so. 
 
Earlier in The Muses, in its principal essay, Nancy writes quite simply, art is 
‘presentation of presentation’.156 Art does not present a presence, it just keeps 
presenting, it never settles down into a fixed signification, for on every viewing, 
every time, it announces that it is not usual, that its meaning exceeds any one 
description, or one time, or one place. Indeed, the art of the sonorous provides a 
paradigmatic example of the phenomenological privilege of the artwork for 
Nancean ontology: 
 
The musical score (text?) including the words, whenever there are 
words, is inseparable from what we call, remarkably, its interpretation: 
the sense of this word oscillating then between a hermeneutics of sense 
and a technique of "rendering". The musical interpretation, or execution, 
the putting-into-action, or entelechy, cannot be simply "significant": what 
it concerns is not or not merely sense in this sense. And reciprocally, 
the execution cannot itself be signified without remainder: one cannot 
say what it made the "text" say. The execution can only be executed: it 
can be only as executed.157 
 
When Nancy calls on the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις in 1999’s ‘L’image - le 
distinct’ [‘The Image - the Distinct’], it is to describe a different kind of presentation 
of presentation, the image. The image, Nancy writes there, is ‘the separate, what 
is set aside, removed, cut off’.158 This is not to say that an artwork cannot be an 
image, it certainly can, but nonetheless, not all images are artworks. The image is 
                                                          
155 Nancy, ‘Painting in the Grotto’, p. 76. 
156 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, p. 34. 
157 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 86. 
158 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Image - the Distinct’ (1999), trans. by Jeff Fort, in The 
Ground of the Image (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), pp. 1-14 (p. 1). 
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the presentation of singularity, which is to say, the ‘distinction of the distinct’.159 
The image, Nancy writes, following his understanding of μίμησις, strikes us as a 
resemblance, but in a ‘dissimilarity that inhabits resemblance’, the image 
‘resembles itself and says (mutely) of itself: I am this thing’,160 but this thing is 
thereby invoked as absent by the mimetic announcement: 
 
What is distinct in being-there is being-image: it is not here but over 
there, in the distance, in a distance that is called ‘‘absence’’ (by which 
one often wants to characterize the image) only in a very hasty manner. 
The absence of the imaged subject is nothing other than an intense 
presence, receding into itself, gathering itself together in its intensity. 
Resemblance gathers together in force and gathers itself as a force of 
the same—the same differing in itself from itself: hence the enjoyment 
[jouissance] we take in it.161 
 
In raising the image from the ground, however, something else happens, for this 
‘cutout or clipping creates edges in which the image is framed’.162 As such, the 
ground, which in contrast to the image is defined by its inconspicuousness, for it 
has ‘no face or surface’,163 is drawn into the ambivalence of the mimetic by being 
gestured to as a background at the edges of the image. In this way, the image’s 
‘detach[ment] from a ground’ is simultaneously a ‘cut out within a ground’,164 as in 
Nancy’s example of a Roman augur reading prophecies from birds in the sky, 
which by making the birds sacred, which is to say, distinct, in turn renders the sky 
(as the relief from which the distinct is distinguished) itself also distinct and 
conspicuous. ‘Thus mimesis encompasses methexis’, Nancy writes, ‘a 
                                                          
159 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 3. 
160 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 9. 
161 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 9. 
162 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 9. 
163 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 7. 
164 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 7. 
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participation or a contagion through which the images seizes us’.165 Both the 
artwork and the image seize us by way of a transimmanent gesture beyond 
themselves, at their own very limits, invoking a field of singularities that presses 
upon them and against which they shine in relief. 
 
The most unambiguous statement regarding the mutuality of μίμησις and μέθεξις 
comes in 2007’s ‘L’image: Mimesis & Methexis’ [‘The Image: Mimesis and 
Methexis’]: 
 
Mimesis and methexis: not in the sense of a juxtaposition of concepts to 
confront and dialectisize, but in the sense of an implication of one in the 
other. That is, an implication – in the most proper sense of the word, an 
enveloping through an internal folding – of methexis into mimesis, and a 
necessary implication, fundamental and in a certain sense generative. 
That no mimesis occurs without methexis (under threat of being nothing 
but a copy, a reproduction): here is the principle. Reciprocally, no doubt, 
there is no methexis that does not imply mimesis, that is, precisely 
production (not reproduction) in the form of a force communicated in 
participation.166 
 
Here, finally, Nancy explicitly returns the question of μίμησις and μέθεξις to Plato, 
raising his texts against the Aristotelian reduction of μίμησις to a cognitive 
function.167 For to render μίμησις a mere imitation, ‘presupposes the abandonment 
of that which is inimitable’.168 In other words, to think μίμησις as imitation, for 
Nancy, would mean to disregard the excess of sense and singularity from which 
any image arises, the conditions that are not absolutely transcendent but neither 
absolutely immediate, conditions that play on the image just as much as one who 
                                                          
165 Nancy, ‘The Image – the Distinct’, p. 9. 
166 Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’, pp. 10-11. 
167 Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’, p. 14. 
168 Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’, p. 11. 
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witnesses it. Where Heidegger points out that the representational function of truth 
as adequation relies on the prior disclosure or presentation of that against which 
the representation is adequated,169 Nancy points further, beyond the moment of 
the phenomenon’s presentation, to the incomprehensibly complex web of 
interrelations and interactions that are implicated in any presencing. Recalling that 
‘Plato does not want to banish mimesis, but he does want it to be regulated 
according to the true’, Nancy states that Plato’s word for the dynamic mutuality of 
image and ground is ‘beauty’, a reference to the Phaedrus to which we will see 
Heidegger and Gadamer both turn, and defines sublimity as nothing other than the 
fact that the beautiful is more than beautiful, because the image it raises is always 
a gesture to an excessive ground given as its relief.170 For Nancy, μίμησις is 
μέθεξις in Plato, because μίμησις only refers to an original insofar it raises a 
ground against which it resembles itself, a ground which is precisely not for 
attaining, an excess of sense. 
 
In the remaining sections of this introduction I would like to note the key themes in 
Nancean scholarship, in order to demonstrate where our focuses on Greek 
philosophy, μίμησις and μέθεξις, and aesthetics, sit within the conversation and to 
what necessity this thesis responds.  
                                                          
169 See: Martin Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Doctrine of Truth’ (1931/2-1940), trans. by 
Thomas Sheehan, in Pathmarks, ed. by William McNeill (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), pp. 155-82. 
170 Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis and Methexis’, p. 11. 
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1.5 Themes in the critical reception of Nancy’s philosophy 
In O’Meara’s review of a recent edited collection of essays on Nancy’s political 
thought, in an even more recent edition of French Studies, she ponders ‘how many 
more anthologies of essays explaining Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought are needed 
before we reach a certain saturation point, or indeed get the point’.171 Yet the 
reinforcement and repetition of what appears to be only a preparatory or 
introductory stage in Nancy scholarship has been necessitated, I would argue, as 
a corrective measure, particularly in the context of Nancy’s political thought, to 
redress the biases of an even earlier phase in the uptake of Nancy’s work.  
 
Nancy’s first two books were published in the same year his doctorate was 
awarded, 1973, and on February 20th of that year the psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan advised his seminar audience: 
 
read a book regarding which the least one can say is that it concerns 
me. The book is entitled Le titre de la lettre,172 and was published by the 
Galilée publishing company, in the collection A la lettre. I won't tell you 
who the authors are - they seem to me to be no more than pawns in this 
case.173 
 
                                                          
171 Lucy O’Meara, ‘Review: Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality and World. Edited 
by Benjamin Hutchens. (Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy). London: 
Continuum, 2011. X + 230 pp.’, in French Studies, 67.2 (2013), 278-9 (p. 278). 
172 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, Le titre de la lettre; une lecture 
de Lacan (Paris: Galilée, 1973). Available in translation as: Philippe Lacoue-
Labarthe & Jean-Luc Nancy, The Title of the Letter: A Reading of Lacan (1973), 
trans. by Francois Raffoul & David Pettigrew, (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1992). 
173 Jacques Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge: The 
Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX, Encore (1973), trans. by Bruce Fink (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 65. 
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The pawns (or as James translates – ‘underlings’174) in question, are Nancy and 
collaborator and co-author Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe. The master beneath whom 
Lacan subjugates their text, other than the psychoanalyst of course, is Derrida. 
Now the fact that fifteen years later, in 1988, Badiou still says the two thinkers’ 
names in the same breath, and again domesticates their work beneath the weight 
of another celebrity  name, claiming they merely ‘delimit Heidegger’,175 speaks of a 
longstanding misalignment between Nancy’s work and an image portrayed of it. By 
this point Nancy had already been awarded the title of Docteur d'État,176 enjoyed a 
rich engagement with the notoriously un-provocable Maurice Blanchot,177 and 
published numerous works on Descartes,178 Hegel,179 and Kant,180 amongst 
others. Now it is indeed true that during Nancy’s early student years at the 
Sorbonne, where he went from undergraduate to aggregated professor between 
                                                          
174 Ian James, The Fragmentary Demand (California: Stanford University Press, 
2006), p. 49. 
175 Alain Badiou, Being and Event (1988), trans. by Oliver Feltham (London: 
Continuum, 2007), 482-3 n. 15. 
176 Nancy was awarded the distinction in 1987 in Toulouse by a jury including both 
Derrida and Lyotard. The major thesis, written under the supervision of Gérard 
Granel was published in 1988 with an extra chapter as L'expérience de la liberte 
and is available in a slightly reorganised translation as: Jean-Luc Nancy, The 
Experience of Freedom (1988), trans. by Bridget McDonald (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1993). 
177 Nancy’s 1983 work La communauté désoeuvrée met with Blanchot’s response 
La communauté inavouable the same year. Blanchot’s text is available as The 
Unavowable Community, trans. by Pierre Joris (New York: Barrytown Ltd., 2000). 
178 Jean-Luc Nancy, Ego Sum (Paris: Flammarion, 1979). 
179 Jean-Luc Nancy, La Remarque spéculative (Un bon mot de Hegel) (Paris: 
Galilée, 1973). Available in translation as Jean-Luc Nancy, The Speculative 
Remark: One of Hegel's Bons Mots, trans. by Celine Surprenant (California: 
Stanford University Press, 2001). This work assigns a not inconsiderable degree 
of centrality to Hegel’s concept of plasticity, a concept that has benefited from 
intricate and rich development by Catherine Malabou in recent times. See, for 
example, her 1996 The Future of Hegel: Plasticity, Temporality and Dialectic, 
trans. by Lisabeth During, (London: Routledge, 2004). 
180 Jean-Luc Nancy, Le discours de la syncope (Paris: Flammarion, 1976). 
Available in translation as: The Discourse of the Syncope: Logodaedalus, trans. by 
Saul Anton (California: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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1960 and 1964,181 Derrida was also present, teaching a general course in 
philosophy and logic,182 and assisting Paul Ricoeur with his phenomenology 
course.183 And it is also well known that when Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe 
created the Centre de recherches philosophiques sur le politique in 1980 it was at 
Derrida’s behest, and that its aim was to continue the research begun at the 
Cerisy colloquium that sought to take Derrida’s 1968 work ‘Les fins de l’homme’ 
[‘Ends of Man’]184 as a jump-off point for rethinking the political. 185 Yet Derrida 
never actually taught Nancy,186 and in the two decades in question it was in fact 
Ricoeur, himself in the midst of the hermeneutic upheaval of his 
phenomenology,187 who supervised both Nancy’s maîtrise188 while still at the 
Sorbonne, and his doctorate, awarded in 1973. 
 
When Derrida’s full-length book on Nancy’s philosophy was published at the turn 
of the millennium,189 the only extended studies of Nancy’s philosophy in circulation 
were collections and special issues of journals, and moreover, they were only 
                                                          
181 In the French academic system, one can become a professor before attaining a 
doctorate or serving as a maître de conférences by passing the agrégation, a 
competitive examination opening the door to distinguished positions for the upper 
percentiles. 
182 Alan D. Schrift, Twentieth-Century Philosophy: Key Themes and Thinkers 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), p. 120. 
183 Schrift, Twentieth-Century Philosophy, p. 173. 
184 Available as: Jacques Derrida, ‘Ends of Man’ (1968), trans by. Edouard Morot-
Sir, Wesley L. Piersol, Hubert L. Dreyfus & Barbara Reid, in Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research, 30.1 (1969), 31-57. 
185 Nancy’s and Lacoue-Labarthe’s core commitment during this project was to 
differentiate between la politique, politics, which is merely the management of 
capital and administration of policy, and le politique, the political, meaning the way 
the common is distributed in-common prior to any determination as a common 
property. Much of this work is collected in: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe & Jean-Luc 
Nancy, Retreating the Political (1981), trans. by Simon Sparks (London: 
Routledge, 1997). 
186 Marie-Eve Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), p. 19. 
187 Bernard Dauenhauer & David Pellauer, ‘Paul Ricoeur’, in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy <http://plato.stanford.edu> [accessed 14 May 2013]. 
188 The Maîtrise is French academia’s equivalent to an MA. 
189 Jacques Derrida, Le toucher, Jean-Luc Nancy (Paris: Galilée, 2000). 
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available in English and Italian.190 And although it could be argued that by his own 
standards Derrida’s treatment of Nancy’s work in that text is rather sympathetic, it 
was another five years before a general introduction appeared that sought to 
present Nancy’s thought on its own terms, Hutchens’ The Future of Philosophy.191 
Insofar as O’Meara is correct in pointing out that since then there have been two 
more introductory books on Nancy, James’ The Fragmentary Demand,192 and 
Morin’s Jean-Luc Nancy,193 with only Armstrong’s Reticulations194 marketing itself 
as something other than a guide for new readers, it is necessary to note that far 
beyond being mere classroom aids, each of these three introductions has, in its 
own way, succeeded in demonstrating the originality and internal coherence of 
Nancy’s philosophy. Without such guidance the primary texts can appear at best 
intimidating and at worst fragmented. 
 
Loosely speaking, each of these three introductions, Hutchens’, James’, and 
Morin’s, correspond to what I would argue are the three prevailing themes in 
Nancy scholarship: community and politics, literature and writing, and art and 
ontology. Hutchens’ book places emphasis on the question of community and 
traces Nancy’s criticisms of various isms toward their contribution to ‘a fascinating 
depiction of humanity as many finitudes that are, singularity by singularity, relation 
                                                          
190 See for example: Elisabetta Nudi. ‘Il percorso filosofico di J.L.Nancy tra 
l’interragoziane ethica e il gioco di linguaggio’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, 
University of Naples Federico II, 1992); Peggy Kamuf, ed. Paragraph, 16.2 (July 
1993); Juliet Flower MacCannell & Laura Zakarin, eds. Thinking Bodies 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1994); Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks & 
Colin Thomas, eds. The Sense of Philosophy: on Jean-Luc Nancy (London & New 
York: Routledge, 1996) and Jennifer Hansen, ed. Studies in Practical Philosophy, 
1.1 (1999). 
191 Benjamin C. Hutchens, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005). 
192 James, The Fragmentary Demand. 
193 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy. 
194 Philip Armstrong, Reticulations: Jean-Luc Nancy and the Networks of the 
Political (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). 
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by relation, vulnerably exposed to a future’.195 James maintains the conjecture 
throughout his text that the fragmentary written style of Nancy’s corpus constitutes 
a response to the fragmentary nature of what is given to be thought.196 Morin 
argues that Nancy’s ‘logic of exposition’,197 that is, the law of singularity and its 
limit, of enclosure and exposure, is the central ontological commitment according 
to which every other branch of Nancy’s thought is governed, that is, his 
metaphysics. Of course all three texts and all three themes overlap immensely, 
especially considering the role I have just suggested sensibility plays in Nancy’s 
work as the crux of a number of philosophical sub-disciplines. Moreover, one of 
the most successful aspects of Morin’s text is that it demonstrates the inseparable 
interconnection of the three themes, by showing that the stylistic rubric James 
uses to organise Nancy’s work, and the political one Hutchens uses, are both 
regional versions of the same basic ontological commitment, that is, revealing one 
as the exposition of sense and the other as the exposition of bodies. I would like to 
introduce these trends in the secondary literature one by one. 
 
1.5.1 Community, or the exposition of bodies 
Peter Hallward’s 2005 essay ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the Implosion of Thought’ is a 
near-definitive formulation of the question facing political interpreters of Nancy’s 
work: can it be applied? Hallward takes the following to be the central commitment 
of Nancean thought, before working through its implications for the ethico-political: 
 
Nothing can be presented of a presenting. All of Nancy's philosophy 
relies on this basic ontological rule: every presenting, or presencing, 
                                                          
195 Hutchens, Jean-Luc Nancy and the Future of Philosophy, p. 160. 
196 James, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 3. 
197 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 145. 
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whatever it presents, itself withdraws from every possible presentation. 
It withdraws, to begin with, from any presentation of itself. Presenting, 
or presencing, can only be said as a verb without a subject; presencing 
is what will come, and what has always been coming, both before and 
after the subject.198 
 
Although Hallward conflates a Nancean notion of transimmanent mediated 
withdrawal with a Heideggerian one structured by ontological difference,199 the 
point he draws stands nonetheless. What, he wonders, can be said of a people 
who are not a people, since the: 
 
Singular presentings have nothing in common and share no 
presentable project, place or identity; they compear or come into being 
together only in the withdrawing of any “common being, spaced apart 
by the infinity of this withdrawal — in this sense, without any relation, 
and therefore thrown into relation”200 
 
For Hallward, therefore, the “with” of being-with, which, as we just saw, is the key 
term in Nancy’s understanding of the human being, is the same element that 
restricts the possibility of constructing a political system or project on the basis of 
Nancy’s analyses, since the “with”, on Hallward’s account, is only a relation insofar 
as it is an interruption.201 Nancy is absolutely clear on this question, stating that it 
is precisely interruption that he seeks, for ‘[w]ithout anger, politics is 
                                                          
198 Peter Hallward, ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the Implosion of Thought’, in Oxford 
Literary Review, 27.1 (2005), 159-80 (p. 161). 
199 ‘In every possible situation of thought, it boils down to the simple distinction, 
which he adapts from Heidegger [….it]s derivation from Heidegger's conception of 
the ontological difference and its proximity to familiar Heideggerian notions of 
Ereignis and the giving or disclosing of be-ing (as primordial verb) in infinite 
excess of any given or disclosed being (as derivative noun) need not detain us 
here’. Hallward, ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the Implosion of Thought’, pp. 160-1. 
200 Hallward, ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the Implosion of Thought’, p. 175. 
201 Hallward, ‘Jean-Luc Nancy and the Implosion of Thought’, p. 176. 
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accommodation and trade in influence’,202 and that he ‘should be ashamed to 
speak of politics in terms of management’, that is, ‘management of justice, 
equality, the rule, etc.’,203 because what is at stake is neither a ‘philosophical 
politics’, nor a ‘political philosophy’, but rather an attempt to ‘think being-in-
common as distinct from community’, as ‘the constitutive separation of dis-
position’.204 Nancy’s thought, by his own account, does not lend itself to a political 
interpretation because it constitutes ‘a reconsideration of the very meaning of 
“politics”’.205 
 
The ethico-political commentary on Nancy’s work therefore fluctuates between, on 
the one hand, those invested in the possibility of its practicability for a constructive 
political enterprise and those who understand the work as a resistance to the very 
possibility of such a project, and on the other hand, those who praise Nancy for 
this resistance206 and those that chastise him for it.207 The question of politics is 
not a central concern of this thesis, and this silence speaks implicitly of a refusal to 
                                                          
202 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La Comparution /The Compearance: From the Existence of 
"Communism" to the Community of "Existence"’ (1991), trans. by Tracy B. Strong, 
in Political Theory, 20.3 (August 1992), 371-98 (p. 375). 
203 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Love and Community: A Roundtable Discussion with Jean-
Luc Nancy, Avital Ronell and Wolfgang Schirmacher’ (2001), 
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[accessed 31 May 2011]. 
204 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 24. 
205 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 25. 
206 See for example: Benjamin C. Hutchens, ‘Archi-Ethics, Justice, and the 
Suspension of History’ in Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking, eds. Gratton & 
Morin, pp. 129-42, and: Marie-Eve Morin, ‘Putting Community Under Erasure: 
Derrida and Nancy on the Plurality of Singularities’, in Culture Machine, 8 (2006) < 
http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/37> [accessed 12 
July 1012]. 
207 See Simon Critchley’s various criticisms: ‘With Being-With: Notes on Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Rewriting of Being and Time’, in Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on 
Derrida, Levinas & Contemporary French Thought (London: Verso, 1999), pp. 
239-53; The Ethics of Deconstruction (Wiltshire: Cromwell Press / Purdue 
University Press, 1999), pp. 207-19, and: ‘Re-tracing the political: politics and 
community in the work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy’, in The 
Political Subject of Violence, ed. by David Campbell & Michael Dillon (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993), pp. 73-93. 
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place Nancy’s ontology of the “with” at the ground of a systematic procedure that 
contradicts its very logic. 
1.5.2 Writing, or the exposition of sense 
Much has been written of the question of style in Nancy’s texts. The dominant 
readings in the secondary literature, which I wish to affirm and to which I wish to 
contribute, are, firstly, that Nancy’s writing is organised by a strong and original 
concept of the written fragment, and secondly, as Derrida puts it, by ‘Words 
Beginning with ‘ex-’.208 We will begin with the former. In one of Nancy’s early 
collaborations with Lacoue-Labarthe, 1978’s The Literary Absolute, the two 
authors lay out the blueprint for a different notion of the written fragment, in an 
examination of the Jena Romantics’ ideal of the fragment as a piece of writing that 
‘like a small work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and 
be complete in itself’,209 free of author, context or external support, an ideal work 
form reflecting the idea of absolute writing, absolute literature. Extending a 
trajectory embarked by Walter Benjamin,210 the two thinkers point out that to the 
contrary of the Romantic formulation, while the fragment does indeed distil 
something of the nature of literature, this something is not the unconditioned self-
presence of a self-enclosed truth, but the opposite, that like a tile in a mosaic (this 
is Benjamin’s analogy), the fragment is nothing if not its own transgression, its 
being outside of itself, its gesturing towards other fragments, from the 
incommensurability of which emerges a picture. Radicalising Benjamin, Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe go further and add that the picture that emerges never forms a 
                                                          
208 Jacques Derrida, On Touching: Jean-Luc Nancy (2000), trans. by Christine 
Irizarry (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 20. 
209 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenaeumsfragment 206’, in Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 
The Literary Absolute, p. 40. 
210 Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1925), trans. by John 
Osborne (London: Verso, 1998), pp. 28-9. 
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whole, produced or averaged across the totality of fragmentary differences, that 
there is no totalising picture or absolute literature, because ‘the Gattung 
[genre/form] of the work is incessantly un-worked within it.’211 
 
The kind of fragment Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy describe is neither anything in 
itself, nor does it accede to a whole of which it is the part; the mosaic is never 
produced as a work, but neither does the fragment mean anything in isolation from 
its exposure to other fragments. The Nancean fragment is a part that presents 
itself as a part, but crucially a part of that which excludes the concepts of totality, 
absoluteness, or wholeness. Both James and Morin, albeit in differing ways,212 
have placed this interpretation of the fragment at the centre of Nancy’s stylistic 
approach. And while at the macro level this fragmentary logic evidences in 
Nancy’s work as the disordering of chapters213 and the unstructured collection,214 
                                                          
211 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 123. 
212 James writes in his introduction to Nancy that the writing style Nancy employs 
is a fragmentary response to an experience of fragmentation. James, The 
Fragmentary Demand, pp. 1-10. James adds the suggestion in a paper of 2011 
that Nancy builds mosaics from other philosophies by rendering them figures 
rather than discourses, and thus transforms them into new figures. Ian James, 
‘The Style of Thought’ (paper given at Dundee University, 13 May 2011). Morin, on 
the other hand, thinks that what she names the ‘logic of the fragment’ allows 
Nancy’s writing to do something more systematic, albeit while reimagining what it 
means for anything to in fact be systematic. Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 145.  
213 In the preface to Being Singular Plural, Nancy writes: ‘The first and principal 
essay of this book, which gives it its title, was not composed in an altogether 
sequential manner, but rather in a discontinuous way, repeatedly taking up several 
themes. To a certain extent, then, the sections can be read in any order, since 
there are repetitions here and there. But this is the result of a fundamental 
difficulty. This text does not disguise its ambition of redoing the whole of "first 
philosophy" by giving the "singular plural" of Being as its foundation. This, 
however, is not my ambition, but rather the necessity of the thing itself and of our 
history.’ Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Preface’ (1996), trans. by Robert D. Richardson & Anne 
E. O'Byrne, in Being Singular Plural, pp, xv-vi (p. xv). 
214 In Nancy’s acknowledgements to the English translation of The Birth to 
Presence, he writes: ‘You sometimes have to take books out of libraries, and 
sentences out of books; that's a way of giving them another chance or letting them 
run another risk. Some texts in this collection have been deliberately conceived 
that way’. Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Acknowledgements’ (1993), in The Birth to Presence, 
pp. vii-iii (p. viii). 
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at a deeper more intricate level this special notion of the fragment determines a 
particularly powerful notion of the double genitive. 
 
In the first book of English language essays on Nancy’s thought, the editors point 
out that Nancy’s work should not be understood as a work, in the sense of an 
oeuvre or something composed; rather, ‘Nancy’s is a thinking that refuses to settle 
down’.215 Nancy’s thought, they tell us, is not a thought unto itself but always a 
thought ‘of’, and in particular a thought of the kind of transcendental signifiers that 
Nancy regards as exhausted, for example, sense, art or freedom. Nancy’s thought 
is therefore not a thought in itself, but nor is it a thought of something stable or 
concrete, but rather, the editors write, by paying attention to the double genitive 
that connects the thinking and the thought, made explicit in phrases like ‘the sense 
of the world’,216 ‘the deconstruction of Christianity’,217 or ‘the vestige of art’,218 the 
texts can be seen to enact the oscillation between the two, the of that constantly 
                                                          
215 Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks & Colin Thomas, ‘Introduction: The sense of 
philosophy’, in On Jean-Luc Nancy: The Sense of Philosophy, ed. by Sheppard et 
al, pp. 1-3 (p. 2). 
216 ‘The out-of-place term of sense can thus be determined neither as a property 
brought from elsewhere into relation with the world, nor as a supplementary (and 
problematic or hypothetical) predicate, nor as an evanescent character "floating 
somewhere," but as the constitutive "signifyingness" or "significance" of the world 
itself. That is, as the constitutive sense of the fact that there is world.’ Nancy, The 
Sense of the World, p. 55. 
217 ‘Christianity is in itself essentially the movement of its own distension, because 
it represents the constituting of a subject in the process of opening and distending 
itself. Obviously, then, we must say that deconstruction, which is only possible by 
means of that distension, is itself Christian. It is Christian because Christianity is, 
originally, deconstructive, because it relates immediately to its own origin as to a 
slack [jeu], an interval, some play, an opening in the origin.’ Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The 
Deconstruction of Christianity’ (1995), trans. by Michael B. Smith, in Dis-
Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2008), pp. 139-57 (p. 149). 
218 ‘The vestigial is not an essence – and no doubt this is what puts us on the track 
of the “essence of art.” That art is today its own vestige, this is what opens us to it. 
It is not a degraded presentation of  the Idea, nor the presentation of a degraded 
Idea; it presents what is not “Idea”: motion, coming, passage, the going-on of 
coming-to-presence.’ Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Vestige of Art’ (1992), trans. by Peggy 
Kamuf, in The Muses, pp. 81-102, p. 98. 
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mediates and modifies the unstable pairing. The Nancean text is therefore 
fragmentary in that it does not compose a whole, and is always a thought of 
something else, yet this something else offers no stability, for as an exhausted 
signifier (the type of word that Derrida would rather avoid using altogether219), the 
object of thought is likewise only maintained insofar as it is engaged by that 
thought. Both the thought and its object are fragments with no meaning outside of 
their contact, they are singularities. 
 
Now, as a thinking of all text as exposure, a gesturing that does not signify but 
touches that upon which it borders, that which encloses the text through its 
exposure to it, this kind of thinking is marked over and over again by the prefix 
“ex”. The most frequent word beginning with ‘ex-’, excrit, or excription, rendered 
exscription in translation, is explained by Nancy in an interview of 2000: 
 
The word (excrit) came to me in reaction to a whole infatuation with 
écriture, text, salvation through literature, etc. There is a phrase of 
Bataille’s: “Only language can indicate the sovereign moment when it is 
no longer valid (où il n’a plus cours)”… There is only language, sure, 
but what language refers to is the non-linguistic, things themselves, the 
moment when language is no longer valid. It reminds me of a 
conversation with (Paul) Ricoeur long ago at his house in Chatenay. He 
had just read my first book on Hegel and, opening the door to his 
garden, he said: that’s all fine, but where’s the garden in it? I never 
forgot: the excrit is the garden, the fact that écriture indicates its own 
                                                          
219 Derrida worries that in some instances Nancy’s employment of transcendental 
signifiers gets him in trouble, for instance, quoting Nancy’s statement ‘”Sense is 
touching”’, Derrida warns that Nancy risks reducing the absolutely other to a 
function of the touch of the same. ‘Come now, show some tact’, Derrida scorns, 
‘[l]et’s leave it be.’ Derrida, On Touching, p. 298. 
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outside, decants itself (se transvase), and reveals thing [montre les 
choses].220 
 
That there is only language for Nancy does not mean that there are only as many 
things as there are names, it means that only by language can we communicate 
the non-linguistic, which is to say, that language is the relation, it marks out the 
limit at which the linguistic and non-linguistic touch. ‘Writing touches’, Nancy 
writes, ‘along the absolute limit separating the sense of the one from the skin and 
nerves of the other’.221 As a separation from one and the other, the ex- of excrit is 
not only the ec- of a being-outside-itself, touching the outside of language, it is the 
ex- of a “from”, as Nancy puts it in a lecture of 1994, ‘projected out of the body - ex 
corpore, as in ex cathedra’.222 All writing excribes because it goes from a body to 
other bodies, things, singularities, tracing the shared outlines of finite objects in 
their contact. As such, neither the body that writes nor the body that is written are 
in discourse,223 but rather writing is the delineation of the limit of the two, it touches 
both, writes both – again then, a double genitive. Although there is only language, 
nevertheless, this language is not linguistic, it is the limit that mutually implicates 
the linguistic and the non-linguistic in the mode of a double genitive. 
 
What is special about the way Nancy uses double genitives is this combination of 
the ex-, the ec-, and the of. For while the double genitive of sets the subject and 
object into oscillation, releasing them from tautological relation into mutual 
implication, transformation, interaction and intercession, the ex- on the other hand 
                                                          
220 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Le partage, l’infini et le jardin’ (2000), partially trans. by 
Richard Terdiman, in Body and Story: The Ethics and Practice of Theoretical 
Conflict (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 168. 
221 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 11. 
222 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘On the Soul’ (1994), trans. by Richard A. Rand, in Corpus, 
pp. 122-35 (p. 124). 
223 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), pp. 17-19. 
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determines that the presentation of this relationship never contains either the 
subject or object, but always draws the point of contact between the two, a dark 
orbit only detectible as its gravitational interaction. Nancy’s double genitive, in this 
way, neatly side-steps the paradoxical constructivist224 formula of a subject that 
both writes and is written, but necessarily pre-exists itself as the surface upon 
which the writing is inscribed.225 For embodied Dasein, by Nancy’s account, is 
nothing apart from its exposure, its relation, and the writing that traces this relation, 
this exposure or contact, comes neither before nor after that which is traced, for 
excrit is contact and exposure - it is the garden, as Nancy’s puts it; if being is in 
relation then writing is one way this relation happens. Therefore, Nancy writes, 
‘[w]hat we call writing and ontology are concerned with just one thing’.226 
 
Implicitly invoking Nietzsche’s claim that grammar is inherently metaphysical,227 
Nancy defines the verb “being” in The Sense of the World as a relation of 
                                                          
224 Both James and Heikkilä have argued that constructivism is the principal target 
of much of Nancy’s work on the body. See James, The Fragmentary Demand, p. 
114 & 249 n.2, and Marta Heikkilä, At the Limits of Presentation (Helsinki: Helsinki 
University Press, 2007), 117 n.547. 
225 Foucault, for instance, writes in 'Nietzsche, la généalogie, l'histoire' [Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History], ‘[t]he body is the inscribed surface of events (traced by 
language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self (adopting the 
illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual disintegration. 
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the 
body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the 
process of history's destruction of the body.’ Michel Foucault, 'Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History' (1971), trans. by Paul Rabinow, in The Foucault Reader, ed. 
by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984), pp. 76-100 (p. 83). As Butler has 
pointed out, such a position leads to a negative ontology of the body, for ‘to speak 
in this way invariably suggests that there is a body that is in some sense there, 
pregiven, existentially available to become the site of its own ostensible 
construction’. Judith Butler, ‘Foucault and the Paradox of Bodily Inscriptions’, in 
The Journal of Philosophy, 86.11 (Nov 1989) 601-607 (p. 601). 
226 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), pp. 14-5. 
227 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil (1886), trans. by Judith Norman 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 20, 35 & 49. Nietzsche’s 
judgment concerns the way that speech not only fools us into believing that words 
correspond to objects in the world, but that the causal structure of grammar is 
suggestive of a corresponding causal relation between these objects. Nietzsche 
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‘agrammatical transitivity’,228 agrammatical in that it does not entail the action of a 
subject upon an object. For being, whether the being of Dasein, a rock, or a text, is 
always a matter of being-conditioned, being in relation, but in relation to each 
other, ‘neither extracted or removed from, nor opposed to, a common ground’,229 a 
melee that occurs without either mingling230 or milieu,231 or as Nancy phrases it in 
The Sense of the World, a ‘being-toward [l'être-à]’ that is not toward the world but 
is instead the being of ‘existents to each other’ that makes the world.232 
Agrammatical transitivity is thus the ideal of a writing that functions largely, 
according to Martinon, as a Stoic avoidance of copulas: 
 
that is, verbs that link the subject and the predicate, such as ‘is’ in ‘the 
tree is green’. They (Stoics) prefer to say that ‘the tree blossoms’ or ‘the 
tree greens’ as Deleuze remarks. When copulas are avoided, the 
sentence takes a performative resonance that aims to evade the 
subject–object dichotomy (and therefore the one on one or the one to 
one rapport) and the associated (Platonic) issue of concepts. Their aim, 
in accordance with the idea that incorporeals can only be conceived by 
transition, is to focus, through the use of verbs combining predicates 
and copulas, on the relation itself, the movement of that which is said or 
enunciated and heard or perceived (blossoming).233 
 
This absolute focus on the verbal action of a relating between subjects and objects 
that do not have an existence claim beyond their relating is not so much an 
attempt on Nancy’s part to make his writing mirror the laws of singularity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
compares a belief in grammar to a belief in the soul, because when the pronoun is 
placed in its nominative case, for example in Descartes’ “I-am,” what is implied is 
that there is a stable subject, I, that causes the predicate, in this case, its own 
existence. 
228 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 13. 
229 Nancy, ‘Banks, edges, limits’, p. 41. 
230 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 29. 
231 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 5. 
232 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 8. 
233 Jean-Paul Martinon, On Futurity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 85. 
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exposure that prevail in his basic ontological commitments, as an acceptance that 
writing is something that happens in the world, rather than in a restricted linguistic 
realm, something that goes from one body to another, and is as such subject to 
the basic ontological law of singularity-as-exposure. 
 
1.5.3 Exposition qua exposition: from art and ontology to methodology 
Ian James, alongside fellow Cambridge scholars Martin Crowley234 and 
Christopher Watkin,235 have played a crucial part in the project of locating Nancy’s 
work within the broader philosophical scene and resisting the domestication of his 
work to a mere application of a Derridean semiotics. James and Crowley in 
particular have shown that Nancy’s philosophy of art,236 contributions to gallery 
catalogues237 and discussions238 and collaborations with artists,239 have a 
systematic place within Nancy’s general schema of thought. Although isolated 
papers had appeared on the topic prior to this,240 James, in The Fragmentary 
Demand, for the first time attempts to position the work on art within the broader 
                                                          
234 See for example: Martin Crowley, ‘The human without’, in Oxford Literary 
Review, 27.1 (2005), 67-81. 
235 See for example: Christopher Watkin, Phenomenology or Deconstruction: The 
Question of Ontology in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Paul Ricoeur and Jean-Luc 
Nancy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
236 See for example: Nancy, The Muses. 
237 Many of which are collected in the final section of: Jean-Luc Nancy, Multiple 
Arts: The Muses II, ed. by Simon Sparks (California: Stanford University Press, 
2006), pp. 131-248. 
238 See for example: Jean-Luc Nancy, The Evidence of Film: Abbas Kiarostami, 
trans. by Christine Irizarry & Verena Andermatt Conley (Bruxelles: Yves Gevaert 
Editeur, 2001). 
239 As Beugnet points out, Nancy’s exchange with filmmaker Clare Denis is more 
about ‘adoption’ than ‘adaptation’; Nancy does not simply write about Denis’ films 
any more than Denis’ simply films Nancy’s writing, their responses to each other 
rather form a dialogical collaboration. Martine Beugnet, ‘The Practice of 
Strangeness: L’intrus – Clare Denis (2004) and Jean-Luc Nancy (2000)’, in Film 
Philosophy, 12.1 (April 2008) 31-48.  
240 See for example: Kalliopi Nikolopoulou, ‘L’Art et le gens’, in College Literature, 
30:2 (Spring 2003), 174-93. 
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context of Nancy’s thought, and the broader philosophical context generally. 
Implicitly highlighting the importance of art to the entirety of Nancy’s thought by 
placing the chapter “Art” at the final, almost concluding stage of The Fragmentary 
Demand, and noting that it is the one constant within all of Nancy’s various 
writings, James’ explicit commentary makes an important, if preliminary, step 
towards indicating art’s centrality to Nancy’s philosophy. Not only underlining the 
subtlety and idiosyncrasy of Nancy’s reading of Hegel’s Aesthetics, James also 
points out that the artwork and image have a special status for Nancy in that they 
both disrupt the stagnancy of fixed signification in their unceasing presenting, and 
at the same time imply the ontological framework from out of which they manifest. 
‘In this sense art, for Nancy’, James writes, ‘not only disrupts, interrupts, or 
suspends already existing discourses and representations, it exposes the real of 
the world which those representations leave behind, elide or omit’.241 
 
The following year Alison Ross’ The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy, and Marta 
Heikkilä’s doctoral study At the Limits of Presentation, furthered the understanding 
of Nancy’s aesthetic thought in their shared focus on the rubric of presentation, the 
very same aspect of Nancean thought which for Hallward renders it politically 
ineffectual. Against Hallward, Heikkilä affirms the fact that for Nancy ‘all 
presentation proves to be the presentation of a limit within presentation’,242 
because, in agreement with James’ interpretations, this renders art a kind of 
deconstructive partner to thought, a parallel and continuous interruption that 
philosophy cannot escape because it is tied by Darstellung to literature, a constant 
invocation of the limit and the excess it touches upon. Ross maintains the strength 
                                                          
241 James, The Fragmentary Demand, p, 230. 
242 Marta Heikkilä, At The Limits of Presentation: Coming-into-Presence and its 
Aesthetic Relevance in Jean-Luc Nancy’s Philosophy (Helsinki: Helsinki University 
Printing House, 2007),  p. 306. 
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of the connection between Nancy’s aesthetics and ontology, however placing 
more focus on the types of artwork one finds in a gallery, argues that Nancy’s work 
in general owes less to Being and Time, than it does to Heidegger’s aesthetics, 
quite literally translating Heidegger’s definition of art into a ‘general ontology’.243 
 
The very fact that Ross can speak of Nancy’s work in terms of a “general ontology” 
demonstrates the commitment in recent times to approaching Nancy’s work as a 
coherent, or even systematic, whole. Indeed, in Morin’s 2012 introduction to 
Nancy, she suggests that Nancy’s work is systematic, with the qualification that its 
‘logic of exposition’244 transforms the very notion of systematicity: a conclusion to 
which I subscribe. For to say that all singularities obey the logic of exposition, of 
the singular plural, of the limit of enclosure and exposure, is to suggest that 
singular syntactic elements – sentences, books, a whole corpus – need not be 
systematised in any specific order of exposition, for example, from first principles 
to conclusions, from antithesis to synthesis, or even from beginning to end, 
according to a logical, narrative, or temporal arrow, but rather that meaning arrives 
in every distribution or ordering of exposures conceivable. 
 
What this means, I would suggest, is that Nancy’s philosophical “methodology”, if 
one can call it that, operates in a way akin to what Heidegger calls 
Auseinandersetzung, ‘a debate or contention’, Nancy writes in 1982, in which 
parties are placed in conflict not to resolve their differences but ‘in order to 
implicate and to exclude each other reciprocally’.245 Auseinandersetzung literally 
means setzung: setting, aus: apart from, einander: one another. Gasché writes 
                                                          
243 Alison Ross, The Aesthetic Paths of Philosophy: Presentation in Kant, 
Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe, and Nancy (California: Stanford University Press, 
2007), p. 157. 
244 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 145. 
245 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 212. 
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that the word suddenly breaks into Heidegger’s work in the latter part of the 1930s 
as a term for a mode of relation between the thinker and what is to be thought that 
allows the matter to dictate the terms of the engagement according to its own 
structure as something to be thought.246 Auseinandersetzung maintains rather 
than resolves the difference inherent in a conflict. 
 
As Caputo notes, we Anglophones are fooled by the translation of Being and 
Time’s ‘Wiederholung as “retrieval”’, as if the project of repeating the history of 
ontology were engaged in ‘recovering something hidden, lost, or fallen’.247 For the 
object of retrieval for Heidegger is not the accurate portrayal of an originary 
philosophical foundation, and nor is Heidegger’s purpose ‘to bury the past in 
nullity’248 in the name of a radically new beginning that would transgress the 
traditional linguistic apparatus available to us. ‘The "other beginning" of thought is 
so named’, Heidegger contends in Beitrage Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) 
[Contributions to Philosophy: of the Event], ‘not because it is simply different in 
form from all other previous philosophies but because it must be the only other 
beginning arising in relation to the one and only first beginning’.249 That is to say, 
the other beginning is only “other” insofar as it can only be thought in relation to 
another beginning to which it is other, reciprocally. The object of retrieval is thus 
neither beginning nor end proper, but the relation between the two. The task of 
philosophy, of ‘inceptual thinking’, Heidegger continues on in the Contributions, is 
                                                          
246 Rodolphe Gasché, The Honour of Thinking: Critique, Theory, Philosophy 
(California: Stanford University Press, 2007), p. 104. 
247 John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 60. 
248 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 44. 
249 Martin Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy: Of the Event (1936-38), trans. 
by Richard Rojcewicz & Daniela Vallega-Neu (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
2012), p. 7. 
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of ‘setting the other beginning in motion as confrontation with the first beginning in 
its more original repetition’.250  
 
In ‘Sharing Voices’, in specific reference to Heidegger, Nancy accordingly 
compares two ways in which to conceive of the philosophical “return” to Greece, a 
differentiation that gets lost in the English translation of two different French words 
as “return”. The first way relies upon ‘the possibility of returning [la possibilité du 
retour251] from (or to) an origin’, and a ‘dialectical recovery (relève: negation and 
recuperation)’, in which ‘the immediacy of a participation in meaning is cancelled 
and conserved’.252 The second, is a ‘return [renvoi253]’ which, while also ‘charged 
with furnishing the primordial meaning’, nevertheless, ‘has in truth a function other 
than the simple appeal to the authority of an authentic origin’.254 The words 
retour,255 relève,256 and renvoi,257 have a long and complex terminological history 
documented in the Derridean text which would require a lengthy treatment beyond 
our current scope. Here I will defer to McKeane’s translation of Nancy’s use of 
renvoi in 2010’s Adoration: 
                                                          
250 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy, p. 47. 
251 Jean-Luc Nancy, Le Partage des voix (Paris: Galilée, 1982), p. 19. 
252 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, pp. 213-4. 
253 Nancy, Le Partage des voix, p. 53. 
254 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 230. 
255 Derrida uses the phrase question en retour, to translate Husserl’s Rückfrage, 
indicating that by doing so he is invoking a “postal” metaphor, an implication of 
both post- as the prefix that designates distance, and of the correspondence of 
letters by post, in a “zigzag” of responses. See: Jacques Derrida, Edmund 
Husserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction (1962), trans. by John P. Leavey Jr. 
(USA: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), pp. 50-1. 
256 ‘The word “relève”’ Derrida explains, is ‘a tentative translation of Aufhebung 
[and] cannot be translated into English. It means both to elevate, and to replace as 
in "to relieve one of one's functions’. See: Derrida, ‘Ends of Man’, 40 n. 8. 
257 ‘Everything begins by referring back [par le renvoi], that is to say, does not 
begin; and once this breaking open or this partition divides, from the very start, 
every renvoi, there is not a single renvoi but from then on, always, a multiplicity of 
renvois, so many different traces referring back to other traces and to traces of 
others’. See: Jacques Derrida, ‘Sending: On Representation’ (1980), trans. by 
Peter & Mary Ann Caws, in Social Research, 49.2 (Summer 1982), 294-326 (p. 
324). 
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sense understood as repetition, transferral, or deferral is present in the 
French as envoi and renvoi. The English translations available - 
‘‘echoing,’’ ‘‘referring,’’ ‘‘sending,’’ and ‘‘dispatching’’ - cannot 
reestablish the proximity, itself an echoing, of course, between the two 
terms. In order to reproduce some of the movement conveyed by renvoi 
in particular, ‘‘referring’’ has often been chosen in place of 
‘‘reference.’’258 
 
As such, in regards to this thesis’ twin suggestions that the specificity of Nancy’s 
ontological commitments can only be properly comprehended in light of the 
heritage recalled in his concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις, and that, concomitantly, 
Nancy’s place within the contemporary philosophical scene is only fully articulated 
in accordance with this recollection, it must be understood that for Nancy, the 
ancient and the contemporary are not determinate or isolatable, but rather, in 
accordance with the laws of singularity, are codetermined in their mutual exposure 
as it is enacted by a philosophical investigation, a referring of each to the other, 
rather than a unilateral reference, combining and deploying the Heideggerian and 
Derridean modes of engagement with an inheritance of philosophy to produce a 
definitively trans-temporal notion of contemporaneity. Indeed, as Nancy puts it in a 
short essay on Deleuze: 
 
A contemporary is not always someone who lives at the same time, nor 
someone who speaks of overtly 'current' questions. But it is someone in 
whom we recognize a voice or gesture which reaches us from a hitherto 
unknown but immediately familiar place, something which we discover 
we have been waiting for, or rather which has been waiting for us, 
something which was there, imminent. We know immediately that this is 
                                                          
258 John McKeane, ‘Translators Note’, in Adoration: The Deconstruction of 
Christianity II (USA: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. ix-x (p. x). 
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a possibility which constitutes the presence of the present, and must do 
so.259 
 
Morin suggests that Nancy’s masterword sens, which, as we have seen, evokes 
sense, sensory registers, meaning, and directedness, can be understood as the 
name for this contiguous, performative semantics, denoting a rejection of the 
verticality of signification, in favour of the horizontal relation ‘between things, ideas, 
bodies, and people in their encounters, their movements of attraction/repulsion’.260  
Paralleling Morin’s claim, I suggest that this reorientation of sense, from 
transcendent verticality, to lateral contiguity, also manifests in Nancy’s 
reorientation of the concept of μέθεξις. Nancy, I argue throughout this thesis, 
reorients the transcendent μέθεξις between the apparent and ideal, into a 
horizonal relationship between all singular things in their ontic or factical contact, 
as a μέθεξις that is always also a μίμησις.  As we will see, unlike Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, who also conceives of μέθεξις as horizonal, Nancy’s reorientation does 
not constitute a flattening-out of the heterogeneity μέθεξις traditionally implies, but 
rather recasts the infinite difference between the immanent and transcendent as 
the indefinitely plural reiteration of the finite difference, that is, transimmanence. 
 
In regards to the thesis’ task, of tracing Nancy’s ontological commitments via the 
long heritage of the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις, back to Ancient Greek 
philosophy, there is currently a definite want in the secondary literature. Both 
Michaud261 and de Beistegui262 have offered accounts of the way Nancy often 
                                                          
259 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Deleuzian Fold of Thought’, trans. Tom Gibson & 
Anthony Uhlmann, in Deleuze: A Critical Reader, ed. by Paul Patton (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1996), pp. 107-13 (p. 108). 
260 Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 5. 
261 Ginette Michaud, ‘Outlining Art: On Jean-Luc Nancy's Trop and Le plaisir au 
dessin’, in Journal of Visual Culture, 9.77 (2010) 78-90. 
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invokes μέθεξις alongside μίμησις, and their articles each claim that the concepts 
both mutually implicate and disrupt one another, showing that for Nancy imitation 
and participation each presuppose the other. However, each reading remains 
localised to the immediate concerns of the Nancean text interrogated, namely the 
figure/ground binary in the former and an encounter with Bataillean sacrifice in the 
latter. The question of the place of the concepts, their heritage and interpretation 
within Nancy’s conceptual framework remains underdeveloped. Although this 
thesis concurs with the articles’ findings, it makes the necessary move towards 
identifying the core function of the concepts in the Nancean philosophical 
framework, and locating this function in terms of the long dialogue surrounding 
them. I would like next to lay out the structure of this investigation. 
  
                                                                                                                                                                                
262 Miguel de Beistegui, ‘Sacrifice Revisited’, trans. by Simon Sparks, in On Jean-
Luc Nancy: The sense of philosophy, ed. by Sheppard et al, pp. 152-67. 
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1.6 Thesis structure 
The thesis advances in three moves, following three distinct but interwoven 
trajectories in the philosophical treatment of μίμησις and μέθεξις. Moreover, the 
thesis develops in quite a traditional way across these three chapters, from one 
form of a problematic, through an alternative interpretation or indeed contestation 
of it, to Nancy’s radicalisation and implementation of this alternative. 
 
Chapter two indicates the contemporary reception, in Heidegger and Deleuze, of a 
long philosophical lineage in which μίμησις and μέθεξις are tightly bound to 
questions of immanence and transcendence. In this way, the two central concepts 
of the thesis are demonstrated to bear strongly on both ancient and contemporary 
issues, namely, the de facto withdrawal of the transcendent at the birth of 
philosophy, and the exhaustion that reveals metaphysical signification as the very 
mirror of this withdrawal. In each of the treatments presented in this chapter, 
μέθεξις is conceived as the relational principle binding the realms of a 
hierarchically fractured ontology, correlating with a hermeneutics of deficiency and 
imperfection. Mίμησις, on the other hand, is raised by Heidegger and Deleuze in 
place of μέθεξις as a heterarchical relationship between things, or humans, on a 
singular immanent plane. 
 
I argue that by Nancy’s account, these interpretations reflect a failure to conceive 
of immanence as anything but a privation of the transcendent, a shortfall according 
to which all of these thoughts remain trapped within the binary they attempt to 
overcome. According to the thought of transimmanence, the law of singularity in 
which the one, the limit, and the other, are all said in the same breath, I argue that 
Nancy’s philosophy provides an alternative to this trajectory. Because for Nancy 
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the immanent is structured by its internal transcendence, it need not be conceived 
as a privation of transcendence, and μέθεξις can be affirmed as a principle of that 
internal transcendence and multiplicity. 
 
Chapter three engages with an alternative thought of μέθεξις outlined in the work 
of Hans-Georg Gadamer, a thought I suggest Nancy radicalises. Not only does 
Gadamer’s account of μέθεξις differ from those outlined in chapter two by affirming 
the concept’s invocation of plurality and hiatus, which is to say, its accommodation 
of the transcendent within the immanent, it also articulates a horizontal 
interpretation of the concept, a dimension of lateral interrelations added on to the 
traditionally vertical model, although, as we will see, on Nancy’s account Gadamer 
fails to afford horizontal μέθεξις the same radical heterogeneity he affirms of its 
vertical counterpart. For Nancy, Gadamer’s understanding of horizontal μέθεξις as 
a way to understand Mitsein tends too much towards immanence, reducing or 
dissolving singular Dasein into an indeterminate homogenous communion. 
Moreover, Gadamer’s critique of μίμησις likewise prioritises the immanent political 
and hermeneutic essence of a people. 
 
Following Nancy’s critique of Gadamer’s understanding of certain essential 
Heideggerian concepts, and the interpretation of the roles of μίμησις and μέθεξις in 
Plato’s Ion that follows in ‘Sharing Voices’, I show that Nancy offers a strong 
interpretation of Dasein in which the radical hiatus of vertical μέθεξις is reoriented 
onto a horizontal, or horizonal dimension, radicalising the alternative trajectory 
Gadamer has opened. In doing so, I show, Nancy demonstrates that when 
understood in accordance with the laws of singularity and limit, there can by 
Gadamer’s definitions be no μίμησις without μέθεξις, and vice versa, for the 
togetherness of μέθεξις can only happen at the external limit of parts, in μίμησις. 
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In chapter four, I pursue the philosophical pairing of concepts from the 
counterposition, noting the deployments of μίμησις within philosophical 
approaches to art and the aesthetic, in order to demonstrate that Nancy’s 
reception and tethering of the concepts is just as informative for his work on art as 
it is for his ontology, precisely because the two are bound together by the 
irreducibility of μίμησις and μέθεξις, and immanence and transcendence, from one 
another. Noting that in the works of both Heidegger and Gadamer μίμησις and the 
aesthetic in general is definitively uncoupled from the aisthetic, that is, sensibility, I 
present their thoughts on art in order to bring out their subjugation of artistic 
μίμησις to communal μέθεξις, making of art an operation by which a community is 
unified and presented back to itself. 
 
After following Nancy’s critique of the nostalgic appeal evident in examples of 
sacrificial and theatrical μίμησις, wherein the absence of model always found in the 
mimetic process is interpreted as indicative of a lost immediacy or communion 
vanished into the mists of time, a communion we can now only play at or 
represent, I then outline Nancy’s affirmation of Adorno’s aesthetics for his 
treatment of mimetic absence as absence, and, moreover, his treatment of art’s 
μέθεξις in the continued formation of world as indissociable from the multiplicity of 
its technical events. I then present Nancy’s determination of the artwork and the 
image as self-transgressing phenomena, that is, singularities which in their 
sensible apperception refuse to settle down into an immediate unity between 
observer and observed, instead presenting this very exposure, that is, presenting 
Dasein and world in the transimmanent exposure. In this way art’s μίμησις is for 
Nancy a presentation of the very negotiation between μίμησις and μέθεξις, the 
praxical relating between singularities, a presentation of nothing but presentation 
itself. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Immanence with or without transcendence: the contemporary reception of an 
ancient problematic 
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We have left the land and embarked. We have burned our bridges 
behind us – indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed the land 
behind us. Now, little ship, look out! Beside you is the ocean: to be sure, 
it does not always roar, and at times it lies spread out like silk and gold 
and reveries of graciousness. But hours will come when you will realize 
that it is infinite and that there is nothing more awesome than infinity. 
Oh, the poor bird that felt free now strikes the walls of this cage! Woe, 
when you feel homesick for the land as if it had offered more freedom – 
and there is no longer any “land.”263 
NIETZSCHE, The Gay Science  
 
What was called “the death of God” and later “the end of metaphysics,” 
or even “the end of philosophy,” consisted in bringing to light the 
following: there is no first or last condition; there isn’t any unconditioned 
that can be the principle of the origin. But this “there isn’t” is 
unconditioned, and there you have, if I dare say, our “human 
condition”.264 
NANCY, Philosophical Chronicles
                                                          
263 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science (1882-87), trans. by Walter Kaufman 
(New York & Toronto: Random House, 1974), pp. 180-1. 
264 Jean-Luc Nancy, Philosophical Chronicles (2004), trans. by Franson Manjali 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), p. 5. 
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2.1 Introduction: The end of transcendence and the birth of philosophy 
For Nancy, the “end” he describes in our epigraph holds a twofold significance, as 
both the first and the last determination of metaphysical philosophy. As the first 
determination, for Nancy the “end” names an event in Greece two and a half 
millennia past, when, Nancy writes, ‘[o]ne day, the gods retreated. On their own, 
they retreated from their divinity, that is to say, from their presence’.265 As de 
Beistegui describes it in 2010, the retreat is an empirical fact of the Greek empire 
around the sixth century B.C., that not only had the universe come to be seen as 
one whole, a kosmos governed by physical laws immanent to it, but so too the 
polis came to allow the people to ask questions of that kosmos independently of 
the monarch or the priest.266 This retreat of the transcendent from the immanent 
was as such simultaneous with the emergence of the discipline of philosophy 
 
Historically or empirically speaking then, de Beistegui goes on, ‘[t]he birth of 
philosophy thus coincided with the substitution of a plane of transcendence for a 
plane of immanence’, as the engenderment of a mode of thought from a novel set 
of social conditions that had opened up a view of the world as ‘a unified and 
homogeneous universe that co-existed on a single plane’.267 But this substitution 
and concomitant emergence, Nancy asserts, is far more than a de facto historical 
concurrence, rather it has the epochal status of an initiation or opening, ‘a 
subtraction, to borrow from Badiou; a withdrawal, to borrow from Heidegger; an 
inscription, in the case of Derrida’.268 For Nancy, these ends are beginnings and 
                                                          
265 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Between Story and Truth’ (2000), trans. by Franson Manjali, 
in The Little Magazine, 2.4 (Summer 2001) <http://www.littlemag.com/jul-
aug01/nancy.html> [accessed 5 September 2013]. 
266 Miguel de Beistegui, Immanence – Deleuze and Philosophy (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2010), p. 19. 
267 de Beistegui, Immanence, p. 19. 
268 Nancy, ‘Creation as Denaturation’, p. 85. 
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this opening is quite decisively ‘the event that constitutes metaphysics’, opening 
up the program of the ‘articulation of […] the very incommensurability of being in-
itself’,269 the project of conceiving of what “is”, without hierarchical, authoritarian, 
theological, or mythical appeal, which is to say: only on its own terms, in relation 
its-self. The “meta” here simply designates the parallel. 
 
The “end” that as such constitutes the start, engenders metaphysics as a path of 
enquiry charged with thinking the ‘being which ex-ists to itself’, 270 that is, Nancy 
explains, of modelling, conceptualising and interrogating the self-relation or ec-
stasis of an immanent horizon uncoupled from the objects of its absolute signifiers, 
‘Truth, Goodness, Value, Humanity...’271 etc. Indeed, in the early Socratic 
dialogues, these kinds of grand universal signifiers are the explicit objects of 
enquiry. For example, Socrates requests of Laches ‘try to state what I ask, 
namely, what courage is’,272 and petitions Euthyphro, ‘[w]hat do you say is the 
nature of piety and impiety’?273 In the Charmides, as has already been noted in 
flagging up Plato’s use of the word μετέχειν to denote an ethical disposition 
towards one of the transcendent objects in question, Plato has Socrates ask 
Charmides shortly after ‘what, in [his] opinion, temperance is’.274 As is well known, 
in each case the narrative first visits an example of a particular instance of the 
                                                          
269 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Creation as Denaturation: Metaphysical Technology’ (2000), 
trans. by François Raffoul & David Pettigrew, in The Creation of the World or 
Globalization (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), pp. 75-90 (p. 
85). 
270 Nancy, ‘Creation as Denaturation’, p. 85. 
271 Nancy goes on, ‘State or Value, Right, Force, Will, Work, Freedom, Art, Man ... 
; like the dead incarnate God in the mad Nietzsche, it bears "all the names in 
history" because it accomplishes all significations in the infinite subjectivity and 
inertia of signification.’ Nancy, ‘The Forgetting of Philosophy’, p. 44. 
272 Plato, Laches, 190e. 
273 Plato, ‘Euthyphro’, in Plato With an English Translation, trans. by Harold North 
Fowler, I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, pp. 1- 60 (including 
parallel Greek text), 5c-d. 
274 Plato, ‘Charmides’, 159a. 
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ideal object under scrutiny, before producing a seemingly irreducible set of 
dialogical oppositions, thus allowing Socrates each time to demonstrate the 
linguistic and conceptual functionality, but concrete absence of the transcendent. 
 
The project of metaphysics, for Nancy, never stops repeating this restricted 
gesture towards the subtracted. For as a project charged with describing being in-
itself, metaphysics continually exposes the tension between the immanence of 
metaphysics’ object and conditions, and the transcendent structure of its 
conceptual apparatus. It comprises an intellectual struggle to come to terms with 
an immanence it is unable to describe as anything but a subtraction of the 
transcendent. It is shot through with the figure of the end that conditions its birth. 
‘Philosophy’, de Beistegui adds, ‘always falls short of total immanence’, because ‘it 
is always somewhat tainted with transcendence’.275 And it is something, Nancy 
writes, ‘that is still taking place today […as] the event of metaphysics in its 
completion, that is, in its exhaustion’,276 which means ‘the total accomplishment of 
what one might call the signification of signification, or the presentation - that is, 
the representation - of meaning present-at-a-distance.’277 It is in this sense that the 
“end” for Nancy constitutes both the first and the last determination of philosophy: 
the first end, of a certain transcendence that marks metaphysics as a description 
of the self-relation of the immanent within an ill-suited apparatus, and the last end, 
philosophy’s casting-off of its naivety regarding its metaphysical tendencies. 
 
Philosophy, for Nancy, lingers on as a metaphysics engaged in self-reflection, a 
metaphysics musing upon the absence of orientation concealed in the ostensive 
structure of its significations and representations. The structural tension remains. 
                                                          
275 de Beistegui, Immanence, p. 20. 
276 Nancy, ‘The Forgetting of Philosophy’, p. 44. 
277 Nancy. ‘The Forgetting of Philosophy’, p. 43. 
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For metaphysics still appeals to the absent transcendent in its attempts to 
approach the immanent in itself. But now, doubled over in metacognition, 
metaphysical philosophy draws significations regarding its own signifying nature, it 
begins to present itself according to the absence it has discovered within itself, 
and, as we have been warned many times,278 it therefore risks presenting its own 
exhaustion as an overcoming, wherein the withdrawal of truth can be presented by 
formulations of truth-as-withdrawal, the negative concealed under the positive. It is 
not enough, Nancy demands, to make ‘the annihilation of significations the 
resource of a superior signification’.279 ‘And yet’, Nancy writes, ‘it is indeed with 
this loss that we have to do. It is this loss that is happening to us’.280 The question 
then, is of thinking this immanence that has happened and is happening to us, as 
something other than a remainder or correlate of a withdrawn transcendence.281 
 
Without suggesting that the problematic relationship between immanence and 
transcendence is reducible to a purely onto-theological question, Nancy’s 
reference to Nietzsche in the epigraph is telling. As Nietzsche was so careful to 
warn, abolishing the ideal world does not free the apparent world from its 
referential binding to its negated partner,282 and likewise, for Nancy, it is no good 
to conceive of the immanent by reference to a subtracted transcendence. To do so 
                                                          
278 See for example: Jacques Derrida, ‘Of an Apocalyptic Tone Recently Adopted 
in Philosophy’, in Oxford Literary Review, 9.1 (1984) 3-37; Dominique Janicaud, 
On the Human Condition (2002), trans. by Eileen Brennan (London: Routledge, 
2005); and: Friedrich Nietzsche, Nietzsche: Writings from the Late Notebooks, ed. 
by Rüdiger Bittner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 205. 
279 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 10. 
280 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 7. 
281 If we are to cease conceiving of the kosmos and polis by reference to the 
privation of the transcendent, there will be repercussions for the study of 
“cosmopolitanism”. As Nancy writes in ‘Corpus’, ‘we’ll never get past racism until 
we stop saying generic human brotherhood is its contrary’. Nancy. ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 
35. 
282 Friedrich Nietzsche, ‘Twilight of the Idols’ (1888), in Twilight of the Idols and 
The Anti-Christ, trans. by Reginald John Hollingdale (London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 
29-122 (pp. 50-1). 
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would be to confuse immanence with the sheer ‘absence of exteriority’283 of a 
horizon thought as the immediacy of what is present to itself by virtue of not 
transcending itself. Such an inert homogeneity recuperates the unconditioned 
nature of the negated transcendent partner. Rather, by reformulating the 
philosophical tropes of “the death of God” and “the end of philosophy” in our 
epigraph as the “end of the unconditioned”, Nancy underscores that what is at 
issue for him in this oft repeated rubric of limitation is not just an “end”, but the end 
of an end, a privation of a privation, in the sense that for Nancy, an “end” precisely 
does not end, it borders-upon and shares a limit. The end, in the Nancean text, 
ceases to end. 
 
Nancy’s challenge is to think the withdrawal of the transcendent without marking it 
as a cessation, which is the same as saying, of thinking an immanent world 
without a world’s end, or, of conceiving of the absence of the unconditioned, which 
is to say, conceiving the absence of the absolute, the ideal, substance, or ground, 
as nothing other than an indication of the absolutely conditioned nature of what is, 
of immanence in touch with itself, transcending itself in every finite moment and 
contact, to think the final remaining transcendental as the law of the limit that 
encloses and exposes irreducibly. Nancy’s “end” is an end of the disimplicated 
figures of absolute, or rather, unconditioned immanence and transcendence. For 
Nancy, to end is to end-on and thus is to be conditioned, which is to say, to exist 
transimmanently, enclosed into singularity by the border that is always shared. 
 
                                                          
283 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 68. 
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Returning to our epigraph once more, by separating out the grammatical privation 
“there isn’t” [il n'y a pas284] as the subject of a further proposition, a proposition 
concerning our human condition, Nancy recalls and negates the Levinasian il y a, 
what Nancy calls the ‘desperately poor there is’ of a ‘”brute givenness” of 
Being’,285 the ‘anonymous generality’,286 or as Levinas puts it, ‘the sheer fact of 
being’ which ‘cannot disappear’, even in the ‘[t]he disappearance of all things and 
of the I’.287 For Nancy the end of the unconditioned is not just the end of a simple 
choice between immanence and transcendence, but by bringing the outside 
inside, by marking the transcendent as a function of the immanent (and vice 
versa), there can no longer be a border that does not border-on, no isolated being 
that hovers in ontological difference, no beyond or between all things and the I, for, 
Nancy writes, ‘God filled the intervals; he was himself without interval’.288 In 
asserting that there isn’t, Nancy asserts that being is nothing outside of, in-
between or underneath the conditioning of all of the things by all of the I’s, that if 
they were to disappear, being would disappear with them. The there is is not the 
condition of the human, rather the there isn’t determines the human as the 
condition of being. The immanent therefore demands to be thought as the ‘interval, 
the space between us’ [my italics].289  
 
As Fischer puts it, Nancy’s ‘ontology is the ontology of being abandoned to the 
finite singularity of an existence, an existence itself open and breached in 
                                                          
284 Jean-Luc Nancy, Chroniques philosophiques (Paris: Editions Galilée, 2004), p. 
13. 
285 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p.2. 
286 Lisa Guenther, ‘Levinas on Individuation and Ethical Singularity’, in Epoché, 14. 
1 (Fall 2009) 167-87 (p. 171). 
287 Emmanuel Levinas, Existence and Existents (1946), trans. by Alphonso Lingis 
(Dordrecht, Boston & London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), p. 53. 
288 Jean-Luc Nancy & Ann Smock, ‘Speaking Without Being Able To’ (1989), trans. 
by Brian Holmes, in The Birth to Presence, pp. 310-8 (p. 318). 
289 Nancy, ‘Speaking Without Being Able To’, p. 318. 
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abandonment to the world and to the in-common – not an “individuality”, but 
punctuations, encounters, crossings.’290 “We”, not a communal “we” remaining in 
immediacy beyond the withdrawal of the transcendence that once circumscribed 
us, but a “we” of existences existing ‘between the disintegration of the “crowd” and 
the aggregation of the group’,291 Nancy writes in ‘Of Being-in-Common’. We each 
“are” and, in some way, we “are” together, but in a way that constitutes an 
immanent horizon that is nevertheless shot through with division - finite, ontic, 
transcendental292 limits that hold each self to itself while also in contact with 
others, without substratum.293 Nancy writes in Being Singular Plural: 
 
"The horizon of the infinite"294 is no longer the horizon of the whole, but 
the "whole" (all that is) as put on hold everywhere, pushed to the 
outside just as much as it is pushed back inside the "self." It is no longer 
a line that is drawn, or a line that will be drawn, which orients or gathers 
the meaning of a course of progress or navigation. It is the opening or 
distancing of horizon itself, and in the opening: us. We happen as the 
opening itself, the dangerous fault line of a rupture.295 
 
                                                          
290 Francis Fischer, ‘Jean-Luc Nancy: the place of a thinking’, trans. by Richard 
Stamp, in The Sense of Philosophy: Jean-Luc Nancy, ed. by Sheppard et al, pp. 
34-9 (p. 36). 
291 Nancy, ‘Of Being-in-Common’, p. 7. 
292 That is, pertaining to limits between the immanent and the transcendent. As 
Kant puts it: ‘We shall entitle the principles whose application is confined entirely 
within the limits of possible experience, immanent; and those, on the other hand, 
which profess to pass beyond these limits, transcendent. In the case of these 
latter, I am not referring to the transcendental’ which refers rather to ‘the bounds of 
the territory’. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (1781-7), trans. by Norman 
Kemp Smith (New York: Palgrave, 2003), pp. 298-99. 
293 It is from this position that Nancy pursues his famous work on community and it 
is for this reason that reading the work on community purely as a political 
contribution is misguided. 
294 This is a reference to: Nietzsche, The Gay Science, pp. 180-1. 
295 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Forward’ (1996), trans. by Robert D. Richardson & Anne E. 
O'Byrne, in Being Singular Plural (California: Stanford University Press, 2000), pp. 
xi-xiv (p. xii). 
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Fischer’s reference above to an “ontology of being abandoned” draws on Nancy’s 
1981 ‘L'être abandonné’ [Abandoned Being],296 where Nancy suggests how the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic precept that ‘"being" is said in various senses [τὸ ὂν λέγεται 
πολλαχῶς], but always with reference to one principle’,297 demands to be 
interpreted in the wake of the withdrawal, subtraction, or Seinsverlassenheit that 
places immanent being in abandon. Although, as Raffoul acutely observes, 
Heidegger’s concept of Seinsverlassenheit, is probably not on the periphery of 
Nancy’s essay, as the German text of Heidegger’s Contributions was not 
published until eight years after Nancy’s essay,298 nevertheless, as will be made 
clearer in the section immediately following, by approaching the question of the 
plural enunciations of “being,” Nancy is very much entering into a Heideggerian 
conversation, around an Ancient Greek problematic reactivated by Heidegger for 
the contemporary. 
 
The many modes in which existence is predicated within speech are not, for 
Nancy, merely analogous to one unitary principle of being in the way, for instance, 
Thomas Aquinas interprets the Aristotelian text.299 For ‘[i]f being has not ceased to 
speak itself in multiple ways – pollakōs legetai – abandonment adds nothing to the 
proliferation of this pollakōs’.300 That is to say, the withdrawal of transcendence 
and ontological difference, the withdrawal of the being that would be the principle 
of each saying, does not constitute the absolution of all saying as an immanent 
and immediate totality liberated from a hierarchical ontology, because ‘the speech 
                                                          
296 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’ (1981), trans. by Brian Holmes, in The 
Birth to Presence, pp. 36-47. 
297 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1003b. Translation modified. 
298 François Raffoul, ‘Abandonment and the Categorical Imperative of Being’, in 
Jean-Luc Nancy: Justice, Legality and World, ed. by Benjamin C. Hutchens 
(London: Continuum, 2012), pp. 65-81 (80 n. 33), and Heidegger, Contributions to 
Philosophy, p. 417. 
299 See section (2.7) of this chapter. 
300 Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, p. 36. 
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of being is not appended to being itself. Being is not, has never been – if it has 
ever been – anything but the pollakōs legemenon, the spoken-in-multiple-ways’,301 
the multiplicity of sayings articulating the heterogeneity of the immanent but non-
immediate relations of the speakers in their transimmanence and sharing: us. But 
what the “us” consists in, and therefore, what structures the immanent as its 
transimmanent ec-stasis and self-relation, revolves around yet another kind of 
end, ‘[t]he “end” in question corresponds to the closure of a world, of “our” world, 
of the sense of sense, and of the Greco-Judeo-Christian-Islamic world’.302 
 
Another end of an end, then, this time of the geographical/ideological boundaries 
of the world or the West. For Nancy, the whole problematic set up thus far must be 
understood as coloured through and through by the technological conclusion of 
metaphysics that has succeeded in globalising de Beistegui’s “plane of 
immanence”. That is, the question of immanence and transcendence, unlike its 
prototypical form, is no longer asked within the confines of the city-state. Nancy 
explains in 2001: 
 
it is no longer possible to identify either a city that would be "The City"- 
as Rome was for so long - or an orb that would provide the contour of a 
world extended around this city. Even worse, it is no longer possible to 
identify either the city or the orb of the world in general. The city 
spreads and extends all the way to the point where, while it tends to 
cover the entire orb of the planet, it loses its properties as a city, and, of 
course with them, those properties that would allow it to be 
distinguished from a "country." That which extends in this way is no 
longer properly "urban"- either from the perspective of urbanism or from 
                                                          
301 Nancy, ‘Abandoned Being’, p. 36. 
302 J-L. Nancy – ‘Interview with Jean-Luc Nancy’ in Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural 
Thinking eds. P. Gratton & M-E. Morin, New York: State University of New York 
Press, 2012, p. 237 
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that of urbanity but megapolitical, metropolitan, or co-urbational, or else 
caught in the loose net of what is called the "urban network."303 
 
In the wake of the technological interconnection of the entire globe, the 
‘"becoming-worldwide" that no longer leaves any "outside" and consequently no 
longer leaves any "inside”’,304 the question of the immanent, of what is given to be 
thought in the withdrawal of the transcendent, must be phrased as an investigation 
of what becomes of the same when it can have no recourse to the other, what an 
inside could be without an outside to delimit it, what a figure would be without a 
ground, which is to say, what the immanent is without recourse to a set of 
definitions based upon the privation of the transcendent.305 How can the one 
world, our world, this world, be thought without delimiting it from another, or 
thinking of it as the remainder of the withdrawal of another? 
 
Concomitant to the empirical or ontological question is the second issue, of how 
philosophy thinks. If, Nancy asks, ‘[p]hilosophy begins from itself’, able only to 
‘represent to itself what precedes its own beginning as an early stage […] or else 
as simple exteriority’,306 and if ‘there is no sense except in relation to some 
“outside” or “elsewhere” in the relation to which sense consists’,307 then how is it 
possible to reconcile the sense philosophy attempts to think, with the withdrawal of 
an outside or elsewhere that constitutes its de facto historical genesis, but is an 
outside against which and to which the philosophical apparatus orients itself in its 
significations? How does philosophy approach the sense of the immanent if the 
                                                          
303 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Urbi et Orbi’ (2001), trans. by Francois Raffoul & David 
Pettigrew, in The Creation of the World or Globalization, pp. 33-55 (p. 33).  
304 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 7. 
305 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 6. 
306 Nancy, ‘Creation as Denaturation’, p. 77. 
307 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 7. 
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very operation of philosophical sense proceeds according to a definitively 
transcendent linguistic structure? How are we to rein in sense from signification? 
 
It is the aim of this thesis to draw out Nancy’s answers to these questions, which 
are, in brief: that ‘"immanence," however, is not a vague coagulation; it is nothing 
more than its own horizon’,308 that is, immanence is its own transcendence, for the 
world ‘has its outside on the inside’,309 which is to say, the borders that distinguish 
every being from every other being determine the world’s immanence as 
conditioned only by the infinitely folded web of outsides or exposures that 
composes it, “transimmanently”. And secondly, that as such ‘sense opens itself 
within the world’,310 the relationship of transcendent signification is brought inside, 
maintained as a relation, as a being-toward, but a ‘”being-toward-the-world”’ of 
itself to itself, prior to any signification, a being-toward the world wherein the world 
is nothing but the sum total of being-toward-one-anothers in finite relation, 
rendering ‘sense a coming that is neither immanent nor transcendent’, 311 but 
transimmanent, oriented not to the infinitely other, but across the shared finite 
hiatus. 
 
As such, Nancy’s idiosyncratic inflection of the phenomenological term “toward” 
[‘zum’312 or ‘à’313] speaks of both a loyalty to and divergence from Heidegger. On 
the one hand, as already mentioned in section (1.3), for Nancy, ‘[t]o be jemeinig is 
to be “mine” or “one’s,” not “each time” in the sense of all the times and of always, 
but on the contrary according to the discontinuity and the discretion of times [fois], 
                                                          
308 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 76. 
309 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 54. 
310 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 55. 
311 Nancy, The Sense of the World, pp. 16-7. 
312
 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (1927) (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 
1967), p. 236. 
313 Nancy, Le Sens du monde, p. 55. 
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of space-times [espaces-temps] or of taking-places [des avoirs-lieux]’.314 Which is 
to say, where for Heidegger Dasein’s Being-towards-death is its ‘ownmost, non-
relational, and not to be outstripped […] potentiality-for-Being’,315 in the sense that 
Dasein’s impending but indeterminate temporal limit is both the absolute possibility 
of its unfinishedness and openness (or the impossibility of its completion) and that 
which it can never share with other Dasein, for Nancy, as he writes in ‘Corpus’: 
 
existence isn’t “for” death […] “death” is the body of existence, a very 
different thing. There’s no “death,” taken as an essence to which we’ve 
been consigned: there’s the body, the mortal spacing of the body, 
registering the fact that existence has no essence (not even “death”), 
but only ex-ists.316 
 
That is, Nancy is in agreement with Heidegger that ‘"death" [is] the being-toward- 
infinity of what does not have its end in itself - does not contain its end’,317 but for 
Nancy, once the notion of death is disconnected from ‘the fantasy of abolished 
space’,318 this being-toward refers to the spatio-temporal ec-stasis of the body, 
which is ‘toward itself insofar as it is being-toward-the-world, and toward the world 
insofar as the world is the configuration or constellation of being-toward in its plural 
singularity’.319 This alignment, in Nancy’s text, of the relational and non-relational 
senses of the toward, is treated at length in section (3.7) in light of Nancy’s 
descriptions of absolutely conditioned finitude, that is, shared finitude. 
 
                                                          
314 Nancy, ‘Banks, Edges, Limits’, p. 43. 
315 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 295. 
316 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 15. 
317 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 32. 
318 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 55. 
319 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 33. 
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Yet on the other hand, the world’s being-toward-itself represents, in Nancy’s 
words, ‘a geared down being-toward, where toward has less the connotation of a 
mere opposition to in than the connotation of sense disengaged and delivered 
from in’.’320 Recalling from section (1.4) that Nancy word sens, as well as invoking 
registers of meaningfulness and sensibility, also implies directedness, specifically 
in the sense of the ‘being-to or being-toward [être à]’321 each other of singularities, 
this geared-down toward opens up the possibility for Nancy to declare, ‘thus, world 
is not merely the correlative of sense, it is structured as sense, and reciprocally, 
sense is structured as world. Clearly, "the sense of the world" is a tautological 
expression.’322 Thinking this sens, the fluctuating lattice of this self-relation of all 
beings, which is prior to signification and unreliant upon anthropocentric 
orientation,323 is the challenge of Nancy’s philosophy: 
 
World means at least being-to or being-toward [être à]; it means 
rapport, relation, address, sending, donation, presentation to - if only of 
entities or existents to each other. We have known how to categorize 
being-in, being-for, or being-by, but it still remains for us to think being-
to, or the to of being, its ontologically worldly or worldwide trait.324 
 
  
                                                          
320 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 61. 
321 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 8. 
322 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 8. 
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 See section (1.3). 
324 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 8. 
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2.2 Chapter Structure 
The purpose of this chapter is to set up the contextual and conceptual framework 
in which to approach Nancy’s thoughts on the nature of immanence and 
transcendence, and μίμησις and μέθεξις, by introducing the contemporary domain 
into which Nancy steps and to which his work responds. It is a field, I will contend, 
defined not only by the relation it maintains with the history of philosophy, but also 
by its tendency to treat the immanent as the privative correlate of the 
transcendent. The principle figures to be investigated are Heidegger and Deleuze, 
both of whom, despite their differences, I suggest tender a strong reading of Plato 
and Platonic μέθεξις that sets up a treatment of the immanent as the remainder of 
a transcendent subtraction, and as such, binds the two terms in the secrecy of an 
exclusive affirmation. The presentation of these treatments thus lays out the scene 
against which an alternative trajectory of thought might be understood, one that I 
argue in the next chapter becomes evident in the work of Gadamer before being 
radicalised by Nancy, a group of thoughts about the immanent that do not negate 
but instead affirm the transcendence that structures it internally. 
 
Beyond our introduction, then, this chapter proceeds across three parts broadly 
defined. First of all, it will be necessary to outline the way in which contemporary 
respondents can to a certain extent take as given certain questions, contexts, and 
concepts that have been retrieved from Ancient Greek philosophy. To do this, I will 
refer to two books on Heidegger’s reading of the Greeks, by Walter Brogan and 
David Webb, suggesting that in light of the Heideggerian reactivation of Greek 
philosophy they present, it becomes clear that the Nancean interpretation of Greek 
philosophy with which this thesis is concerned is clearly a response to this already 
available relatedness of the contemporary philosophical scene to the ancient. 
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Specifically, I will suggest that Nancy follows Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle in 
understanding the singularity of being as verbal and comprising a negotiation of 
forces of production, but that, crucially, Nancy blurs the boundaries between the 
Aristotelian divisions of the natural and the technical in regards to this negotiation. 
Furthermore, I argue, by conceiving ontological difference as the horizontal 
sharing of beings, Nancy inverts the syntax of ontological difference entirely, 
determining being to be nothing other than the plurality of beings, that is, 
transforming it from a principle of the plural to the plural as principle. The assertion 
that “being” is said in many ways, for Nancy, refers to the heterogeneity that both 
individuates and transimmanently mediates all things. 
 
In the middle section I focus specifically on Heidegger’s interpretation and 
rejection of the concept of μέθεξις. Here I contend that Heidegger again aligns 
himself with Aristotle by echoing Aristotle’s criticisms of Platonic μέθεξις from the 
Metaphysics. Indeed, for Heidegger, I aim to show, μέθεξις is a theory of 
connection between two realms that ceases to have any meaning when those two 
realms turn out to be nothing but an exteriorisation of the psychological division 
between experience and reflection, that is, merely symptoms of a psychologistic 
ontology. I suggest here that Heidegger’s interpretation of the cave allegory from 
Plato’s Republic presents an outright rejection of the verticality of μέθεξις.  
 
However, unlike Nancy, who realigns μέθεξις onto a horizontal axis as the sharing 
of limits between beings, I will argue that Heidegger’s response is to remove 
μέθεξις altogether, replacing it with μίμησις. I suggest that the further interpretation 
of Plato’s Republic during Heidegger’s considerations of art and μίμησις in the 
Nietzsche lectures between 1936 and 1937, replaces the function of μέθεξις in 
determining what is genuine and true, with the ability of a craftsperson or artist to 
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observe the prevailing cultural modes that govern a people’s way of disclosing 
beings, and moreover the artisan’s mimetic ability to copy these ways of being, 
bringing them forth in media that are or are not their own respectively. On Nancy’s 
reading, I claim, this entails a conception of immanence as a privation of 
transcendence, for as was just the case with de Beistegui’s account of the socio-
political immanence at the birth of philosophy, a Nancean critique could here 
accuse Heidegger of replacing a vertical transcendent participation in meaning, 
with the contract of a people sharing a cultural space. 
 
Then, in the final section, I suggest that Deleuze follows a similar pattern, only to a 
much more radical extent. After noting Nancy’s lack of sympathy towards 
Deleuze’s mode of philosophising, in contrast to his respect for Heidegger’s, I 
argue that Deleuze’s project of “reversing Platonism” repeats Heidegger’s 
replacement of μέθεξις with μίμησις, albeit in an entirely different way. I aim to 
show in this section that Deleuze not only interprets Heidegger’s notion of 
ontological difference as the description of a homogenous plane of immanent 
being, but that he marks it as derivative to the work of Duns Scotus, who Deleuze 
attempts to install as the foremost thinker in the history of ontology. Deleuze’s turn 
from μέθεξις to μίμησις runs deeper than Heidegger’s, because for Deleuze 
μίμησις is not bound to phenomenology, quite the reverse in fact, because 
Deleuze’s exclusive privileging of images or simulacra on a single immanent 
plane, and the relations of μίμησις between them, releases them from a dative 
relationship to an observer.  All of which, I would like to show, sets a precedent 
against which the following chapter’s introduction of an alternative trajectory in the 
work of Gadamer and Nancy, who affirm the heterogeneity and transcendence of 
μέθεξις, can be located. 
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2.3 Heidegger on the Greeks 
In his 2005 book Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being, Walter 
Brogan succeeds in demonstrating the contemporary rejuvenation of Ancient 
Greek philosophy in a quite particular way. For Brogan does not centre his 
discussion on the recuperation or application of Greek thought as it is made 
manifest in the Heideggerian corpus. While the former consideration is indeed 
present, the real force and focus of Brogan’s text is not so much Heidegger’s 
reading of the Greeks, as it is Brogan’s reading of the Greeks via Heidegger. 
Brogan’s fidelity to Heidegger is therefore evidenced not in a commentary, but by 
charting a course back to the Greeks along paths Heidegger has opened, while all 
the way acknowledging Heidegger’s work as that which has made such an 
investigation possible. 
 
The book owes its achievement of an original interpretation of Aristotle (as well as 
Antiphon and Parmenides) explicitly to Heidegger, and implicitly to the subtlety 
with which the author balances his own analysis of the philosophy of Aristotle with 
a simultaneous demarcation of the field of possible accesses Heidegger has given 
to contemporary philosophy. It is within this already staged scene or freed 
opening, I would like to point out, that Nancy articulates his questioning around 
Greek philosophy. That is, Nancy interrogates Greek thought via its already-
reinvigorated place in modern philosophy for which Heidegger is largely 
responsible. Brogan’s text describes the shape of this landscape. 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, however, Brogan’s text has a second, or rather, 
more precise bearing. For in pursuing a reading of Aristotle opened up by 
Heidegger’s quite well documented assertions of the centrality of φρόνησις and 
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production to Aristotelian philosophy,325 Brogan shows that the Nancean 
commitments to which this thesis attempts to assign principality, namely 
singularity, limit, and transimmanence, all respond directly to a problematic 
reactivated by Heidegger from out of the very source of philosophy. In 
investigating the way in which Aristotle conceives of being as production, Brogan’s 
book presents a number of discoveries. The most fundamental kind of production, 
we find, is φύσις, nature, the name for beings that have their own why, their own 
teleology, their own limit,326 that are not occasioned by external factors, but come 
to be what they are from out of themselves only (the blossoming of a rose as 
opposed to, say, the tool that is produced by τέχνη, occasioned from without).327 
Beings produced in this way are fundamental in the sense that they do not 
compose a restricted economy or regional ontology, rather, the horizon of beings 
produced in φύσις is precisely the background against which all regional 
ontologies stand in relief, a horizon with which technical objects only relate in a 
secondary manner, a horizon in which the human is always already embedded 
and involved pre-reflectively and pre-technically.328 The way we still use the word 
synonymously with “essence”, in denoting the “nature of” something, still transmits 
some of this fundamentality.329 
 
Crucially, beings produced in φύσις, for Aristotle, Brogan explains, are not units 
but unities. That is to say, the fundamental way for a being to be is not as a 
                                                          
325 See for example: Franco Volpi, ‘Being and Time: A "Translation" of the 
Nicomachean Ethics?’, trans. by John Protevi, in Reading Heidegger from the 
Start, eds. Theodore Kisiel & John van Buren (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), pp. 195-212; Jacques Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of 
Fundamental Ontology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991); and 
Joanna Hodge , Heidegger and Ethics (London: Routledge, 1995). 
326 Walter A. Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 2005), p. 66. 
327 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, pp. 30-3. 
328 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, pp. 21-7. 
329 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, p. 25. 
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στοιχεῖον, an irreducible elemental or atomistic building block, but as a unified or 
‘folded’ manifold,330 ‘folding [Faltung]’331 being a term Heidegger uses in a summer 
1931 lecture course on Aristotle’s Metaphysics (which Brogan in fact translated332) 
to refer to Aristotle’s great transformation of Parmenides’ words, his 
pronouncement that ‘being as one is in itself many’.333  Indeed, Heidegger states, 
while Plato had taken the first steps down this path in determining that not only 
being, but also non-being, that is, the transitory and the false, also is, it was 
Aristotle, for Heidegger, who recognised that as such, being and non being, 
potential and actual, singular and multiple, all belong together, each folding into 
their opposites and, furthermore, into each other.334 In this much, for Heidegger, 
Aristotle transformed Philosophy from a system, that is, a structure extrapolated 
from a basic commitment to the oneness of being, into a task,335 the task of 
thinking the oneness of being as the necessity of its manifold.336 
 
That which is ‘in the truest sense substance [οὐσία]’,337 Aristotle writes in the 
Metaphysics, is the ‘primary substrate [ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον]’,338 and as 
candidates for the position, he first names ὕλη, matter, second μορφή, form, and 
                                                          
330 Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle, p. 109. 
331 Martin Heidegger, Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1-3: on the Essence and Actuality 
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337 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1029a. 
338 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1029a. 
101 
 
thirdly a hylomorphic combination of matter and form.339 Before entering a 
complicated and possibly self-contradictory340 set of definitions, Aristotle rules out 
the possibility that ὕλη is the truest substance, due to its not being τόδε τι, “this”, an 
individual.341 While matter is indeed found at the ground of every substance, once 
stripped of all its forms, what is left is an undifferentiated homogeneity. This would 
not be governed by φύσις, but στοιχεῖα. Which is to say: that in reference to which 
every enunciation of being is made is not the contingently indivisible and simple, 
but the held-together-in-unison, the work of being in the maintenance of balanced 
singularity, not a mere default position of collapsed brute “stuff”. 
 
On this, Heidegger is clear: the analogous character of a multiplicitous predication 
of oneness is not to be understood as offering a direction for a reductive or 
derivative enquiry in the way that, for example, some medieval thinkers342 interpret 
it as a way to connect philosophical accounts to theological principles.343 Rather, 
‘[t]he analogy of being – this designation is not a solution to the being question […] 
but the title for the most stringent aporia’.344  ‘For Antiphon’, Brogan writes, ‘it was 
the elements that are untouched by division; for Plato it is the eidos. For Aristotle it 
is the tode ti, the individual being, which is present as a whole and holds itself 
there as such’.345 The guiding question for Aristotle, then, according to Brogan, is 
‘[h]ow can there be a singularity of being when being is manifold’?346 
 
                                                          
339 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1029a. 
340 See the intricate analyses in: Michael Woods, ‘Problems in Metaphysics Ζ, 
Chapter 13’, in Aristotle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Julius Matthew 
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The upshot and guiding thread of Brogan’s text in its entirety, as its title would 
suggest, is that Heidegger has reopened Aristotle’s philosophy in such a way that 
for us it can be discerned that Aristotle conceives of being as twofold, a στέρεσις of 
generation and decay, presence and privation, being and non-being, ‘a continuity 
that has rupture belonging to its very core’.347 In the summer of 1924, in the lecture 
series on the Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy, Heidegger refers to the 
concept of στέρεσις in the Physics, as precisely the concept for the ‘new 
phenomenon of being’348 that would complete the Platonic introduction of non-
being into ontology. Heidegger strongly asserts here that what is not in question is 
a merely logical form of negation dissociated from a real distribution of the ontos: 
 
When we say that non-being is a way of being, it sounds formal-
dialectical. But one must see that it is interpreted on the basis of the 
sense of being: non-being in the sense of a definite there, the there of 
absence. On the basis of this being-that-is-not, the there is in the 
character of a determinate being-absent, from which “something can 
become”.349  
 
‘The being that is brought forth’, Brogan explains, ‘is singled out, selected, 
gathered into a unity. It stands there in relation to other beings in such a way that it 
holds its own relation to them.’350 As we have seen Nancy emphasise, the distinct 
can only be so by being distinguished from something else distinct, that is, being is 
relational both for Nancy and, on this interpretation, for Aristotle. And being as 
relation, or relating, is explained in the thought of Aristotle, Brogan explains, as 
primordial movement. 
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Beyond the emphasis on the concrete specificity, the τόδε τι, that renders 
metaphysics for Aristotle a science of being qua being, ὄντος ᾗ ὂν351 (and as such, 
Brogan emphasises, not really a meta-physics in the scholastic sense at all), the 
thinking of twofoldness pertains largely to a thinking of movement as 
fundamentally ontological rather than ontic, and, in reverse, a thinking of the 
ontological as kinetic, rather than stable. That is, when Aristotle asserts in the 
Metaphysics that the primary form of motion is circular locomotion,352 Brogan can 
add that this is only, for Aristotle, the primary form of motion in space, but that 
space itself already presupposes being, and that the place or τόπος of a being, the 
place opened by the boundary at which being maintains itself in στέρεσις as a 
tense, kinetic conflict with non-being, is governed by a wholly more fundamental, 
ontological movement that opens place along the limits of the thing:353  
 
the Greeks had no notion like our modern notion of “location of a mass 
in space.” Space rather is understood as the “place” of a being […] 
Place is not an indifferent container that defines the being. Rather, the 
being arrives in its place and thereby its place first comes to be […] The 
place is the limit of a separate, embodied being. This is why Aristotle 
speaks of relations such as contact, touch, and succession whenever 
he discusses place. Only an embodied physical being is capable of 
touching and reaching out toward its proper realm.354 
 
In the natural kind of being, φύσις, the ontological kinesis is the being’s own, and 
furthermore it is just as much its yet-to-be and its struggle as it is its presence, 
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unlike the technical object, occasioned as it is from without by a movement from 
elsewhere. Brogan quotes Heidegger’s Being and Time: 
 
When, for instance, a fruit is unripe, it “goes towards” its ripeness. In 
this process of ripening, that which the fruit is not yet, is by no means 
pieced on as something not yet present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to 
ripeness, and such a bringing of itself is a characteristic of its Being as 
a fruit. Nothing imaginable which one might contribute to it, would 
eliminate the unripeness of the fruit, if this entity did not come to 
ripeness of its own accord. When we speak of the “not-yet” of the 
unripeness, we do not have in view something else which stands 
outside [aussenstehendes], and which - with utter indifference to the 
fruit - might be present-at-hand in it and with it.355 
 
Being, for Aristotle, Brogan finds by way of Heidegger’s opened paths, is indeed 
presence or being-present, but in a specifically verbal form, as a presencing or 
enduring, a constant movement of coming-to-presence, an ontological kinesis, a 
flow of preservation or sustenance of objectuality. Ontological production, then, is 
always a confluence of forces, the being is the fluctuating moment of resistance 
formed by the playing-off of the one against the other.356 What this means is that 
being is not simple oneness for Aristotle, but rather that being is a balanced 
tension between parts, which do not form or total, but are preceded by, a unifying 
whole.357 
 
Although it is certainly not the intention here to mark a Nancean critique (this 
would misunderstand that Brogan presents a space of possibility Heidegger opens 
and hands over, not a determinate set of philosophical propositions), it is worth 
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commenting on certain homologies that are clear. Nancy, like Aristotle, conceives 
of singularity as unity rather than unit, and understands presencing as twofold, as 
the negotiation of a unifying or distinguishing limit between (at least) two opposing 
factors. Moreover, as Malpas puts it, for Aristotle ‘to unify is to limit’,358 just as is 
the case for Nancy, being conceived as unity is equally being conceived as the 
function of a limit, a topological limit that dissects and opens space, rather than 
entering an already available Cartesian plenum. 
 
Furthermore, the conceptual framework Aristotle uses to describe the ways in 
which these forces come about and interact in the production of beings, limits, and 
space, provides a powerful tool for discerning a novelty in the Nancean text. 
Specifically, in light of Aristotle’s differentiation between the internal ἐντελέχεια of 
φύσις, and the external αἰτία of τέχνη, Nancy’s understanding of the coming-to-
presence of objectuality and singularity, is revealed as referring both to φύσις and 
τέχνη. 
 
Being, the presencing of the τόδε τι or the singularity, is, for Nancy, shared; it is 
still a twofoldness, but for Nancy this twofoldness does not span an ontological 
difference between being and non-being, it is the twofoldness of beings bordering 
one another, co-articulating their shared limits without remainder, jostling for 
position, fluctuating and presencing as mutual resistance and endurance: a logical 
conclusion of Aristotle’s conception of τόπος. The production of beings is, for 
Nancy, occasioned from without and within, not as an antagonism between the 
natural and the technical, but as a negotiation of a shared limit that is 
simultaneously natural and technical, for the internal and external are only 
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disimplicated from the limit in the abstract. In the world, on the other hand, there is 
only limit and sharing. To speak with Aristotle of teleology reveals that for Nancy 
the boundary and the telos are again abstractions of the same figure, the 
necessary and the contingent are both at play in coming-to-presence as the 
sharing that disentwines into a tension between blossoming and causing. 
 
Not only are these rediscovered philosophical materials, spaces, and paths, made 
available to Nancy in the pre-staging of the contemporary, but so too are certain 
methodological or meta-philosophical attitudes. Phenomenology, Brogan 
emphasises, in the way Heidegger conceives it as less an invention than a 
rediscovery of an essentially Greek mode of philosophising, is to be understood as 
the ‘self-address of factical life’.359 It involves another kind of twofoldness, a 
‘doubling of the regard’,360 of the human being always already embedded pre-
reflectively in the world it reflects upon. The regard falls not only upon the 
revealed, but also on the revealing in which the human observer is involved prior 
to any reflection upon what is revealed. Phenomenology regards both what is 
revealed, and that it is revealed. We have already seen Nancy echo this 
understanding in his determination of metaphysics as the enquiry into (and from) 
‘being which ex-ists to itself’.361 What I would like to do in the remaining half of this 
section is to again introduce the way this philosophical disposition, already 
available to Nancy’s enquiries, connects Nancy’s work, via Heidegger, to Ancient 
Greek thought. 
 
David Webb’s Heidegger, Ethics, and the Practice of Ontology takes as its starting 
point the very same issue as Brogan’s book, the many ways in which “being” is 
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said, and the ‘various paths’ of response  ranging from advocations of principles of 
unity to disputations that the manifold of ‘experience may be accommodated within 
a single form’.362 In this much, the book pronounces its similar importance not only 
to the historical context but also the specific problematics with which this thesis is 
concerned. The distinction of Webb’s approach is to place methodological 
concerns at the forefront of his investigation, specifically, sounding out the 
possibility that ontology is a practice, that is, like a doctor’s practice, something 
that moves forward in such a way that theory and application are constantly 
modulated by one another, so that, therefore, the philosophical sub-disciplines of 
ontology and ethics are fundamentally mutually inclusive.363 
 
For the insight that philosophy is a self-address of factical life and a questioning of 
the being that ex-ists to itself, leads directly to a realisation that an understanding 
of disclosure in general can never be disconnected from the moment of disclosing, 
which is to say, that a general ontology can never be installed once and for all 
because it is always ‘founded’ in the ontic moments of the human’s everyday 
dealings.364 For instance, while categories such as singularity and opposition can 
be the elements of an all-encompassing ontological taxonomy, nevertheless these 
categories are not pure logical forms mapping onto a chaotic manifold of sensory 
data, but are rooted in the already formed arrangements of beings loaded with 
practical, human concerns. 
In his book, Webb again presents a Heideggerian reactivation, this time of 
Aristotle’s practical philosophy, though placing much more emphasis on the 
question of how Heidegger transforms and applies Aristotle’s texts. A key point 
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here, Webb states, is that while Heidegger applauds Aristotle’s acknowledgement 
of the ontological difference between beings and their being (a difference that is 
missing in Plato’s hierarchical ontology of perfection365), and eagerly takes up the 
conceptual tools Aristotle bequeaths, he refuses the methodological direction 
according to which Aristotle organises them. In Book VI of the Nicomachean 
Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes φρόνησις from ἐπιστήμη [science] since the former 
deals with variables and the latter laws, and from τέχνη [craftsmanship], since 
φρόνησις is neither applied nor has ends beyond its own practice.366  Heidegger, 
Webb explains, takes up Aristotle’s analyses of φρόνησις, the practical pre-
reflective  disposition that guides the disclosure of each part of the whole, the part 
which, Heidegger asserts in the 1924-25 lectures on Plato’s Sophist, ‘can also be 
otherwise, but […] has a relation to the deliberator himself’, and, furthermore, 
‘contributes to the deliberator himself’,367 rendering φρόνησις a prudence or 
practical wisdom that contains no content as such, but bears on the disclosure of 
what “is”, and in such a way, Hodge writes, that it allows Heidegger to unpick the 
‘presumption that identity is defined by metaphysics in advance of ethical 
questioning’.368 
 
Heidegger, Webb points out in agreement with Hodge, disagrees with Aristotle 
regarding the task of philosophy, because for Aristotle, σοφία, the generalised 
kosmotheoretical knowledge of the whole, what Heidegger, in 1922, refers to as 
‘authentic understanding […] concerned with the ultimate viewpoints […] in which 
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beings can in themselves be defined’,369 is always its final goal.370  Which is to 
say, while the philosophical approach is for Aristotle founded in the mortal realm of 
practical concerns and culturally-prejudiced disclosures which undercut the grand 
metaphysical determination of the being of beings, the philosophical maxim 
demands a unidirectional path from the mortal to the divine. While for Heidegger 
Aristotle does understand ontological difference, he fails to think according to it, for 
when it comes to the philosophical objective Aristotle privileges the 
kosmotheoretical whole over the phenomenologically engaged part, rather than 
thinking the two in their cyclical modification of one another, their difference as 
difference,371 rather than a difference requiring philosophical resolution. 
 
The point Webb makes is that Heidegger offers not only a strong ontological 
interpretation of the Aristotelian dictum, that “being” is said in many ways or 
senses but always with reference to one principle, but also a strong 
methodological definition that follows from it. In agreement with Brogan, whose 
book he in fact cites, Webb underscores that the principle of unity in question is 
indeed a unity of opposing forces, not an elemental or analogical simplicity.372 But 
further, Webb emphasises that the rootedness of metaphysics in physics, the 
ontological movement of the being of beings, also dictates a route of enquiry for 
philosophy. Which is to say, Webb highlights that upon the ontological στέρεσις 
Heidegger discovers in Aristotle, Heidegger adds a methodological στέρεσις as its 
necessary correlate. 
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It would be impossible for the human, always already pre-reflectively involved in 
the disclosure of beings in accordance with everyday concerns, to engage a 
philosophical movement unidirectionally from the perception and apperception of 
beings out towards a general ontological overview, as if to leave those everyday 
regional disclosures behind. Rather, methodological στέρεσις, or the hermeneutic 
circle, emphasises a constant philosophical conversation between part and whole, 
between the concrete givenness of the lived situation that is not a manifold of data 
but a horizon of always already meaningful beings and relations, and the 
kosmotheoretical overview in which general laws and principles are 
extrapolated.373 The former cannot be left behind by any partial access to latter 
because the former is entirely bound up with cultural and epochal 
transformations.374 The understanding of the production of beings as φύσις, 
ontological movement and negotiation of opposing forces rather than stable 
presence, must not simply blot out and replace the many senses of being, 
because those senses are cultural variables. If “being” is said in many ways but 
always with reference to one principle, then this principle is just as contingent upon 
the sayings as they are upon the principle. The task of philosophy for Heidegger, 
Webb asserts, is to think being within this reflective dynamic, not to just 
hypothesise the ontological difference, but to philosophise with it, to think it as 
difference. 
 
In light of Webb’s analysis, I would suggest that Nancy’s interrogation of the many 
ways being is said, already mentioned in section (2.1), turns out to be an 
extension or radicalisation of the path Heidegger has already trodden from 
Aristotle’s texts into the contemporary. For as already noted, Nancy writes in 1981 
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that ‘the speech of being is not appended to being itself. Being is not, has never 
been – if it has ever been – anything but the pollakōs legemenon, the spoken-in-
multiple-ways’.375 Which is to say, a three stage transformation is discernible 
across the three philosophers in question. First, the principle of being, while tied to 
the everyday disclosure of beings, is the exclusive target for philosophy (Aristotle). 
Second, the principle of being is to be thought in constant mediation with the 
disclosure of beings, in a two-way dynamic (Heidegger). Third, with Nancy, a 
principle of the plural is no longer relevant at all; the plural is the principle, for both 
the dynamic of ontological forces, and the dynamic of human methodological 
access, takes place between beings, as the inside, outside, exposure and sharing. 
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2.4 Heidegger’s rejection of μέθεξις 
What neither Brogan nor Webb mention explicitly, and what I would like to 
introduce here, is Heidegger’s quite adamant rejection of the concept of μέθεξις, 
and his affirmation of μίμησις in its place. In doing this, the aim is to indicate 
another element of the mediated conversation between Nancy, Heidegger, and the 
Greeks. In Being and Time Heidegger directly asserts that ‘the ontological 
meaning of the relation between Real and ideal (μέθεξις)’, relies on ‘the 
ontologically unclarified separation of the Real and ideal’ [my italics].376 In this 
regard, Heidegger once again demonstrates his alliance with Aristotle, who, 
Vlastos writes, ‘makes the "separation" (χωρισμός) of the Forms the most 
objectionable aspect of the Platonic theory’.377 
 
Indeed, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents Plato’s philosophy as a generalised 
version of Socrates’ commitment to the universality of ‘ἠθικὰ’, ethics.378 Socrates, 
Aristotle writes, brackets all but the universal from his studies, discounting physical 
explanation and seeking the ‘ὁρισμῶν’, the definition, the unchanging moral law 
that applies unvaryingly to the indefinite variation of human affairs.379 Since for 
Plato there can be ‘no general definition [κοινὸν ὅρον] of sensible things which are 
always changing’,380 according to Aristotle, Plato applies the Socratic approach to 
his general ontology, discounting the ephemerality of the sensible, and seeking 
instead the universal forms ‘that all sensible things are named after’,381  and in 
which they participate. In this way, Plato is for Aristotle the ‘first philosopher to 
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posit a duality’,382 and therefore requires the remedial concept of μέθεξις to bridge 
the hiatus of being. If it is indeed the case, Aristotle writes, that Plato determines 
that ‘things which bear the same name as the Forms exist by μέθεξιν in them’, 383 
then this represents the patching over of an untenable dualism, for it is ‘impossible 
that the substance and the thing of which it is the substance exist in separation 
[χωρὶς]’.384 In the Contributions, Heidegger writes further of the χωρισμός between 
the real and the ideal: 
 
The "between" of Da-sein overcomes the χωρισμός ("separation”) not 
by slinging a bridge between beyng (beingness) and beings as if they 
were two objectively present riverbanks but by transforming together, 
into their simultaneity, both beyng and beings.385 
 
What Heidegger’s Aristotelian rejection of μέθεξις amounts to, I will show in this 
section, is a charge of psychologism. The notion of a participation or μέθεξις 
between the ideal and the real, for Heidegger, becomes extraneous as soon as 
one discounts the separation or χωρισμός between ideal and real to which it is 
derivative. But, I will argue, for Nancy χωρισμός and μέθεξις are not to be 
understood on the basis of a division between real and ideal, nor between being 
and beings, but simply between beings. Or, more precisely, separation and 
participation are not for Nancy only between beings, as if only contingent to those 
beings. Rather, for Nancy, separation and participation are the between itself, the 
functioning of the shared limit that distinguishes only by intimately connecting. 
What this means is that for Nancy μέθεξις is not vertical or transcendent, but rather 
lateral, contiguous, horizontal, and, in fact, horizonal. It is in this regard that the 
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emergent ontological interpretation of Nancy in the secondary literature owes so 
much to Morin, who, as I stated in the first chapter, points out that Nancy’s sens is 
a fundamentally horizontal concept.386 I am, in this chapter, laying the groundwork 
to understand in what way this constitutes a response to the reactivated Greek 
problematics of contemporary philosophy. In the next chapter we follow the 
alternative trajectory in the thought of μέθεξις as a horizontal relation. 
 
Van Buren notes that Heidegger was consistently troubled throughout his 
developmental years by the binding of the logical and the psychological,387 having 
been ‘awakened’ to philosophy, as Gasché puts it, by Franz Brentano’s ‘analysis 
of the multiple ways in which being is expressed’.388 Heidegger was awarded a 
post-doctoral scholarship in 1913 on the proviso the he ‘would remain true to the 
spirit of Thomistic philosophy’, and it was then extended in 1915, with Heidegger 
promising that ‘his academic life’s work [would be] oriented to making the wealth of 
ideas inherited from Scholasticism applicable to the future intellectual struggle for 
the Christian ideal of life in Catholicism.’389 This study culminated in Heidegger’s 
Habilitationsschrift, ‘Die Kategorienund Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus’ [The 
Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus].390 
 
In Scholastic metaphysics Heidegger was searching for a pre-epistemological 
theory of meaning, that is, a ‘disposition for attentively listening in on the 
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immediate life of subjectivity and its immanent contexts of sense without having 
acquired a precise concept of the subject’.391 Heidegger writes in 1912 that ‘[t]here 
is good reason to see the true spiritus rector of contemporary philosophy in 
Hume’,392 since in Heidegger’s view, it is in the first place the empiricist restriction 
of a transcendent connection between the ego and the real that, via its perfection 
in Kant’s transcendental philosophy, had brought about the current state of 
philosophy’s entrapment between ‘conscientialism (immanentism) and 
phenomenalism’.393 By immanentism, Heidegger means solipsism, the 
interpretation of Kant’s critical philosophy as a pure apriorism; by phenomenalism, 
the interpretation of the real world as something never fully knowable in itself, on 
the thither side of sensibility. As Heidegger writes in the Scotus dissertation, 
‘[i]mmanence and transcendence are relational concepts that acquire a clear 
meaning only by establishing that with reference to which something is thought of 
as immanent or transcendent.’394 The Greeks, on the other hand, as well as ‘the 
Neoplatonists’ and ‘the philosophers of the middle ages’, all provided Heidegger 
with texts concerned with a thinking of the real, either critically or as the ‘trans-
subjective’.395 That is to say, not as the transcendental epistemological 
architecture of the Kantian mind, but as the remainder for which no single mind 
can account. 
 
Crucially however, Heidegger’s want for a non-epistemological philosophy is 
occasioned by the influence of Husserl, and it is in Heidegger’s reading of 
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Aristotle, not Scotus,396 that Heidegger discovered something of what he was 
looking for: 
 
What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as 
the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by 
Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as aletheia, as the 
unconcealedness of what-is present, its being revealed, its showing 
itself. That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the 
supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of 
Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such.397 
 
As has just been noted in our sections on Webb and Brogan, in Heidegger’s 
lecture course of 1924-25, a reading of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is 
expounded in which the intellectual virtues are rendered definitively non-
epistemological, and are introduced as pre-reflective affinities between thought 
and fields of being, that is, as non-epistemological categories of a relatedness that 
is not separable into the simple opposition subject-object. In the lecture course on 
logic taught the same year, and continuing into 1926,398 Heidegger blames ‘the 
Platonic [distinction] between sensible being, the αἰσθητόν, and the being that is 
accessible through reason or νοῦς: the νοητόν’,399 for the forgetting of this deep 
identity between thought and its object, a forgetting that has since lead to the 
‘psychologism’ that confuses ‘what is thought as such [with] thinking as empirical 
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and mental’, an attitude unaware that ‘logic is constructed on an ontological 
basis’.400 
 
Recalling the classic logical example of the principle of contradiction, Heidegger 
asserts that ‘its validity is completely independent of a possible change in the 
mental nature of human beings’, a point which is meant to highlight the 
absurdity401 of a philosophy in which the ‘matter under investigation is determined 
according to the kind of science related to it, rather than vice versa’.402 ‘The inquiry 
today’,  Heidegger writes, ‘takes up again the question of the μέθεξις, the 
participation of the real in the ideal, and it is up for grabs whether or not we can 
get clear on the phenomenon of thinking, of the thought, and more broadly of truth, 
by stating the problem in these terms’.403 In the 1926 lecture course on Ancient 
Greek concepts404 Heidegger was no more open to the possibility of restoring the 
thought of μέθεξις, and is recorded as saying, ‘[t]he fact that this connection 
[μέθεξις] is unresolved must make philosophy wonder. Was not the entire 
approach perhaps too hasty?’405 
 
In Being and Time, Heidegger is no longer so coy. As we saw in the passage cited 
above, Heidegger is wholly committed in that text to the thought that μέθεξις has 
nothing to do with ontology, but is symptomatic of a representational epistemology 
which hypostatizes the split between the intellect and its adequations into a 
determination of the nature of beings. The χωρισμός diagnosed by Aristotle, for 
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Heidegger, comes about when thought, which is always a thought-of-being, 
confuses itself with the empirical act of thinking, forgetting its relatedness to its 
object, being, and taking itself for an ideality abstracted from objects over there, in 
the world. In what follows I would like to show how Heidegger’s close reading of 
Plato’s cave analogy from the Republic, in ‘Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit’ 
[Plato’s Doctrine of Truth], a concise essay that forms the culmination of the first 
part of a lecture course Heidegger delivered between 1931-32,406 renders it a 
microcosm of the psychologistic mistake, before showing in the final section how 
Heidegger reimagines μίμησις as a special concept once freed from the schema of 
μέθεξις. 
 
The cave allegory from Plato’s Republic is an analogy in which παιδείας and 
ἀπαιδευσίας, education and its lack, are compared.407 Taking Vlastos, again, as 
representative of the most thoroughly thought-through and articulately expressed 
interpretation of the standard translations of the Republic, the cave allegory is said 
to demonstrate the analogical homology of two relationships, that is, an analogy in 
the form A is to B as C is to D. The Platonic Ideas, Vlastos explains, are ‘to their 
sensible instances’, what ‘the figurines in the Cave […] are to their shadows on the 
wall’.408 Enlightenment therefore is not described as a state of achievement, but an 
awareness that the sensible entities one encounters are mere shadows of 
something ‘more real’.409 On Heidegger’s reading however, there are four main 
steps or stages in the narrative of the allegory,410 and crucially, the final one 
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definitively departs the Parmenidean identity of being and thought, by setting up 
an understanding of truth as a measure of tessellation between what is presented 
and what is represented, and in doing so, hypostatises this psychologistic 
differentiation into an ontological division between subject and object. 
 
Stage one:411 the human born bound and desensitized in the dark of the cave 
believes that reality [ἀληθὲς] consists in σκευαστῶν [artificial objects] and σκιάς 
[shadows].412 Stage two, when he or she is freed to see the fire that casts the 
shadows in the cave, the human recoils, seeking the solace and familiarity of the 
shadows that are still assumed to be the most real.413 In stage three, the human, 
dragged out into the sunlight, is awakened to the possibility not only that there is 
something more real than the world he or she was accustomed to, but that 
whatever his or her current position, there might always be something more real 
[ἀληθέστερα]414 to strive for, something still yet hidden that might become 
revealed. The enlightened, freed human therefore strives for the ἀληθέστατα,415 
the glorious sunlight of the true world.416 Finally, in stage four, the enlightened 
human turns liberator, re-entering the cave to tell the other captives what he or she 
has seen, and in doing so, for Heidegger, demonstrates that the lesson of the 
allegory has already been forgotten, for the ἀληθέστατα has already taken on a 
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normative status, but that, importantly, this introduces a further allegorical element 
into the story, the danger of the sovereign philosopher.417 
 
There are three regional ontologies on show in the cave allegory: the realm of 
shadows, the dynamic world of light and shadow, and the pure region of daylight, 
indicating for Heidegger ‘the different kinds of ἀληθὲς normative at each level, that 
is, the different kinds of “truth” that are dominant at each stage’.418 According to 
Heidegger’s interpretation of the Greek word for “truth” however, which he 
pointedly places in scare quotes in the citation above, the third stage within the 
allegory’s narrative represents a denaturation of a pre-epistemological concept of 
truth. As he puts it in Being and Time, ‘[t]o translate this word as “truth”, and, 
above all, to define this expression conceptually in theoretical ways, is to cover up 
the meaning of what the Greeks made ‘self-evidently’ basic for the terminological 
use of ἀλήθεια as a pre-philosophical way of understanding it.’419 ‘[E]verything 
depends’, Heidegger writes much earlier on in the text, ‘on our steering clear of 
any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of “agreement”,420 that is, 
as adaequatio intellectus et rei, the accurate correspondence between thought 
and thought’s object, 421 as if the two were not always already, as Heidegger has it, 
one thought-of-being. As we saw earlier, this is for Heidegger to confuse a 
differentiation between reflection and thought for a differentiation between thought 
and its object. 
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As Reiner Schürmann puts it, the dynamic of ἀλήθεια pertains to ‘a redistribution of 
shade and light […] a rearrangement of the “clearing” within which life and thought 
are possible for a while.’422 That is to say, the properly Greek definition of truth for 
Heidegger is described in the middle step of the cave allegory, as the play of fire 
and shadow, the reality in which neither is everything shrouded, nor totally 
revealed, the alpha-privative of ἀ-λήθεια designating the flux of hidden, and 
unhidden, ἀληθὲς.423 As such, in Being and Time Heidegger determines 
‘[α]ἴσθησις, the sheer sensory perception of something’ to be ‘”true” in the Greek 
sense’,424 for ‘[j]ust as seeing aims at colours, any αἴσθησις aims at its ἴδια (those 
entities which are genuinely accessible only through it and for it); and to that extent 
this perception is always true.’425 The concept of the ἀληθέστατα, the most 
unhidden, simply does not tally with this thought of truth as the dynamic ratio of 
disclosure and covering over of the phenomenon, for it sets an absolute standard 
for the genuinely revealed, against which the play of ἀλήθεια, of fire and shadow, 
can only be adequated. As such, Wolz explains: 
 
The notion of truth inherent in the theory of ideas, together with its 
corresponding attitude of mind, seems in fact to be the very opposite of 
aletheia. Instead of turning to things, to the concrete situation, the 
inquirer turns to the ideas; instead of flexibility and malleability, there is 
now rigid adherence to set standards.426 
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The ἰδέα, which for Heidegger ‘is the visible form that offers a view of what is 
present’, becomes subjugated to ‘something else (behind it) that shines through 
it,427 or shines on it, the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, the idea of the good, the sun that 
illuminates. Whether or not the source of truth is transcendent, its division, its 
χωρισμός, is for Heidegger an epistemological division, not ontologically 
representative. In the final section I would like to show how Heidegger goes on to 
invert Platonism, rejecting μέθεξις as an epistemological fracturing of the prior 
unity of thought and being, and escalating μίμησις to a privileged position. 
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2.5 Heidegger’s affirmation of μίμησις 
Heidegger never mentions μίμησις in Being and Time, or the Plato essay, but it is 
an important concept in one of the Nietzsche lectures delivered during the time the 
Plato essay was  being redrafted, in the Winter semester of 1936-37.428 This 
lecture too focuses on Plato’s Republic, and focuses in on the threefold hierarchy 
of production described in Book X. Highest in Plato’s thread of productions is the 
θεός [divine], the highest point from which the singular universal forms flow. Next 
comes the τεχνίτης [artisan], who is the one capable of reproducing sensible 
instances which partake in the forms, specified in Plato’s text by the examples of 
κλινοποιός [bed-maker] and τέκτων [carpenter]. The artisan is not divine, yet has 
some kind of access or relation to the immutable and the ability to invest it in his or 
her work. Last ranks the μιμητής [imitator], the agent ‘three removes from the king 
and the truth,’429 who in creating works of art offers nothing but a copy of the 
already second-order objects of craft and nature. The work of the μιμητής is, as a 
result, judged deficient for his or her remoteness from the truth of the pure forms of 
the θεός. This type of activity is exemplified by the ζώγραφος [painter] and 
τραγῳδοποιός [tragic poet].430 While the θεός, τεχνίτης and μιμητής are all said by 
Plato to ποιεῖ [produce], the verb μιμεῖσθαι [imitate] is reserved for the μιμητής 
alone.431 
 
Heidegger announces emphatically at the beginning of the lecture that ‘[a]rt is 
mimēsis. Its relation to truth must be ascertainable in terms of the essence of 
                                                          
428 I am here using the translation of GA 6.1, Brigitte Schillbach’s edited collection 
of lectures from the series, rather than the lengthier originals: Martin Heidegger, 
‘Plato’s Republic: The Distance of Art (Mimēsis) from Truth (Idea)’ (1936–1939), in 
Nietzsche, ed. by David Farrell Krell, vol. I-II (San Francisco: Harper San 
Francisco, 1991), pp. 171-187. 
429 Plato, The Republic,597e. 
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431 Plato, The Republic, 601a. 
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mimēsis’.432 We will return to the question of the relation between art and truth in 
chapter four of this thesis; all I would like to do here is demonstrate the way in 
which Heidegger privileges μίμησις as a phenomenological concept. Given that 
Heidegger discounts the illumination of μέθεξις and conceives of the ideal in terms 
of the shining of the being in the ‘eidos […] the outward appearance of 
something’,433 the question becomes one of interpreting the nature of the tripartite 
chain of production, θεός-τεχνίτης-μιμητής, outside of a top-down definition of their 
work by degree of participation in the idea. For ‘we may be tempted to [say] that 
for a multiplicity of individual things, for example houses, the Idea (house) is 
posited’.434 
 
But on Heidegger’s reading the methodological stance of the Republic aims at no 
such universalization, and points the reader to the same section of the Republic 
that Tredennick cites as a paradigmatic statement about μέθεξις in the standard 
translation: ‘[w]e are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form in the 
case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name [εἶδος γάρ πού τι 
ἓν ἕκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἕκαστα τὰ πολλά, οἷς ταὐτὸν ὄνομα 
ἐπιφέρομεν]’.435 But Heidegger translates this as: ‘”[w]e are accustomed to posing 
to ourselves (letting lie before us) one eidos, only one of such kind for each case, 
in relation to the cluster (peri) of those many things to which we ascribe the same 
name”’.436 What is at stake is phenomenology, it is a case of using language to ‘let 
that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way that it shows itself from 
itself’,437 as Heidegger puts it in Being and Time, or in this interpretation of 
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Socratic method, ‘[t]he procedure is therefore a mutual accommodation between 
the many particular things and the appropriate oneness of the “Idea,” in order to 
get both in view and to define their reciprocal relation’.438 
 
How then, can Heidegger reconcile the oneness of the Idea, if the Idea is always 
the one that shines through the multiplicity of beings that do not partake in it as a 
transcendent unity, but  share in it as outward appearance? Heidegger’s answer is 
to give the Platonic Idea a fundamentally political definition. For beings appear as 
what they are, not because they are ‘simply at hand, but are at our disposal for 
use,439 or are already in use. They “are” with that end in view’.440 The τεχνίτης, as 
such, is not one with privileged access to a divine realm of ideas, but one who 
‘keeps an “eye” on the outward appearance of tables [for instance,] in general’.441 
He or she neither produces the idea nor accesses it from elsewhere, for the 
τεχνίτης is a ‘dēmiourgos’, that is, ‘a maker of something for the sake of the 
dēmos’,442 the polis: 
 
The realm of a workshop extends far beyond the four walls that contain 
the craftsman’s tools and produced items. The workshop possesses a 
vantage point from we can see the outward appearance or Idea of what 
is immediately on hand and in use.443 
 
Insofar as the θεός is discounted and the τεχνίτης given an entirely novel 
definition, it remains to be seen what Heidegger makes of the μιμητής and their 
μίμησις. For Heidegger’s redetermination of the ποιεῖν of the τεχνίτης as the 
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production of the outward appearance of that which appears to the craftsperson as 
what it is, in the sense of what it does, in the shared in-order-to structure of the 
dēmos, is not the same as affirming the mimetic object as unreliant upon a model, 
there is still a relatedness to a model here, albeit the model is itself constantly 
produced as part of the work of the polis, a work for which the τεχνίτης has an eye. 
The difference between ποίησις and μίμησις for Heidegger, when thought outside 
of a schema of μέθεξις, is that while they both act in some sense like a mirror, 
producing by ‘bringing forth444 the Idea (bringing the outward appearance of 
something into something else, no matter in what way)’,  nevertheless, ποίησις, 
like phenomenology, brings together the ‘what-being of the bedframe’,445 the eidos 
or self-showing of the bedframe, (which is not created as such) with a particular 
bedframe, that which is produced or manufactured in the modern sense, while 
μίμησις, on the other hand, ‘cannot at all produce any particular usable table [or 
bedframe]’.446 That is, μίμησις does not reveal in the sense of ἀλήθεια, but only 
brings forth the φαινόμενον in a medium that is not its own.447 Yet, as we will 
explore in more detail in chapter four, the distance of μίμησις from the real, from 
the ratio of hidden and unhidden, is actually its power, for Heidegger finally affirms 
the proximity of μίμησις to the shining of the Idea in the φαινόμενον as that which 
makes ‘Being itself visible’: 
 
                                                          
444 Here Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle on τέχνη informs his interpretation of 
Plato. On Heidegger’s account, what we nowadays call production was originally 
thought as allowing something to become what it is, in the same sense that we say 
Michelangelo does not carve an angel, but sees him trapped in the marble and 
sets him free. See: Martin Heidegger, ‘The Question Concerning Technology’ 
(1953), trans. by William Lovitt, in The Question Concerning Technology and 
Other Essays, (New York & London: Garland Publishing Inc, 1977), pp. 3-35. 
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by showing a particular thing from any given angle, he, Dürer the 
painter, brings to the fore not only one single isolated view which offers 
itself to the eye [as the disclosure of ἀλήθεια at play in αἴσθησις does]. 
Rather - we may complete the thought in the following way - by showing 
any given individual thing as this particular thing, in its singularity, he 
makes Being itself visible: in a particular hare, the Being of the hare; in 
a particular animal, the animality.448 
 
In chapter four of this thesis we will return to Heidegger’s understanding of art and 
μίμησις in a discussion of Nancy’s invocation of both μέθεξις and μίμησις at work in 
art, and moreover, the aesthetic in the sense of general sensibility. Here though I 
would like to close by again reasserting that here in Heidegger, the rejection of 
μέθεξις precisely follows the logic of privated transcendence outlined in the 
introduction to this chapter. In rejecting the hierarchical, vertical concept of a 
μέθεξις between ontologically discrete realms, Heidegger is left requiring a 
reinforcement of the immanent realm that remains. Without the guidance of a 
perfect model, the people from whom the model has withdrawn are required by 
Heidegger to come together in an immediate communion of shared disclosure. 
The unity of a being in this instance is guaranteed not by its participation in the 
ideal, and neither by its sharing and negotiation of limit, but by the mystical 
communion of a people engaged in a unitary life, swapping absolute 
transcendence for absolute immanence. We will pick back up on this notion of 
political immanence in chapter four, when it reappears as an important element in 
Nancy’s interpretation of the political force of the Athenian theatre. 
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2.6 Deleuze on Heidegger 
It has already been noted in a number of ways in this thesis that Nancy is an 
extremely sympathetic reader of Heidegger, and that both the methodology of 
Nancy’s philosophy, as a form of Auseinandersetzung, and the content, as 
conversant with the reactivated Greek scene, owe a great deal to Heidegger. 
Deleluze’s work, to the contrary, Nancy is deeply critical of, and in one of his few 
explicit treatments of Deleuze, Nancy notes the incompatibility of their 
philosophical methods: 
 
For me, it was rather others who wove the backcloth: they shared the 
Germanic and metaphysical origins of my present in thought. But 
Deleuze traversed this cloth with a singular, less familiar, fold. He never 
turned to Hegel, was never tied to a dialectical continuity woven at once 
from the logic of a process (from an origin towards an end) and from the 
structure of a subject (an appropriation, an intention, a being-in-itself or 
a lack-of-being-in-itself). I had to discover, little by little, that it is 
precisely along these major lines that Deleuze was creating a fold - as if 
by the flick of a fingernail (Deleuze's nails...) he raised or lowered 
another, heterogeneous dimension, that of a plane or a network, which 
was neither being nor process, but rather composed of points, 
distributions, referrals, spaces.449 
 
As we have noted, Nancy’s philosophical style mirrors its content, its syntactic 
singularities making sense within a continuum composed materially and temporally 
around a limit that swaps absolute transcendence and immanence for a strong 
notion of mutual mediation. Because philosophy happens in the world, it is subject 
to the laws Nancy attempts to document within it. And within this continuum, there 
are, for Nancy, singularities with more exposures than others, singularities that 
could otherwise be called influential, but here might well be named confluential, 
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singularities upon which whole fields of philosophical singularities border and are 
in turned marked as their shared point of bifurcation. Nancy’s account of Deleuze’s 
commitment to a ‘plane’ of semi-homogenous distributions, on the other hand, 
implies that Deleuze excuses his philosophy from paying any respect to what 
Nancy considers to be the most singular texts of the tradition, by smoothing out 
their singularity. For Nancy, Deleuze organises his philosophical style upon the 
same immanent plane expounded by Deleuzian ontology, thus dodging 
responsibility towards the alterity of that to which all thought is exposed, refusing 
the other’s singularity, deeming it instead a varied modulation or swelling of the 
same. 
 
In this section I will introduce Deleuze’s commitment to this plane of immanence, 
again noting his contribution to a conversation between the contemporary, 
Heidegger, and the Greeks, and again, noting the way in which his work 
formulates a problem around the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις. What I want to 
relay in this section is the way Deleuze’s commitment to the ‘ontological 
precomprehension of Being as One’,450 as Badiou puts it, strongly informs his 
critique of Platonic μέθεξις, which Deleuze puts as follows in Logique du sens [The 
Logic of Sense]: 
 
“to reverse Platonism” means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm 
their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do 
with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This 
distinction operates completely within the world of representation. 
Rather, it has to do with undertaking the subversion of this world – the 
“twilight of the idols.” The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors 
a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and 
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the reproduction. At least two divergent series are internalized in the 
simulacrum - neither can be assigned as the original, neither as the 
copy.451 
 
As with the overall structure of this thesis, here the investigation of μίμησις and 
μέθεξις in Deleuze provides focus at the expense of bracketing broader issues. So 
while the following sections will approach Deleuze’s project within the established 
context of μίμησις, μέθεξις, and χωρισμός in Heidegger’s Plato, the contention 
here is certainly not that Deleuze’s ‘renversement du platonisme’452 is entirely 
reducible to the frame in which I am presenting it. Indeed, as Williams argues, the 
operative term here, renversement: 
 
has at least two possible senses. The first sense is that of a reversal or 
inversion. The second is that of an overturning. If the line is read in 
terms of overthrowing or wiping out Platonism or if it is understood as 
positioning Deleuze as straightforwardly opposed to, or even as distant 
from Plato, then the consistency of the arguments of Difference and 
Repetition and the detail of Deleuze’s definition of difference will have 
been missed.453 
 
The key point, Williams asserts, is that for Deleuze a reversal in this instance does 
not entail replacing Platonic structures, but rather maintaining them and “tweaking” 
them to reverse certain results that have emerged in error. Moreover, although the 
name invoked is Plato’s, Colebrook emphasises that what Deleuze is doing really 
needs to be understood in terms of his broader critique of phenomenology. For 
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phenomenology, she writes, ‘insisted that we need to look at the world in its 
fluctuating appearances, and not in terms of fixed concepts of logic’,454 and as 
Lawlor argues, Deleuze’s work therefore parallels phenomenology’s commitment 
to the thought ‘that essence does not lie outside of appearance’, but criticises it for 
relating this immanent plane of appearance ‘back to a subject that constitutes the 
given’.455 
 
Moreover, in spite of Nancy’s methodological criticisms, Deleuze is a remarkably 
skilled scholar of the history of philosophy, and many of his most important texts 
are commentaries on and interpretations of single philosophers. So while in 
Différence et répétition [Difference and Repetition] Deleuze’s reading does, on the 
surface, seem to assimilate Heidegger’s philosophy’s singularity in just the way 
Nancy bemoans, by stating firstly that ‘[t]here has only ever been one ontological 
proposition: Being is univocal’, and that furthermore, ‘there has only ever been one 
ontology, that of Duns Scotus, which gave being a single voice’,456 before finally 
asserting that ‘from Parmenides to Heidegger it is the same voice which is taken 
up’,457 nevertheless, Deleuze is in fact a highly sensitive to Heidegger’s thought of 
ontological difference. The ‘Heideggerian Not’, Deleuze writes, ‘refers not to the 
negative in Being but to Being as difference’,458 that is, just as Brogan and Webb 
have shown, the conflict that constitutes ontological unity is not ontic, because the 
distribution of the positive and negative as it is presented in the ontical is not 
equivalent to, but presupposes, the difference between beings and their Being. 
Deleuze contrasts this formulation with the ontological and hermeneutic starting 
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point of Sartre’s L'Être et le néant [Being and Nothingness], which is, according to 
Deleuze, that ontical negativity and positivity are directly equivalent to being and 
not being. As we have seen, Nancy attributes a similar position to Levinas.459 
 
Deleuze states that in this sense, Sartre’s and Heidegger’s concepts of ontological 
difference are diametrically opposed, the former, for Deleuze, as a thinking of what 
is and the empty spaces in between (much like Harman, in fact460), and the latter 
described by Deleuze as espousing an ontology of difference.461 But here 
Deleuze’s position diverges, for rather than interpreting this ontology of difference 
in light of the Aristotelian interpretation we have noted, that is, as Brogan and 
Webb have shown, as the ontological movement or entelechy that Heidegger 
discovers in Aristotelian φύσις, and as the dynamic interrelation of the cultural 
disclosure of beings and the general principles of their disclosure, Deleuze instead 
makes the rather unfounded claim that Heidegger ‘follows Duns Scotus and gives 
renewed splendour to the Univocity of Being’,462 that is, Deleuze claims that 
Heidegger understands “being” as always said in the same way, thus reducing 
ontological difference to a series of concentrations and relaxations of one 
homogenous plane of the same. What this means will only become clear after a 
note on the content of Duns Scotus’ philosophy itself. 
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2.7 The concept of univocity 
In 1925, Harris could write of a ‘profound misconception’ that the philosophy of 
Duns Scotus,  in its departure from Aquinas’ total consolidation of theology and 
philosophy, ‘marks a decline in the development of scholastic thought’.463 The 
opposite is now the case; as Tonner notes, not only is Scotus’ introduction of the 
concept of haecceity seen as a game-changer in the medieval recovery and 
interpretation of neo-Platonic and Aristotelian themes, but Scotus’ novel approach 
to the univocity of being has also been a highly influential force in our own 
contemporary revival, namely, the ontological turn that has organised our thinking 
since the beginning of the twentieth century.464 Aside from Deleuze, Jean-François 
Courtine,465 for instance, has acknowledged the influence of Scotus in a differing 
way.466 To understand Scotus’ notion of univocity we need to look at the way in 
which it departs from Aquinas’ influential position within Scholasticism. 
 
As already stated repeatedly, for Aristotle “being” is said in many ways but always 
with reference to one principle. This came to be understood by Scholastic 
philosophy as one of three contending ways in which to conceive of the saying of 
being: univocally, equivocally, and analogically.467 Thomas Aquinas, who died 
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when Scotus was only eleven, was a proponent of analogy, which he sets about 
proving by eliminating the other two options one by one. First of all, univocity, in 
which “being” is understood to be said in the same sense of all things is 
disregarded for the reason that ‘it is impossible for anything to be predicated 
univocally of God and a creature’.468 Aquinas’ argument here rests on ‘previous 
truths already known about God’,469 Rocca asserts, namely, that God is infinite 
and creatures are finite. Furthermore, Aquinas asserts that both matter and form 
are mutually privative: 
 
three things are required for any generation: existence in potentiality, 
which is matter; nonexistence in actuality, which is privation; and that by 
which a thing is made to be in actuality, which is form.470 
 
Privation, for Aquinas, is the relationship between matter and form. ‘[P]rime 
matter’,471 that is, ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον, is essentially ‘shapelessness and 
formlessness’,472 that which cannot exist ‘without form and privation’,473 and by 
privation, ‘form gives existence to matter’.474 ‘[I]n regard to God’, however, ‘infinite 
is not to be understood as a privation, as in quantitative numbers and dimensions, 
for such a quantity is naturally finite, and calling it infinite would mean a subtraction 
of what it has by nature’.475 That is to say, matter and form are finite in virtue of 
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their mutual privation, but God is not the privation of this privation,476 the privative 
in-finite or a-finite, for Aquinas, ‘the being of God […] is not limited to any particular 
mode of a perfection of being, but contains all being within itself’.477 Finite 
creatures and infinite God are not in symmetrical opposition, but are rather related 
by a causal hierarchy that reflects Aquinas’ adherence to the Augustinian doctrine 
of divine illumination, a matter we will come to shortly. As Somers-Hall notes,478 
this causal picture has just as much import for Aquinas’ refutation of univocity. 
Aquinas evidences this: 
 
Every effect of a univocal agent is equal to the agent’s power, and no 
creature’s power, being finite, can be equal to the first agent’s power, 
which is infinite. Wherefore it is impossible for a creature to receive a 
likeness to God univocally […] the form in the agent and the form in the 
effect have a common ratio479 
 
Aquinas goes on to express the asymmetry of God and creature in a number of 
other similarly structured refutations of univocity, adding that on the finite plane: 
 
being is not predicated univocally of substance and accident, because 
substance is a being as subsisting in itself, while accident is that whose 
being is in something else. Wherefore it is evident that a different 
relation to being precludes a univocal predication of being.480 
 
In regard to the doctrine of equivocity, wherein “being” is said in many ways 
without any shared point of reference, Aquinas’s rebuttal revolves less around a 
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contention of principle, than an expression of shock at the disturbing nature of 
equivocity’s logical conclusions. For if the terms predicated of God and creature 
are connected only nominally, this amounts to an admittance that we in fact know 
nothing of God, and worse, that the accepted philosophical proofs of God’s 
existence are nothing but ‘sophisms’.481 Back on the finite horizon, without naming 
Aristotle, Aquinas recalls his example of the multiple ways in which ‘healthy’ is 
predicated by reference to a common principle, albeit in Aquinas’ causal system, 
health produces ‘medicine and animal’.482 Aquinas’ remaining candidate, the 
analogical predication of being, is affirmed and described as operating in two 
ways. The first kind is ‘when one thing is predicated of two with respect to a 
third’.483 In this sense, accidents are related by virtue of the substance to which 
they are accidental.  The second is ‘when a thing is predicated of two by reason of 
a relationship between these two’.484 It is in this second sense that being is 
understood by Aquinas as the analogical relationship between the infinite God and 
the finite creature of which it is the cause. 
 
Marrone explains that since an article of 1927,485 it has become fairly 
uncontroversially accepted that Scotus’ rejection of analogy and appeal to 
univocity in his engagement with Henry of Ghent is necessitated to resolve certain 
problems in Aquinas’ divine causality that are carried over from the Augustinian 
doctrine of divine illumination Aquinas inherited:486 
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For I did not know that the soul needs to be enlightened by light from 
outside itself, so that it can participate in truth, because it is not itself the 
nature of truth. You will light my lamp, O Lord. My God you will lighten 
my darknesses (Ps. 17: 29), and of your fullness we have all received 
(John 1: 16). You are the true light who illuminates every man coming 
into this world (John 1: 9), because in you there is no change nor 
shadow caused by turning (Jas. 1: 17).487 
 
Ghent, Marrone explains, had divided the functions of this received doctrine into 
three separate parts. First of all, its ‘normative’ function brought fallible human 
thought within the confines of God’s ultimate truth, allowing the dialectic 
methodologies learned from the Greeks to lead the human mind from the beings 
given to thought in the world, toward reliable knowledge. Secondly, it justified the 
possibility of a priori knowledge. Thirdly, it justified the very fact we can and do 
conceive of God at all, through certain divine ideas given innately in the 
illumination.488 But these three functions proved on closer inspection by Ghent to 
be incongruous with one another, for to suggest that God provides the human with 
the means to think, is by no means the same as suggesting God is given as the 
object of that thought. If these two are thought in tandem the problem arises that 
God is both the first and last thing thought; that which is ascended to, and that 
which is given in the first instance. To maintain the classic formula, Marrone 
writes, Ghent was forced to suggest that being, the first brute object of experience, 
from which the human ascended towards a knowledge of God and God’s truth, 
was in fact the most general attribute of God, a conclusion Scotus discounts as no 
different from the problem it was meant to solve, and essentially circular. On the 
                                                          
487 Augustine, Confessions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), IV.25. 
488 Marrone, ‘Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being’, pp, 
23-4. 
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basis of this insight, Scotus rejects the whole schema of divine illumination.489 The 
need for univocity therefore arises out of a need to find a new way to explain ‘how 
knowledge of God could be available to human beings in the world of sin’.490 
Scotus’ conception of a univocal predication of being replaces the first and third 
premises of divine causal illumination, the former being the question of how 
meaningful thought is possible, and latter being the question of what is given to be 
thought. I will present each in the following section, along with the way in which 
Deleuze shadows each move. 
 
  
                                                          
489 Marrone, ‘Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being’, pp. 
24-5. 
490 Marrone, ‘Henry of Ghent and Duns Scotus on the Knowledge of Being’, pp. 
22-3. 
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2.8 Deleuze’s “reversal” of Platonism 
Faced with the requirement of replacing the third function of divine illumination, 
needing to be able to seek God without God being circularly given to thought in the 
first instance, Scotus makes the Aristotelian move of reining in metaphysics as a 
science of being qua being,491 ὄντος ᾗ ὂν.492 For to determine the word “being” as 
not just synonymous or analogous, but genuinely used in the same way in all 
possible contexts, allows the science of being to seek truth in the finite without 
recourse to the illumination of the infinite. Just as the eye’s propensity to see ‘per 
se objects’, such as an area of white, lies in the fact that sight’s ‘primary object’ is 
colour, so too metaphysics for Scotus ceases to be overridden by privileged 
objects, such as God or substance; metaphysics’ ability to conjugate per se 
objects, beings, lies in the fact that its primary object is univocal being. As King 
notes, Scotus’ metaphysics does not in this way stop dealing with special 
categories, such as the most irreducible, like the substrate, the least attributable, 
like the primary substance, or the most perfect, God, but crucially, in Scotian 
metaphysics these special objects ‘are no more the primary object of metaphysics 
than triangles are of geometry.’493 
 
This move is mirrored in Deleuze’s project of ‘reversing’ Platonism in the following 
way. ‘In very general terms’, Deleuze writes, ‘the motive of [Plato’s] theory of Ideas 
must be sought in a will to select and to choose’, which is to say, it is designed for 
‘distinguishing the “thing” itself from its images, the original from the copy, the 
model from the simulacrum’.494 Smith explains Deleuze’s terminology here, as the 
                                                          
491 Peter King, ‘Duns Scotus on Metaphysics’, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Duns Scotus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 15-68 (p. 16). 
492 Aristotle, The Metaphysics, 1026a. 
493 King, ‘Duns Scotus on Metaphysics’, p. 18. 
494 Deleuze, ‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’, p. 253. 
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three separations listed between commas in the passage are not as 
interchangeable as they look. What Deleuze describes is a three-tiered hierarchy 
of resemblances in Plato’s philosophy. The “thing itself” is the singular idea, Smith 
writes, the “copy” is a thing which has a claim to resemblance in accord with the 
criteria of the idea it copies, and the “simulacrum” is something else, a counterfeit, 
a false claimant.495 As such, Deleuze’s schematisation clearly reflects the tripartite 
chain of production in Book X of Plato’s Republic. According to Deleuze’s 
rankings, the θεός produces the thing itself, the τεχνίτης the copy, and the μιμητής 
the simulacrum. 
 
For Deleuze, Smith explains, this hierarchy describes the fact that ‘Platonism 
allows differences to be thought only by subordinating them to the principle of the 
Same and the condition of Resemblance’.496 That is, what is given to thought is 
only given by virtue of its “illumination”, or rather, in the Platonic language Deleuze 
employs, participation (μέθεξις):497 
 
To participate is, at best, to rank second. The celebrated Neoplatonic 
triad of the “Unparticipated,” the participated, and the participant follows 
from this […] Undoubtedly, one must distinguish all sorts of degrees, an 
entire hierarchy, in this elective participation. Is there not a possessor of 
the third or the fourth rank and so on to an infinity of degradation 
                                                          
495 Daniel W. Smith, ‘The concept of the simulacrum: Deleuze and the overturning 
of Platonism’, in Continental Philosophy Review, 38 (2006), 89-123 (p. 98). 
496 Smith, ‘The concept of the simulacrum: Deleuze and the overturning of 
Platonism’, p. 97. 
497 Deleuze’s thought is not spurious in refuting μέθεξις by paralleling the Scotian 
critique of divine illumination; Aquinas makes it quite clear that what is in question 
is two perspectives on the same phenomenon, writing ‘the air has light, which it is 
participating from the sun, which is thus the cause of its illumination’: Aquinas, The 
Aquinas Reader, p. 79. 
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culminating in one who possesses no more than a simulacrum, a 
mirage498 
 
Deleuze follows Scotus in refuting such a system whereby the only thing given to 
thought is already the highest thing to which thought might aspire, by likewise 
affirming metaphysics as a science of being qua being. ‘[The] inversion of 
Platonism’ Smith writes, ‘in other words, implies an affirmation of simulacra as 
such. The simulacrum must then be given its own concept and be defined in 
affirmative terms’.499 Reversing Platonism, in the restricted context of this 
chapter’s concerns, can therefore be understood to entail a transformation of  
the “top-down” schema of illumination and participation, away from an ontology in 
which μίμησις is always analogued to μέθεξις, away from a world in which 
appearance or resemblance is never a value in itself without authorisation on the 
vertical dimension, and away from a world where, as Deleuze writes, ‘resemblance 
should not be understood as an external relation [for] it goes less from one thing to 
another than from one thing to an Idea’.500 Resemblance, μίμησις, is instead 
affirmed and reconceptualised by Deleuze, the univocal predication of being 
turning out to be, as Ansell Pearson writes, ‘the pure positivity of being as a power 
of self-differentiation’.501 Deleuze writes: 
 
Simulation is the phantasm502 itself, that is, the effect of the functioning 
of the simulacrum as machinery – a Dionysian machine. It involves the 
false as power, Pseudos, in the sense in which Nietzsche speaks of the 
                                                          
498 Deleuze, ‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’, p. 255. 
499 Smith, ‘The concept of the simulacrum: Deleuze and the overturning of 
Platonism’, p. 100. 
500 Deleuze, ‘The Simulacrum and Ancient Philosophy’, p. 257. 
501 Keith Ansell Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual (London: 
Routledge, 2002), p. 99. 
502 The phantasm is the image of imagination, φαντασία, for Aristotle. See: 
Aristotle, De Anima, trans. by Hugh Lawson-Tancred (Oxford: Penguin, 1986), 
iii.3.428.  
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highest power of the false. By rising to the surface, the simulacrum 
makes the Same and the Similar, the model and the copy, fall under the 
power of the false (phantasm). It renders the order of participation, the 
fixity of distribution, the determination of the hierarchy impossible. It 
establishes the world of nomadic distributions and crowned anarchies. 
 
Returning to Scotus’ philosophy itself, its second charge is to replace the first 
function of divine illumination, to demonstrate how thought can be coherent 
without being in some way brought in line with God’s truth from without. Scotus’ 
answer follows from the nature we saw ascribed to metaphysics in the prior 
section. For the reason that the primary object of metaphysics is being, is the 
original Parmenidean identity (although Scotus cites Ibn Sīnā rather than 
Parmenides),503 ‘it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be’,504 that 
is, being is the primary object of metaphysics because it is the primary object of 
thought in general. 505 To think is to do metaphysics. So where Aquinas argues 
that knowledge is only gleaned from brute sensation once its form has been 
abstracted in the imagination as an image or phantasm, Scotus rejects this notion; 
while upholding the importance of universal abstract knowledge, he also assigns 
genuine meaning to pre-reflective intuition.506 In dividing the intellect into 
immanent and universal faculties, Scotus’ thought of univocity opens up a non-
representational space for philosophy, for as Ingham and Dreye comment, ‘[t]he 
act of intuitive cognition turns the attention of the philosopher from knowing as a 
                                                          
503 Gilson, ‘Avicenne et le point de depart de Duns Scot’. 
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505 King, ‘Duns Scotus on Metaphysics’, pp. 15-17. 
506 Frederick Copleston, History of Philosophy, II: Medieval Philosophy (London: 
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representational act to knowing as an act both immediate and certain […] direct 
access to reality, if only in the act of existence’.507 
 
In his book on Deleuze, Badiou makes a great deal of Deleuze’s inheritance of this 
pre-representational identity of thought, and indeed philosophy, with being, 
remarking that ‘Deleuze’s philosophy is in no way a critical philosophy. Not only is 
it possible to think Being, but there is thought only insofar as Being simultaneously 
formulates and pronounces itself therein’.508 That is to say, when Deleuze speaks 
of a ‘transcendental field’, or a ‘transcendental empiricism’,509 he has, as Somers-
Hall explains, broken completely with the way these concepts operate in Kant’s 
critical philosophy.510 Agamben explains that insofar as Deleuze maintains the 
Kantian conception of the transcendental as that which castigates all thought of 
transcendence,511 what remains in Deleuze after sweeping away the speculative is 
not a critical delimitation of the correlation between ego and empirical horizon, but 
a transcendental field ‘immanent only to itself’, which means, thought-as-
transcendental field and transcendental field-as-thought, with no recourse to 
subjective or objective correlates.512 In Deleuze’s 1968 work Spinoza et le 
problème de l'expression [Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza], Deleuze 
suggests that ‘[f]rom the viewpoint of immanence’, an ‘effect is “immanate” in the 
                                                          
507 Mary Beth Ingham & Mechthild Dreyer, The Philosophical Vision of John Duns 
Scotus: An Introduction (USA: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p. 
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cause, rather than emanating from it’.513 As Agamben notes, the word immanate, 
in combining the manare or flow of emanation with the manere or dwelling of 
immanence,514 for Deleuze describes an immanent kineticism, a process or flow 
without any ‘transcendent finality’.515 
 
In contrast to Deleuze’s conception of a pure plane of immanence, populated by 
simulacra lacking reference to things-in-themselves or even the middle term, 
images, a plane in which the transcendental consciousness resides pre-
subjectively, for Nancy, as noted in the introduction to this chapter, the immanent 
demands to be thought as something other than a privation of the transcendent. In 
a paper presented in Paris in 1992,516 Nancy marks out a critique of what he takes 
to be the Deleuzian position, pointing out that discarding the duality of the image in 
order to render the simulacra pure and devoid of any dative reference risks 
defining the immanent in accordance with this subtraction. To do so, Nancy raises 
Aquinas to counter Scotus. 
 
Recalling for a moment the causal framework whereby Aquinas explains the 
analogical connection of the infinite god and finite creature as a relation without 
recourse to a third shared term, Nancy notes that outside of the relation between 
god and human, which is, to a certain extent, a two-way street, Aquinas’ particular 
version of causality functions differently, in the case of brute beings it works in a 
“vestigial” mode. ‘[T]he vestige is an effect that “represents only the causality of 
the cause, but not its form”’, Nancy writes, quoting Aquinas; ‘”[a] vestige shows 
                                                          
513 Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza (1968), trans. by Martin 
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that someone has passed by but not who it is”’.517 As much as we assert that there 
is no smoke without fire, Nancy goes on, the smoke does not bear the form of the 
fire, only its causality, that is, ‘smoke has value first of all as absence of fire’.518 
The point of the metaphor is that here an absent cause does not come to mark the 
effect as lacking, as the outcome of a privation, for ‘the absence is not considered 
as such; it is not to the unpresentability of the fire that one refers but to the 
presence of the vestige’.519 Moreover, I would add, the metaphor demonstrates the 
inaccessibility of the contents of an immanent world, the common sense fact of the 
non-immediacy of the immanent. In the case of art, which is the topic of the essay 
and a subject to which this thesis returns in chapter four, Nancy states, ‘art is 
smoke without fire, vestige without God’.520 Likewise for the image in general, the 
withdrawal of the ideal thing in itself does not erase the image, leaving pure 
simulacra; the vestigial operates along the immanent horizon without reference to 
the ideal, but, nevertheless, without plunging into the immediacy of pure 
immanence, it brings the outside inside, the delay or spacing that constitutes the 
world immanently. 
 
The outright rejection of the idol’s transcendence only inverts Platonism insofar as 
it also maintains it, as Nancy points out in 2001, it repeats the essential gesture of 
the ‘threefold Abrahamic traditions’,521 rehashing the foundational flight of the gods 
from presence, which originally determines idolatry as the sin of devaluing the 
infinite in presence. For ‘[h]ere’, Nancy writes, in idol-worship, ‘one turns away 
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from the infinite, one becomes complacent in immobility’,522 so that rejecting the 
quasi-position of a presencing of the infinite, whether it be in the name of the 
infinite or the name of the finite, repeats the original Platonic-Christian gesture of 
disavowing the sophist and the idolater. Both are entirely bound up in their 
reference to or φιλία of the unattainable, the simple opposition of immanence and 
transcendence. But the moments of the idols’ twilight are precisely transitory, a 
borderland, not the midday of the shortest shadow523 but a time when ‘the god is in 
decline and finds himself tangled up, as he declines, in the affairs of the world’,524 
when the mutuality of transcendence and immanence privates the privation that 
existed between them, bringing to an end the thought of one without the other. For 
Nancy, the image is not abolished with the original, leaving only pure simulacra; 
rather, like the death-mask, the ‘Roman imago is the appearance of the deceased, 
his or her compearance among us: not the copy of the deceased’s traits, but his or 
her presence qua deceased’.525 We will return to question the way these thoughts 
transform aesthetics in chapter four. 
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2.9 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to provide a context into and against which to locate 
Nancy’s treatment of the figures of immanence and transcendence, and the 
concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις which are tied historically to them. Indeed the 
historical is an essential part of this context, for Nancy’s philosophical responses, I 
suggested, are not addressed in one instance to the ancient or traditional and in 
another instance to the contemporary, but formulated on the basis of the already 
available staging of the retrieval of the ancient within the contemporary. Regarding 
the contemporary context of Nancy’s responses, this chapter focused specifically 
on two thinkers who, I argued, interpret the ancient question of the relationship 
between the immanent and the transcendent as a demand for an exclusive choice. 
Heidegger and Deleuze, I argued, choose immanence at the expense of negating 
transcendence, repeating what Nancy describes as the founding gesture of 
metaphysics, by marking the immanent as a privation of the transcendent. Both 
Heidegger and Deleuze, in differing ways, describe the transcendent relation 
requiring deletion as μέθεξις, and the concept of immanent connection to be 
affirmed in its place as μίμησις. Against this contextual background I will in the next 
chapter introduce an alternative trajectory in the thought of immanence and 
transcendence, and μίμησις and μέθεξις, which affirms the transcendent as an 
aspect of the immanent, and which Nancy, I suggest, radicalises in his philosophy. 
 
The chapter began by noting the de facto immanence of the social conditions 
concurrent with the birth of philosophy, and that for Nancy, metaphysical 
philosophy is defined as an attempt to conceive this empirical immanence while 
lacking any apparatus other than transcendent signifiers with which to do so. 
Meaning, it was noted, is definitively understood by philosophy as the ostensive 
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gesturing of the immanent beyond itself, marking not only an ontological but also a 
hermeneutic difficulty, which is clearly the topic of many Socratic dialogues. In 
more recent times, Nancy was noted as indicating, metaphysics has become self-
aware, but in doing so risks oversignifying or recuperating itself. Nancy’s 
response, I suggested, is not to reject transcendence outright, but to reorient its 
verticality onto the lateral axis of the distinction of beings in their finite exposures, 
making immanence a function of its own web of contiguous transcendences, and 
to conceive of meaning as the gesturing not to the absolutely other, but to the non-
immediate. 
 
In the next section, I introduced the contemporary reactivation of Ancient Greek 
philosophy by referring to two books by Walter Brogan and David Webb, in order 
to demonstrate that Nancy’s work on the nature of immanence and transcendence 
responds to an already retrieved problematic. Specifically, it was not noted, 
Heidegger opens up a reading of Aristotle in which the dictum of “being” said in 
many ways can be understood as an affirmation of the complex negotiation of 
forces at work in the verbal presencing of beings. And by borrowing the 
Aristotelian division between the natural (internal) and technical (external) 
production of these forces of being, I suggested it was possible to discern that in 
translating ontology into a horizontal, contiguous format, Nancy can suggest that 
the transimmanent sharing of beings is both natural and technical. In light of 
Heidegger’s discovery that Aristotle passes to us a way of conceiving of 
philosophy as a dialogical conversation between the regional disclosure and 
general principles of being (even if Aristotle failed to properly take up this 
opportunity), and also in light of the further point that as such, the principle 
according to which being is said in many ways is never fully detachable from those 
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sayings, I suggested that Nancy radicalises this thought by conceiving of being as 
nothing other than its many sayings, the plural being the principle. 
 
In the following section I attempted to show that Heidegger’s critique of μέθεξις is 
based upon his understanding of Aristotle, but that it constitutes a privation of the 
transcendent in the sense I argued Nancy ascribes to metaphysics. I suggested 
that for Heidegger, μέθεξις emerges from a conflation of the split between 
reflection and thought, with an ontological split between thought as ideal and being 
as real. Rethinking μέθεξις and μίμησις in two different interpretations of Plato’s 
Republic, we saw that Heidegger interprets ποίησις not as an act that copies by 
μέθεξις, but rather a production of beings that pays attention to the political 
designation of useful objects. Finally, μίμησις, which for Heidegger copies the 
outward appearance of a thing without bringing it into an instance of the thing, was 
affirmed as a privileged mode in which the Being of a thing may be 
phenomenologically approached, a thought that will be pursed in chapter four. 
 
In the final section of the chapter, after noting Nancy’s disagreement with 
Deleuze’s methods, we followed Deleuze’s Scholastic influences, from Scotus’ 
affirmation of univocity into Deleuze’s project of reversing Platonism. Again, here, 
my aim was to show that Deleuze conceives immanence as a privation of 
transcendence and interprets μίμησις and μέθεξις accordingly. Following Scotus’ 
requirement of replacing certain functions of the Augustinian doctrine of divine 
illumination, the section was concerned with the questions of what is given to 
thought and how thought is possible. In both instances, Scotus’ thought of 
univocity, which determines both the intellect’s and metaphysics’ primary object as 
univocal being, is brought into Deleuze’s work, firstly, in affirming the μίμησις 
between simulacra over a μέθεξις which would illuminate from above, and 
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secondly, in rethinking the Kantian transcendental as the immanence of the 
thought of being (as its primary object) as a non-subjective and non-objective 
transcendental field.  
 
Insofar as the examples just treated subjugate μέθεξις to thoughts of immediacy, 
community, and oneness, in the following chapter I would like to draw attention to 
an alternative, pluralist trajectory in the history of receptions of the concept of 
μέθεξις, presented in the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer, and rethought by Nancy. I 
would like to show that Nancy’s interpretation of Heidegger’s Dasein as Mitsein, 
that is, his assertion ‘that the “mit” does not modify the “sein” [… and] that the “mit” 
does not even qualify the “Dasein,” but that it constitutes it essentially’,526 is the 
key to Nancy’s thought of the end of the unconditioned and the internal 
transcendence of the immanent. I will show that a preliminary development in 
Gadamer’s affirmation of μέθεξις to describe the ontological structure of Dasein is 
radicalised by Nancy to conceive an ontology released from the simple opposition 
of immanence and transcendence, and fundamentally connected to the nature of 
the human. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
A hermeneutics of finitude 
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The schema, which is not devised in accordance with an idea, that is, in 
terms of the ultimate aim of reason, but empirically in accordance with 
purposes that are contingently occasioned (the number of which cannot 
be foreseen) yields technical unity; whereas the schema which 
originates from an idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, 
and does not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis 
of architectonic unity.527 
- KANT, Critique of Pure Reason 
 
Philosophy for me has always been a matter of meaning. 528 
NANCY, ”Our World”
                                                          
527 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 653-4. 
528 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘”Our World” an interview’, trans. by Emma Campbell, in 
Angelaki, 8:2, (August 2003), 43-54 (p. 45). 
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3.1 Introduction: the interpretation of interpretation 
In the interview quoted in our epigraph, Nancy states unequivocally that before his 
discovery of the questions of writing and literature with Derrida, Blanchot and 
Lacoue-Labarthe, and before being confronted by Bataille’s affirmation of plurality, 
what has always been at stake for him in philosophical research is, firstly, the 
sacred, secondly, ‘the question of meaning [sens], of another meaning of 
“meaning”’, and thirdly, ‘“the meaning of being”’ in the sense that it shows us ‘our 
provenance has its source in nothing other than a withdrawal of meaning’.529 
 
The interview was conducted in 2003, with Peter Hallward playing the role of 
questioner. Considering the rather critical nature of the essay Hallward would go 
on to publish in 2005,530 which, as noted in section (1.5.1), judges Nancy’s political 
philosophy a failure for its antagonism toward construction, Hallward’s agenda in 
the interview is remarkably restrained. Hallward is himself strongly committed to 
the possibility of a neo-communist movement, taking his cues from Badiou531 in 
interpreting, for example, the recent uprisings in North Africa as signs of a 
potentially self-organising force unifying swathes of underrepresented workers.532  
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It scarcely needs reiterating that for Nancy, while the emancipation of any 
proletariat is to be affirmed (as, in fact, he does publicly in Libération in 2011,533 
much to Badiou’s antipathy534), no political construction or organisation can be 
truly representative of the ontological organisation of being-with, wherein nothing 
is shared other than the fact of existing, and, moreover, it is not shared as a value 
but as a condition. What is more, it should be added that the notion of a political 
construction of the contemporary is of no interest to a thinker sensitive to a notion 
of the contemporary as precisely the unworking of stable constructions in the 
arrival of unexpected trans-temporal arrangements of meaning. 
 
As with the rest of the thesis, I maintain that an external expectation placed upon 
Nancy’s philosophy that does not approach Nancy’s philosophy on its own terms, 
has no place here. Rather, therefore, than discussing the relationship between 
Nancy’s version of being-with and the political, this chapter focuses on its 
implications for a theory of how meaning operates in a transimmanent world, 
suggesting that Nancy’s hermeneutics, tied as they are to both ontology and 
aesthetics, can be read as a radicalising response to Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical and ontological affirmations of the transcendent nature of μέθεξις. 
 
Indeed, questioned in the interview as to whether the triad “theology-meaning-
Heidegger” marks an affinity between Nancy’s thought and the theological and 
phenomenological hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer, Nancy points the 
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Libya, to those in Tunisia and Egypt, suggesting that the latter are authentic 
revolutions and the former a product of Western intervention. Alain Badiou, ‘An 
Open Letter from Alain Badiou to Jean-Luc Nancy’ (2011) < 
http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/463> [accessed 21 June 2013]. 
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reader to his essay on hermeneutics, ‘Sharing Voices’, explaining that while his 
work is not a traditional hermeneutics, nevertheless nor is it an ‘”anti-
hermeneutic”’, ‘it is something else, because it begins with a different interpretation 
of the word hermeneia’ [interpretation].535 The implication is that this beginning 
happens in ‘Sharing Voices’, and indeed, in the text’s introduction Nancy states: 
 
This essay explores what one can risk calling the modern 
misinterpretation of interpretation and, therefore, it has only one end: to 
serve as a preamble, to incite a reevaluation of our relations, insofar as 
we are interpreters of that dialogue which distributes our "human" scene 
to us, and thus which provides us with our being or our "destination." It 
explores what would be, inseparably, nothing other than another 
poetical and another political sharing of our voices.536 
 
Published in 1982, ‘Sharing Voices’ comes into existence after two decades of 
apprenticeship with Ricoeur,537 and falls directly between the creation of the 
research centre in 1980 and its dissolution in 1984, after the explosion of Bataille’s 
thoughts of plurality into Nancy’s thought in 1983’s The Inoperative Community.538 
‘Sharing Voices’, I would suggest, presents a microcosm of these four years, for it 
interrogates contemporary hermeneutics and then exposes it to a scene of 
multiplicitous re-creative interpretation,539 before in the final footnote determining 
itself as overture to the question of community that would follow. There, at the 
                                                          
535 Nancy, ‘”Our World”’, p. 46. 
536 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 212. 
537 Nancy went on to be supervised by Gérard Granel for his doctorat d'État 
studies. 
538 Nancy was clearly already reading Bataille, but his work is only mentioned in 
passing before 1983, for example, in Nancy, The Speculative Remark, p. 188; 
and: Nancy, The Discourse of the Syncope, pp. 7-8 & 134. 
539 Indeed the conjugation of the title “Le partage” (singular) “-des voix” (plural), is 
the reverse of the grammatical trajectory of Derrida’s “Les fins” (plural) “-de 
l’homme” (singular). What is at stake for Nancy is a rejection of a principle of unity 
instancing in multiple places, that is, humans; rather Nancy is thinking about our 
multiplicity without recourse to any common principle. 
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closure, Nancy writes that ‘closer to what is in question here would be the thought 
of "communication" in the texts of Bataille’.540 I would like therefore, in this chapter, 
to accept Nancy’s implication that the essay denotes a beginning point and to treat 
it as such. This chapter will explore ‘Sharing Voices’ in order to interrogate 
Nancy’s confrontation with Gadamer’s interpretation of μέθεξις within his 
hermeneutic programme, before then presenting Nancy’s continued utilisation of 
the concept in first questioning community, and then broader notions of plurality. I 
give a brief overview of ‘Sharing Voices’ here in the introduction, in order to 
introduce the close readings, tributaries and confluences that will make up the 
body of this chapter. 
 
  
                                                          
540 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 259 n. 58. 
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3.2 Chapter structure and outline of ‘Sharing Voices’ 
The first section of ‘Sharing Voices’ draws a trajectory between two contemporary 
ways of understanding the act of interpretation. The first of these takes 
interpretation as an end in itself, and for Nancy is exemplified in certain shallow 
readings of Nietzsche and Freud541 that affirm nothing but the interpretation of 
interpretation and which are as such nihilistic at heart.542 The second version 
orients an interpretation towards the site at which meaning is thought to lie in wait. 
This interpretation is associated, Nancy explains, with the names Ricoeur and 
Gadamer. In orienting meaning,543 Nancy warns, this interpretation risks 
predetermining its content, since as ‘a movement towards the comprehension of a 
meaning, its fundamental rule is, thus, that meaning must be given in advance to 
the interpreter in the manner of an anticipation, an "in view of which" (a Woraufhin) 
or a "participation."’544 It is the hermeneutic figure of participation, placed in scare 
quotes here by Nancy and universally ascribed to ‘Ricoeur, Gadamer, Barthel, 
Greisch’…,545 that I will firstly show is tied to an interpretation of μέθεξις in 
Gadamer’s work,546 before then arguing that Gadamer’s interpretation of it breaks 
                                                          
541 Nancy accuses Christian Descamps of reading Nietzsche and Freud in this way 
in ‘Sharing Voices’, and puts forward a similar criticism of Guy Debord’s notion of 
the spectacle in ‘Of Being Singular Plural’. See: Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 248 n.1, 
and: Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, pp. 47-55. 
542 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 248 n. 1. 
543 Nancy plays on the etymology of the word “orient”, disrupting the 
geographically delineated “first world” of the Occident which supposedly defines 
itself against the Orient, each regional ontology defined in its radical alterity from 
the other. Pointing out that this picture did not even make sense two hundred 
years ago, let alone now in the age of globalization, Nancy indicates that our 
contemporary world is definitively disoriented, since it is worldwide with nothing 
outside of itself against which it may position itself. See: Nancy, ‘Urbi et Orbi’, p. 
34; and: Nancy, The Sense of the World, pp. 4-9. 
544 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 215. 
545 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 251 n. 14. 
546 For further reading on this matter, see the chapter: ‘Platonic Methexis: 
Heidegger’s Aristotelian Destruktion and Gadamer’s Heideggerian Wiederholung’ 
in: Rod Coltman, The Language of Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Heidegger in 
Dialogue (Albany: State University of New York Press), pp. 25-66. 
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with the immanentist bias investigated in chapter two. I then argue that Nancy 
reinterprets and radicalizes this other notion of μέθεξις, first in a direct engagement 
with Gadamer, and then in the reading of Plato’s dialogue Ion that makes up the 
second half of Nancy’s essay. 
 
Nancy does not afford the nihilistic version of interpretation the respect of a 
sustained engagement, and dedicates most of the first section of the essay to a 
discussion of Ricoeur’s and Gadamer’s hermeneutics, highlighting what Nancy 
deems to be their commitment to orientation, anticipation and participation, and 
criticising Gadamer’s purported misuse of certain concepts from the texts of 
Heidegger.547 In interrogating this appropriation Nancy draws attention to a 
fundamentally different notion of orientation, anticipation and participation, 
articulated in Heidegger’s concept of Auslegung. Auslegung is, on Nancy’s 
reading, an orientation to meaning that does not anticipate any determinate or 
linguistic content, and furthermore, is a thought of human finitude that does not 
even presuppose a subject to whom the relation of anticipation relates, or to whom 
it can be reversed and claimed as participation. 
 
I aim to show that Nancy does not do away with orientation, still less that he 
installs an arbitrary aestheticism akin to a doctrine of an “interpretation of 
interpretation”.548 For as Nancy notes in The Sense of the World, meaning does 
                                                          
547 Although Ricoeur does not go unchallenged, the more cutting critique in 
‘Sharing Voices’ is reserved for Gadamer. Considering the fact that Ricoeur, just 
like Gadamer, determines Auslegung to be the concept that ties hermeneutics to 
phenomenology and vice-versa, the softening of Nancy’s criticism can only be 
interpreted as a mark of respect for a friend and teacher. See: Paul Ricoeur, 
‘Phenomenology and Hermeneutics’ (1974), trans. by John B. Thompson, in 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981), pp. 101-28. 
548 Hodge notes that on Nancy’s account aesthetic experience can never be a 
matter of passive impression, for the sensory body presses back against the world 
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have something to do with orientation, and he uses the word sens precisely 
because in French it invokes, alongside meaning and sensory registers, also 
orientation and directedness.549 In arguing that the relation to meaning of 
Auslegung is constitutive of finitude, Nancy blurs the boundaries between the 
semantic and the ontological (thus the earlier cited declaration of a “dialogue 
which distributes our "human" scene to us, and thus which provides us with our 
being”), opening a space within which to think Greek μέθεξις and hermeneutic 
participation not as properly transcendent relationships to ontotheological or 
communal meaning, but as the finite μέθεξις that happens at the finite limits 
sharing-out finite things, that which discloses beings without recourse to a 
common principle and makes sense in the redistribution of their shared limits. 
 
The middle section of ‘Sharing Voices’, which analyses Heidegger’s A Dialogue on 
Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer, plays out the resulting 
philosophical predicament: how does one authorise this new definition of meaning 
and interpretation without reorienting it, either to Being and Time, or to the Greeks’ 
use of the concept of ἑρμηνεία? I claimed in section (1.5.3) that Nancy responds 
with a strong definition of how a philosophical “reading” operates, one which 
transforms the nature of Nancy’s own “commentaries” on authoritative texts. Then 
in the final section of ‘Sharing Voices’, Nancy’s now long standing commitment to 
plurality bursts onto the scene in a reading of Plato’s Ion, a year before its 
presentation in the confrontation with Bataille. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
that impresses. To speak “only” of meaning or of sense, is therefore to speak just 
as much of a primordial politics of bodies clamouring for position: Joanna Hodge, 
‘Excription at the Edge of Sense: Reading Jean-Luc Nancy’, in Aesthetic 
Pathways, 2.1 (2011), 2-30 (p. 28). 
549 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 12, and, for more see: Nancy, ‘The 
Forgetting of Philosophy’, p. 34. 
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In order to locate the emergence of Nancy’s interpretation of μέθεξις at the “turn” 
whereby Nancy marks out both his loyalty to the question of meaning and the 
radically different terms under which he will be pursuing it, it is necessary to trace 
back the way an interpretation of μέθεξις is already a central issue for Gadamer’s 
project, and how it becomes, in Gadamer’s work, a plural principle, rather than 
something reducible to a principle of plurality. As such, the majority of the first half 
of this chapter is given over to delineating the trajectory to which Nancy and 
Gadamer are responding, from neo-Kantianism into phenomenological 
hermeneutics. The second half of the chapter is then concerned with Nancy’s 
critique itself. 
 
Beginning with a discussion of Nicolai Hartmann’s and Martin Heidegger’s 
influences on the young Gadamer, I then argue that the early interpretation of 
μέθεξις in Gadamer’s habilitation thesis is a direct refutation of Hartmann’s project, 
staged in idiosyncratically Heideggerian terms, and that it outlines a pluralist 
ontology. In this much, I argue, Gadamer’s interpretation of μέθεξις as a 
transcendence that forms part of the immanent, breaks definitively with the 
reductive readings outlined in the prior chapter. I then show how Gadamer applies 
what began as an interpretation of Platonic dialogue to his own hermeneutic 
project, by interpreting μέθεξις as the ontological and temporal structure of 
Dasein’s understanding, an appropriation which Nancy undermines in the first part 
of ‘Sharing Voices’. 
 
The conceptual thrust of Nancy’s critique will be reproduced before I go on to 
argue that Nancy’s critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics goes much deeper than a 
matter of interpretive practice, and claim that it presents a strong concept of 
human finitude that opens up Nancy’s interpretation of μέθεξις as both a semantic 
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and ontological concept, opening the way to the final sections’ focus on μέθεξις as 
a plural principle of world disclosure and sense making. The aim across this 
chapter is to bring to light the reorientation of μέθεξις in Nancy’s work, which, 
mirroring Morin’s affirmation of the horizontality of Nancy’s sens, I claim begins 
with Gadamer’s texts as a thinking of the transcendent within the immanent, and 
completes in Nancy’s thought of μέθεξις as the mutual articulation and distinction 
of beings in their transimmanent contact at shared limits, his assertion that 
immanence and transcendence are but two facets of the limit that distributes our 
horizon without verticality. After moving from Nancy’s explicit reading of 
Gadamer’s texts, to Nancy’s interpretation of Plato’s Ion, in which, I claim, Nancy 
indicates the availability of a demonstration of the mutuality of μίμησις and μέθεξις, 
end with a suggestion of the way in which Nancy conceives of the ecotechnical 
makeup of the world on the basis of these discoveries. 
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3.3 Gadamer’s affirmation of μέθεξις as a refutation of Hartmann’s critical ontology 
Hans-Georg Gadamer is one of the twentieth century’s most influential theorists of 
the art of interpretation. His work is distinctive both in the originality of its 
interpretations of Greek philosophy and the centrality it ascribes to encounters with 
it. This dedication to the Greeks has its earliest roots in an intellectual 
development in the twenties informed by three different ways of interpreting Plato’s 
philosophy: as a transcendental epistemology with Paul Natorp, as a critical 
ontology with Nicolai Hartmann, and as a dialogue, with Heidegger.550 In this 
section and the one that follows, I would like to show how Gadamer’s earliest 
interpretation of μέθεξις comes about when Gadamer sets to work refuting his 
teacher Hartmann’s critical ontology551 with the tools provided by his new 
Heideggerian commitment to philosophizing with the Greeks within the logos. 
 
Natorp’s neo-Kantian interpretation of Plato, 1903’s Platos Ideenlehre, eine 
einführung in den Idealismus [Plato’s Theory of Ideas, an Introduction to 
Idealism],552 was the most influential in Germany at the time.553 The text presents 
the doctrine of ideas as transcendental principles rather than real substances, and 
                                                          
550 Heidegger’s relationship with Hartmann is somewhat ambiguous. In Being and 
Time Heidegger writes that Hartmann follows Max Scheler’s thesis that ‘knowing is 
a “‘relationship of Being”’, but leaves this relationship as the blindspot of an 
ontology built upon it.  For Heidegger this relationship is Dasein, and in failing to 
ontologically clarify Dasein, Hartmann ‘is forced into a “critical realism” which is at 
bottom quite foreign to the level of the problematic he has expounded’. Yet Dermot 
Moran suggests that it was meeting Hartmann that allowed Heidegger to first 
understand Aristotle on an ontological basis. Heidegger, Being and Time, 493 n. 
xvi, and: Dermot Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology (London: Routledge, 
2000), p. 204. 
551 Not long before, Natorp had been Hartmann’s teacher, supervising his 
habilitation in the first years of the century. 
552 Available in English translation as: Paul Natorp, Plato’s Theory of Ideas. An 
Introduction to Idealism (1903), trans. by Vasilis Politis & John Connolly (Sankt 
Augustin: Academia Verlag, 2004). 
553 Robert M. Wallace, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Plato's Dialectical Ethics: 
Phenomenological Interpretations Relating to the Philebus, trans. by Robert M. 
Wallace (New York: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. ix-xxiv (p. x). 
163 
 
marks the doctrine’s purpose as critical in the Kantian sense, being to delineate 
the epistemological conditions of thought.554 Natorp will not be discussed at length 
here, but he is the interlocutor against which Hartmann most often positions his 
own work. Hartmann’s reading in Platos Logik des Seins555 of 1909, for instance, 
is similarly categorical, for example interpreting οὐσία [being or beingness] as ‘that 
mutual relationship between the elements of thought in which the concept of 
“Being” consists’.556 Importantly however, as Luchetti notes, unlike Natorp’s pure 
epistemology, Hartmann’s logic of being does not entirely reduce being to logic.557 
 
Hartmann’s ontological commitments markedly distinguish his philosophy from that 
of his contemporaries, to the degree that both Harich and Peterson have recently 
questioned why we attribute the twentieth century fixation with ontology to a 
Heideggerian genesis at all.558 Hartmann, Peterson explains, is indeed a Kantian, 
but one who does not accept that the role of the critical in Kant’s project is to 
delimit all of its findings to a purely transcendental horizon, as a blueprint of the 
relationship between sensibility and understanding that makes no claims regarding 
the nature of the world beyond our representation of it.559 Such an abstract 
algebra, ‘completed in neo-Kantianism […] undoubtedly gives wings to apriorism 
                                                          
554 Vasilis Politis, ‘Anti-Realist Interpretations of Plato: Paul Natorp’, in 
International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 9.1 (2001), 47-62. 
555 No English translation available. Nicolai Hartmann, Platos Logik des Seins 
(1909) (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1965). 
556 Claudia Luchetti, ‘Nicolai Hartmann’s Plato. A Tribute to the “Power of 
Dialectics” (Parmenides, 135c 2)’, in The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, ed. by 
Frederic Tremblay, Carlo Scognamiglio and Roberto Poli (Berlin/Boston: Walter de 
Gruyter & Co, 2011), pp. 221-36 (p. 222). 
557 Luchetti, ‘Nicolai Hartmann’s Plato’, p. 226. 
558 Keith R. Peterson, ‘An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology’, in 
Axiomathes, 22 (2012), 291-314 (p. 292). 
559 Peterson, ‘An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology’, p. 294. 
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as such, but it ceases to be epistemological apriorism’, Hartmann writes, giving 
rise instead to ‘speculative flights of conceptual fancy’.560 
 
But nor, Cicovacki notes, can Hartmann accept ‘the Parmenidian postulation of the 
ultimate unity of being and thinking’, which for Hartmann assigns too much unity to 
a patently discordant world, and depending on which way the unity is inflected, 
either slips into speculation or reduces what is to a series of bracketed Augustinian 
pictures.561 For Hartmann, both apriorism and immanentism are entirely arbitrary 
so long as the realms they each describe remain disconnected. In fact, Hartmann 
considers the seemingly opposed poles of apriorism and immanentism to be 
symptoms of but one erroneous presumption, namely, that the logical can and 
should only be pursued in the realm of logic.562 In the former, the logical ends up 
being taken as a world unto itself, and in the latter, the world is reduced to 
‘everything that is the case’563 as it is with logical atomism. Kant’s critical 
philosophy, on Hartmann’s interpretation, is centrally concerned with defining the 
connection between the a priori and the immanent. 
 
Hartmann’s disagreement with neo-Kantianism can as such be seen to come 
down to a disagreement over whether an a priori justification of knowledge 
restricts the content of that knowledge to the a priori realm. When, in the Critique’s 
‘Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding’ Kant seeks to justify, in the 
strongly legal inflection of the word, the leap from demonstrating the de facto 
                                                          
560 Nicolai Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible? Toward the Foundation 
of the General Theory of the Categories, Part One (1923)’, trans. by Keith R. 
Peterson, in Axiomathes, 22 (2012), 315-54 (p. 317). 
561 Predrag Cicovacki, ‘New Ways of Ontology – The Ways of Interaction’, in 
Axiomathes, 12.3-4 (2001), 159-170 (p. 160). 
562 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, pp. 317-25. 
563 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1913) (London: 
Routledge, 1961), I. 
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possibility of applying the a priori categories to objects, to asserting the necessity 
of their application de jure,564 rather than understanding this proof as taking place 
entirely within the transcendental horizon, Hartmann takes the ‘objective validity’565 
for which Kant strives to be ontological in nature, stating that ‘there is no doubt that 
the deduction pertains directly to the ontological problem disguised in the 
apriorism of the cognitive categories.566 ‘It has been repeated ad nauseam since 
Kant’, Hartmann goes on, ‘that a priori knowledge is possible only where the object 
of knowledge is a mere appearance; one could at least not know anything a priori 
about something existing in itself’.567 But for Hartmann, Peterson explains, ‘in 
asking about our epistemological limitations Kant was also asking a question to 
which philosophers had always assumed they knew the answer, namely, “How 
does thought relate to things?”’.568 Claiming that Kant ‘makes it astoundingly easy 
for himself, but he misses the point from the start’,569 Hartmann professes the 
extent of his commitment to interpreting Kant’s texts ontologically: 
 
Representation is, as such, never knowledge; it can be, but then it is not 
knowledge by virtue of its own essence, but by virtue of the essence of 
a heterogeneous and transcendent relation to something else, by the 
relation to an object intended by it beyond the representation. Whether 
it be thought, imaginary objects, or ostensible knowledge of being, 
representation emptily running on without such a counterweight is a 
priori in the widest sense. It is not a priori knowledge, however. It is a 
mistake to believe that the problem of the a priori is a purely 
epistemological one. Wishes, intentions, suppositions, and prejudices 
also have an a priori character. An a priori object [Gebilde] first acquires 
its epistemic value through a particular dignity, not belonging to it 
                                                          
564 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 120-1. 
565 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 130. 
566 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 317. 
567 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 316. 
568 Peterson, ‘An Introduction to Nicolai Hartmann’s Critical Ontology’p. 294. 
569 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 317. 
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merely due to its apriority, which Kant called ‘objective reality’ or 
‘objective validity.’ The Critique of Pure Reason teaches in the most 
emphatic way just how much the proof of objective validity is in itself a 
problem by giving a central place to the ‘transcendental deduction’ in 
the problem of knowledge.570 
 
So where Heidegger deems the adequation between thought and thing secondary 
and derivative to the presentation of the phenomenon,571 Hartmann provides the 
countermove, accepting the critical delimitation of the phenomenon as synthetic 
representation and placing all genuine ontological weight on the adequation 
between that representation and its object in knowledge. Thus when Kant sets out 
the stakes of the critical program as being to turn the faculty of reason on itself, in 
order to determine the ‘knowledge after which [the faculty of reason] may strive 
independently of all experience’ so as to delimit and do away with those questions 
which although prescribed by reason, also transcend its abilities,572 the critical 
delimitation must have repercussions beyond epistemology since for Hartmann 
‘there is no knowledge whose whole meaning would not consist in knowledge of 
“what is”’.573 
 
If it is the case that, as Hartmann claims, knowledge justified without recourse to 
the world can nevertheless make claims about that world, then Kant’s critical 
delimitation of what knowledge may be attained a priori is on Hartmann’s 
interpretation a critical delimitation of what connections between thought and thing 
may be deemed sound. To restate, Hartmann’s kritische ontologie or critical 
ontology, makes no claims of a general symmetry or unity between cognitive 
                                                          
570 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 317. 
571 See section (2.4). 
572 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 9. 
573 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p .316. 
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representations and their objects, but in critically delimiting what can be known 
apriori, and with the stipulation that knowledge is knowledge of what is, we can 
determine the nature of our transcendent connection to the world in a critically 
circumscribed way. The symmetry here, rather than being between 
representations and objects, is between the a priori categories and certain logically 
governed restricted portion of the real world. 
 
Hartmann’s presentation of Plato follows a very similar process, in the way that it 
progresses out towards the ontological from the ground of the critical-
transcendental. Luchetti explains that Hartmann’s starting point is Natorp’s 
interpretation of Plato’s ideas as transcendental principles, but even here the two 
differ over what exactly defines a principle. For while it is the case that the two 
contemporaries agree that the Platonic idea is not a substance,574 their 
disagreement over how to interpret the idea as a law or Platonic category follows 
the same points as their differences regarding Kant. Replace Kantian “category” 
with Platonic “principle” and the contention remains: where Natorp understands 
Plato’s ideas as laws governing the a priori cognition of a priori representations, 
Hartmann sees knowledge of something in the world. The work to be done for 
Hartmann, as with his interpretation of Kant, is to steer the Platonic text between 
                                                          
574 This is Hartmann at his most positivist. Borrowing from the natural sciences the 
tenet that ‘laws can show an essentially qualitatively different face than the 
phenomena which rest on them and exist through them’, for example, the 
postulates of trigonometry are not triangular or indeed of a spatial order at all, 
Hartmann highlights what he calls the ‘Error of Homogeneity’, or ‘the “Platonic 
Error”’. Hartmann points out that Plato’s Ideas and the beings which share their 
names should not be considered qualitatively homogenous and only differing by 
degree of perfection, for instance the Idea of red being redder than any instance of 
red but still qualitatively red, for this picture is at best ambiguous (what explanatory 
power can a dualism hold if it simply describes the same world in duplicate?), and 
at worst paradoxical (if the Ideas of tallness and shortness are also qualitatively 
so, then they not only provide the principle for differentiating between sizes of 
entities, but also have qualitative differences with each other, and would therefore 
require recourse to a meta-principle, and so on ad infintum): Hartmann, ‘‘How is 
Critical Ontology Possible?’, pp. 326-27. 
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empty tautological apriorism (which is nothing but a closed ‘unified deductive 
scheme’),575 and the naiveté of ascribing absolute unqualified identity to being and 
thought (in which ‘there cannot be anything alogical in reality’,576 for ‘an 
unintelligible element in the realm of the real would be rendered impossible’).577 
Hartmann therefore writes of Plato: 
 
The ‘Idea’ was to him the metaphysical expression of the structural 
identity between the principle of thinking and the principle of being. Of 
course, by this means the problem was not resolved for him. In order to 
seize the Idea, a particular method was still required, that of the 
‘hypothesis,’ in which a critical reference back to the phenomena was 
clearly included.578 
 
Now Natorp, Luchetti notes, understands Socrates’ affirmation of the hypothetical 
method,579 in his assertion that he ‘must have recourse to λόγους and examine in 
them the ἀλήθειαν of ὄντων’,580 to be a proposition regarding transcendental 
objects, wherein ὄντων are objects of representation, ideas are the laws that form 
and organise them and λόγους the fabric of dialectical reasoning that is both 
                                                          
575 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 319. 
576 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 319. 
577 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 320. 
578 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 319. 
579 The “hypothetical method” is announced in the Phaedo when Socrates turns 
his gaze from the blinding sun of the ideal, and, like one studying an eclipse, looks 
to the images reflected in the water of the logos (99d-e). Socrates quickly qualifies 
this as a metaphor however, indicating that λόγοις are connected to the ideal in a 
much more fundamental way than εἰκόσι (100a). Refuting the regresses of causal 
explanation, Socrates defines his method as to take the ‘principle [λόγον] which I 
consider the strongest [ἐρρωμενέστατον], and whatever seems to me to agree with 
this [συμφωνεῖν], whether relating to cause [αἰτίας] or to anything else, I regard as 
true [ἀληθῆ], and whatever disagrees with it, as untrue’ (100a). If asked for an 
‘explanation of the principle [λόγον], you would give it in the same way by 
assuming some other principle which seemed to you the best of the higher ones’ 
(101d): Plato, ‘Phaedo’. 
580 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, 99e. 
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grounded in these principles and capable of exposing them, in just the same way 
that for Kant the critical project operates both on and from the power of reason.581  
 
As such, in determining the ontological-critical moment in Plato as the 
“hypothetical method”, Hartmann is indicating another departure from his old 
teacher. Although Hartmann agrees that ‘the Logos belongs to the nature of the 
Idea itself’,582 he refuses to consign the idea exclusively to the a priori 
epistemological horizon, and indicates that Socratic method is deductive in the 
Kantian sense, claiming that the hypothetical movement from  each λόγον to a 
higher, simpler concept, is far more than a Natorpian auto-exposition of 
epistemological categories, but is a deduction of the basic logical symmetry 
between the most fundamental ideas from which the logos arises, and a critically 
delimited portion of the real world. Indeed, Hartman writes that he sees ‘the great 
dialectical investigations of Plato’s Parmenides as a kind of “transcendental 
deduction” of the Ideas’,583 that is, a critical delimitation of what can be known of 
what is. 
 
At its base, the dialectical deduction is for Hartmann rooted in a moment of pure 
identity. Musing over the multiplicity of sensory organs and registers, Socrates 
remarks in the Theaetetus that it would be ‘strange’ if there were not ‘one power 
[μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν’], whether we should call it soul [ψυχὴν] or something else, by 
which we perceive through these as instruments the objects of perception’.584 
From this, Hartmann concludes that ‘the vision of the Idea is mainly the “unity of a 
                                                          
581 Luchetti, ‘Nicolai Hartmann’s Plato’, p. 222. 
582 Luchetti, ‘Nicolai Hartmann’s Plato’, p. 223. 
583 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, 328 n. 3. 
584 Plato, ‘Theaetetus’, in Plato With an English Translation, trans. by Harold North 
Fowler, II: Theaetetus, Sophist (London: Heinemann, 1914) pp. 1-248 (including 
parallel Greek text), 184d. 
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vision”’585 since the ψυχὴν [psyche, soul] is itself an idea, and as such it is a 
mistake to confuse the relation between idea and thing for a relation between 
subject and object; the ψυχὴν is one part of the unity it seeks to discover 
dialectically, 586 and the “error of subjectivity”, which Hartmann ascribes to Kant 
also, is to internalise this unity and in doing so transform the real connection of 
thing and idea into a χωρισμός,587 the classic Aristotelian renunciation of μέθεξις, 
which designates the ‘ontological transcendence of the ideas’, existing in isolation 
‘”in a heavenly place”’,588 whether this heavenly place is a transcendental subject 
with Kantianism or a suprasensuous realm with Platonism. It is clear why 
Gadamer would find Hartmann to be ‘trapped in a naïve realism’589 or 
‘objectivism’.590  
 
It is important to note that Hartmann determines the problem of χωρισμός to be an 
issue in Platonism rather than the Platonic oeuvre itself,591 since his approach to 
μέθεξις emerges from a biographical or historicist interpretation of the intra-
relatedness of the dialogues. Gadamer writes in 1974, that on Hartmann’s 
                                                          
585 Nicolai Hartmann, Platos Logik des Seins, cited by Claudia Luchetti, in ‘Nicolai 
Hartmann’s Plato. A Tribute to the “Power of Dialectics” (Parmenides, 135c 2)’, in 
The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann, ed. by Frederic Tremblay, Carlo 
Scognamiglio and Roberto Poli (Berlin/Boston: Walter de Gruyter & Co, 2011), pp. 
221-36 (p. 226). 
586 Hartmann and Heidegger come remarkably close here. In his lectures of the 
winter of 1931-32, Heidegger explains that in this passage of the Theaetetus, the 
soul is ‘a relationship to what is perceivable in general’, but not in the sense that it 
is employed to unite the sense organs after the case, for ‘we do not perceive 
colour and sound because we see and hear, but the reverse is the case: only 
because our self is relational in its essence, i.e. maintains a region of perceivability 
as such and comports itself to this, can the same self have different kinds of 
perceptions (e.g. seeing or hearing) within one and the same region’. Heidegger, 
The Essence of Truth, p. 128. 
587 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, pp. 332-334. 
588 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 328. 
589 Moran, Introduction to Phenomenology, p. 255. 
590 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’ (1975), in The Gadamer 
Reader: A Bouquet of the Later Writings, ed. by Richard E. Palmer (Illinois: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007), pp. 5-38 (p. 10). 
591 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 328. 
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account, and by the accounts of those who would follow ‘the trend-setting works of 
Julius Stenzel’,592 the rather more intense dialectical interrogation of the doctrine 
of ideas that takes place in later dialogues593 should be interpreted biographically, 
as if it were the case, Gadamer mocks, that ‘Plato himself recognised that the 
dogmatic assertion of the doctrine of ideas was untenable and that he then sought 
by means of dialectic to overcome the gap between two worlds’.594 Hartmann 
confirms this position in the 1923 text, stating that: 
 
In [the later dialogues] the concept of “symploke” turned methexis itself 
from the one-dimensional vertical axis into the horizontal axis where the 
participation of the Ideas among themselves takes the place of the 
notion of the participation of things in the Ideas.595 
 
By making Plato an emergent proto-Kantian who came to understand vertical 
μέθεξις as a deductive error to which the συμπλοκή of intra-ideal μέθεξις provided 
the answer, Hartmann is claiming that the two concepts essentially do the same 
job. For if Plato truly did at one stage conceive of vertical μέθεξις as a concept 
binding two discrete realms, which, in Kantian maturity Plato realised were not 
actually separate, why did he not just get rid of the connectivity of μέθεξις 
altogether? Here Hartmann has subtly blurred the distinction between the 
methodology of his strong interpretation of Plato, and a trajectory within the 
Platonic text. 
 
                                                          
592 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Idea and Reality in Plato’s Timaeus’ (1974), in 
Dialogue and Dialectic, trans. by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 156-93 (157 n. 2). 
593 As noted in chapter one, Plato submits his ontology of perfection and concept 
of μέθεξις to stringent critique in both the Sophist and the Parmenides. 
594 Gadamer, ‘Idea and Reality in Plato’s Timaeus’, p. 157. 
595 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 327. 
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As we have seen, on Hartmann’s account, the point of Socratic dialectic is to 
proceed by hypothesis from the identification of soul and idea in intuition, to 
higher, simpler, more general principles. Now at the pinnacle of these, Hartmann 
explains, is not the Parmenidean ‘”One.” but rather a ‘community’ (koinonia)’, in 
which the interconnections of principles are reducible no further, for if they were, 
the dialectic would prove the absolute identity of being and thought beyond the 
critically delimited categories.596 In contending that ‘the chorismos of the Ideas that 
is conclusively bridged by means of these investigations [due to the fact that] the 
symploke leads to ‘the counterpart of the Idea,’ the concretum’,597 Hartman 
reverses the hypothetical deductive dialectic into a διαίρεσις, a division, that 
explains the physical circumscription of beings on the basis of the division of their 
principles from more general principles.  
 
Hartmann would of course object that this is not problematic, for we are speaking 
only of a critically delimited set of entities whose connection with ideas have been 
transcendentally deduced by dialectic, yet the ideal nature of intuition would 
suggest that this is a rather broad set. Gadamer writes in 1968 that the casting of 
μέθεξις as a ‘principium individuationis’, the principle by which entities can be 
individuated in space and time, ‘has its origins in Hegel’s and Fichte’s systematic 
conception598 of philosophy’,599 and then, in 1978 points out that this historicist 
version of Plato’s later “discovery” of συμπλοκή is not even philologically accurate: 
                                                          
596 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, p. 347. 
597 Hartmann, ‘How is Critical Ontology Possible?’, 328 n. 4. 
598 Since this particular interpretation is singularly epistemological it falls outside of 
this thesis’ focus on ontological interpretations of the concept of μέθεξις, for 
precisely the same reason that I do not claim Hartmann’s rejection of 
Parmenidean Oneness is of relevance. Categorical plurality makes no claim of 
ontological plurality, only of a set number of critical correlations, either within the 
transcendental horizon or between cognition and world. Ontology is as such either 
entirely bracketed, or critically delimited. 
173 
 
 
It is striking that throughout the dialogues the terminology used for the 
relationship between idea and appearance is extremely free: parousia 
(presence), symplokē (interweaving), koinōnia (coupling), methexis 
(participation), mimēsis (imitation), and mixis (mixture) are all found 
alongside each other. Both the Parmenides and Aristotle’s critique 
finally single out methexis [not συμπλοκή] from these expressions.600 
 
I will show in the following section that Gadamer seeks to refute Hartmann’s 
conception of μέθεξις on both fronts in his early Plato interpretation, arguing that 
neither variety of μέθεξις, vertical or intra-ideal, is a principle of individuation, and 
that they are certainly not reducible to one another. First, however, I would like to 
conclude this section by introducing the Heideggerian elements of Gadamer’s 
refutation of Hartmann. 
 
Having waned in the time the two had spent together in Marburg from 1923, 
Heidegger’s academic respect for his assistant Gadamer was reinvigorated when 
he examined Gadamer for the certificate in classical philology on 20 July 1927.601 
As a result, Heidegger took on the supervision of Gadamer’s Habilitationsschrift on 
Plato alongside Paul Friedländer. It was submitted under the title ‘Interpretation 
des Platonischen Philebos’ the following summer and published in 1931 as Platos 
                                                                                                                                                                                
599 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic’ (1968), in Dialogue and 
Dialectic, pp. 124-55 (p. 138). 
600 Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian 
Philosophy (1978), trans. by P. Christopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1986), p. 10. 
601 Lawrence Schmidt, ‘Hans-Georg Gadamer: A Biographical Sketch’, in 
Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. by Jeff 
Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald and Jens Kertscher (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), 
pp. 1-14 (p. 4). 
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dialektische Ethik [Plato’s Dialectical Ethics].602 Gadamer recalls this period of 
their relationship from the reverse perspective, asserting that Heidegger opened 
up the possibility of the Plato interpretation all the way back in the summer of 
1923, immediately prior to Heidegger’s relocation from Freiburg to Marburg. The 
seminars of that term,603 Gadamer writes, ‘permitted me to have the necessary 
distance from the work of my two other Marburg teachers’,604 Natorp and 
Hartmann. 
 
With the revolutionary potential of Husserl’s phenomenology also too closely allied 
with transcendental idealism in the eyes of the young Gadamer,605 it was the 
Heidegger of 1923 who persuaded Gadamer of a genuine possibility for ‘real 
thinking’,606 which could be, against positivism, a thinking of substances and 
forces irreducible to permutations of equations within atemporal conceptual 
architecture. Heidegger showed Gadamer ‘that we could only “fetch back” 
[wiederholen, repeat] the philosophizing of the Greeks after we had forfeited that 
fundamentum incommensum of philosophy […] namely, self-consciousness’.607 
With the rejection of the transcendental reduction to epistemological substructure, 
the historicality of thought was released to Gadamer from a story of the same 
barren questions iterated in different contexts, and ‘the old questions of the 
                                                          
602 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological 
Interpretations Relating to the Philebus (1931), trans. by Robert M. Wallace (New 
York: Yale University Press, 1991). 
603 These lectures are available in English translation as: Martin Heidegger, 
Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1923), trans. by John van Buren 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999). 
604 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 10. 
605 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, pp. 6-9. 
606 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 10. 
607 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 10. 
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tradition’ were not in this way rendered outmoded relics, but ‘so alive that they 
became our own questions’.608 
 
Firstly, Gadamer explains, in Heidegger’s analysis of Aristotle’s φρόνησις in the 
seminars, an analysis already outlined in section (2.3), Gadamer heard a ‘magical 
word’.609  In Heidegger’s seminars, Gadamer recalls, Heidegger marked out the 
importance of the fact that ‘in practical reason there is no forgetting’,610 a lesson 
Gadamer reiterates in the section on Aristotle in 1960’s Wahrheit und Methode 
[Truth and Method].611 As Gadamer recalls some years later, this lack of 
‘teachability’ of a wisdom that does not simply ‘pass from one to the other’ reveals 
its ‘possibility in praxis itself, and that means the inner linkage of ethics’.612 This 
insight, that the understanding can only be understood by taking account of its 
roots in intersubjectivity, was to be the seed of a realisation that the critical 
‘conditions of understanding’ are not to be sought in the unchanging architecture 
of the mind, for they ‘articulate themselves in a consciousness that formulates 
itself in language and does not begin with nothing or end in infinity’.613 Φρόνησις 
opened for Gadamer a space between historical relativism and atemporal 
universalism, for it indicates a Vorgreiflichkeit or ‘anticipation within concepts’614 
that determines the understanding as always already conditioned by a pre-
reflective world of shared meaning which is neither arbitrary nor fixed, but is 
conditioned by the ethico-political flux of the logos. 
                                                          
608 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 11. 
609 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 12. 
610 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 12. 
611 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (1960), trans. by Joel Weinsheimer 
and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2006), pp. 315-18. 
612 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Philosophical Apprenticeships’ (1977), in The Many 
Faces of Philosophy, ed. by Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (New York: OUP USA, 
2004), pp. 467-72 (pp. 470-71). 
613 Gadamer, ‘Philosophical Apprenticeships’ p. 470. 
614 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 12. 
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Secondly, in the assertion Heidegger made to Gadamer in a private meeting, that 
‘Aristotle ultimately stood on the same ground of the logos for which Plato 
prepared him’,615 Gadamer sees that Aristotle’s interrogations of Plato’s 
philosophy do not reverse the Socratic linguistic turn, but introduce a discourse on 
the empirical into a dialectical relationship with Plato’s texts, and that all of this 
happens entirely within the ‘Socratic-Platonic ground which Plato entered with the 
flight into the logoi’.616 The methodological framework of this dialogical reading of 
Aristotle impressed upon Gadamer the insight that to be loyal to the Greeks was 
‘to discover truths in their “being-other”,617 that is, entirely flipping the assimilating 
approach of transcendental philosophy, ‘that one should make the dialogical 
partner stronger’.618 
 
It is in this sense that Gadamer’s greatest loyalty to Heidegger is his divergence 
from Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle during the course of his philological 
studies.619 And it is a lesson applied in Gadamer’s habilitation, attested to by the 
negative reviews its publication received from certain readers who, Gadamer 
writes, ‘only regard one’s research as “positive” if something new is produced’,620 
since they regard it as ‘trivial to understand what is simply there’.621 The stakes 
had for Gadamer been reversed; positivity really meant appropriation into 
established systems, whereas showing what is simply there meant the genuine 
creativity of entering into a dialectical relationship that renews rather than 
synthesises. 
                                                          
615 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
616 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 311. 
617 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
618 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
619 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
620 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
621 Gadamer, ‘Autobiographical Reflections’, p. 13. 
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When, years later, Gadamer describes his early interpretation of Platonic μέθεξις, 
as a refutation of Hartmann’s ‘theory of descending622 methexis’,623 he recalls that 
his charge was that Hartmann ignored ‘the binding of the eidos to the logos’ to his 
own detriment, such that in his work ‘language is consequently replaced with 
mathematical calculus’.624 It is clear from our brief discussion of Hartmann’s and 
Heidegger’s influences that Gadamer’s charge is an application of his lesson from 
Heidegger, that Greek philosophizing takes place always on the common ground 
of the logos. And indeed, although Hartmann is never called by name, Gadamer’s 
thesis does attack both the terms under which Hartmann formulates the question 
of μέθεξις, and those by which he answers it. In the following section I aim to 
demonstrate the mechanics of Gadamer’s early reading, and to highlight the way it 
prefigures his mature work, in which μέθεξις becomes an important element of his 
hermeneutics. 
 
  
                                                          
622 This is a translation of ‘absteigende μέθεξις’, the title of a section in Hartmann’s 
Platos Logik des Seins, pp. 360-65 
623 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 312. 
624 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 312. 
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3.4 Gadamer’s interpretation of μέθεξις as an ontological presupposition of 
dialogue 
As already stated, Hartmann is never mentioned by name in Plato’s Dialectical 
Ethics, but one can be under no illusion whom is in Gadamer’s targets when he 
explicitly declares in that text that μέθεξις has nothing to do with the problem of 
individuation: 
 
If Plato makes the particular thing’s methexis with the Idea into a 
problem, he is not thereby formulating an unsolved problem of his 
ontology: he is not posing the problem of individuation; instead, the 
aporia of this “problem” is itself meant, indirectly, to make the 
assumptions of the ontology visible.625 
 
The analysis of μέθεξις offered in the text is powerfully informed by the work’s 
guiding insight, that the dialogical form of Plato’s text is no rhetorical device, but 
rather reflects the form of shared understanding and the way meaning arrives in 
dialogue. ‘The process of reaching a shared understanding of the matter in 
question through conversation is aimed at knowledge’,626 Gadamer notes, and as 
such, he reads the texts as performative, so that if the problem of μέθεξις is indeed 
‘insoluble’ as he echoes Aristotle in asserting,627 this aporia is nevertheless real, 
because it expresses not an impasse arising from a systematic treatise, but is a 
dialogical invocation of the ontological presuppositions of dialogue itself. Gadamer 
therefore reverses the order of exposition; where Hartmann sees the dialectic as 
an experiment yielding results, Gadamer sees the staging of a game that takes 
place, as Heidegger has taught him, already on the ground of the logos, 
apagogically gesturing back toward its conditions. 
                                                          
625 Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, 96 n. 20. 
626 Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, p. 17. 
627 Gadamer, Plato's Dialectical Ethics, p. 96. 
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Gadamer comes to refer to this presupposition in Truth and Method as ‘die 
metaphysische Crux des Platonismus’628 - ‘the metaphysical crux of Platonism’.629 
Both of the meanings of the word crux are at play here. The metaphysical crux is 
for Gadamer both an unsolved problem and a central tenet of Platonism, not in the 
sense of the critical point from which to unravel it, but as the nexus that cannot be 
refuted from within the system. For Gadamer, the transcendent dimension of 
μέθεξις is not a problem Plato’s dialogues run into, but is their very presupposition, 
for ‘in the logos the individual entity is encountered only as an ahyletic eidos.’630 
The very linguistic articulation of the problem of transcendent μέθεξις in the 
Platonic text, by Gadamer’s account, therefore already relies for its presentation 
upon the division it queries. What was understood by Hartmann as a problem 
Plato only became cogent of in maturity, for Gadamer pertains to the fact that the 
ontological division that grounds the logos cannot be completely accounted for 
within the logos, due to its being of another order. As such, to take any resulting 
aporia as a refutation would be for Gadamer a category mistake. Μέθεξις is only 
aporetic insofar as it is not appropriable by the dialogue it permits and Plato’s 
demonstration of this aporia within the dialogues is, on Gadamer’s account, not a 
crisis but a further refinement. 
 
‘That this participation exists is, in the end,’ Gadamer writes in the 1988 essay 
‘Plato als Porträitist’ [Plato as Portraitist], ‘the condition for the very possibility of 
thinking and speaking, of the binding together of the ideas and understanding’.631 
In Truth and Method, as in that essay, Gadamer turns to Plato’s phenomenological 
                                                          
628 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (1960) (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975), 
p. 456. 
629 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 476. 
630 Gadamer, Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, 96, n. 20. 
631 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 314. 
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treatment of the beautiful in the Phaedrus to demonstrate that what is aporetic in 
expression is not so in experience, evidenced in the otherworldliness of beauty 
which emerges and subsides in the immediacy of the phenomenon: 
 
“Being present” belongs in a convincing way to the being of the 
beautiful itself. However much beauty might be experienced as the 
reflection of something supraterrestrial, it is still there in the visible 
world. That it really is something different, a being of another order, is 
seen in its mode of appearance. It appears suddenly; and just as 
suddenly, without any transition, it disappears again. If we must speak 
with Plato of a hiatus (chorismos) between the world of the senses and 
the world of ideas, this is where it is and where it is also overcome.632 
  
Μέθεξις pushed to the intensity of the singular case of beauty reveals itself to 
Gadamer as the appearance of otherness in the appearance, and its correlate dis-
appearance, whereby the flickering radiance of beauty divulges the dialectical 
element of brute phenomenal experience. The two registers of being in this picture, 
the apparent and the supraterrestrial, are not for Gadamer two expressions of the 
same unity, and nor does μέθεξις resolve their difference, for it is only in the 
tension of this duality that novelty arrives. 
 
In affirming that the logos already presupposes the irreducible connectedness of 
the real and ideal for the presentation of its interrogation of this divide, Gadamer’s 
text flips on its head the univocal assertion that μέθεξις merely says the one 
“being” in two ways, for, according to Gadamer, every time “being” is said in the 
singular, it already presupposes the duality of μέθεξις that binds the ideal and real 
in the logos, and is quite evident in brute experience. I aim to show in the following 
section that the irreducibility of μέθεξις from a dynamic of radical transcendent 
                                                          
632 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 476. 
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alterity is retained in Gadamer’s use of the concept in theorising the irreducibility of 
the temporal extension of the faculty of understanding. 
 
Now, the question of Hartmann’s intra-ideal μέθεξις is approached by Gadamer in 
a consideration of Plato’s Parmenides. When in that text Plato has the young 
Socrates employ a set of similarly phenomenological proofs to the example of 
beauty just outlined, the Eleatic master points out to Socrates that although his 
comparison of μέθεξις to daylight achieves a demonstration that the light of being 
need not become separate from its source in shining on beings,633 it does not, 
however, explain how the ‘whole idea, being one, is in each of the many 
participants,’634 without as a result becoming divided and ‘separate from itself,’635 
or, like a sail spread ‘over many persons’,636 reveal its nature as in fact constituted 
of parts, segments through which each particular participates in but a small section 
of the singular idea.637 
 
Parmenides’ point to the young Socrates is that in his examples, which are meant 
to demonstrate that there is no problematic χωρίς between the idea and 
appearance, Socrates still maintains the singularity of each form in which the 
particular participates, the oneness of the ideal. ‘In the hypothesis of the beautiful 
and the good, Socrates does not doubt that “it itself” would be different and 
separate from everything that participates in it’,638 Gadamer writes. Here Plato 
has, through the mouth of Parmenides, internalised his text’s confrontation with 
the Parmenidean oneness of being. For how can it be that the text enacts a 
                                                          
633 Plato, Parmenides, 131b. 
634 Plato, Parmenides, 131a. 
635 Plato, Parmenides, 131b. 
636 Plato, Parmenides, 131b. 
637 Plato, Parmenides, 131c. 
638 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 313. 
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shared dialogue on a single idea - in this particular instance the idea of the 
doctrine ideas - if by sharing in it, the characters of Socrates and Parmenides in 
fact share it out, dissect it, or rupture it? This is of course the same dialectical 
interrogation which Hartmann refers to as a transcendental deduction, and 
reverses as an explanation of individuation in space and time. 
 
Insofar as this iteration of the μέθεξις problem is supplementary to the first, 
likewise Gadamer’s response to it in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics builds on his 
response to the first. Again recalling the binding of the ideas and the logos, 
Gadamer reminds the reader that the ‘Parmenides proof takes place entirely within 
the eidē’,639 an observation which is enough to refute Hartmann’s notion that here 
Plato’s dialogue is providing a princpium individuationis by which entities can be 
individuated in space and time, through a dialectical division or diaeresis of higher 
genera of ideas into more specific concrete species. ‘Plato did not intend this as a 
proof that the Idea as a unity is and can be the plurality of what comes to be’,640 
Gadamer writes, indeed dialectical diaeresis is not employed to ‘provide positive 
defining characterizations of things’641 at all, for again, on Gadamer’s account such 
a determination cannot be achieved from within the logos where only the ideal is 
encountered. Rather, as with the first version of the μέθεξις problem, the 
demonstration exposes the ontological preconditions of doing diaeresis at all. 
 
To dialectically investigate the way a multiplicity of entities may participate in the 
same idea is, according to Gadamer’s strict adherence here to philosophizing with 
the Greeks within the logos, not to make any claim regarding the participants in 
themselves, but only of the ahyletic eidos that is encountered in the logos. 
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Therefore to show that a multiplicity of individuals or things participate in the same 
idea is really to show that a multiplicity of ideas can participate in the same idea. 
The dialectic takes place on but one horizon and therefore makes no claims 
regarding a hierarchical individuation of general ideal principles into concrete 
particulars, partly due of course to the fact that for Gadamer the dynamic μέθεξις 
that holds the real and the ideal in discordant harmony is already irrefutably 
intimated in the very act of dialogue. But on top of this, through the character of 
Parmenides, Plato ‘shows that the idea of unity does not exclude, but posits 
together with itself, the idea of multiplicity’.642 
 
In bringing the process of diaeresis to bear on the μέθεξις problem, Plato, on 
Gadamer’s interpretation, does not mark out the fracturing of the conceptual in the 
real, but exposes another ontological presupposition of the dialectical quality of 
dialogue, a nature upon which the logos relies but which it cannot master, ‘that the 
unity of an Idea can include a multiplicity of ideas under it’, not an ‘undefined 
manifold of things that are coming to be’, but a ‘multiplicity of unities’.643 As with 
the first version of the μέθεξις problem, the demonstration exposes the ontological 
preconditions of doing diaeresis at all, since it is only by virtue of, first of all, the 
fact of the binding of the ideas and logos, and secondarily, the fact that a 
multiplicity of unitary ideas can participate in another ideal unity, that any dialogue 
can achieve the ‘substantive defining characterisation of entities by dialectical 
diaeresis’.644 
 
In Plato’s Dialectical Ethics this conclusion remains partial, for although Gadamer 
has steered the interpretation of the Parmenides away from a reduction of the idea 
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to a genus or common trait under which a plurality of beings may be 
encompassed, it is only in ‘Plato as Portraitist’ that Gadamer makes the full 
assertion regarding the dialogue in question, that ‘if there is to be logos at all’, 
‘there must be participation of one idea in the other.’645 The crux or tension that 
holds the space of experience open and grounds the logos, μέθεξις, is not for 
Gadamer restricted purely to a unilateral transcendent doubling whereby the 
apparent sensible realm participates in the suprasensuous, the resonance of the 
one in the other allowing meaning to happen – this is only one condition of the 
dialectic; there is also a contiguous crux, a participation of idea in idea, which 
multiplies the participations involved in dialogue potentially without end. 
 
Gadamer’s ontological claims in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics are thus powerfully 
pluralistic, and on both counts. Firstly, as already noted, Gadamer denies that 
μέθεξις merely says the one “being” in two ways, turning the argument back on 
itself, pointing out that in the binding of the real and the ideal in the logos, any 
saying, even the saying of this one Parmenidean “being”, already presupposes the 
duality of μέθεξις for its presentation. Secondly, here, reversing Hartmann’s 
suggestion that the multiplicity of things are only particular expressions of higher 
and yet higher unities organised by hierarchical intra-ideal μέθεξις all the way up to 
the συμπλοκή, discoverable by the hypothetical method, Gadamer asserts the 
opposite, that this hypothetical method or dialectic, is only possible due to the fact 
that the ahyletic ideas it conjugates must already participate in one another for the 
method to proceed. Again, then, in every saying, dialectical or otherwise, the 
possibility of meaningful discourse already relies on the multiplicity of unities at 
play in every λόγον. 
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Now inasmuch as the analyses of transcendent and horizontal μέθεξις are 
presented in Plato’s Dialectical Ethics as an interpretation of Platonic dialogue, in 
what follows I would like to show the way in which Gadamer incorporates these 
two dimensions of participation as elements of his theory of hermeneutic 
experience, where the transcendent dimension is interpreted as the temporal 
interval of Dasein’s understanding, and the horizontal as the participation of 
individuals in the creation of shared tradition. In doing this, I am attempting to 
present the position from which Nancy combines these concepts, transforming 
μέθεξις into a horizontal or horizonal concept, through his demonstration that 
Dasein’s interval or openness, is an openness to others, a participation with other 
individuals, a μέθεξις of singularities. 
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3.5 Gadamer’s ontological interpretation of μέθεξις as the temporal and communal 
structure of Dasein 
Gadamer’s transference of aspects of his Plato interpretation into his hermeneutic 
theory, although implicitly clear throughout Truth and Method, is first 
acknowledged explicitly in the text when, in Gadamer’s aforementioned turn to 
Plato’s examination of beauty, Gadamer puts the word ‘μέθεξις’ in brackets next to 
his own concept of participation, ‘Teilhabe’.646 In the much later essay on Plato, 
Gadamer explains that the Greek μέθεξις and German Teilhabe have an intimacy 
entirely unavailable in the Latin participatio and its modern derivatives, ‘for here 
the idea of the whole and the parts intrudes[…] Can one really speak of taking a 
part when one takes part?’647 Gadamer backs this up with reference to Socrates’ 
response to Parmenides, writing that ‘Socrates finds the use of the concepts of 
whole and part inadequate, especially in the reified form in which Parmenides 
employs them for his refutation’.648 
 
As we will see, Gadamer’s rejection of the figures of whole and part is tied up with 
Truth and Method’s transformation of the historicist methodology of traditional 
hermeneutics. With this rejection, Gadamer refutes Aristotle’s claim that with the 
concept of μέθεξις Plato merely refers to the same external-representational 
relation as Pythagorean μίμησις,649 and the concomitant suggestion that there is a 
unified whole of which the parts are merely analogues. On Gadamer’s account, 
μίμησις ‘always points in the direction of that which one approaches, or towards 
which one is oriented,’ whereas μέθεξις, ‘as the Greek meta already signifies, 
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implies that one thing is there together with something else.’650 I will argue 
however that on Nancy’s reading the degree of belonging Gadamer assigns to 
μέθεξις in Truth and Method risks contradicting the ontological heterogeneity his 
analyses announced in the early treatment of Plato. 
 
Gadamer’s Truth and Method solicits a definitive break from classical hermeneutic 
method, which it diagnoses as historicist, consisting in an exegetical technique 
based on ‘the universal principle of textual interpretation’, namely ‘that all the 
details of a text were to be understood from the contextus and from the scopus’.651 
Referring to Schleiermacher, Gadamer explains that for the old hermeneutics, in 
the same way ‘the single word belongs in the total context of the sentence, so the 
single text belongs in the total context of a writer’s work’ and furthermore, to the 
‘whole genre’ and the ‘whole of its author’s inner life.’652 
 
The old hermeneutics therefore predicates its method on the assumption of the 
absolute availability of the meaning of a text within a specific historical worldview 
or contextus, and marks its aim or scopus as being to ‘transpose ourselves into 
the perspective within which [the author] has formed his views’,653 in order to 
resolve the historical division of the reader’s contextus from the author’s, with the 
further presupposition of the possibility of ‘one person’s immediate participation 
with another.’654 Methodologically speaking, the reader’s attention oscillates 
between a partial comprehension informed by his or her own historical 
situatedness and an anticipation of the full meaning of the text which is presumed 
to have been available to the author. The two are modified against one another 
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until equilibrium is reached and they resolve into a complete understanding of the 
text. What is presupposed by this method is participation understood as 
immediacy, both on the transcendent dimension spanning the historical hiatus and 
on the horizontal dimension of an immersion in one’s immanent contextus. 
 
Gadamer rejects the historicist interpretation of hermeneutics and along with it the 
very notion that hermeneutics is a method or technique at all. Referring to sections 
§31-2 of Being and Time, Gadamer explains that ‘when Heidegger gave 
understanding an ontological orientation by interpreting it as an "existential" and 
when he interpreted Dasein's mode of being in terms of time’,655 hermeneutics 
could no longer be understood to be structured according to a historical gap 
between contextūs, but reveals itself instead as the temporal structure of Dasein’s 
being-in-the-world, ‘the supportive ground of the course of events in which the 
present is rooted.’656 The interplay between immersive comprehension and 
anticipative conjecture is therefore not a methodological, or even a subjective 
process, it is in Gadamer’s text a description of ‘the ontological structure of 
understanding’,657 which as an existentiale, is entirely pre-subjective. As with the 
analysis of the transcendent μέθεξις of beauty and dialogue then, the interval 
between comprehension and anticipation does not for Gadamer constitute the 
objective of a resolution in the faculty of understanding, but rather the irreducible 
spacing of its ontological foundation. 
 
In being transformed from a historically antagonistic hiatus between worldviews 
into the dynamic ontological reciprocity of familiarity and arrival, there is no longer 
with Gadamer any motivation to close the gap between what had traditionally been 
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called “whole” and “part” in hermeneutics. Indeed, in being determined as the 
ontological structure of understanding, these concepts cease to have a 
substantive identity for Gadamer at all. Instead what is described is ‘the interplay 
of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter’,658 such that 
what is anticipated never finishes arriving, ‘the understanding of the text remains 
permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of fore-understanding’,659 
and the ‘discovery of the true meaning of a text or a work of art is never finished; it 
is in fact an infinite process’.660 For Gadamer, then, the understanding is not an 
instrument of synthesis or appropriation, because the tension between immediacy 
and partial disclosure ‘is not dissolved in perfect understanding but, on the 
contrary, is most fully realized’.661 “Perfect understanding” happens in the 
affirmation of Dasein’s differing from itself, the distinctiveness of novelty, the 
unfinishedness of the interpretive position and the ontological hiatus first 
articulated in Gadamer’s reading of Plato. 
 
Introducing the horizontal dimension of μέθεξις into his analysis, Gadamer notes 
that where historicist hermeneutics is unidirectional in its program of recovery, the 
hermeneutic dynamic is mutually implicative, it articulates Dasein’s contextus as a 
work in progress rather than as a stable historical coordinate, for ‘we produce it 
ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and 
hence further determine it ourselves’.662 He goes on, ‘[u]nderstanding is to be 
thought of less as a subjective act than as a participating in an event of tradition, a 
process of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’.663 
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Away from the fixity and immediacy of the historicist contextus, that is, the figure of 
the whole, Gadamer’s theory of interpretation is not only forged on an irreducible 
ontological heterogeneity that temporally spaces Dasein’s understanding, but the 
immediacy into which the novel arrives is itself in constant flux, opening onto the 
future and onto the others with whom meaning is shared. Gadamer calls this 
context-creation Horizontverschmelzung,664 the ethico-political negotiation and 
fusion of singular phenomenal horizons in the flux of the shared logos.665 
 
There is a problem here, however, that Gadamer affords this contiguous μέθεξις 
none of the radicality he ascribes to the temporal interval of Dasein’s 
understanding. For in the case of the transcendent μέθεξις of beauty and dialogue, 
as with Dasein’s understanding, every articulation and comprehension 
presupposes the irreducible hiatus of being. But here, in the contiguous μέθεξις of 
the event of tradition, Gadamer risks repeating the immanentist assertion of a 
unitary source, since though it is the case that the event of tradition that creates 
shared context is a plural dynamic, it is nevertheless a linguistic event grounded in 
a deep political identity. ‘Participation,’ Gadamer writes in the later essay on Plato, 
‘completes itself [erfüllt sich] only in genuine being-together and belonging-
together’,666 before going on to make the powerful claim that ‘the signifying power 
of the syllable meta lends μέθεξις the sense of “being-with” [Mitsein667]’.668 
Invoking Heidegger’s existential analytic, where ‘Being-with and Dasein-with 
[Mitsein and Mitdasein]’ are ‘structures of Dasein which are equiprimordial with 
                                                          
664 Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, p. 290. 
665 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 306. 
666 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 262. 
667 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Plato als Porträitist’ (1988), in Gesammelte Werke, vol. 
VII: Griechische Philosophie III: Plato im Dialog (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1991) 
pp. 228-257 (p. 246). 
668 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 314. 
191 
 
Being-in-the-World,’669 and disentangling hexis [ἕξις: disposition]670 from μέθεξις, a 
homology is derived. For Gadamer, met-hexis and mit-dasein say the same thing: 
an openness to meaning, an existential disposition, coordinated in advance by an 
essential togetherness with others. ‘Being present’, Gadamer writes in Truth and 
Method, ‘does not simply mean being there along with something else that is there 
at the same time.671 To be present means to participate,’672 and this means one 
‘participates in the communion of being present’.673 The plural project of tradition 
forming is thus grounded in a prior ontological commonality. In contrast to the 
radical otherness that permeates all phenomena, the interaction of contiguous 
μέθεξις is for Gadamer rooted in similarity, not alterity, spirit rather than logos, 
communion rather than community. 
 
These two trajectories, Dasein’s temporal interval as a transcendent μέθεξις, and 
its Mit- as the horizontal μέθεξις of shared tradition, are brought together by 
Gadamer in the Plato essay in a phenomenological demonstration akin to the one 
repeatedly referenced from the Phaedrus. Unlike Plato’s example of beauty which 
only illustrates the dynamic of a transcendent μέθεξις, Gadamer locates in the 
portrait a site at which both forms of μέθεξις evidence. Presenting his paper at the 
Munich Glyptothek, at the exhibition of a sculpture of Plato, Gadamer asserts that 
the portrait is exemplary amongst the plastic and visual disciplines for its 
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escalation of recognition, and therefore understanding to its forefront.674 In clear 
reference to Heidegger’s phenomenological definition of the artwork as a thing that 
announces its existence as its essence, radiating the fact that it is when it might 
not have been,675 Gadamer here determines ‘the most distinctive element of a 
portrait [as] its intention to be recognised as such,’676 that is, unlike the symbol that 
only wishes to disappear in its mediation, the portrait seemingly discloses its own 
μίμησις as its primary quality. And yet, as we have seen, this consideration of the 
portrait happens in a paper in which μίμησις is completely rejected.677 
 
‘It is the likeness [Abbildung], the image [Bild] of an individual or a person that 
would enable us to recognise it, if we know it’,678 Gadamer writes, and one must 
recognise the force of the last four words. The portrait is by no means a μίμησις of 
an origin. In the case in point, neither Gadamer nor the exhibitors can say how far 
removed this particular portrait is from an original, it being a Roman copy of a 
Greek sculpture of Plato, or maybe even a copy of a copy. The portrait rather 
discloses the way Plato becomes his image, that is, the way our Plato is 
constituted through the literary self-portrait he has bequeathed to us, and our 
shared understanding of it. That is to say, the portrait is for Gadamer a special 
case of the theatrical mimetic ambivalence noted in section (1.2), whether 
                                                          
674 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 294. 
675 Martin Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ (1935-37, 1950 & 1960), in 
Poetry Language Thought, trans. by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 
1975), pp. 15-89. 
676 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 295. 
677 In Truth and Method, Gadamer writes ‘[t]he doctrine of recognition on which 
mimetic representation is based only hints at what it would mean to grasp the 
claim to being of artistic representation’. Earlier, Gadamer writes of tragic theatre, 
‘[t]he spectator does not hold himself aloof at the distance characteristic of an 
aesthetic consciousness enjoying the art with which something is represented, but 
rather participates in the communion of being present.’ We will return to the 
question of μίμησις and the artwork in chapter four. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 
pp. 128 & 581. 
678 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 294. 
193 
 
Gadamer acknowledges this or not. We only recognise the portrait, for Gadamer, if 
we already participate in something of its meaning. Thus the portrait brings 
together in a special way the two terms of the investigation, novelty and 
participation, a transcendent burst of meaning in the μέθεξις of temporal arrival, 
enabled by the shared μέθεξις that furnishes the immanent that may enter this 
transcendent dynamic. 
 
To the extent that Gadamer’s strategy to overthrow the whole/part logic of 
classical hermeneutics dictates the rejection of the part and its μίμησις in favour of 
the belonging-together of μέθεξις, it seems clear that when Gadamer translates 
μέθεξις as Mitsein and determines being present to be co-originary with 
participation, that the whole/part logic he has in mind corresponds to the artificial 
separation of being-with and being-there. Yet, as already noted, in Gadamer’s 
refusal to make the μέθεξις of being-with a function of radical alterity in the same 
way that temporal μέθεξις is a properly transcendent opening onto otherness, he 
shrinks away from Plato’s Parmenides’ prompt in the direction of unstructured 
multiplicity and risks thinking the μέθεξις of tradition as not a 
Horizontverschmelzung, Gadamer’s word for a political negotiation and fusion of 
singular phenomenal horizons, but rather as Heidegger’s Erbschaft,679 which is the 
historical and fraternal essence which binds horizons together in advance.680  In 
the remaining sections I aim to show how Nancy’s reading of Gadamer, and his 
strong interpretation of the nature of Dasein and Mitsein, transposes the strong 
partition of transcendent μέθεξις onto the contiguous horizon of being-with. 
Beginning with Nancy’s criticism of Gadamer’s theory of interpretation, I will then 
draw out its ontological implications.  
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3.6 Nancy reading Gadamer reading Heidegger 
Explicit mentions of Gadamer are scarce in Nancy’s work and the one with which 
the beginning of this section is concerned, from 1982’s ‘Sharing Voices’, is critical 
of his appropriation of Heidegger’s hermeneutics. Nancy reprimands Gadamer for 
running together ‘the hermeneutic circle and Heideggerian preunderstanding’,681 
which is to say, for conflating Auslegung, which is Dasein’s prelinguistic 
articulation of beings as beings, and Interpretation, which Heidegger describes as 
the linguistic process that only comes after, and on account of, Auslegung.682 
Auslegung, Heidegger explains in this section, differs from Interpretation which is 
synonymous with the retroactivity of “explanation” by way of its Latin root, because 
it is not something that comes “after” the understanding, which is to say, in 
Auslegung ‘understanding does not become something different’.683 
 
Macquarrie and Robinson explain in their translation of Being and Time that 
Heidegger uses both words, Auslegung and Interpretation (which shares the 
spelling and etymology of its English counterpart), according to a consistent 
terminological program. They explain that while Interpretation is reserved for 
speaking of systematic exegeses and calculated strategies of theoretical 
development, Auslegung, which they translate as “interpretation” with a lower case 
“i” by way of distinction, ‘seems to be used in a broad sense to cover any activity in 
which we interpret something “as” something’.684 The notion of the “as” [als] 
highlighted by the translators in scare quotes, is a loaded term in itself. The fact 
that we experience entities as entities, rather than as manifold intuition of chaotic 
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sensory data, is amongst the first philosophical curiosities for the Greeks, and the 
“as” in Heidegger’s lexicon pertains precisely to this pre-predicative 
meaningfulness of experience, as Heidegger explains: 
 
In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it 
circumspectively, we “see” it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; 
but what we have thus interpreted [Ausgelegte] need not necessarily be 
also taken apart [auseinander zu legen] by making an assertion 
[Aussage]  which definitely characterizes it.’685 
 
The difference clearly concerns language. Auslegung Nancy writes, ‘announces 
what it comprehends’ and ‘to announce (Kundgeben) is neither to interpret nor to 
anticipate.’686 It furnishes the propensity to experience things as things rather than 
as a chaotic manifold. Auslegung, Nancy reasserts, ‘does not depend, in 
particular, on linguistic enunciation. Rather, it is the als which renders linguistic 
enunciation possible’.687 In the comprehensive Interpretation that follows, the thing 
already announced is split in the adding of a characterization. In §7 of Heidegger’s 
text, Heidegger states that the quality of logos is to ‘make manifest what one is 
“talking about,”’ that it lets ‘something be seen by pointing it out.’688 As such, logos 
relies on the prior disclosure of what is to be talked about, and if its speech is to be 
phenomenologically accurate it must only ‘let that which shows itself be seen from 
itself in the very way that it shows itself from itself.’689 For Nancy, this is a ‘discreet 
but decisive inflection’690 in Heideggerian methodology, because it shows that 
Heidegger is no longer interested in: 
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Showing the constitution of a world for a subject, but of letting be seen 
what the manifestation is, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, of 
letting it be seen that a comprehension is already comprehension of 
being.691 
 
What is at stake in the thought of Auslegung, as Heidegger puts it in the 1924-25 
lectures on Plato’s Sophist, is the thought that ‘in every understanding of the 
world, existence is understood with it,’692 and that while Being and Time will have 
to make use of the Darstellung of logos, the logos is to be set to use in 
approaching the things-themselves, phenomena, in their self-showing, not, as 
Heidegger writes in the lecture course on Plato’s Sophist two years prior to the 
publication of Being and Time, to ‘repeat propositions and understand them 
without having an original relation to the beings of which I am speaking’,693 that is, 
not to let the λέγειν (speaking) become the λεγόμενον (what is spoken of).694 If 
phenomenology is truly to be a science then it must not fix its results in advance, 
but rather discover them, for speaking of what is spoken of constitutes a vicious 
circle. 
 
In §2 of Being and Time Heidegger justifies his own project on this basis. There he 
writes that interrogating the question of the meaning of Being is ‘formally’ but not 
‘factically’ circular’.695 The circularity of which Heidegger speaks concerns the fact 
that Dasein has a ‘vague average understanding of Being’,696 since it experiences 
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that a being ‘is’, while lacking the ability to define what the ‘’is’ signifies’.697 But 
unlike an ‘axiom from which a sequence of propositions is deductively derived’,698 
the vague average understanding of Being does not presuppose ‘something which 
only the answer can bring’,699 for it does not constitute determinate knowledge of 
an ‘explicit concept of the meaning of Being’,700 but only the fact that Dasein 
experiences beings as beings, prelinguistically - a fact ‘which in the end belongs to 
the essential constitution of Dasein itself’.701 
 
This assertion is less a presupposition than a tautology, for as Nancy writes, ‘the 
being of being-there does not consist of anything other than this: it is in its Being 
that this being relates itself to its Being.’702 Being is not ‘presupposed as another 
thing’ and nor is a subject posited to whom a relation to Being must then be 
appended. Dasein is nothing but the relation, such that in “presupposing” Dasein’s 
vague average understanding of Being, Being ‘is infinitely less anticipated than 
according to [the] classical interpretive model, and nevertheless infinitely more 
presupposed: it is presupposed as the relation itself’.703 Nancy goes on, ‘Being is 
presupposed as the relation to Being which makes the Being of being-there. It is 
presupposed as being-there itself, as the facticity of being-there’.704  
 
The ‘vague average understanding’ of Being that imposes the question of the 
meaning of Being is clearly Dasein’s Auslegung, a fact that Heidegger confirms in 
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§32. It is here however that Nancy locates Gadamer’s misreading of the 
Heideggerian text, and I reproduce the section both cite in full from the book: 
 
It is not to be reduced to the level of a vicious circle, or even a circle 
which is merely tolerated. In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of 
the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold 
of this possibility only when, in our interpretation [Auslegung], we have 
understood that our first, last and constant task is never to allow our 
fore-having [Vorhabe], fore-sight [Vorsicht], and fore-conception 
[Vorgriff] to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but 
rather make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-
structures in terms of the things themselves.705 
 
Gadamer’s reception of this passage in Truth and Method goes like this: 
 
What Heidegger is working out here is not primarily a prescription for 
the practice of understanding, but a description of the way interpretive 
understanding is achieved. The point of Heidegger's hermeneutical 
reflection is not so much to prove that there is a circle as to show that 
this circle possesses an ontologically positive significance. The 
description as such will be obvious to every interpreter who knows what 
he is about. All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary 
fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought, 
and it must direct its gaze "on the things themselves" (which, in the 
case of the literary critic, are meaningful texts, which themselves are 
again concerned with objects). For the interpreter to let himself be 
guided by the things themselves is obviously not a matter of a single, 
"conscientious" decision, but is "the first, last, and constant task." For it 
is necessary to keep one's gaze fixed on the thing throughout all the 
constant distractions that originate in the interpreter himself. A person 
who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a 
meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning 
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emerges in the text. Again, the initial meaning emerges only because 
he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain 
meaning. Working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in 
terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is 
understanding what is there.706 
 
Auslegung, as the openness to being that Dasein quite literally is, is not a circular 
structure, but nor is it linguistic. So when Gadamer, on the same page as the 
reference to Being and Time, ascribes the structure of Auslegung to ‘a person who 
is trying to understand a text’, and determines ‘meaningful texts’ as one example 
of the phenomenological ‘things themselves’ which populate the prelinguistic fore-
structures of the understanding,707 he has, for Nancy, justified the apparent 
circularity of an anticipation of linguistic meaning by recourse to an ontological 
structure that is presupposed by, but does not apply to, language. 
 
In light of our prior discussion of Gadamer’s reading of Plato, I would like to 
suggest the following slant on Nancy’s critique. If Auslegung is in Heidegger’s 
philosophy the ontological presupposition of linguistic Interpretation, in the same 
way as, in the analyses of Plato’s Dialectical Ethics, the transcendent version of 
μέθεξις is for Gadamer the ontological presupposition of linguistic dialogue, then in 
transforming the historical structure of hermeneutics into ‘the ontological structure 
of understanding’,708 Gadamer is, against his own warning, attempting to 
appropriate an ontological presupposition of the logos into the logos. There, as 
here, the result of doing so is aporia, for as Nancy writes, Gadamer’s ‘hermeneutic 
circle is suspended in the supposition or the presupposition of an origin: both the 
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origin of meaning and the possibility of participating in it’.709 What this means is 
that the phenomenological ‘things themselves’ are on Nancy’s reading precisely 
what Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not pay attention to,710 because the circle 
predetermines the object of its investigation as the Aussage that has already 
dismantled the phenomenon. Worse, by predetermining that which it seeks, 
Gadamer’s hermeneutic process fixes the object of its lack in advance, both 
predetermining and negating, before recuperating this negativity into the positive 
moment of tradition which is nothing but the relève of the circle’s origin.711 Nancy 
writes of Gadamer’s project: 
 
In this way, the hermeneutic circle is suspended in the supposition or 
the presupposition of an origin: both the origin of meaning and the 
possibility of participating in it, the infinite origin of the circle in which the 
interpreter is caught always already. The circle can be nothing other 
than the movement of an origin, lost and recovered by the mediation of 
its substitute. Insofar as it renders possible the right direction for 
interpretive research, this substitute implies a mode for the conservation 
and preservation of the origin up to and through its loss. Hermeneutics 
requires very profoundly, very obscurely perhaps that the "participation 
in meaning" is unaware of the absolute interruption. On account of this 
profound continuity, hermeneutics represents the process of a historicity 
which is valued both as suspension and as revival of the continuity. It 
designates in the most accentuated fashion the history of a 
permanence and a remanence, that is to say, the possibility of returning 
from (or to) an origin.712 
 
It is this presupposition of an origin which Nancy recognises in Ricoeur’s 
statement that ‘it is necessary to understand in order to believe, but it is necessary 
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to believe in order to understand,’713 and even more so in Gadamer’s concept of 
tradition which he marks as the target of the above passage in a footnote.714 This 
is because in the notion of tradition, Nancy thinks Gadamer has unwittingly made 
explicit the fact that the history of hermeneutics is a history of historicism, that the 
circle projects an origin (as negativity), an anticipated future, and synthesises a 
continuity as return to origin. In this sense all novelty in hermeneutics is illusory; 
the true event is abhorrent to it. Nancy returns to the terms of this analysis in 
L’oubli de la philosophie [The Forgetting of Philosophy] where he designates all 
philosophies of crisis as being strangers to real rupture, and rather attestations of 
a deeper continuity to which a “crisis” motivates our return.715 Nancy will finally say 
this best in Being Singular Plural, where he distils the problem to the sheer fact 
that ‘denying the presence of meaning affirms that one knows what meaning 
would be, were it there, and keeps the mastery and truth of meaning in place.’716 
 
  
                                                          
713 Paul Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté. Tome II: Finitude et culpabilité (1960), 
cited in: Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 214. 
714 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 250 n. 9. 
715 Nancy, ‘The Forgetting of Philosophy’, pp. 13-5. 
716 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 1. 
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3.7 Nancy’s interpretation of Dasein as absolutely conditioned finitude 
‘Sharing Voices’ for the most part proceeds textually, offering detailed readings of 
Heidegger’s existential analytic (from which emerges the critique of Gadamer’s 
interpretation of it), and of Plato’s dialogue Ion. But the terms of Nancy’s 
presentation should not convince the reader that the import of Nancy’s 
disagreement with Gadamer is restricted to academic contestation over who reads 
Heidegger more accurately, nor is its purpose merely to debunk phenomenological 
hermeneutics. I would like to suggest in this final section that the key component in 
the mechanics of Nancy’s critique of Gadamer indicates an important ontological 
undercurrent. What is specifically in question here is the weight Nancy assigns to 
the determination of Dasein as a relation, that is, not a thing in relation, nor even 
always already in relation, but itself a relation that presupposes nothing but its own 
being as a factical relation to being. Beyond this figure’s contribution to, or 
disruption of, a theory of interpretation, I wish to point out that it has deep 
repercussions for the way Gadamer conceives of Dasein’s participation in tradition 
as grounded in communion, because Nancy’s subtly powerful observation serves 
to reorient the radically transcendent μέθεξις of Dasein’s ontological interval onto a 
contiguous horizon, that is, the horizon of Mitsein. 
 
In the course of discussing the inapplicability of Dasein’s Auslegung as an element 
of the hermeneutic project, Nancy differentiates between ‘anticipation as 
“prejudgment” of meaning’ and the ‘ontological anticipation’ which is ‘anterior’ to 
it.717 The former refers to the mistaken appropriation of Auslegung into 
Interpretation, and the latter, to Auslegung understood as Dasein’s absolute 
presupposition of itself as relation to what is. I would like to highlight that the word 
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anterior [antérieur]718 here is no grammatical or logical connector, but a spatial 
designation that draws attention to the topological significance of defining Dasein’s 
relation to being as ‘infinitely less anticipated than according to [the] classical 
interpretive model, and nevertheless infinitely more presupposed: it is 
presupposed as the relation itself’.719 Now, in the linguistic-hermeneutical register, 
the word presupposition refers to an implicit logical precondition, but Nancy plays 
on the topological roots of the word, pre-sub-ponere, literally place-under-before720 
and writes in ‘Sharing Voices’: 
 
This "presupposition" is not one: when one speaks of a presupposition, 
one supposes it anterior to that subject of which there is a 
presupposition. In reality, it is implied in this way as posterior to a 
position, whatever it is (ideal, imaginary, etc.), to that subject which one 
can "presuppose." But here, nothing precedes the presupposition, there 
is no "that" and above all not so much as a "being," which is nothing 
without [en dehors: outside] the presupposition. "That," it is the 
"presupposition" which is posterior and anterior only to itself that is to 
say, to being-there. On this account, one would be able to call it, as 
well, the "absolute" presupposition, but this "absolute" will be the only 
pure and simple beginning given in being-there and by being-there. In 
other words, the "absolute" presupposition is tied essentially to 
"absolute" finitude.721 
 
The presupposition of Dasein’s relation to being is not, strictly speaking, a 
presupposition at all, since this relation is not positioned before, after, or outside of 
the subject of which it is presupposed. Neither subject nor being are anything 
                                                          
718 Nancy, Le Partage des voix, p. 35. 
719 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 217. 
720 A year later Nancy places ‘sup-pose’ and ‘sub-stance’ side by side when 
asserting that ‘community is presuppositionless’. Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Preface’ 
(1983), trans. by Peter Connor, in The Inoperative Community, ed. by Connor, pp. 
xxxvi-xli (p. xxxix). 
721 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 218. 
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“outside” of the presupposition of their relation, the relation is rather supplementary 
to the position in the Derridean sense, 722 an appendage that is equiprimordial with 
the appended,723 for there is no ‘object or term to which this relation would have to 
be made’.724 The presupposition of relation is therefore “absolute” in the sense that 
there is no position from which it can be posited that is not already supplemented 
by the relation presupposed; and in this way the concept of the “absolute” 
undergoes a significant transformation. The “absolute” finitude to which the 
“absolute” presupposition is tied, does not conform itself to the thought that the 
absolute would be unconditioned,725 in fact it is the opposite; “absolute” finitude’s 
being absolutely-in-relation recasts the absolute as the absolutely conditioned. 
This represents an early formulation of a core ontological commitment running 
                                                          
722 Derrida cites Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s assertion that ‘[l]anguages are made to 
be spoken, writing serves only as a supplement to speech’ (p. 144). Pointing out 
that the ‘logic of the supplement’ in this case leads to a ‘chain of supplements’ 
(p.165), since, for Rousseau, language is in turn supplementary to the mute child, 
Derrida indicates that what is at stake is a deferral of immediacy that is constitutive 
of immediacy. There is no origin within the chain of supplements to which they are 
appended extraneously, thus each time a supplement is added as an enrichment it 
is at the same time a replacement, gesturing to that which withdraws in its wake. 
(p.145). The exterior of pure presence, the sign or the image, is thus precisely not 
external. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (1967), trans. by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997). 
723 In ‘L’intrus’ [‘The Intruder’] Nancy confirms that he considers the human body, 
its technical engagement and prosthesis, its sickness and auto-immunity, all to be 
engaged in a network of supplementarity in Derrida’s sense. Derrida repeatedly 
picks up on this fact, suggesting that Nancy’s ‘thinking of a technē of bodies as 
thinking of the prosthetic supplement’ marks the originality of his work. Noting that 
this supplementary technicity both connects and spaces out bodies, Derrida 
commends the departure from a Husserlian reliance on the presence of a same 
and other that is dissolved in the thought of a supplementary limit “between” but, in 
place of, the two figures. Yet as Morin notes, Derrida also worries that this 
departure is a reduction or domestication of the other to its immediate contact at 
these shared limits: Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Intruder’ (1999), trans. by Richard A. 
Rand, in Corpus, pp. 161-70 (172-3 n. 2);  Derrida, On Touching, pp. 97 & 223, 
and: Morin, Jean-Luc Nancy, p. 20. 
724 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 217. 
725 Kant, for example, determines the first class of transcendental ideas to contain 
the ‘absolute (unconditioned) unity of the thinking subject’. Kant, Critique of Pure 
Reason, p. 323.  
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throughout Nancy’s work, the subtly powerful observation that ‘finitude is not 
privation’.726 
 
A year later, in The Inoperative Community, Nancy refers this to Heidegger’s 
formulation, that ‘[t]he ending implied in death does not signify a Dasein's Being-
at-an-end, but a Being-toward-the-end of this entity’,727 remarking that in these 
words Heidegger ‘leads us farthest’ towards understanding conditioned finitude.  
By Nancy’s account, Heidegger’s assertion that ‘"[t]he dying of Others is not 
something that we experience in an authentic sense; at most we are always just 
"there-alongside." ... By its very essence, death is in every case mine"’,728 pertains 
to an inversion of the originary recognition by which one comes to know oneself in 
the other. In recognising that there is nothing comprehendible in witnessing the 
death of another, one comes to “know” that one’s own finitude is no less 
comprehendible. Dasein’s singularity is thus revealed as not something enclosed 
by the absolute cessation of death (“Being-at-an-end”), but as the rending out 
towards that which Dasein will never come into contact with (“Being-toward-the-
end”), that is, as an “unfinishedness” rather than some determinate object 
possessing its start and finish. 
 
But as far as this takes us, Nancy does not consider it far enough. Heidegger has 
shown that the singularity of Dasein is not absolute, but by relying on the specular 
recognition of the death of the other to account for the cognisance of the 
incomprehensibility of one’s own mortality, Heidegger is stuck in a circle. For 
finitude is precisely the delimitation of Dasein from the other that is presupposed 
by any specular recognition of it, such that one cannot appeal to a cognisant 
                                                          
726 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 29. 
727 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 33. 
728 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 33. 
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relationship with the other to explain the ontological differentiation that necessarily 
precedes it. Heidegger has succeeded in thinking death without privation, but has 
still presumed privacy, that is, that Dasein is distinct from other Dasein in whom it 
recognises that it is a Being-toward-death. Nancy’s formulation is much simpler. If 
Dasein’s singularity, its spatio-temporal finitude that distinguishes it from others, is 
the absolute presupposition of supplementary relation, then its limit cannot be 
private, Dasein cannot be private. The anterior and posterior that are 
equiprimordial with its singularity determine Dasein’s limit as precisely shared with 
other beings, which in their finitude share their limits with Dasein. 
 
As already intimated, this is not merely a logical conjugation; it concerns the 
spatio-temporal topology of Dasein, that is, its finitude, its discontinuousness in 
time and space, its singularity. For to say that Dasein’s finitude is absolutely 
conditioned is to say that the material and temporal limits of Dasein are 
conditioned, which means that its circumscription is not its own, but is a relation to 
something other. Dasein is nothing outside of its relation to being, and as such 
Dasein is equally for Nancy a being-in-relation; it is nothing if not in relation to 
other beings. Dasein for Nancy cannot be said in the pure singular, its singularity 
is only so by virtue of its being one-with-another. 
 
Indeed, as Nancy points out in 1996’s Being Singular Plural, the Latin singuli only 
denotes individuality insofar as the one is individuated from others; it means ‘”one 
by one”’729  in the sense of the singular distinguished from the plural it is a part of. 
Likewise here, Dasein’s privation is not private, it is a function of its being-in-
relation, its finitude and its relation are the same limit that constitutes Dasein’s 
singularity as one amongst others, connecting and distinguishing in the same 
                                                          
729 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 32. 
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contact. The contiguous μέθεξις that for Gadamer constitutes a shared ontological 
identity therefore becomes strongly qualified in accordance with Nancy’s 
understanding of Dasein. For if, as Gadamer has it, Dasein’s contact and 
communication with other Dasein were truly to be bereft of any external mimetic 
relationship, which is to say, lacking any exposure, relating only as a pure 
“belonging-together” of μέθεξις, then on Nancy’s reading there would be no 
enclosure, no Dasein. For Nancy, Dasein’s separation and contact mutually 
implicate, such that there is never an exclusive choice between them. An 
absolutely immanent conception of contiguous μέθεξις, by Nancy’s account, 
violates the terms of Dasein’s very existence. Nancy’s concept of the relatedness 
of plural Dasein would therefore be by Gadamer’s definitions both a μέθεξις and a 
μίμησις. 
 
Furthermore, inverting the perspective of his analysis of Dasein’s finitude by 
looking to that which conditions it, Nancy goes on to note that ‘the finitude of the 
other is, without a doubt, in its singularity and its delimitation’, but ‘it does not 
consist in a limitation (sensible, empirical, individual, as one would like) which will 
set itself up dependent upon infinity and in an imminent relation of sublimation or 
of recovery in this infinity’.730 Which is to say, Dasein do not simply chance upon 
one another as disconnected islands of being wandering an infinite unconditioned 
substratum, for the other that conditions any particular Dasein relies no less on 
exposure for its own being. 
 
That there can be no “outside” of the relation of being, means that there is no 
“between” Dasein that would not disrupt the endless chain of supplements by 
which every Dasein each time defers its finitude to the other, and on to every other 
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Dasein. As Nancy puts it in 1996, there is no milieu from which beings would 
arise,731 but instead, ‘in lieu of and in the place of Being’,732 there is simply lieu, 
place – places, each time singular and exposed to plurality. Moreover, in that text, 
what is declared in Nancy’s ‘ambition of re-doing the whole of “first philosophy” by 
giving the “singular plural” of Being as its foundation’,733 is that not only Dasein, 
but everything ‘which occurs only once’,734 a rock, a voice, or a line of text, all 
conform to Nancy’s fundamental topological law, that the singular cannot be 
singular without apportioning itself from the plural, which is a plurality of singulars 
in contact, bound in the separation that distinguishes them. All singularity, every 
being, is maintained in exposure and sharing. There is no pre-existing horizon in 
which singulars exist, for the horizon is nothing other than the sum total of the 
exposures that differentiate and individuate all singulars. ‘Lest we confuse it with, 
say, Hegelian “finiteness”’, Nancy writes, finitude is ‘a limit that does not soar 
above nothingness’.735 Finitude is rather ‘the infinite of the finite itself’,736 ‘the 
instability of every finite determination’.737 
 
For Nancy, there can therefore be no transcendent μέθεξις, at least not in the 
sense Gadamer understands it, because on Nancy’s account there can be no 
exposure that would not be an exposure to another finite thing. Dasein’s 
conditioned finitude, the exposure that encloses, is, as we saw, both a μίμησις and 
a μέθεξις, for the belonging of its Mitsein and the externality of its Dasein are two 
functions of the same limit. But here, in extrapolating this logic of conditioned 
                                                          
731 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 5. 
732 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 80. 
733 Nancy, ‘Preface’, in Being Singular Plural, p. xv. 
734 Nancy, ‘Banks Edges Limits’, p. 41. 
735 Jean-Luc Nancy, Hegel: The Restlessness of the Negative (1997), trans. by 
Jason Smith & Steven Miller (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002), 
p. 37. 
736 Nancy, ‘On the Soul’, p. 122. 
737 Nancy, Hegel, p. 12. 
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finitude into a general ontology, Nancy shows that the transcendent and the 
contiguous are also irrevocably implicated in one another. The arrival of the new is 
no less radically transcendent, but it is nevertheless devoid of verticality, for it 
comes in the touch of other incommensurable plural Dasein, mediated by endless 
chains of supplements, singularities, ‘machines, vehicles, photocopies, eyes, still 
other hands are all interposed’,738 never coming into contact with an in-between or 
an outside, but renewing meaning in the transcendent and contiguous μίμησις and 
μέθεξις of being-with. To put it another way, there is with Nancy no ontological 
difference, only the endless plurality of finite differences that each time present 
what is, which is to say, for Nancy, “being” is nothing other than its indefinitely 
plural announcement. In the following section I will present Nancy’s demonstration, 
in his reading of Plato’s Ion, of how meaning arrives and is shared in accordance 
with these figures, that is, how meaning happens when it is stripped of 
metaphysical transcendence or immanence and consigned to finite plurality. 
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3.8 Nancy’s interpretation of μίμησις and μέθεξις in Plato’s Ion 
My aim here is to relay Nancy’s presentation of Plato’s dialogue as a description of 
how the communication of meaning can function when stripped of the devices 
Gadamer employs to formulate its transmission, namely, predetermination and 
communal unanimity. As we will see, Nancy finds the Ion to illustrate a passage of 
meaning between agents in which neither utility is available, for in it no party has 
either access to an origin or comprehension of an accord; all that is shared is the 
ontological limit at which each is exposed to the other. As such, meaning and 
being in the Ion are not participated in vertically as an illumination, but nor are they 
reduced to functions of pure unitary immanence and univocity, rather, Nancy 
shows, they are functions of the transcendent nature of the immanent, the 
externality of that which is nevertheless right at [à même]. 
 
Ion, Nancy tells us, is the ῥαψῳδῶν [reciter] and ἑρμηνεύς [interpreter] of but one 
poet, Homer. Ion’s ἑρμηνέα [interpretation] ‘makes heard the logos in the delivery 
of the verse’,739 it allows the audience to grasp what the verse means.  Yet Ion has 
no ability in the ἑρμηνέα of any other poet’s work and harbours no poetic skill 
himself, nor any knowhow in the subject matters Homer touches upon. He 
therefore neither identifies with the poesy nor the content of Homer’s verse. Nor 
does Ion simply recite the verse by rote. He does not reproduce the verse through 
sheer mastery of Homeric syntax, for such an exact reproduction would merely 
repeat that which the audience already lack the ability to grasp without the help of 
the ῥαψῳδῶν, and  a perfect μίμησις, critical theory will tell us, is absolutely not 
what an interpreter strives for.740 Under Socratic interrogation, Nancy writes, Ion’s 
                                                          
739 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 231. 
740 See for example: Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1923), trans. 
by Hannah Arendt, in Illuminations (New York: Fontana/Collins, 1970), pp. 69-82; 
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skill is determined in the dialogue to be neither a τέχνη nor an ἐπιστήμη, for he 
neither deciphers Homer’s message nor comprehends its origin.741 Ion does not so 
much know what the poetry means as what Homer means. There is therefore, by 
Socrates’ determination, no σοφία in Ion’s relationship to Homeric verse and his 
ability is deficient in the eyes of the philosopher,742 because it is, Plato writes in the 
Ion, accidental, unintentional, unconscious and rapturous; a possession of sorts.743 
Spreading like magnetism through iron rings, this possession is infectious, 
infecting with the ability to infect.744 What this means is that “ἑρμηνέα” is a magical 
word for Nancy in the same way that we saw φρόνησις is for Gadamer in (3.4), for 
it confers another way in which the Greeks approach meaning and communication 
at an entirely pre-reflective level. 
 
A chain of ‘en-thusiasm’745 connects the characters of the Ion, Nancy writes, 
hyphenating the word ‘en-thousiasme’746 to highlight its etymological connotations 
of divine inspiration. From the muses to Homer, from Homer to Ion and from Ion to 
Socrates or the audience, each is in turn taken possession of by the divine voice. 
Yet no member of the chain has any more comprehension of its divine source than 
any other. Socrates has already established that Ion does not comprehend it, but 
even Homer himself, when infected by the divine voice, just like Ion or the 
audience is not given ‘the comprehension of a logos of the gods’, but only 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Cleanith Brooks, The Well Wrought Urn: Studies in the Structure of Poetry (San 
Diego, New York & London: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1970), and: Stanley 
Cavell, ‘Aesthetic Problems of Modern Philosophy’, in Must We Mean What We 
Say? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 73-96. 
741 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 232. 
742 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 233. 
743 Plato, ‘Ion’, 536b. 
744 Plato, ‘Ion’, 533d-e. 
745 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 237. 
746 Nancy, Le Partage des voix, p. 68. 
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‘entrance’ into one singularly distinctive tone from the cacophony of muses,747 one 
‘sweet’ from the ‘honey-dropping founts’ of the ‘gardens and glades of the 
Muses’.748 Enthusiasm takes them all, from the outside, sweeps them up, ‘place[s] 
the self outside itself in the other, en-theos in delirium’.749 What Homer’s skill as a 
poet comes down to is therefore ‘a saintly passivity which gives way to the 
magnetic force. The lightness of the poet is made of this passivity, responsive to 
the inspiration and the fragrance of the Muse's garden’.750 Ion’s skill, in turn, is the 
ability to emulate this passive transitivity, magnetism and openness to enthusiasm. 
 
As Hynes observes in 2011, enthusiasm, as it appears in Spinoza, Kant, Dickens, 
Lyotard and Deleuze, is an ‘affective force that is “elusive and unobjectiﬁable”, 
which spreads like ﬁre in the in-between of subjects and objects; barely 
perceptible, yet with potentially world transforming effects’.751 Her argument is that 
the force of enthusiasm in these thinkers can be seen as describing an alternative 
trajectory for anti-foundational theories of subjectivity and politics, which for her 
money have been dominated by various notions of ec-stasis, naming Bataille, 
Heidegger and, interestingly, Nancy752 as exponents in this regard. Ecstasy, for 
Hynes, ‘is still (too) tied to the form of man and thus of God’,753 since on her 
reading the figure of ecstasy revolves around the ‘the experience of ﬁnitude’754 in 
the sense of a quite literal confrontation with sublime revelation or existential 
dread, and is thus caught up in the human perspective of a total divide between 
                                                          
747 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 237. 
748 Plato, ‘Ion’, 534b. 
749 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 235. 
750 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 235. 
751 Maria Hynes, ‘Surpassing Ecstasy, Infinite Enthusiasm’, in Parallax 17:2 
(2011), 59-70 (p. 67). 
752 Hynes limits her commentary on Nancy to the Inoperative Community and 
limits this to the way it reads Bataille. 
753 Hynes, ‘Surpassing Ecstasy, Infinite Enthusiasm’, p. 67. 
754 Hynes, ‘Surpassing Ecstasy, Infinite Enthusiasm’, p. 68. 
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finite and infinite. Enthusiasm, on the other hand, ‘the in-common of enthusiasm – 
vitalised by the unbounding of the imagination and the encounter with the forces of 
the outside’, refers to the ‘site of a brush with the inﬁnite, not in order to raise man 
(failingly) toward the perfection of God, but as an experiment with a life freed from 
God and Man and from the abyss of their absence’.755  
 
What I find so useful about Hynes’ analysis is that it perfectly lays out the binaries 
Nancy finds Plato’s text to be intersecting. For when Nancy asks if ‘finitude has 
been the stake since Plato’ and if ‘Ion [is] the first name of finite being-there’,756 we 
know from section (3.7) that the finitude of finite being-there, Dasein, is by no 
means to be understood as ‘finité’,757 the mode of finitude that only appears in 
relief from the infinite,758 but rather as Dasein’s absolutely conditioned or 
irreducibly exposed nature. As soon as Dasein is comprehended as pure exposure 
to other Dasein and other singularities, rather than as an absolutely finite entity 
amidst an infinite sea traversed by other disconnected self-enclosed things, then 
two obstructions come to interrupt the opposition Hynes opens between the 
human-centric experience of ecstasy and the from-elsewhere of a wave of 
enthusiasm. Firstly, there is no “in-between of subjects and objects” in which 
enthusiasm can spread like fire, no milieu or elsewhere (again see section (3.6)), 
only singularities sharing their finitude. Secondly, for the same reason, ec-stasis is 
not the experience of an infinite outside, but rather the experience of the finite 
other, with which Dasein shares its enclosing and exposing limit. On Nancy’s 
                                                          
755 Hynes, ‘Surpassing Ecstasy, Infinite Enthusiasm’, p. 67. 
756 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 234. 
757 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 87. 
758 Nancy borrows this distinction from Henri Birault, and although he does not 
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model, neither enthusiasm nor ecstasy pertain to a brush with the infinite, but 
rather to an experience of the exposure from which all finite beings are entirely 
irreducible. The enthusiasm is communicated at the limit that separates and 
shares out singularities, and the delirium or ecstasy, the being-outside-of-oneself it 
induces, is the experience of this limit, the limit that is simultaneously familiar and 
strange, proper and other. 
 
Nancy highlights two levels at which communication occurs in the Ion’s 
illustrations. Firstly, there is the comprehensive linguistic communication ascribed 
to philosophy by Socrates, that is to say, the μίμησις, the external transmission or 
transfer of a determinate content, the words of the Homeric verse. Secondly, there 
is the non-linguistic communication which Socrates ascribes to lyric poets, which, 
in the same sense that we speak of a contagion being communicated, 
communicates no content other than its communicability. But it would be 
erroneous, Nancy points out, to suggest that in the Ion the word ἑρμηνέα names 
only the latter and does not imply the former. Here Nancy refers to Rémi Brague’s 
differentiation between two modes in which Plato deploys the concept of 
μίμησις,759 the one that ‘produces, outside of itself, a copy of a model’,760 which as 
we saw in section (2.4) is the mode of the painter and tragic poet as defined in 
Book X of the Republic; and the one that ‘conforms itself to a model’761, as is the 
case by contrast in Book III of the Republic, where μίμησις put to the use of 
παιδείᾳ [education]762 operates not as external reproduction but as praxical 
emulation. Nancy points out that here, in the case of Ion the ῥαψῳδῶν, there is 
really never one without the other. For when Ion reproduces Homer’s verse in a 
                                                          
759 Rémi Brague, Du temps chez Plato et Aristote (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1982), p. 60. 
760 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 239. 
761 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, p. 239. 
762 Plato, The Republic, 416c. 
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mimetic and determinate linguistic communication, a reproduction, this 
transmission only takes place on account of  a certain emulation on Ion’s part; he 
does not simply impart a learned content to the audience, but ‘the rhapsode 
embodies, overall, the very transitivity, even the transit of the enthusiasm, the 
passage of communication, in that it is necessary to listen to the meaning of the 
magnetic communication and to the meaning of the communication of the divine 
logos’.763 The mimetic transfer of the rhapsodic performance is deeply connected 
to an emulation of the poetic gesture, for, as pointed out earlier on, a pure μίμησις 
that lacked this would give nothing to the audience. The accompaniment of these 
two modes of μίμησις, the reproductive and the praxical, the content and the 
enthusiasm, for Nancy shows that in the Ion: 
 
Hermeneia is mimesis, but an active, creative, or re-creative mimesis. 
Or, again, it is a mimetic creation, effected through a mimesis which 
proceeds from methexis, from the participation itself due to the 
communication of enthusiasm-unless mimesis is the condition of this 
participation.764 
 
The mimetic communication of poetry across the chain illustrated in the Ion, from 
the muses to Homer, from Homer to Ion, from Ion to the audience, proceeds from 
a participation, a μέθεξις, a pre-linguistic communication at the ontological level of 
enthusiasm and rapture wherein each link in the chain lets themselves be taken 
outside of their domesticity to experience the limit at which they are exposed, not 
to the infinite, but to each other. Of course this μέθεξις does not and cannot 
produce an immanence or immediacy either between or encompassing the 
members of the chain, for this would violate the laws of their finitude, and nor does 
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this μέθεξις have any vertical element, as pertaining to a communication or 
participation that might connect each person to one overarching meaning, or to the 
origin of the chain, but, rather, only operates each-time, in each singular 
communication between finite beings, it restricts the production of the “chain” as a 
work at all. Devoid of verticality, that is, devoid of external criterion or standard, 
this finite μέθεξις renders the mimetic element of the communication, as Nancy 
states, creative, or recreative, a Chinese whisper; for while the mimetic element 
does indeed have an external yardstick, the determinate syntactic arrangement of 
the poetic words, it is always accompanied by a non-regulated communication 
between beings, an emulative μίμησις that renders μίμησις a form of μέθεξις, 
without which it “means” nothing, and which, moreover, Nancy suggests describes 
something rather more universal than just this scene of the Ion: 
 
It is not certain, moreover, if it is not to err to ask oneself, with or without 
Plato, if the combination of these two is not inevitable in every case of 
mimesis: can one conform without producing this structure as a work? 
Can one, in copying for the sake of the work, not conform oneself to 
something of a model?765 
 
A number of years later Nancy will answer this question rather more definitively, 
asserting that there is never any μίμησις without μέθεξις, or μέθεξις without 
μίμησις,766 in an essay we will return to in the next chapter’s focus on the central 
role of the aesthetic in Nancy’s philosophy. Here, it is enough to note that the text 
is for Nancy an illustration of a shared participation in meaning in which there is 
neither communion nor vertical transcendence. The members of this chain of 
interpretation neither participate in the chain’s origin, nor comprehend the chain as 
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a chain. What is important is each singular transference, only the repeated 
iteration of an announcement of meaning, which neither produces compromise, 
correspondence or accord, nor reveals anything of an originary determinate 
meaning. There is no transcendence here other than the contiguous, the 
transimmanence that is each time singular and finite, between finite beings. The 
chain, unlike Gadamer’s tradition, is not the product of a sublation; the work of 
ἑρμηνέα does not produce the chain as a work, its members do not participate in 
the creation of it as a shared whole, nor reproduce it in their part. Meaning is not 
averaged or entered by contract, it is announced and renewed in every 
communication of ἑρμηνέα which is at each time a singular communication 
between singular voices. There is no signal degradation because there is no 
identical signal, the singularity or incommensurability of each voice recreates and 
refreshes the signal each time, their difference making sense.767 Meaning thus 
emerges from the harmony of singular voices, albeit under a different definition of 
the harmonious, and Nancy writes in The Sense of the World that ‘insofar as the 
cosmos is a harmony, it is already distributed among the various functions of the 
Muses’,768 which is to say, harmony is not the organizational principle, essence, or 
average of the plurality of singular voices, it is what is affirmed and renewed 
infinitely in their distinctiveness. Or as Nancy puts it in the book he names after the 
Muses, what is at stake in the harmony of singular voices is ‘the plural itself as 
principle’ which is nothing like a ‘principle of plurality’.769 
 
Where, as we saw earlier, Gadamer affirms μέθεξις as the multiplicitous 
ontological foundation of meaning, importantly introducing into the thought of 
μέθεξις a horizontal distribution, between Dasein, yet, by denying this horizontal 
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element the heterogeneity he affords μέθεξις in its vertical element, his work 
possibly presupposes a substratum of fixed relations joining the agents as an 
immanent ‘we’, a communion; for Nancy, on the other hand, by erasing verticality 
altogether, we find that ‘we are the meaning, in the sharing, in the distribution, in 
the multiplication of our voices’,770 on the strict qualification, as Nancy goes on 
state in the opening section of Being Singular Plural, that ‘[t]his does not mean that 
we are the content of meaning, nor are we its fulfilment or its result, as if to say 
that humans were the meaning (end, substance, or value) of Being, nature, or 
history’,771 it means only that this “we” contains its own transcendence, from each 
to each, as the à même of exposure, of absolutely conditioned finitude, and this 
“we” is the medium across which meaning circulates. Likewise, being, which is the 
being of the singularity, is the privation of matter not from the ideal but from other 
matter, a privation that does not circumscribe but exposes, and as such, circulates 
also, for there is no singularity that does not co-articulate itself with other 
singularities, which do the same in turn, the distribution of the infinitely folded limit 
that shares all beings, indefinitely rippling with fluctuations. 
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3.9 From μίμησις and μέθεξις to ecotechnics 
Whilst for Nancy no “one” can ever have access to the excess of meaning 
circulating across and as a transimmanent “we”, either in communal immanence, 
or by vertical ascension to a common principle or origin, nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen how absolute transcendence does not become re-established  in 
Nancy’s picture, not at the border of the phenomenological event, but at the border 
of the “we”, in the spaces between regional circulations, for example, in the gulf 
that separates the “we” that names Ion, Socrates and the audience (itself already 
a conglomeration, for Ion is an Ephesian772 and Socrates an Athenian – Eastern 
and Western Greeks respectively), and the “we” of the Persians or the Gauls, or 
even the Chavín. Would not the hermeneutic community unworked by the delay, 
spacing, and praxical creativity of communication become reworked, enclosed by 
its cultural boundaries into something self-present and isolated? Or to ask the 
question another way, how can Nancy move from a thinking of a regional dynamic, 
to a thinking of the world, a world which is a sum total of its parts? 
 
By Nancy’s account the dawn of globalisation answers this question, understood 
as the world-wide telecommunication of capitalism, the appropriation of all inter- 
and intra- cultural exchange mechanisms into a system of general equivalence 
whose unending circulation is incited by the amassing of a greater and greater 
surplus of socially necessary labour time. And what is crucial to Nancy’s account is 
that this interconnectedness of the globe is to be conceived at an ontological level, 
which is to say, not only as web of technical instrumental connections overlaid 
upon discrete pre-existing entities, but also as a multiplication of the exposures 
that make up the very being of beings, their mutual distinction, a network of 
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technical connections that forms identities and singularities by putting them into a 
contact that they do not exactly pre-exist, sharing-out by sharing-in. 
 
As such, for Nancy, however alienating or extortive a global economy of relative 
value is, nevertheless its unending conglomeration, the overlay of more and more 
networks, connects us all together in never before known ways, it extends and 
intensifies the equally inter- and intra- cultural ontological exposure of human 
bodies and being-with into something worldwide and ever accelerating: 
 
Even it if is without reason, end, or figure, it is clearly the case that the 
"global (dis)order" has behind it all the effectiveness of what we call 
"planetary technology" and "world economy": the double sign of a single 
network of the reciprocity of causes and effects, of the circularity of 
ends and means. In fact, this network or order is what is without-end, 
but without-end in terms of millions of dollars and yen, in terms of 
millions of therms, kilowatts, optical fibers, megabytes. If the world is a 
world today, then it is primarily a world according to this double sign. Let 
us call this ecotechnics.773 
 
Ecotechnics clearly pertains to an indefinite deferral of all teleology. Just as the 
discovery of the spherical nature of the globe opened up the possibility of sailing to 
the same point in different directions without fear of reaching an end, so too the 
world economy is without end, geographically and figurally spherical, deferring 
cause, effect, and meaning or rather sens in unending circulation. ‘Circulation 
goes in all directions’, Nancy writes in ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, ‘this is the 
Nietzschean thought of the "eternal return," the affirmation of meaning as the 
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repetition of the instant, nothing but this repetition.’774 And in this deferral of a 
world without end, without inside or outside, the world is reconfigured and 
constantly recreated as the sum of its parts exposed and singularised, spaced out 
in ever new ways. ‘This would be a world’, Nancy writes in 1991, ‘where spacing 
could not be confused with spreading out or gaping open, but only with 
“intersection”’,775 where spacing is the multiplication of shared ontological limits, 
giving ‘priority to a multiple and delocalized spatiality over a unitary and 
concentrated spatiality’.776 Furthermore, as Nancy asserts in 2002, such a 
circulation of deferrals produces a resistance to ethico-political hierarchy: 
 
The world that I have called “ecotechnics” – that is, a natural 
environment entirely made up of the human replacement of a “nature” 
henceforth withdrawn – which is also the world of democracy, the 
universal rights of a human being presumed to be universal, the world 
of secularism and religious tolerance both aesthetic and moral, not only 
keeps us from founding in a sacred regime differences of authority and 
legitimacy, it makes those disparities or inequalities that overtly violate 
its principles of equality and justice seem intolerable.777 
 
Nancy’s particular understanding of globalisation is rooted in his understanding of 
the human body. For in the same way that Nancy can claim Dasein is nothing 
reducible from its relations, conditions or exposures, likewise, the body that every 
Dasein is, is, for Nancy, irreducible from its exteriority, touches or contacts, such 
that in Corpus, he states that ‘[t]he body is the return of the “outside” that is to this 
“inside” that it isn’t.778 The body for Nancy is the limit at which a negotiation takes 
place between an interiority and exteriority that do not pre-exist their touch upon 
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the body. However, and without exempting the body from the laws of singularity 
and limit, in the thought of “ecotechnics”, the relation between interiority and 
exteriority along the surface of the body is qualified as technical, which means as 
consisting in appendages, supplements and apparatuses, a surface that is 
extended or deferred along all of the technical objects it appropriates to mediate 
the relationship between inner and outer. 
 
That the body is innately technical, and that it is so in a more fundamental way 
than just being a manipulator of tools, is according to Derrida what Nancy means 
by ecotechnics.779 According to Derrida, ecotechnics is Nancy’s name for the 
‘technē of bodies,’ which instances in ‘the prosthesis, the metonymic substitute, 
the autoimmune process, and technical survival.’780 We already know from Plato’s 
Protagoras that the fire Prometheus gifted to humanity was the same fire that was 
used to create the human, and as Plato writes in the dialogue, this gave each one 
of us a ‘share [μετέσχε] of the divine dispensation’,781 imbued with a ‘τέχνῃ’ 
enabling us not only to invent ‘houses [οἰκήσεις], clothes, shoes, and blankets’ but 
crucially also to articulate ‘speech and words’.782 But what Nancy takes seriously 
in the concept of the ecotechnical is that this same fire produces us, as he writes 
in Corpus, ‘[t]he ecotechnical functions with technical apparatuses, to which our 
every part is connected. But what it makes are our bodies, which it brings into the 
world and links to the system’.783 Eco-technics, οἰκήσεις-τέχνῃ, thus means the 
mutual technical relation between the body and the world (which is a world of 
bodies in turn); a matter of pure contingency, precisely the opposite of the way 
Kant conceives of the body’s organisation: 
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The whole is thus an organised unity (articulatio), and not an aggregate 
(coacervatio). It may grow from within (per intussusceptionem), but not 
by external addition (per appositionem). It is thus like an animal body, 
the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by the 
rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and 
more effective for its purposes. The idea requires for its realisation a 
schema, that is, a constituent manifold and an order of its parts, both of 
which must be determined a priori from the principle defined by its end. 
The schema, which is not devised in accordance with an idea, that is, in 
terms of the ultimate aim of reason, but empirically in accordance with 
purposes that are contingently occasioned (the number of which cannot 
be foreseen) yields technical unity; whereas the schema which 
originates from an idea (in which reason propounds the ends a priori, 
and does not wait for them to be empirically given) serves as the basis 
of architectonic unity.784 
 
Now, as has already been made clear, Nancy’s strong notion of singularity is 
entirely at odds with the picture of absolute internal consistency Kant paints above; 
a singularity, for Nancy, is singularised from the plural and is only singular insofar 
as it remains exposed. But in the case of a living human body, there is more to 
consider, for the nature of its exposure is not that of simple brute contact, but is 
technical. The ‘technical supplementarity of the body’785 as Derrida calls it in Le 
toucher, refers to the way in which the body does not for Nancy pre-exist the 
supposedly subsidiary organs (and tools) of sense (ears, eyes, skin, walking 
canes, telephones…) which expose it to the world; the body is not something 
reducible from its prostheses, whether these be organs, or tools: the body is 
absolutely conditioned, a pure relation, a Dasein within a system of technical 
relations operating praxically. 
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All that is left for Nancy is a surface, ‘a skin, variously folded, refolded, unfolded, 
multiplied, invaginated, exogastrulated, orificed, evasive, invaded, stretched, 
relaxed, excited, distressed, tied, untied’.786 But describing the folding of this skin 
in accordance with the thought of the ecotechnical, is not as simple as tracing the 
visible outlines, or the material boundaries of things, for when all singularities are 
organised around the ecotechnical nature of the body, they are revealed as 
themselves forms of skin, of limit, folded in their own way, connecting, 
supplementing, deferring bodies, ‘machines, vehicles, photocopies, eyes, still 
other hands are all interposed’,787 interlacing the exposure of Dasein in their 
Mitsein. The possibility that this opens up for Nancy is of interpreting globalization, 
the technological achievement of total capitalism, the ultimate extortion and 
devaluation, as simultaneously the becoming of a world, toward the contiguous 
exposure of all Dasein without remainder. 
 
According to Nancy, the entire world is connected via, or simply is the 
connectedness of, a network of electronic communication and informational 
exchange which appropriates value into a world economy of general fiscal 
equivalence, a single network under a “double sign” which does not go from one 
place to another, but circulates indefinitely, repeating the empty instant. Now to an 
extent Nancy is following Heidegger here in marking the “suspension”788 of technê 
that happens in global technological society, in that once there is no space 
“outside” of the relation of technê, no other space in the world, technê becomes its 
own means and ends, with the accumulation of capital corresponding to 
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Heidegger’s Bestand or standing reserve.789 And yet for Nancy, there is no 
“technology” beyond each of its instances, each use or operation in a specific 
context (Nancy gives the examples of transport and fertilisation), and, without 
naming Heidegger, he refutes ‘[t]he vague idea of a general technology […] 
represent[ed] in comics or in the cinema’, arguing to the contrary that: 
 
Technology "as such" is nothing other than the "technique" of 
compensating for the nonimmanence of existence in the given. Its 
operation is the existing of that which is not pure immanence. It begins 
with the first tool, for it would not be as easy as one imagines to 
demarcate it clearly and distinctly from all animal, if not indeed 
vegetable, "technologies." The "nexus" of technologies is existing itself. 
Insofar as its being is not, but is the opening of its finitude, existing is 
technological through and through. Existence is not itself the technology 
of anything else, nor is technology "as such" the technology of 
existence: it is the "essential" technicity of existence insofar as 
technology has no essence and stands in for being.790 
 
The technicity of existence is the ‘spacing of the world’,791 because as Derrida 
noted of Nancy’s ontology above, the human body is nothing if not equiprimordial 
with the technologies of exposure which put it into contact with other bodies, such 
that the world of bodies is a world of ecotechnics. The upshot of Nancy’s thought 
of the equiprimordiality of the οἰκήσεις of world and the τέχνῃ of bodies forms in 
this way a rejoinder to the Heideggerian commitment of which Brogan made us 
aware in section (2.3), that is, Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle’s φύσις and the 
ontological difference of which it is suggestive. As was noted there, as well as in 
section (1.3), by Nancy’s account there is only difference between beings that do 
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not pre-exist their exposure to one another, and in a footnote to the principal essay 
of A Finite Thinking, Nancy reads this, via his thought of ecotechnics, back into 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology: 
 
it follows that the Greek phusis, with its complex relation to technē, a 
relation that renders the two indistinguishable, isn't "nature" in this 
sense. This is one of Heidegger's central theses, although he was 
unable to draw out its full consequences and instead allowed phusis to 
assume once again the guise of a kind of original immanence. The 
reactive part of his thinking about "technology" is entirely of a piece with 
this (although it's perhaps worth adding that Heidegger wasn't 
confronted by the kinds of technology we know today)792 
 
This is not to say, however, that Nancy simply affirms “the kind of technology we 
know today”. Nancy is acutely aware of the problematic tension named by 
ecotechnics, which is that while Marx’s analysis of capitalism ‘indicates an excess 
with respect to production as well as with respect to possession’,793 that is, a 
connection between extortion and exposure, nevertheless, there is no possibility of 
affirming the one without the other, for exposition and extortion fall with one 
another. Techno-capitalism prioritises the bodies of the “first world”, the “west” and 
the “one percent” in the extortion and redistribution of equivalent value, but 
simultaneously connects every single human being, not instrumentally, but 
ontologically, redistributing the supplementary-technical limits at which the entire 
plurality of human bodies now touches. Yet on cannot have one without the other: 
 
the most important [thing] is not to say, "Here is the decisive 
alternative!" (which we already know). What matters is to be able to 
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think how the proximity of the two "ex-," or this twofold excess is 
produced, how the same world is divided in this way […] 
jouissance would be shared appropriation-or appropriating sharing-of 
what cannot be accumulated or what is not equivalent, that is, of value 
itself (or of meaning) in the singularity of its creation.794 
 
Jouissance is what Nancy calls the creation of meaning in the touch of 
incommensurable bodies, a touch that is paradoxically structured by technologies 
of commensurability. But it cannot be a simple choice between the two and in this 
way Nancy releases Marx’s double figure of alienation and emancipation from its 
eschatological narrative; Marx’s emancipation-from-alienation cannot be realised, 
because they are the double facet of one world, the creation and jouissance of 
value at the limits of bodies that neither outlasts nor pre-exists techno-capitalist 
extortion. For Marx, the excess of the unalienable in all alienation is indicative of 
an originary community to which “we” may return or accede,795 but for Nancy, 
while the emancipatory gesture is not entirely restricted, it certainly cannot come 
from a choice between the extorted “we” and the exposed “we”, for neither comes 
first or second, they are the same network: the world. 
 
To close this chapter I would like to return this notion of a world to an alternative 
interpretation of Plato’s concept of συμπλοκή, which, as we saw in section (3.3), is 
claimed by Hartmann to signify a turn in the dialogues from ‘methexis [as] the one-
dimensional vertical axis into the horizontal axis where the participation of the 
Ideas among themselves takes the place of the notion of the participation of things 
in the Ideas’,796 to which Gadamer argued that not only, philologically speaking, is 
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there no such turn in the Platonic corpus, but also that transcendent μέθεξις 
cannot be reduced to a horizontal principle of individuation without committing a 
category mistake. As useful as Gadamer’s argument was in charting a path that 
refused to conceive of transcendent μέθεξις as something reducible to a more 
fundamental unity (recalling that in Hartmann’s system, μέθεξις is only the 
diaeresis that individuates the highest genera of ideas, the συμπλοκή understood 
as κοινωνία, into the concrete), it does not, on Nancy’s reading, manage to avoid 
thinking horizontal μέθεξις as κοινωνία, communion. We have seen in the prior two 
sections how Nancy conceives of intersubjective communication as horizontal 
transimmanence, and then how this operates within the regional ontology of a 
cultural space, and here, in this section, how Nancy conceives of a whole world 
which, unlike the singularity, has no outside by which to enclose itself. I would like 
to suggest that here μέθεξις can indeed be understood as συμπλοκή, but an 
alternative interpretation of it as something other than κοινωνία. 
 
In the Sophist, Plato’s stranger leads Theaetetus to question precisely what 
degree of horizontal μέθεξις is possible. First, the possibility that nothing 
associates with anything else is discounted, for this would mean that nothing had 
any ‘share in being’ [μεθέξετον οὐσίας],797 and nothing would be. Next, the 
possibility that everything is interrelated with everything else is discounted out of 
hand, because this would require that opposites participate each other.798 By 
deduction, therefore, the stranger asserts that the only option left is that ‘some 
things will commingle and others will not’,799 that much like γραμματικῆς, the art of 
grammar, in which some letters are compatible and some are not, but by virtue of 
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the art are all joined together, although many of them only indirectly.800 What this 
means is that συμπλοκή, mingling, is presented in the Sophist neither as a 
communion nor as a reduction to more fundamental principle, but rather as an 
organisational concept that stresses contiguity in its purest form, something which 
Gustavo Bueno argues is central to understanding philosophy in general. 
Camprubí writes: 
 
Bueno takes his concept of symplokē from Plato and understands it as 
a principle of his system. It stresses both the moment of connection and 
the moment of disconnection, or partial mutual independence, of things 
themselves forming a situation, system or totality. In effect, according to 
Plato’s principle, if everything were connected to every other thing, we 
would be able to know nothing, but if nothing were connected to no 
other thing, we could remain equally ignorant about every aspect of the 
world.801 
 
That is to say, within a totality, it is not necessary for every part to be connected to 
every other part, nor, indeed, even be capable of being; συμπλοκή is the 
conception of a totality of contingency, a family of parts who need not all be in 
direct contact for they each mediate that contact according to their immediate 
relatedness which reflects nothing of an all-encompassing unity. 
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3.10 Conclusion 
It was my intention, in this chapter, to highlight a family of interpretations of μέθεξις 
entirely distinct from the reductions and rejections outlined in chapter two. In 
chapter two, μέθεξις was shown to be interpreted in certain cases as a principle of 
a problematic transcendence, and a candidate for replacement by an immanent 
concept of μίμησις. In these cases, I argued, the rejection of absolute 
transcendence lead to a reliance on an absolute notion of immanence defined 
nevertheless by its privative relation to the transcendent. This chapter was to 
highlight in contrast, an interpretation of μέθεξις as a form of transcendence within 
the immanent, an interpretation I am suggesting Nancy takes to its full conclusion 
in his commitment to the mutuality of μίμησις and μέθεξις, and of immanence and 
transcendence. 
 
We saw that Hartmann’s critical philosophy, in which μέθεξις is understood as a 
principle of individuation, is refuted by Gadamer on the Heideggerian grounds that 
it is a positivist misinterpretation of the dialectical nature of Plato’s dialogues. By 
strict attendance to the binding of the ideas and the logos in the dialogues, 
Gadamer is able to flip Hartmann’s interpretation on its head, pointing out that, first 
of all, transcendent μέθεξις does not say one being in two ways, but is the dualistic 
presupposition of every singular saying, and secondly, that contiguous μέθεξις 
does not organize multiple concrete beings beneath a hierarchy of more and more 
general principles, but is the participation of ideas in each other that is 
presupposed in every dialectical operation. 
 
We saw that in Truth and Method, Gadamer interprets the temporal structure of 
Dasein’s understanding as a transcendent μέθεξις, an irreducible interval between 
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immanence and arrival, but that when he interprets Mitsein as the contiguous 
μέθεξις that produces the immanence of shared tradition, he assigns it none of the 
radicality of the temporal interval. Although intent on affirming the inseparability of 
Dasein and Mitsein, and on rejecting the schema of whole and part that was at the 
centre of traditional theological hermeneutics, Gadamer ends up privileging the 
whole by conceiving of contiguous μέθεξις as a communion. In critiquing 
Gadamer’s misuse of Auslegung, the pre-linguistic comprehension of being, to 
model the anticipation of textual meaning in the hermeneutic operation, Nancy, we 
saw, uncovers a deeper more disruptive problem that goes much further than 
problematizing Gadamer’s theory of interpretation. 
 
In arguing that Dasein’s Auslegung is not something presupposed outside of the 
facticity of Dasein, Nancy emphasises the supplementarity of Dasein’s finitude-in-
relation, the fact that it is finite only on the basis that it is conditioned. The 
traditional limit that circumscribes the mortal being, death, is therefore 
reinterpreted by Nancy as not being an absolute limit, separating the singular from 
the infinitely indeterminate, but as the finite limit that is never Dasein’s own, for it is 
shared with other Dasein and other beings. According to this picture, neither the 
figures of whole and part, nor the differentiation of Dasein and Mitsein, any longer 
make any sense.  Dasein’s ownness, is the same limit that it shares with other 
Dasein, and the part is only so by virtue of its being distinct from other parts with 
which it shares boundaries. Gadamer’s contiguous μέθεξις, the dynamic that binds 
us together in shared understanding, therefore only binds insofar as it guarantees 
distinction, which is to say, on Nancy’s reading, it is both a μέθεξις of internal 
belonging, and a μίμησις of external relatedness. Moreover, within the narrative of 
Plato’s Ion, and furthermore, within a system of ecotechnical interconnection, the 
sharing of this limit can be understood as internal, or transimmanent, a limit that 
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does not circumscribe one world from another, but as the complex network of 
fissures around which a world is determined as the totality of beings in exposure to 
one another, an ontological sharing of meaning and finitude without appeal to 
origin, elsewhere, or communion. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
An art of plural origins 
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Artworks are not the absolute, nor is the absolute immediately present 
in them. For their methexis in the absolute they are punished with a 
blindness that in the same instant obscures their language, which is a 
language of truth802 
- ADORNO, Aesthetic Theory 
 
 
It is a matter, then, of the relations between art and sense803 
- NANCY, The Sense of the World 
 
                                                          
802 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (1961-69), trans. by Robert Hullot-Kentor 
(London & New York: Continuum, 2002), p. 133. 
803 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 128. 
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4.1 Introduction: aesthetics as first-philosophy 
Nancy writes of the principal essay of 1996’s Being Singular Plural, ‘[t]his text does 
not disguise its ambition of redoing the whole of “first philosophy” by giving the 
“singular plural” of Being as its foundation’.804 The double meaning of this initiative 
runs parallel to the structural deuce of this thesis, harking back to the beginning of 
chapter two, where de Beistegui was petitioned regarding the de facto immanence 
of the Ancient Greek polis and kosmos, and the ‘philosophy [that] always falls 
short of total immanence’.805 
 
For what is up for grabs for a reconstructed first philosophy, for Nancy, is not only 
a reorganisation of the popular trope which orders philosophical approaches 
according to the procedural questions, “what is there?”, “how can we know it?”, 
and finally, “what are we then to do?”, but also ‘the fact that philosophy is 
contemporaneous with the Greek city’,806 which is to say, the question of first 
philosophy is also the question of the first philosophy. Redoing first philosophy by 
giving the singular-plural of Being as its foundation will therefore entail 
interrogating the empirical immanence that is supposed to lie at its genesis: 
 
According to different versions, but in a predominantly uniform manner, 
the tradition put forward a representation according to which philosophy 
and the city would be (would have been, must have been) related to 
one another as subjects. Accordingly, philosophy, as the articulation of 
logos, is the subject of the city, where the city is the space of this 
articulation. Likewise, the city, as the gathering of the logikoi, is the 
subject of philosophy, where philosophy is the production of their 
common logos. Logos itself, then, contains the essence or meaning of 
                                                          
804 Nancy, ‘Preface’, in Being Singular Plural, p. xv. 
805 De Beistegui, Immanence, p. 20. 
806 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 21. 
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this reciprocity: it is the common foundation of community, where 
community, in turn, is the foundation of Being.807 
 
According to Nancy, what these traditional accounts miss, including de Beistegui’s, 
is that ‘[t]he city is not primarily "community," any more than it is primarily "public 
space"’; it is these things, but it is simultaneously ‘being-in-common as the dis-
position (dispersal and disparity) of the community represented as founded in 
interiority or transcendence.’808 The city is the place of happenstance and the 
economic space constituted in the negotiation of individual concerns. To think that 
the logos produced in the city takes on a purely immanent character once the 
gods, priests, and crowns have left is to ignore the dynamic heterogeneity of 
position and exchange that creates the city not as a thing but as a happening, and 
the way logos is produced in the incommensurability of speakers bound by 
economic relations of pure commensurability. 
 
In light of his understanding of the nature of Dasein’s ecotechnical being-with, 
Nancy reverses the problematic of empirical-theoretical tension outlined in chapter 
two; the question of first philosophy, for Nancy, is not of how philosophy’s 
transcendent apparatuses of signification can be reconciled with a de facto 
immanent foundation, but of how philosophy’s mania for consistency, immanence, 
essence and principle, its constant ‘appeal to the origin’, can be reconciled with 
the fact that this appeal can only happen ‘on the condition of the dis-position of 
logos’, which, as ‘the spacing at the very place of the origin’,809 opens the 
possibility of philosophy as the impossibility of completing its appeal. To redo first 
philosophy for Nancy means aligning philosophy’s form and its foundation, but this 
                                                          
807 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 22. 
808 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 23. 
809 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 23. 
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does not mean prioritising the immanent over the transcendent (or vice versa), 
only thinking its singular-plural logic with its singular-plural origin, the 
transimmanence of Dasein/Mitsein. 
 
Indeed, as he states in the same text, Nancy considers Heidegger’s fundamental 
ontology of Dasein to be ‘the last “first-philosophy”’,810 because it ‘has put us on 
the way to where we are, together’,811 that is, as Nancy writes elsewhere, 
Heidegger’s ‘thinking sought to analyse what it is that constitutes man as the being 
through whom being has as its original sense (or ethos), the choice and conduct of 
existence’.812 Which is to say, Heidegger’s was the last first philosophy because 
by pursuing the question of being at its privileged site, human Dasein, in one fell 
swoop both ethics and ontology are displaced from their positions in the 
procedural order of enquiry. 
 
‘Soon after Being and Time appeared a young friend asked me’, Heidegger quips 
in the ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, ‘”[w]hen are you going to write an ethics?”’.813 For 
what Heidegger’s project claims to have uncovered in the originary 
phenomenology of the Greeks is that the notion of a distinct human realm 
independent but nevertheless conditioned by an ontological foundation is but a 
disciplinary fracturing of the Parmenidean unity of being and thought, a division 
that did not , by Heidegger’s account, exist prior to Plato.814 We noted as much in 
chapter two, specifically in terms of the way Heidegger undercuts the μέθεξις 
problem by attributing it to a projection of a psychologistic metacognition. Here in 
                                                          
810 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 26. 
811 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 26. 
812 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Heidegger’s “Originary Ethics”’ (1995), trans. by Duncan 
Large, in Studies in Practical Philosophy, 1.1 (1999) 12-35 (pp. 12-13). 
813 Martin Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’ (1946), trans. by Frank A. Capuzzi, in 
Pathmarks, ed. by McNeill, pp. 239-76 (p. 268). 
814 Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, p. 269. 
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the ‘Letter’ Heidegger legitimises his unifying return with a translation of Heraclitus’ 
Fragment 199, ‘ὴθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων’,815 classically rendered as a 
straightforwardly ethical proposition, as in the case of Burnet’s standard 
translation, which imposes a neo-Aristotelian interpretation816 in construing the line 
as ‘Man's character is his fate’.817 Heidegger, translating ὴθος instead as “abode”, 
renders the fragment ‘”The (familiar) abode for humans is the open region for the 
presencing of god (the unfamiliar one)”’.818 For Heidegger, what we now call 
ethics, the study of ὴθος, was once a first philosophy of the abode or opening in 
which Dasein and being are disclosed in one breath.819 
 
Now although Nancy’s strong reading of Being and Time in ‘Sharing Voices’820 
goes a long way toward rejecting the notion of a Greek source available for 
recovery, nevertheless, in interpreting Dasein as pure relatedness, absolutely 
conditioned exposure, that is, the mutual exposition of Dasein and the beings to 
which its relation is neither posterior nor anterior, it is clear that Nancy is 
sympathetic to the idea that the sub-disciplinary hierarchy of philosophy is 
somewhat contrived. Moreover, as we have seen, there is for Nancy no ontology 
that is not ontology of the body, and no possibility of human Dasein being 
abstracted from its necessary exposure to beings. However, as we saw Nancy 
point out in ‘Sharing Voices’, as part of the analysis of Auslegung within his 
critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, whatever expectation of imperatives we might 
place on an ethical first philosophy will have to be abandoned to the disclosure of 
                                                          
815 Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, p. 271. 
816 Burnet admits as much, noting that he understands these words identically with 
their use in Aristotle’s Ethics. Heraclitus, The Fragments, trans. by John Burnet, in 
Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 97-105 (123 n. 49). 
817 Heraclitus, The Fragments, 121. 
818 Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, p. 271. 
819 Heidegger, ‘Letter on “Humanism”’, p. 269. 
820 See sections (3.6-8). 
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being that precedes any such ethico-political determinations. As Nancy puts it in 
1995: 
 
This thinking “has no result.” It gives neither norms nor values. It does 
not guide conduct but conducts itself toward the thinking of conduct in 
general – not as something to be normalized or finalized, but as what 
constitutes dignity itself, namely, having, in one’s own being, to make 
sense of being. Besides, if thinking as originary ethics were to provide 
“maxims that could be reckoned up unequivocally,” it “would deny to 
existence nothing less than the very possibility of acting”’821822 
 
After the so called “turn” in Heidegger’s work, die Kehre, when, as Nancy puts it, 
Heidegger begins to question “no longer from man to Being, but from Being to 
man”,823 there is a corollary modification to Heidegger’s project of disciplinary 
reorganisation. Continuing the trajectory departed by Kant, who, Nancy writes in 
1988, ‘is the first to do justice to the aesthetic at the heart of what one can call a 
“first-philosophy”’,824 Heidegger ceases to focus exclusively on the 
phenomenological unity of the science of the subject and the science of being qua 
being, and begins to pursue a different notion of the origin, that of the work of art, 
which is an origin for many. Like ‘the act that founds a political state’ or ‘the 
                                                          
821 Nancy, ‘Heidegger’s Originary Ethics’, p. 14. 
822 Nancy’s doctorat d'État thesis, translated as The Experience of Freedom, 
pursues this thought exhaustively. Compounding the question marks we have 
seen some commentators place on Nancy’s refusal to contribute to a “politics” of 
which he refutes the very possibility, here Nancy places strong restrictions also on 
the question of the ethical. Of course, since for Nancy the question of the 
individual and the many is the question of the same transcendental exposure of 
Dasein/Mitsein, the ethical and the political can only be thought together, as 
Hutchens has shown in: Hutchens, ‘Archi-Ethics, Justice, and the Suspension of 
History’. 
823 Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’, p. 5. 
824 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Sublime Offering’ (1988), trans. by Jeffrey S. Librett, in 
Of the Sublime: Presence in Question (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1993), pp. 25-54 (p. 27). 
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essential sacrifice’,825 it is, Heidegger writes, an origin that plays a part in 
determining the regime under which all beings are disclosed within a world, or a 
people. Like Kant, whom for Nancy enacts a ‘double suspense’ in his third 
Critique, suspending and overcoming the regional science of sensory αἴσθησις by 
marking its invocation of the sublime,826 but simultaneously enslaving all future 
consideration of the beautiful to philosophical service,827 Heidegger brackets the 
notion of aesthetics as a regional discourse or derivative sub-discipline in the 
same way he had done with ethics, accusing the classic Hegelian formula that 
analogues the perfection of an artistic movement with its ability to adequately 
present the ideal in the sensuous, of repeating the psychologistic mistake.828 
 
The aesthetic, in Heidegger, is definitively severed from the aisthetic; ‘[f]or 
Heidegger’, Geulen writes, ‘beauty remains objectively what it is, independently of 
how the question “who notices it?” might be answered’.829 Heidegger’s artwork not 
only gestures beyond itself as in Kant, but is once and for all uncoupled from the 
functioning of sensibility altogether. For Heidegger, as we have already seen in 
chapter two, αἴσθησις discloses the ἴδια of Dasein’s intentional horizon. But the 
artwork, freed from this individual relationality, is no longer uncovered or partially 
determined by Dasein, but, Heidegger claims, in reverse, the artwork stands at the 
origin of the whole shared horizon of a people, determining the regime under 
which beings are disclosed or uncovered, which is to say, the artwork, for 
Heidegger, shows a community of Dasein what counts as a being. This was 
touched on briefly at the end of chapter two in regards to the way in which 
                                                          
825 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 62, 
826 Nancy, ‘The Sublime Offering’, p. 27. 
827 Nancy, ‘The Vestige of Art’, p. 86. 
828 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 26-7. 
829 Eva Geulen, The End of Art: Readings in a Rumour After Hegel (2002), trans. 
by James McFarland (California: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 115. 
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Heidegger affirms μίμησις as a special way in which meaning arrives when 
disengaged from the in-order-to structure of the city state. There the matter was 
left underdeveloped with the promise to return to it, which we will do in the first 
sections of this chapter. 
 
What I would like to claim in this chapter is that, firstly, in formulating the nature of 
the exposure of Dasein as ecotechnical, the interplay of senses and the interplay 
of technological intermediaries forming the limits around which singularities are 
referred to one another, Nancy’s version of first philosophy is fundamentally 
aisthetic, that is, it returns the notion of an aesthetic origin to the senses, and in 
doing so, pluralises that origin. Secondly, I would like to suggest that as a result, 
Nancy’s philosophy of art takes on a particular priority within his corpus, since the 
artwork is determined by Nancy to present nothing to the observer other than that 
they are exposed, at the limit of their senses, to the sense of the world, which is its 
transimmanence. 
 
As such, a phenomenology of the artwork is for Nancy a phenomenology that does 
not reduce the exposure of singularities to an immanent unity in the phenomenon, 
but rather discloses the transimmanence, the simultaneous contact and differing of 
the observer and the world, and discloses the way in which each is nothing 
beyond its exposure to the other. Rather than merely concluding the direction of 
this thesis’ prior chapters, by demonstrating their “results” or “application”, the aim 
of this chapter is to feed back into and enrich the extrapolation of the core 
problematic from the reverse angle. For here, rather than approaching from 
ontological and hermeneutic angles, asking what becomes of μέθεξις if it is 
irrevocably implicated in mimetic, ontical, sensible relations, the question is 
instead: what then can be said of μίμησις and its place in traditional theories of 
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representation when it is likewise implicated in the fundamental ontological 
structure of a transimmanent world? 
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4.2 Chapter structure 
The chapter begins by noting Nancy’s well known criticism of Heidegger’s 
fundamental ontology, namely, that it implicitly prioritises Dasein over Mitsein, and 
therefore requires a tertiary principle to explain how a community of Dasein can 
share a world – a principle that for Nancy opens up a totalitarian politics in 
Heidegger’s project. I then suggest that Heidegger’s analyses of μίμησις in both 
the Origin of the Work of Art, and the Nietzsche lectures already discussed in 
chapter two, tend in a similar direction, that although they restrict the possibility of 
any one individual or political movement setting the rules of world disclosure by 
determining the operation of the mimetic around which the μέθεξις of the 
community is conformed, to be neither operable nor presentable, they 
nevertheless bind the plurality of a people to the sovereignty of an origin. 
 
Next, I show the way in which Gadamer repeats this move, again dislocating 
artistic μίμησις from both the intention of the individual and the αἴσθησις of the 
observer, but again, subjugating it to the self-presentation or mirroring of a 
communal μέθεξις. Following this, I present Nancy’s critique of theatrical and 
sacrificial μίμησις and μέθεξις as a response to the Heideggerian and Gadamerian 
tropes just noted. Nancy, I argue, rejects the notion that artistic or ritualistic μίμησις 
is or has ever been a μίμησις or mirroring of a communal μέθεξις, by pointing out 
that the nostalgic impulse of this schema invents a lost originary community to 
which μίμησις gestures, rather than affirming the absence of model of which all 
analyses of μίμησις are suggestive. 
 
By reference to Nancy’s concept of ecotechnics outlined at the end of the prior 
chapter, I then introduce Nancy’s determination, following Blanchot and Kant 
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amongst others, of art as a moment of τέχνη in which the particular technical 
operation is opened out from its given purpose into a moment of sheer purposivity. 
As such, art is for Nancy something that discloses the technicity at the limits 
shared between all things, and is not severable from the aisthetic limit along which 
Dasein/Mitsein are exposed. Nancy, we see, affirms Adorno’s negative aesthetics, 
in which μίμησις is still without model, maker, or observer, but is now announced 
and affirmed as such, as an expression of the irresolvable technical plurality of the 
world and its continued redistribution, I show that for Adorno μέθεξις is always a 
principle not of the communal, but of conflict and disruption. 
 
In the final sections, I argue that for Nancy the artwork and the image are 
presentations of presentation, that is, of transimmanence; they are aisthetic events 
in which the exposed world is gestured toward as sheer existence and possibility, 
neither completely transcendent nor immediately immanent, and the observer is 
disclosed to herself as something other than herself, as the exposure-to-world 
from which he or she cannot be abstracted.  
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4.3 Heidegger’s mimetic origin 
In one of the most commented upon moments of his work,830 Nancy states in 
Being Singular Plural that the existential analytic of Heidegger’s Being and Time is 
incomplete because it implicitly prioritises Dasein over Mit-Dasein, while all the 
while claiming that the two ways of existing are in fact equiprimordial, that is, two 
facets of the same being.831  As we saw in chapter three, for Nancy, this 
equiprimordiality is absolutely fundamental: there can neither be Da without Mit 
nor Mit without Da, being-with and being are not reducible from one another. The 
singular is so only insofar as it is one of many and the many is only the totality of 
singulars, and Mit-Dasein names nothing but the fact that plural Dasein co-
constitute their finite boundaries by exposure to one another. 
 
Nancy therefore advocates a completion of Heidegger’s project that would involve 
writing a “co-existential” analytic [analytique co-existentiale832], which would revive 
Dasein’s “Mit” as a resistance to the totalitarian politics that Nancy interprets 
Division II’s Erbschaft [heritage] and Geschick [destiny] to imply.833 As he puts it in 
2003’s ‘The Being-with of being-there’, an essay that serves as a highly 
condensed statement of the themes of Being Singular Plural, this wrong turn that 
Nancy contends occurs in the second division of Heidegger’s text comes about 
because the implicit priority Heidegger affords singular being-there in the first 
division leads him to have to question how it is that many being-there can all be-
there together. For if every Dasein is entirely its own “there”, there must for 
                                                          
830 See for example the varied receptions in: Critchley, ‘With Being-With?’; Adriana 
Cavarero, ‘Politicizing Theory’, in Political Theory, 30.4 (Aug., 2002) 506-532, and: 
Anne O’Byrne, Natality and Finitude (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
831 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, pp. 93-9. 
832 Jean-Luc Nancy, Être singulier pluriel (Paris: Galilée, 1996), p. 117 
833 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 384. 
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Heidegger be a further intersubjective principle than the ‘simple external ‘‘with’’ of 
things which are only put together, only contiguous to one another’:834 
 
What kind of there for many? A common there or the there of each? But 
then, brought together in what way? 
How is Mitdasein possible? First of all, how should one picture it? As 
the Being-with of several Dasein, where each opens its own da for 
itself? Or as the Being-with-the-there, or maybe more precisely as a 
Being-the-there-with, which would require that the openings intersect 
each other in some way, that they cross, mix or let their properties 
interfere with one another, but without merging into a unique Dasein (or 
else the mit would be lost)? Or else—in a third way—as a common 
relation to a there that would be beyond the singulars? But what would 
such a there-beyond be?835 
 
By Nancy’s account, Heidegger discards being-with as merely factical, that is, the 
surface effect of a deeper ontological structure, and submits it to an overriding 
temporality, Geschick, which determines that ‘our fates have already been guided 
in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our 
resoluteness for definite possibilities.’836 The existential fore-having of Auslegung 
is, in this way, supplemented by a predetermined political-historical spirit into 
which every singular Dasein is born and to which it is fated, such that ‘the 
individual has no weight at all, except insofar as it can be transcended toward 
(devoted or sacrificed to?) the Gest and the Legend of a common foundation and 
inauguration, that is, in so far as the individual measures up to a destiny and a 
civilization’.837 
 
                                                          
834 Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’, p. 3. 
835 Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’, p. 4. 
836 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 438. 
837 Nancy, ‘The being-with of being-there’, p. 5. 
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Nancy’s emphasis on the identity of Dasein and Mitsein removes any requirement 
for such a destinal milieu, and, in fact, excludes its ontological possibility entirely, 
leaving it as a tertiary structure of political ideology. Denying Dasein/Mitsein any 
communal solidarity, it can no longer conceive of itself as existing within the 
element of the common (as one speaks of a town common). Fraternity and 
patriotism reveal themselves as auxiliary, and Dasein finds that the “common” of 
community is nothing but the totality of plural Dasein with but one thing in common 
– that they exist as exposed. It is precisely at this point that the disagreements in 
the secondary literature emerge, over whether common exposure could ground, or 
whether it ultimately rules out, a future political construction.838 
 
It should be stressed, however, that whatever one makes of the outcome of 
Nancy’s reading, its resources are drawn from the Heideggerian text itself. 
Critchley, for example, while expressing reservations over what he deems to be a 
reduction of ethical alterity entailed by the terms of Nancy’s proposed co-
existential analytic, nevertheless agrees: 
 
that the genuine philosophical radicality of Being and Time lies in the 
existential analytic of inauthenticity. What has to be recovered from the 
wreckage of Heidegger’s political commitment is his phenomenology of 
everyday life, the sheer banality of our contact839 
 
As such, Nancy’s position here can be roughly situated within a field of projects 
seeking to retrieve Heidegger’s work on its terms, against, on the one hand, crude 
interpretations that over-identify Heidegger’s philosophy with his personal political 
                                                          
838 See introduction section (1.5.1). 
839  Critchley, ‘With Being-With?’, p. 54. 
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errors,840 and on the other, much more attentive readings that nevertheless 
conclude that Being and Time opens up an irreconcilable division between the 
solipsistic singularity of existence, and the intermingling of facticity.841 In one such 
project, for example, Brogan argues to the contrary that the division is in fact what 
is important, that the ‘movement between facticity and existence’, is exactly that 
which ‘opens up the space of being in the world’.842 The point being, that when 
taken together, Being-towards-death as the ‘ownmost, non-relational, and not to 
be outstripped […] potentiality-for-Being’,843 provides the singularising resistance 
to the totalizing thrust of heritage and destiny,844 while, in turn, Brogan explains, 
facticity anchors the ownmost in the everyday, for ‘existence always arises out of a 
recovery from one’s absorption in the they-self’,845 in the recognition of the 
unrecognizability of the other’s finitude.846 
 
These alternative potentials in the Heideggerian text notwithstanding, in what 
follows, I would like to show that Heidegger’s later account of an artistic 
identification of what counts as a being within a certain cultural horizon, which as 
we saw at the end of chapter two, replaces authorisation by μέθεξις with mimetic 
reference, is still susceptible to Nancy’s critique, and that, furthermore, Nancy 
responds by returning the aesthetic to the aisthetic. While Heidegger’s μίμησις is 
intended to take the place of a psychologistic μέθεξις, I would like to suggest that it 
                                                          
840 See for example: Víctor Farías, Heidegger and Nazism (1987) (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1989). 
841 See for example: Taminiaux, Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental 
Ontology. 
842 Walter A. Brogan, ‘The Community of Those Who are Going to Die’, in 
Heidegger and Practical Philosophy, eds. François Raffoul & David Pettigrew 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 237-48 (p. 238). 
843 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 295. 
844 Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 384. 
845 Brogan, ‘The Community of Those Who are Going to Die’, p. 240. 
846 We have already seen Nancy refute this point in section (3.7). 
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only does so by projecting a communal μέθεξις upon a community, in much the 
same direction as we saw Gadamer does in Truth and Method. 
 
Chapter two closed by noting the phenomenological privilege Heidegger ascribes 
to μίμησις in the specific case of a painting of a hare by Dürer. Refuting that Book 
X of Plato’s Republic determines the difference between the τεχνίτης and the 
μιμητής to lie in differing standards of authenticity, as Il Divino and the rascal 
counterfeiter respectively, instead Heidegger asserts that the τεχνίτης is better 
understood as a demiurge, one with an eye for the in-order-to structure of the 
demos, allowing them to create artefacts fully appropriate to that particular epochal 
regime of what counts as being, while the μιμητής is skilled at revealing things in a 
different way, having just as much an eye for the being of beings, but unlike the 
τεχνίτης, wrenches beings out of their in-order-to structure, showing in isolation 
and clarity what it means to be that being, as, for example, in the case of Dürer’s 
hare, held frozen in a glazed, brutish stare.847 I would like now to reprise this 
element and explore it further. 
 
In Heidegger’s 1935-37 artwork essay, it is Van Gogh who is called upon to 
demonstrate the special power of μίμησις to reveal the being of beings. Noting that 
the ‘mere thing’ of nature that has ‘taken shape by itself’848 as the product of 
φύσις, is ‘self-contained’,849 whereas ‘use-objects’ or ‘equipment’,850 which are ‘the 
product of a process of making’,851 a ποίησις, do not merely presence as self-
enclosed beings in the way the stone does, because their usefulness, that is, their 
                                                          
847 See Albrecht Dürer, Feldhase (1502), held at Albertina, Vienna. Presumably 
this image corroborates Heidegger’s assertion that ‘the animal is poor in world’, as 
discussed in section (1.3). 
848 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 29. 
849 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 28. 
850 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 29. 
851 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 28. 
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embedding in a political in-order-to structure, is their basic aspect and is ingrained 
in their very form, not something ‘assigned or added on afterward’,852 Heidegger 
asserts that the nature of the artwork falls into a third category. Describing a pair of 
“peasant shoes”853 as we encounter them in everyday life, the way they appear to 
us as useful objects, ‘gear [that] serves to clothe the feet’,854 that we experience 
them in the first instance as the simultaneity of what they are and what they are 
for, only truly at home in the place they are put to use (the field), so much so that, 
recalling the tool analysis of Being and Time,855 Heidegger asserts that the shoes 
disappear in their proper work, that in the field ‘they are what they are […] all the 
more genuinely so, the less the peasant woman thinks about the shoes while she 
is at work, or looks at them at all, or is even aware of them’.856 
 
But Van Gogh’s painting of such shoes857 abstracts the shoes, takes them out of 
their element, leaving ‘nothing surrounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to 
which they might belong – only an undefined space’,858 on the face of things, 
violating the ‘natural comportment toward things’, in which, Heidegger asserts in a 
lecture course of 1927, ‘we never think a single thing, and whenever we seize 
                                                          
852 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 28. 
853 It should be noted that the meditation upon Van Gogh’s painting of the shoes 
was only added in later versions of the much-redrafted lectures and essay. See for 
comparison: Martin Heidegger, ‘On The Origin of the Work of Art: First Version’ 
(1935-37), trans. by Jerome Veith, in The Heidegger Reader, ed. by Günter Figal 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 130-50. 
854 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 33. 
855 See: Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 95-122. 
856 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 33. 
857 According to the catalogue at the Amsterdam Van Gogh Museum, the shoes in 
question actually required wearing-in as they appeared too ‘smart’ fresh from the 
flea market. See: Vincent van Gogh Stichting, Een paar schoenen (1886), held at 
Van Gogh Museum, Amsterdam. 
858 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 33. 
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upon it expressly for itself we are taking it out of a contexture to which it belongs in 
its real content’,859 but in Van Gogh’s painting, something else happens entirely: 
 
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome 
tread of the worker stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the 
shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the 
far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. 
On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. In the shoes 
vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and 
its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. 
This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety as to the 
certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood 
want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the 
surrounding menace of death.860 
 
As was the case with Dürer’s hare, by presenting the shoes outside of their place 
in the in-order-to structure of daily life, the equipment that is never considered in 
itself but only constitutes one piece in a practical chain eventually leading by way 
of sowing, tending, harvesting, grinding, baking and eating to continued life, the 
shoes no longer disappear into this long deferral of intention, but become entirely 
conspicuous, and, not only that, make conspicuous the whole world into which 
they are usually absorbed. The artwork for Heidegger, while a product of ποίησις, 
is not drawn into the teleological circulation of the intentional world, but rather, like 
the product of φύσις is ‘self-sufficient’.861 However, unlike both, the artwork has a 
special ability to disclose these structures, to reveal the world as what it is, 
resisting both the deferral of ends in which equipment disappears and the scientific 
attitude that denatures beings by isolating them from their place in the world. 
                                                          
859 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), trans. by 
Albert Hofstadter (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 162. 
860 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 33-4. 
861 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 29. 
252 
 
 
Heidegger only completes his severance of the aesthetic from the aisthetic when 
he abruptly inverts the example he has just described, asserting that Van Gogh’s 
painting in fact depicts neither the likeness nor the essence of any existent 
thing.862 For ‘[w]ith what nature of what thing should a Greek temple agree? Who 
would maintain the impossible view that the Idea of Temple is represented in the 
building?’863 The temple copies nothing, to the contrary, for Heidegger, it is an 
origin, it ‘gathers around itself the unity of those paths and relations in which birth 
and death, disaster and blessing, victory and disgrace, endurance and decline 
acquire the shape of destiny for human being’.864 Recalling what we have already 
noted of Heidegger’s analysis of μίμησις in the 1936-39 Nietzsche lectures in 
chapter two, it is clear that what Heidegger is asserting here in the 1935-37 essay, 
is that the μιμητής in no way copies or reproduces that which is supposedly made 
more authentically by the τεχνίτης. Rather, the μιμητής possesses two abilities; 
they indeed have an eye for the in-order-to structure of the demos, allowing them 
to present beings as they are, but furthermore, in a way that the τεχνίτης is not, the 
μιμητής is also moved by this access to create works that are originary, that, for 
instance in the case of a tragic drama, while ‘originating in the speech of the 
people’, also ‘transforms the people’s saying’.865 The μιμητής is the vessel through 
whom the community transforms itself, which is to say, μίμησις for Heidegger is not 
mimetic; Heidegger’s μίμησις does not refer to what is, it founds its very possibility. 
 
                                                          
862 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 37. 
863 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 37. 
864 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 42. 
865 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, pp. 43. 
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In the second of Heidegger’s 1936-37 Nietzsche lectures866 thematised around the 
assertion that ‘[a]rt is mimēsis’,867 Heidegger interestingly turns from the 
discussion of μίμησις in the Republic, to the discussion of beauty in the Phaedrus, 
the same discussion to which we saw Gadamer repeatedly return in the 
discussions of chapter three. For Gadamer, beauty is one of the paradigmatic 
phenomenological demonstrations of the vertical dimension of an irreducible 
μέθεξις that only becomes aporetic when one attempts to master it linguistically, 
for it is in fact presupposed in every act of speech. The experience of beauty, the 
conflagration of the suprasensuous in the sensuous, is for Gadamer one of the 
ways in which this dualism is experienced in a completely unproblematic way as a 
transcendence within the immanent. Heidegger denies this conclusion. Speaking 
of art, which is for Heidegger, as already noted, μίμησις, he parallels Gadamer in 
stating that it ‘bring[s] forth the beautiful’ yet at the same time ‘resides in the 
sensuous’,868 however in congruence with his characterisation of Plato as one who 
turned away from the shining of beings towards an invented ideal that shines on 
them,869 offers a different interpretation of what beauty really constitutes. 
 
Heidegger refers here to the so called “doctrine of recollection” wherein Plato 
asserts that memory, ἀνάμνησις,870 is defined by its alpha-privative prefix in the 
same way Heidegger determines ἀλήθεια.871 In the Phaedo, Plato asserts that 
what we call learning, μάθησις, is actually the practice by which we 
                                                          
866 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Phaedrus: Beauty and Truth in Felicitous Discordance’ 
(1936-37) in Nietzsche, pp. 188-99. 
867 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Republic’, p. 171. 
868 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Phaedrus: Beauty and Truth in Felicitous Discordance’, p. 
198. 
869 See section (2.4). 
870 Plato, ‘Phaedrus’, in Plato With an English Translation, trans. by Harold North 
Fowler, I: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Phaedrus, pp. 405-579 (including 
parallel Greek text), 257a. 
871 See section (2.4). 
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ἀναμιμνῃσκόμεθα, recollect, our acquaintance with the ideal that preceded our 
physical births into the sensuous.872 This is usually considered as an argument for 
the immortality of the soul, a suggestion that before birth we existed in the ideal 
realm. Heidegger regards it rather as a statement of the always-already 
relatedness, the Auslegung, of a being ‘that comports itself to beings as such’,873 
Dasein, the being that ‘”has beings as such in view ahead of time”’.874 
Correspondingly, μάθησις is for Heidegger the task of opening oneself to this 
comportment, becoming open to the way beings reveal themselves (the project of 
phenomenology875) rather than losing oneself in the in-order-to structure that 
defers beings to goals. Now, beauty, Heidegger asserts, has a special place in 
that it makes us aware of this comportment, in its radiance it snaps even the most 
‘cockeyed’876 out of their everyday concerns and gives them a glimpse of the truth, 
not an ideal truth that illuminates, but the truth of the being’s shining, the truth of 
ἀλήθεια. 
 
It is necessary, then, to add qualification to Geulen’s pronouncement of the 
absolute objectivity of beauty, since as much as Heidegger affirms its 
universality,877 he does not detach it from phenomenality in the way he does 
μίμησις. Beauty, for Heidegger, is neither ‘a property that is added to a being as an 
                                                          
872 Plato, ‘Phaedo’, 72e. 
873 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Phaedrus’, p. 192. 
874 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Phaedrus’, p. 198. 
875 See section (2.3). 
876 Heidegger, ‘Plato’s Phaedrus’, p. 193. 
877 See for example: Martin Heidegger, Parmenides (1942-43), trans. by André 
Schuwer & Richard Rojcewicz (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998), p. 
10. 
255 
 
attribute’,878  and nor does beautiful mean ‘stimulating, pleasant, for pleasure and 
enjoyment’,879 but it is, nevertheless, something given to be witnessed: 
 
Truth is the unconcealedness of that which is as something that is. 
Truth is the truth of Being. Beauty does not occur alongside and apart 
from this truth. When truth sets itself into the work, it appears. 
Appearance - as this being of truth in the work and as work - is beauty. 
Thus the beautiful belongs to the advent of truth, truth's taking of its 
place. It does not exist merely relative to pleasure and purely as its 
object. The beautiful does lie in form, but only because the forma once 
took its light from Being as the isness of what is.880 
 
In this way, Heidegger describes a division of operations in the realm of art: where 
μίμησις contributes to the reproduction of what is and the production of novel 
possibilities for ways of being within a particular epochal regime, beauty discloses 
these ways of being to the observer. According to a mode of the of mimetic 
ambivalence which we noted in sections (1.1-2) stretches from Aristotle to Nancy, 
the community is grounded in a copying-operation in which nothing is copied, and 
then returned and shown to the community as their self-reflection in the beautiful 
self-evidence of beings formed by the operation. Before moving onto Nancy’s 
critique of the dialectic of communal self-identification, I would like to note the way 
it appears also in Gadamer’s reflections on the aesthetic, albeit in a modified 
fashion, which stays much closer to an Aristotelian account of mimetism than 
Heidegger’s focus on Plato.  
                                                          
878 Martin Heidegger, The Principle of Reason (1955–56), trans. by Reginald Lilly 
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 57. 
879 Heidegger, The Essence of Truth, 235 n. 17. 
880 Heidegger, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’, p. 81. 
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4.4 Gadamer and the end of μίμησις 
Gadamer, in parallel fashion to his replacement of μίμησις with μέθεξις in 
conceiving the social and temporal structure of Dasein, refutes Heidegger’s 
aesthetic reading of μίμησις entirely, and, as we will see, again relegates it 
beneath an affirmation of μέθεξις. This is not to say he entirely departs the 
Heideggerian thought of ἀλήθεια, nor his analysis of beauty, although he does add 
qualification to the Heideggerian reading. But what Gadamer categorically cannot 
accept is the suggestion that any Platonic text legitimises the connection 
Heidegger makes between μίμησις, beauty, and ἀλήθεια. 
 
In regards to the Phaedrus, to which we have seen both Gadamer and Heidegger 
refer, in Truth and Method Gadamer agrees with his old master that the privilege 
of beauty is to ‘attract the desire of the human soul to it’, because ‘[b]eauty is not 
simply symmetry [or harmony] but appearance itself’, that is, ‘disclosure 
(aletheia)’.881 But, crucially, in reference to the Philebus, Gadamer states that 
ἀλήθεια is only ‘part of the nature of the beautiful’,882 part because although 
‘[b]eauty has the mode of being light’, unlike Heidegger’s determination of it as the 
singular shining of the beautiful being, Gadamer refuses to collapse the duality of 
its phenomenological experience, referring in a footnote to Chrysippus and 
asserting that the light of beauty has a ‘reflective character’, in that ‘by making 
something else visible, it is visible itself, and it is not visible in any other way than 
by making something else visible’.883 
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882 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 477. 
883 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 477. 
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As we have already noted, it is during this same discussion in Truth and Method 
that Gadamer affirms μέθεξις as the dynamic of this duality, the essentially bonded 
but irreducibly distinct appearance of the idea in the appearance. In 1992 
Gadamer appends this analysis quite definitively: 
 
When Plato speaks of aletheia [truth] and sees truth connected with 
beauty, he is not thinking of art and he is also not thinking of the poets, 
who have much to say that is true but as the saying goes, “The poets lie 
a lot.” What Plato has in mind with this connection between truth and 
beauty is a joy in pure forms and colors, but not in flowers or animals 
“or copies of them” (Philebus 51c). This passage in the Philebus 
teaches quite clearly how little weight Plato actually accords to copying 
as such.884 
 
Gadamer in fact sides with neither Plato nor Heidegger in this debate. He concurs 
with Plato against Heidegger that μίμησις has no connection to beauty or ἀλήθεια, 
but disagrees with Plato that art should be identified with μίμησις at all; at least not 
in our current ‘world order’ in which we no longer experience the beautiful ‘that 
presents itself in its true fulfilment in the starry heavens’.885 Rather, what we mean 
nowadays in referring to the ἀλήθεια of the artwork, for Gadamer, is the fact that 
‘art presents itself in such a way that it both conceals itself and at the very same 
time authenticates itself’,886 which is to say, the artwork actually amplifies the 
dynamic of the apparent and the transcendent which Plato identifies with beauty. 
‘It remains always the same work’, Gadamer writes, ‘even if in each new 
encounter it emerges in its own way’,887 a point Nancy in fact echoes in a seminar 
                                                          
884 Han-Georg Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image: “So True, So Full of 
Being!”’ (1992), trans. by Richard. E. Palmer, in The Gadamer Reader, pp. 195-
224, (p. 204). 
885 Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image’, p. 214. 
886 Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image’, p. 214. 
887 Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image’, p. 214. 
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of 2010, when he suggests the power of da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is its refusal to be 
pinned down, that it offers something more every time it is seen,888 as opposed to 
the deficient type of artwork he critiques in a lecture four years earlier, which, 
through a political over-emphasis, pins itself down to a static reference point.889 
 
Gadamer asserts that while for Plato and Aristotle μίμησις truly was art, now things 
are not so simple. He writes in 1977’s ‘Die Aktualität Des Schönen’ [‘The 
Relevance of the Beautiful’], that ‘the tradition is justified in saying that “art is 
always mimesis”’, just so long as it is understood that ‘[w]hen we say this’, we do 
not mean it represents in the way the orbit of the stars represent mathematical 
perfection for the Greeks; no, ‘this representation cannot be grasped or even come 
to be “there” for us in any other way’,890 the representation does not re-present at 
all, it offers something completely original. ‘Clearly, we are dealing here with 
something quite different from the relationship of original and copy’, he writes in 
the 1992 text, ‘[w]orks of art possess an elevated rank in being, and this is seen in 
the fact that in encountering a work of art we have the experience of something 
emerging—and this one can call truth!’.891 Our truth, our ἀλήθεια, is not simple 
unconcealment, not the clarity of a mathematical beauty that presents itself as it is, 
rather, in our experience of artworks ‘what comes forth was hidden there’,892 it 
presents itself as the emergence, the reopening, each time, “representing” only 
insofar it presents. 
 
                                                          
888 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Mystery of Art’ (2010) 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=he2k_ukMgRM> [accessed 9 September 
2013]. 
889 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, pp. 91-99. 
890 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘The Relevance of the Beautiful’ (1977), trans. by 
Robert Bernasconi, in The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other Essays 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 1-56 (p. 36). 
891 Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image’, p. 207. 
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In Truth and Method, Gadamer refers to Aristotle’s discussion of μίμησις in the 
Poetics893 as a paradigmatic example of the “ancient” version of ἀλήθεια: 
 
when children enjoy dressing up, as Aristotle remarks, they are not 
trying to hide themselves, pretending to be something else in order to 
be discovered and recognized behind it; but, on the contrary, they 
intend a representation of such a kind that only what is represented 
exists. The child wants at any cost to avoid being discovered behind his 
disguise. He intends that what he represents should exist, and if 
something is to be guessed, then this is it. We are supposed to 
recognize what it “is.”894 
 
Indeed, considering our prior chapter’s reference to Plato’s Republic and Ion, and 
the emulative kind of μίμησις found there, Aristotle’s account is by no means a 
marginal one, even if, in the much later essay of 1992, Gadamer would have us 
believe that for Plato μίμησις only means the hierarchical copying of an idea (as in 
Republic X) whereas for Aristotle it means the heterarchically shared similarity of 
two things in our cognition of them, which thus leads to ‘recognition’895 (even if, as 
Gadamer has it in Truth and Method, this would lead straight back to Plato’s 
ἀνάμνησις and thus to hierarchy896). Interestingly though, Gadamer finds 
something legitimate in Aristotle’s formulation, stating that ‘even today the mimesis 
theory still retains something of its old validity’,897 because what is described there 
is a scene in which the player ‘allows what he knows to exist and to exist in the 
way that he knows it’,898 that is, it ‘is the presentation of a common truth’,899 a 
participation in the shared horizon of those for whom the imitation makes sense: 
                                                          
893 See sections (1.1-2). 
894 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 113. 
895 Gadamer, ‘The Artwork in Word and Image’, p. 204. 
896 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 113. 
897 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 129. 
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Their being is not exhausted by the fact that they present themselves, 
for at the same time they point beyond themselves to the audience 
which participates by watching. Play here is no longer the mere self-
presentation of an ordered movement, nor mere representation in which 
the child playing is totally absorbed, but it is "representing for 
someone." The directedness proper to all representation comes to the 
fore here and is constitutive of the being of art.900 
 
Indeed, as keen as Gadamer is to highlight the epochal difference between the 
Greek and the modern conception of art with or without μίμησις, he cannot deny 
that the Greek worldview is not ‘wholly alien to us, separated from us by 
fathomless stretches of time’,901 as he says in a lecture of 1964. For, as he states 
in that lecture, the definitively Greek art form of tragic theatre speaks to us of 
something we share far more fundamentally with the Greeks than any specific 
worldview, the experience of our very finitude, and, moreover, a transgression of 
finitude that operates on two levels. ‘The tragic hero resembles, indeed 
represents, a sacrificial victim’, the victim in whom ‘the finitude of fate is 
transcended’,902 Gadamer writes, it is the image of a confrontation with the gods 
that destine the people who commune in the transgression. Yet already at a 
remove from the “real” sacrifice of the Minoans, this sacrifice is only represented in 
the tragic hero, played out, but it is in this representation that we come closest to 
the Greeks, as Gadamer writes in Truth and Method, this play stops being simple 
imitation or μίμησις as soon as it takes on the form of being ‘a play’, that is, 
theatre: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
899 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 129. 
900 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 108. 
901 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ‘Image and Gesture’ (1964), in The Relevance of the 
Beautiful and Other Essays, pp. 75-82 (p. 78). 
902 Gadamer, ‘Image and Gesture’, p. 78. 
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For the players this means that they do not simply fulfil their roles as in 
any game - rather, they play their roles, they represent them for the 
audience. The way they participate in the game is no longer determined 
by the fact that they are completely absorbed in it, but by the fact that 
they play their role in relation and regard to the whole of the play, in 
which not they but the audience is to become absorbed. A complete 
change takes place when play as such becomes a play. It puts the 
spectator in the place of the player. He - and not the player - is the 
person for and in whom the play is played.903 
 
The μίμησις of sacrifice, the representation of a transgressive participation, brings 
about a second-order participation, in which the ‘removal of boundaries between 
the I, the thou, and the we in a unique collective union’904 is dislocated via a 
μίμησις and emerges from the act of playing as the participation of the actors and 
audience in the idea of communion. It is in this Gebilde [structure], as Gadamer 
calls it,905 that we recognise the genesis of the non-mimetic art that defines our 
world. ‘Thus transformation into structure means that what existed previously 
exists no longer. But also that what now exists, what represents itself in the play of 
art, is the lasting and true’.906 The play, as Gebilde, ceases to rely on any of its 
formative relations, the mimetic gesture of the actors or the writers, or indeed the 
audience, and becomes autonomous, ‘exist[ing] for someone, even if there is no 
one there who merely listens or watches’,907 ‘it is, so to speak, its own measure 
                                                          
903 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 109. 
904 Gadamer, ‘Image and Gesture’, p. 78. 
905 In the winter of 1921/22 lectures on Aristotle Heidegger has already used this 
word in a similar way, connecting the construction of a structure, Gebilde, to the 
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and measures itself by nothing outside it.’908 And so Gadamer, like Heidegger, 
severs the aesthetic from the aisthetic, but beyond Heidegger, also subtracting its 
mimetic function, replacing it with μέθεξις. Indeed, in the case of our art, and its 
roots in tragic theatre: 
 
The spectator does not hold himself aloof at the distance characteristic 
of an aesthetic consciousness enjoying the art with which something is 
represented, but rather participates in the communion of being present. 
The real emphasis of the tragic phenomenon lies ultimately on what is 
presented and recognized, and to participate in it is not a matter of 
choice.909 
 
Somewhat invertedly, it is in fact in the “occasional” artwork, the piece that 
maintains its mimetic element through the orientation it maintains to the occasion 
to which it is addressed,910 that Gadamer finds the most intense demonstration of 
our art. It is at this point that we are returned to Gadamer’s discussion of Plato’s 
portrait from chapter three. As we saw there, ‘the most distinctive element of a 
portrait [is] its intention to be recognised as such,’911 yet this is not a presentation 
that comes about as the result of a μίμησις, but rather a presentation of μίμησις, a 
relation carried by the work independently of our ability to recognise its likeness to 
a Plato to whom none of us are acquainted, ‘though indeterminable this relation 
remains present and effective in the work itself’.912 In being presented, the model 
or represented is neither required nor called upon, it ‘becomes its image’,913 and in 
this way ‘the universal becom[es] visible in the individual’,914 that is to say, what is 
                                                          
908 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 111. 
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911 Gadamer, ‘Plato as Portraitist’, p. 295. 
912 Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 142. 
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recognised is not the original, but our own participation in the formation of its 
image. Making the occasional the most intense demonstration of the nature of our 
art, Gadamer shows that what he means by the artwork’s dual dynamic of 
revealing and concealing, the way it opens anew on every occasion, unlike the 
self-same μίμησις of the Pythagorean orbs reflecting the singular static worldview 
of an undefined Greek age, is that ‘[t]he specific mode of the work of art's 
presence is the coming-to-presentation of being’,915 which, as we have already 
noted, is for Gadamer a function of communal participation, μέθεξις.916 In what 
follows I will trace out Nancy’s extended critique of modes of thought that 
legitimise communal μέθεξις according to a mimetic operation. 
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4.5 Nancy on the myth of participation 
When Nancy states in ‘Sharing Voices’ that Ion’s μίμησις proceeds from a μέθεξις 
of which it also the necessary condition, he remarks in a footnote, ‘[o]ne knows 
how Levy-Bruhl returns to this couple of Platonic terms in his last conception of the 
"primitive mentality"’.917 The “last conception” Nancy is referring to here is the idea 
of a ‘participation-imitation’918 which in Lévy-Bruhl’s posthumously published 
notebooks describes a conjunction in the “primitive” worldview of certain cultures 
that is not suggested in his earlier texts.919 Earlier, Lévy-Bruhl had written 
extensively of ‘participation mystique’, to describe this mentality, a concept Jung 
describes as the ‘lack of distinctiveness between individuals’ and the ‘oneness of 
the subject and the object’,920 a deep connection of community and environment 
that Lévy-Bruhl proposed defined the so-called “primitive mentality” of the 
uncivilised.921 
 
But in the later notebooks Lévy-Bruhl complicates this communion, and writing of 
the Indian and Burmese Naga people, Lévy-Bruhl notes that in the case of the rain 
dance, ‘imitation of the desired event determines a participation […] It is certain, by 
virtue of participation-imitation, that the rain will fall, a little sooner or a littler 
                                                          
917 Nancy, ‘Sharing Voices’, 256 n. 51. 
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later’.922 In her pioneering studies of Greek mythology, which cite Lévy-Bruhl along 
the way,923 Harrison argues that a community operating in such a way, 
participating by imitating, for instance in the ritual blood-letting or eating of a totem 
animal, evidences that ‘the beginning of a distinction is just drawing’,924 a new 
epistemological division between the members of the community, and also 
between the community and its environment, a loss of participation mystique that 
is now being appended by a mimetic function, imitating that which was once 
simply immediate, undifferentiated. She writes: 
 
The magical ceremonies, the shedding of the human blood, the 
counterfeiting of the animal, have for their object to bridge the gulf that 
is just opening, to restore by communion that complete unity which is 
just becoming conscious of possible division. The ceremonies are 
however still intensely sympathetic and cooperative; they are, as the 
Greeks would say, rather methektic than mimetic, the expression, the 
utterance, of a common nature participated in, rather than the imitation 
of alien characteristics.925 
 
Making the atomic family synonymous with civilisation, in just the way as does the 
early Lévy-Bruhl, Harrison notes that right there in the dawn of a civilisation 
μίμησις is already the weaker term, the servant of μέθεξις, that is, of a communal 
μέθεξις conceived in the way Gadamer has it, as Teilhabe, but a lost, irrecoverable 
Teilhabe subsidised by emulation. In doing so, Harrison demonstrates the exact 
form of nostalgia that Nancy suggests pervades our notion of community to this 
day, the yearning of the West to recover an immediacy of community, a spiritual 
communion that is thought to have been lost to rationality, and which the West 
                                                          
922 Lévy-Bruhl, The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality, pp. 111-12. 
923 Jane Ellen Harrison, Themis, a study of the social origins of Greek religion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1912), p. 122 
924 Harrison, Themis, p. 125. 
925 Harrison, Themis, p. 125. 
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now plays at, imitating it, deficiently. It is worth highlighting here that this is 
precisely the charge levelled at Plato’s use of the concept of μέθεξις by Aristotle, 
Heidegger, and Deleuze, namely, that his concept is extraneous, that it merely 
covers over the division of a prior unity which is to be the object of recovery, by 
analogy or univocity. Nancy’s point here, as it was in his discussion of Plato, is that 
communion, the prior unity that is established as negated, as the object of 
recovery, is a construct symptomatic of a thinking of the immanent as a lack of 
transcendence, without which it now struggles to circumscribe itself, that is, the 
philosophical tension we have been following throughout this thesis. As we will see 
here, Nancy’s aim is rather to think community according to the mutual μέθεξις and 
μίμησις that shares out its finite, internal, transimmanent limits. 
 
Before the publication of ‘Sharing Voices’, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe had 
touched upon Lévy-Bruhl’s work in a paper delivered at the 1980 conference Les 
Mécanismes du fascisme, a more developed version of which was translated into 
English and published in Critical Enquiry in 1990 as ‘The Nazi Myth’. In that paper 
the two thinkers use Lévy-Bruhl’s conjunction of imitation and participation to point 
out the curious relationship between the Romantic German, or simply modern926 
conception of how a people identify with their founding myths, and a “Greek” 
conception of myth invented by the modern to provide an origin against which to 
define itself. First of all the authors turn to the Platonic text to glean how grand 
teleological and unifying narratives might have functioned within a polis, finding 
that Plato’s approach to myth: 
 
                                                          
926 In their book on the Literary Absolute, Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe assert 
unequivocally that Romanticism is not over, that it stretches from the publication of 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason to the contemporary. Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 
The Literary Absolute, p. 17.  
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implies the recognition that their specific function is, in fact, that of 
exemplarity. Myth is a fiction, in the strong, active sense of "fashioning," 
or, as Plato says, of "plastic art": it is, therefore, a fictioning, whose role 
is to propose, if not to impose, models or types (this is still Plato's 
vocabulary, and you will soon see where and how it reemerges), types 
in imitation of which an individual, or a city, or an entire people, can 
grasp themselves and identify themselves. In other words, the question 
posed by myth is that of mimetism, insofar as only mimetism is able to 
assure an identity.927 
 
This idea of exemplarity is what is at stake in the doubled approach to μίμησις we 
have already observed in Plato’s writing, in the contrast between Plato’s 
denunciation of artistic, reproductive μίμησις in Republic Book X, but his 
acceptance of the emulative, educational μίμησις of Book III. ‘Why?’, Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe ask, before answering, ‘[f]or the essential reason that myths, 
through the role they play in traditional education, through their character of 
general reference in the habitual practice of the Greeks, induce bad attitudes or 
bad ethical (and political) behaviors’.928 In line with the project of the Republic as a 
whole, μίμησις for Plato must therefore be controlled, turning the power of 
mimetism to sway entire peoples in the right direction. As was the case with the 
productive hierarchy of Book X, where it was a question of the right model by 
which to create a physical product, here, when the pedagogical mode of μίμησις is 
in question, it is a question of the correct narrative around which the polis should 
organise itself, of determining the correct myth, that Plato no doubt considered the 
Republic to fulfil the need for. 
 
                                                          
927 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’, p. 297. 
928 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’, p. 297. 
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Nancy suggests in Being Singular Plural that this qualitative classification of 
μίμησις in Plato’s texts ultimately mirrors the much more general delineation Plato 
makes of philosophy as a whole when he circumscribes it from its opposite, 
sophism.929 According to Nancy there is for Plato ‘a "good" mimesis (the sort Plato 
wanted), a mimesis of logos, and a "bad" mimesis (that of the "sophist,"930 the 
prototype of the spectacular merchant who sells the simulacra of logos.)’931 As is 
well known, the determination of what philosophy is according to what it is not 
produces the conjunction of its name, where σοφία is placed under the negative 
restriction of φιλία, whereas the σοφιστής, 932 Plato would have us believe, claims 
ownership over σοφία and worse still instrumentalises it, so that it ceases to be an 
end in itself. The philosopher loves σοφία, and in desiring it, contrary to the 
pretence of the sophist, does not and cannot have it. The sophist, therefore, must 
not be allowed to instrumentalise the mimetism of myth. Plato confirms this in the 
Laws: 
 
We ourselves, to the best of our ability, are the authors of a tragedy at 
once superlatively fair and good; at least, all our polity is framed as a 
μίμησις of the fairest and best life, which is in reality, as we assert, the 
truest tragedy. Thus we are composers of the same things as 
yourselves, rivals of yours as artists and actors of the fairest drama, 
which, as our hope is, true law, and it alone, is by nature competent to 
complete.933 
 
Now, what is so interesting about the modern account of the place of myth within a 
community, according to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, is not only that it adds a 
                                                          
929 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, pp. 71-2. 
930 Nancy is referring here to: Plato, ‘Sophist’, 235a. 
931 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 72. 
932 Plato, ‘Sophist’, 218c. 
933 Plato, Laws in Two Volumes, 817b. 
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participation mystique or μέθεξις to the Greek emphasis on μίμησις, but that it 
represents the Greek worldview as the mythical origin which it can now only relate 
to by μίμησις, which is to say, we moderns ascribe the μέθεξις we have invented to 
an outmoded era, the perfection of which we can scarcely hope to recover, and in 
doing so it quite literally: 
 
adds something to the classical, Greek theory of mythic imitation, of 
mimesis - or develops, very insistently, something that, in Plato for 
example, was really only nascent, that is, a theory of fusion or mystical 
participation [i.e. participation mystique] (of methexis, as Lucien Levy-
Bruhl will say), of which the best example is the Dionysian experience, 
as described by Nietzsche.934 
 
And we need only look as far Die Geburt der Tragödie [The Birth of Tragedy] to 
find a powerful instance of this mythical nostalgia: 
 
We had actually always believed that the true spectator, whoever he 
might be, must always remain aware that he is watching a work of art 
and not an empirical reality, while the tragic chorus of the Greeks is 
required to grant the figures on the stage a physical existence […] The 
audience of spectators as we know it was unknown to the Greeks: in 
their theatres anyone in the terraces, rising in concentric arcs, was able 
to overlook the whole of the surrounding cultural world, and, in satisfied 
contemplation, to imagine themselves members of the chorus.935 
 
Here Nietzsche demonstrates what Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy refer to in their 
paper as the ‘double’ Greece,936 distinguishing between one Greece just outlined 
as the world of Plato, the world of mimetic distance, and another Greece that 
                                                          
934 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’, p. 302. 
935 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy (1872), trans. by Shaun Whiteside 
(London: Penguin, 2003), pp. 37-42. 
936 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, ‘The Nazi Myth’, p. 301. 
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forms part of the modern representation, a Greece employed as the image of the 
ἀρχή of the modern combination of imitation and participation, μίμησις and μέθεξις, 
determined circularly as the prototype of this combination with Nietzsche’s feigned 
surprise, as if a discovery, “[w]e had actually always believed…”. As Nancy will put 
it later in Being Singular Plural: 
 
There is certainly nothing accidental in the fact that our modern way of 
grounding the so-called Western tradition involves a triple reference: to 
philosophy as the shared exercise of logos, to politics as the opening of 
the city, and to the theater as the place of the symbolic-imaginary 
appropriation of collective existence. The Athenian theater, both the 
institution itself and its content, appears to us as the political (civil) 
presentation of the philosophical (the self-knowledge of the logical 
animal) and, reciprocally, as the philosophical presentation of the 
political. That is, it appears to us as the "one" presentation of being-
together, yet as a presentation where the condition for its possibility is 
the irreducible and institutive distance [l'écart] of representation.937 
 
The “danger” is that we ‘efface the moment of mimesis in favor of the moment of 
logos’,938 as if, as in the role Nietzsche plays, we really did imagine ourselves 
impassionate observers of an entirely self-enclosed, perfect fragment, in the 
Schlegelian sense, of political life. Subjugating μίμησις to logos on the one hand 
makes of the theatre a unilateral spectacle, a simple and neutral representation of 
political life recounted to a passive viewer, and on the other hand it misrepresents 
the logos as something that can be represented, but ‘logos does not present itself 
of its own accord—and maybe because it does not present itself at all, because its 
logic is not the logic of presence.’939 In its folding together of logos, polis and 
                                                          
937 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 71. 
938 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 71. 
939 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 72. 
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shared existence, the theatre is not a representation of logos via a secondary 
μίμησις, it is a presentation of the μίμησις of logos, and of the necessity of μίμησις 
for logos; or again, the theatre enacts the logos in total conspicuity through its 
staged intensification of the μίμησις which is at its heart. ‘This amounts to 
recognizing that "social logos," the logic of "association," and "association" itself as 
the logos all require mimesis’,940 Nancy writes. He goes on: 
 
By effacing the intrinsic moment or dimension of mimesis, we efface 
this sharing [partage]. We give ourselves the representation of a 
presence that is immanent and enclosed, self-constitutive and self-
sufficient, the integrally self-referential order of what we call a "logic" in 
the most general and basic sense.941 
 
The members of the chain in the Ion, or the polis, or the modern community, are 
connected by an imitation-participation, a μέθεξις that can neither access an origin 
nor encompass every member in communion, but functions as a μίμησις of such a 
communion, a μίμησις that in doing so presents itself as μίμησις, a participation in 
the emulation of the myth of communion. Now, as we have already noted, such a 
μίμησις, while it may represent or recreate an origin, in fact consists in a 
communication between Dasein, exposed singularities devoid of milieu or pure 
outside, and at the end of Nancy’s essay ‘L’insacrifiable’ [‘The Unsacrificeable’] 
from 1990’s Une pensée finie [A Finite Thinking], Nancy once again recalls Lévy-
Bruhl’s ‘guess that mimesis is methexis, participation’,942 and asks in a footnote: 
 
why shouldn’t we grasp mimesis on the basis of a methexis, a 
communication or contagion that, outside the West, has perhaps never 
                                                          
940 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 71. 
941 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, p. 71. 
942 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 62. 
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had the meaning of a communion, which we have tended to give it? 
What escapes us, and what “Western sacrifice” at once misses and 
sublates, is an essential discontinuity of methexis, an in-communication 
of every community.943 
 
Here Nancy picks back up on themes from Bataille previously explored in The 
Inoperative Community, namely, that communication is predicated upon alterity,944 
and that, therefore, the work of death, the ultimate transgression of the finite, leads 
not to communion but to ‘the infinity of immanence’,945 that in the thought of 
‘decomposition leading back to nature’ in which ‘everything returns to the ground 
and becomes part of the cycle […]there is no longer any community or 
communication: there is only the continuous identity of atoms’.946 Western 
sacrifice, Nancy points out, by representing itself as only figurative,947 which 
means, only μίμησις, a spiritual simulacrum of Christ-like or Socrates-like self-
sacrifice that only mimes the “real” ancient sacrifice, of the truth of which it knows 
nothing, just like the nostalgia of modern myth, reflects back its own ideal of 
communion, ‘the uniqueness of the life948 and of the substance in which-or to 
which-every singularity is sacrificed’,949 as a μίμησις of something truer. 
 
But ‘what we represent as the bonds or communication of sacrifice’ Nancy writes, 
‘stems from what we have already invested in this idea’,950  and ‘[a]s is the case at 
other decisive points in our Western discourse, the representation of a loss of truth 
- here, the truth of sacrificial rites - leads directly to the representation of a truth of 
                                                          
943 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, 327 n. 30. 
944 Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’, p. 24. 
945 Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’, p. 17. 
946 Nancy, ‘The Inoperative Community’, p. 12. 
947 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 59. 
948 i.e. ‘Who was delivered for our offences, and was raised again for our 
justification’. Romans 4.25. 
949 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 57. 
950 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 62. 
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loss’,951 our immanent world placed under the sign of a negation of the absolute 
transcendence and transgression that once had the power to circumscribe it. For 
philosophy, ‘[e]verything happens as if the West began where sacrifice ends’,952 
precisely because philosophy emerges in and as a tension of the immanent and 
the transcendent in which being is abandoned, so that so too, sacrifice is 
‘abandoned to the finite world’,953 determined as a negation, a faulty imitation of 
the absolute transgression of horizon by which a perfect community circumscribed 
itself from the absolutely transcendent. I want to quote Nancy’s response from the 
end of ‘The Unsacrificeable’ in full, noting that it leads directly into the next 
section’s concerns with understanding the nature of a whole world structured by 
singularity and exposure: 
 
[T]here is no horizon; that is, there is no limit to transgress. In another 
way, though, horizon is all there is. On the horizon something is 
constantly rising and setting. And yet this is neither the rise nor the fall, 
the orient nor the occident of sacrifice. It is, so to speak, "horizonality'' 
itself. Or, rather, finitude. Or, better still, it is the fact that sense needs to 
be made of the infinite absence of appropriable sense. Again, 
"technology'' might well constitute just such a horizon (so long as 
"technology'' is understood as the regime of finitude and its 
"unworking"). That is, and there's no getting away from it, the closure of 
an immanence. This immanence, however, would neither lose nor lack 
transcendence. In other words, it would not be sacrifice in any sense of 
the word. What we used to call "transcendence" would signify instead 
that appropriation is immanent. Such "immanence," however, is not a 
vague coagulation; it is nothing more than its own horizon. The horizon 
holds existence at a distance from itself, in the separation or the 
"between" that constitutes it: between life and death ... We don't enter 
into this between, which is also the stage of mimesis and methexis. Not 
                                                          
951 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, pp. 60-61. 
952 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 52. 
953 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 59. 
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because it would be an abyss, an altar, or an impenetrable heart, but 
because it is nothing other than the limit of finitude.954 
 
In the next section I would like to present the way in which Nancy precisely does 
articulate μέθεξις and μίμησις on this basis, starting with Nancy’s ratification of the 
dislocated, fractured interactions of μέθεξις and μίμησις as they are described in 
the aesthetics of Theodor Adorno. 
 
 
  
                                                          
954 Nancy, ‘The Unsacrificeable’, p. 76. 
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4.6 Adorno: negative μίμησις and catastrophic μέθεξις 
Referring via Blanchot to Bataille’s book on Lascaux, Nancy concurs with both in 
2006 that the “birth of art” consists in a disruption of the simplicity of τέχνη, at the 
moment when, as Blanchot writes, ‘finally, the one who breaks the bone or the 
stone with which to arm himself, also breaks it apart for his own delight’.955 
Moreover, as Nancy states in 1994, with the first artistic gesture comes also the 
first human; the first monstration (from the Latin monstrare, to show956), engenders 
the first monstrousness (from the same root), that is, the first unnatural being. It is 
a gesture that is without end, in the teleological sense, unlike the technical 
‘gesture of picking up my glass’, which ‘stops when I’ve picked up the glass’,957 it 
is the gesture that Kant calls ‘purposiveness without purpose’, a formulation958 to 
which Nancy demands we remain true.959 In fact: 
 
from Kant down to our day, including Hegel, Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, 
Adorno, Heidegger and our contemporaries, Derrida for instance, all the 
reflections about art agree in one way or another, in terms that are 
similar or different, that in art there is a question of something like what I 
am calling a gesture.960 
 
From that list it is Adorno whom Nancy names, in the principal essay of 1994’s 
Muses, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, as ‘one of the ones who 
                                                          
955 Maurice Blanchot, Friendship (1971), trans. by Elizabeth Rottenberg 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1997), p. 8. 
956 Nancy evokes this etymological connection much more clearly with the original 
French montrer. See: Jean-Luc Nancy, Les Muses (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1994), 
p. 122. 
957 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 97. 
958 See Kant’s ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ and its development in the ‘Analytic of 
Teleological Judgement’, in: Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgement (1790), trans. 
by James Creed Meredith & Nicholas Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007). 
959 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, p. 90. 
960 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 97. 
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comes closest’961 to conceiving of the technical at the heart of the artistic, for while 
in one sense Adorno does repeat the disconnective moment we saw in 
Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s severance of the aesthetic from the aisthetic, in 
renouncing the ‘consumptive, bourgeois satisfaction’962 of aesthetic amusement, 
and indeed, even radicalising it by pointing out that ‘”[m]ost works of art fall short 
of coinciding with a generic concept of art”’, in another sense Adorno flips the 
stakes entirely, by asserting to Nancy’s approval that ‘”the arts do not vanish 
completely in art”’.963  Moreover, as Jarvis notes, for Adorno: 
 
Art imitates nature: but nothing like 'nature' exists as yet: art imitates 
what does not yet exist. For Adorno it can be said that all authentic art 
is a mimesis of utopia - yet this mimesis can be carried out only 
negatively. Art cannot provide an explicit image of utopia. The possible 
'nature' which does not yet exist can only be imitated by the determinate 
negation of the falsely naturalized culture which does exist.964 
 
The upshot of this “negative” dialectic, although Nancy does not say it, is that 
Adorno also comes closest to breaking with the nostalgic formula in which μίμησις 
is overcome, or overcomes itself, in subjugation to a communal μέθεξις that it 
makes present in its representation. Although Adorno’s art is nostalgic insofar as 
its μίμησις points backwards, ‘because for art, Utopia - the yet-to-exist - is draped 
in black, it remains in all its mediations recollection’,965 nevertheless what is 
recalled is brought back as negative, not as an object of return or resolution, it is 
engaged rather as a moment of resistance to the positivity of the actual that can 
                                                          
961 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, p. 3. 
962 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, p. 17. 
963 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (1961-69), cited in Nancy, ‘Why Are 
There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, 104 n. 2. 
964 Simon Jarvis, Adorno: A Critical Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 
100. 
965 Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 135. 
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only begin to move into the yet-to-exist through this conflict.966 Elsewhere in the 
1982 essay ‘Noli Me Frangere’ Nancy affirms this movement of tension between 
actual and mimetic as enacted in the very way Adorno writes, comparing his text 
to the fragments discussed in section (1.5.2), which tremble at their frayed edges, 
so too Adorno’s dialectic, for Nancy, makes no attempt either to recuperate what is 
recalled nor even to ‘maintain the contradiction but to bear its rupture’,967 such that 
much later in Listening, Nancy asserts that Adorno is one of but a few thinkers to 
write in a way that ‘mak[es] sense resound beyond signification’.968 Like Gadamer, 
what this means for Adorno is that our modern art is tensed between two poles, 
the actuality that provides the material of their existence, and the negative μίμησις 
that ruptures it, although, unlike Gadamer, no new structure emerges from this 
conflict:  
 
The truth content of artworks, as the negation of their existence, is 
mediated by them though they do not in any way communicate it. That 
by which truth content is more than what is posited by artworks is their 
methexis in history and the determinate critique that they exercise 
through their form. History in artworks is not something made, and 
history alone frees the work from being merely something posited or 
                                                          
966 Nancy and Adorno offer divergent attitudes to the utopian. For while Adorno 
conceives of art’s participation in the construction of a future as blind to the nature 
of what is to come, only beckoning it in by destroying the actual to make space for 
it, and as such appears to parallel Nancy’s rejection of political or hermeneutic 
constructions that fix their object in advance, nevertheless, Adorno still states that 
‘[e]ach artwork is Utopia insofar as through its form it anticipates what would finally 
be itself, and this converges with the demand for the abrogation of the spell of self-
identity cast by the subject’. Which is to say, Adorno trusts that whatever is 
brought about in an artistic disruption will be itself, how it is meant to be. Adorno, 
Aesthetic Theory, p. 135. For more discussion, see: Richard Wolin, ‘Utopia, 
Mimesis, and Reconciliation:  A Redemptive Critique of Adorno’s Aesthetic 
Theory’, in Representations 32 (Autumn 1990) 33-49. 
967 Jean-Luc Nancy & Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, ‘Noli Me Frangere’ (1982), trans. 
by Brian Holmes, in The Birth to Presence, pp. 266-78 (p. 272). 
968 Nancy, Listening, p. 34. 
278 
 
manufactured: Truth content is not external to history but rather its 
crystallization in the works.969 
 
Like ἀλήθεια, Adorno’s artwork mediates the distribution of light and shade, but in 
contrast to it, Adorno’s artwork at no point presents what has been brought to light. 
For just as much as Adorno’s negative μίμησις consists in a recollection of 
obsolescence, the actuality upon which it works (which is also the material of its 
own actuality) is no less a product of history and its sedimentation, and is as such 
entirely incidental, transcending the intention of the artist or the experience of the 
viewer by its very universality. Insofar as the artwork does enact a material 
participation in truth, it does not communicate it, rather ‘[a]rt's methexis in the 
tenebrous, its negativity’, is ‘its tense relation to permanent catastrophe’.970 Art’s 
μέθεξις with history, its mimetic participation in the material reconfiguration of the 
historical truth given to it incidentally in the actual, is not a content to be 
communicated by the artwork, but a process it is engaged in, and the maker or 
artist who sets the artwork to work has no access to this content, they can only 
presuppose it in the forms historically available for their μίμησις. In this way their 
μίμησις is political,971 not artistic, and the artwork’s μέθεξις, that which constitutes 
its special artistic relation to truth, can never be disclosed. Adorno’s μέθεξις never 
presents anything positive; for Adorno art arises from, but cannot communicate, 
the truth of its historical conditioning nor what comes after the conflictive act of 
μίμησις that is its μέθεξις in the reconfiguration of those conditions. The upshot of 
this, Adorno states in a lecture of 1966, which Nancy cites as length in his first 
footnote to The Muses, is: 
                                                          
969 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 133. 
970 Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, p. 135. 
971 For more on the intimacy between art and politics’ negative engagement with 
the actual in Adorno, see: Michael Rothberg, ‘Adorno: Culture in the Wake of 
Catastrophe’, in New German Critique 72 (Autumn 1997), 45-81. 
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In relation to the arts, art is something that forms itself, contained 
potentially in each of them insofar as each must seek to liberate itself 
from the contingency of its quasi-natural moments by traversing them. 
But such an idea of art within the arts is not positive; it is nothing that 
one can grasp as simply present in them, but only as negation… Art 
has its dialectical essence in that it accomplishes its movement toward 
unity only by passing through plurality. Otherwise the movement would 
be abstract and powerless. Its relation to the empirical order is essential 
to art itself. If it overlooks that relation, then what it takes to be its spirit 
remains exterior to it like any material whatsoever; it is only in the 
empirical order that the spirit becomes content. The constellation of art 
and the arts has its place within the concept of art.972 
 
What Nancy finds important here is that although the truth of art, its μέθεξις in the 
reconfiguration of history, does entirely transcend any possible moment of 
aisthetic contact, determining art as an unconsciousness or even inhuman agent 
in the formation of the actual shared material horizon, for the very same reason, 
no particular artwork can ever claim to present the truth of this μέθεξις, each 
artwork falls short of the total force of art, which gains its energy not from a unitary 
or unifying field that would nullify its insurgence, but from its internal differing, ‘”the 
free movement of discrete moments (which is what art is all about)”’,973 the 
multiplicity of its transgressions. If art were to resolve into a singular essence it 
would cease to be art by becoming nothing but actuality. 
 
There are, I would therefore suggest, three interconnected reasons why Nancy 
affirms Adorno’s above all of the other names. First of all, unlike Heidegger’s 
                                                          
972 Theodor W. Adorno, ‘Die Kunst und die Künste’ (1966), cited in: Nancy, ‘Why 
Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, 103n.1. 
973 Aesthetic Theory (1961-69), cited in Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and 
Not Just One?’, 103 n. 1. 
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dialectic of beauty and μίμησις, or Gadamer’s presentation of μίμησις, Adorno’s 
notion of art invokes no absolute distinction between total immanence and total 
transcendence. It is something that only transcends the individual insofar as one 
finite individual can never be cogent of the total conditions (material and temporal) 
of his or her existence. Second, Adorno does not claim that art ever represents 
that totality of conditions back to the individual. For Adorno, μίμησις is never put to 
the work of, or made to represent a communal μέθεξις. Irreducible from its 
technical instances, the material temporality of its happening, and emptied of 
determinate content, neither presenting nor representing, it is clear that Adorno’s 
aesthetics really describes nothing but gesture, nothing but purpose without 
purposiveness. Third and finally, there is, in Adorno’s thought of art, no origin 
proper; there is rather an indefinite distribution of finite artistic moments that, while 
they are indeed world forming, do not do so according to a common intent or a 
shared principle. 
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4.7 Nancy on the presentation of presentation 
I would like to suggest that Nancy’s contribution to an understanding of the nature 
of artistic μίμησις and μέθεξις turns on an alignment of the Romantic and the 
technical definitions just presented. As Nancy puts it in 2007’s Le plaisir au dessin 
[The Pleasure in Drawing], by his account, ‘[m]imesis proceeds from the desire for 
methexis - of participation’, that is, in accordance with the Romantic schema of 
ambivalence and absence, μίμησις is the desire to ‘imitate the inimitable’, yet, in 
accordance with art’s irreducible technicity, and, moreover, the world’s irreducible 
ecotechnicity, the inimitable is to be understood neither as pure negation nor pure 
transcendence, but rather as the excess that escapes every presentation that 
touches it, such that what is at stake in μίμησις is not the desire for presence, 
immediacy, or communal μέθεξις, it is the desire to be involved in the presencing 
of the world, its sense, to draw a line or form a thing in order ‘to imitate the 
inimitable ‘‘creation,’’ or more simply, the inimitable and unimaginable uprising 
[surgissement] of being in general.’974 Or, as Nancy puts it in an essay of the same 
year: 
 
(If the imago was first formed on the basis of a death mask,975 it was 
because, from the moment of the mask’s molding, mimesis modulated 
the methexis through which the living shared the death of the deceased. 
It is this sharing of death – of its harrowing and hallucinatory force -  it is 
the methexis of disappearance that properly serves as a model for 
mimesis.) The image is the effect of a desire (of the desire to rejoin the 
other) or, better yet, it opens up the space and hollows out the chasm of 
this desire. Every image is the Idea of a desire. It is conformity itself as 
“self” of a desire, not of a posited-being.976 
 
                                                          
974 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, p. 64. 
975 Image comes from imago, the Roman word for death mask. 
976 Nancy, ‘The Image: Mimesis & Methexis’, p. 12. 
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The image, for Nancy, makes the in-order-to structure conspicuous precisely by 
exiting it, that is, in just the same way that Heidegger described Van Gogh’s shoe-
image. As Nancy writes in ‘The Image – The Distinct’, ‘[t]he thing as image is thus 
distinct from its being-there in the sense of the Vorhanden, its simple presence in 
the homogeneity of the world and in the linking together of natural or technological 
operations’,977 and in being distinguished, raising the image from a ground, the 
ground is itself framed in relief, indicated at the borders upon which it touches the 
image. But unlike Heidegger’s account, this indication or gesturing toward the 
ground absolutely does not present it as a determinate regime of disclosure in 
view of which the image would become a representation, drawing its meaning in 
resemblance to the world from which it has arisen. No, the image ‘resembles itself 
and thus it gathers itself together’,978 and ‘the distance in which its self-coincidence 
is separated in order to coincide with itself, leaves behind its status as a thing and 
becomes an intimacy’.979 In its relief, the image gestures towards the world in an 
announcement merely that there is world, not what specific distribution of meaning 
is currently at play, but rather that there is meaning and existence at all, and in 
doing so, serves as a moment of resistance to semantic structures involved in the 
opposite operation, of illustrating a fixed organisation: 
 
[The image] is outside the world, since in itself it is the intensity of a 
concentration of world. It is also outside language, since in itself it is the 
assembling of a sense without signification. The image suspends the 
course of the world and of meaning—of meaning as a course or current 
of sense (meaning in discourse, meaning that is current and valid): but 
                                                          
977 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, p. 9. 
978 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, p. 9. 
979 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, p. 10. 
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it affirms all the more a sense (therefore an “insensible”) that is 
selfsame with what it gives to be sensed (that is, itself).980 
 
The image is therefore opposed to a counter-regime, not only signification but also 
its support, the ‘decoration or illustration’.981 This, in fact, forms the basis of a 
critique of ‘Art Today’, an aesthetic movement that spreads across ‘painting, 
drawing, sculpture, engraving, ceramics’, ‘experimental cinema’, ‘”body art” or 
“land art”’, ‘installation’, and ‘performance’,982 without being defined under any 
specific ism, other than according to its de facto contemporaneity. Echoing 
Adorno, Nancy asserts that this is the most empty definition of an artistic 
movement possible, since ‘art is always contemporary because it always belongs 
to a creation of forms in the space of the contemporary, in the space of an 
actuality’.983 But what art precisely does not do is bring the meaning of this 
actuality to rest, rather, ‘the meaning that art shapes’, is ‘the meaning that allows 
for a circulation of recognitions, identifications, feelings, but without fixing them in a 
final signification’.984 ‘Never’, Nancy goes on, does art say to us “the meaning of 
the world, the meaning of life, is this”’.985 
 
And this is what leads to a questioning of “art today” regarding those artists who 
‘want to characterize themselves as witnesses, even sometimes instead of 
artists’.986 For this pathos leads art down two parallel paths. Firstly, the artworks 
themselves become things that ‘shoot a big block of significations at me’, as if to 
                                                          
980 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, pp. 10-1. 
981 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, p. 12. 
982 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, pp. 91-2. 
983 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 92. 
984 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 92. 
985 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 92. 
986 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 95. 
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say, for instance, ‘”here you are, this is war”’, famine, rape…987 Secondly, the artist 
who bears witness also makes a more a much general statement about the state 
of the contemporary, that not only is the world something signifiable, something 
that has come to rest in a general way as a certain distribution of determinate 
meanings, but that, moreover, art has nothing to contribute to this arrangement, 
that ‘there is no possibility of giving form, or creating meaning’.988 ‘So’, Nancy 
laments, ‘I find myself embarrassed and sometimes even simply greatly 
disapproving of certain artistic gestures which are almost exclusively gestures of 
signification’.989 
 
Nevertheless, even in the most politically motivated work, the excess of 
signification with which it is loaded cannot negate the excess of sense from which 
the image arises in relief.  ‘Sylvie Blocher hangs this parachutist’s uniform on the 
wall, she nails it up in a certain way, she nails a head of hair over it: of course, 
there is the excess of signification I spoke of, but there is also the gesture, her 
artist’s gesture’.990 Beyond and beneath the political signification, there is what 
Kant calls, and Nancy reaffirms, 991 the work’s ‘purposiveness without purpose’.992 
For a ‘technical work is there for itself, it has its own function, its own usefulness, it 
bears its finality along with it, this bottle bears its finality as a container of liquid, of 
allowing one to pour liquids’.993 But with the artwork there is something else, ‘its 
character as work always consists of pointing outside the work’, that is, to the 
world, not a fixed signified world, but to the fact that there is world, and that what is 
fixed and signified is always exceeded by that world, an excess of sense that 
                                                          
987 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 95. 
988 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 95. 
989 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 95. 
990 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 97. 
991 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, p. 90. 
992 Kant, Critique of Judgement, pp. 174-8. 
993 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 98. 
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always offers possibility and future, what Heidegger, Nancy writes approvingly, 
refers to as a totality of ‘significabilities’.994 
 
Moreover the artwork also always presents the viewer to herself, just like the 
traced hands on the walls of Cosquer Cave, Nancy writes, ‘these hands present 
nothing other than presentation itself, its open gesture, its displaying’,995 a 
presentation not only of the fact that there is world, that there is an indefinitely 
multiplying network of surfaces spreading out from the outlines of the hands, but 
also that there is an “I”, and a “we”, from which the world is distinct, and, in fact 
from which the experience is distinct, in its ek-sistence. Nancy writes in 1994: 
 
The pleasure men take in mimēsis is made up of the troubling feeling 
that comes over them in the face of recognizable strangeness, or in the 
excitement that comes from a recognition that one would have to say is 
estranged. 
I recognize there that I am unrecognizable to myself, and without that 
there would be no recognition. I recognise that this makes for a being 
as well as a non-being, and that I am one in the other. I am the being-
one-in-the-other.996 
 
Or, as Nancy puts it in 1999: 
 
We touch on the same and on this power that affirms this: I am indeed 
what I am, and I am this well beyond or well on this side of what I am for 
you, for your aims and your manipulations. We touch on the intensity of 
this withdrawal or this excess. Thus mimesis encompasses methexis, a 
participation or a contagion through which the image seizes us.997 
                                                          
994 Nancy, ‘Art Today’, p. 92. 
995 Nancy, ‘Painting in the Grotto’, pp. 71-2. 
996 Nancy, ‘Painting in the Grotto’, pp. 69-70. 
997 Nancy, ‘The Image – The Distinct’, p. 9. 
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And then again in 2007: 
 
The line, or the mark, or better yet, the tracing of the line - this gesture 
is nothing other than the infinite in actuality that drawing shows us, that 
it extends toward us so that we produce it again within us, so that we 
ourselves become mimesis of this mimesis of the birth to form. This 
includes methexis as well - I embrace the line that I am gazing at or the 
musical movement that I hear. Their desire is reborn in me and for me - 
or rather, in a withdrawn body [corps retiré] that is not ‘‘me’’ but the 
other ‘‘self ’’ in me that harmonizes with this motion and emotion.998 
 
Given in art is not only the exposition of the possibility and excess of world, but the 
possibility and excess of self, and, moreover, the “harmony” that connects the two. 
To draw out what this means, I would like to indicate the relevance of these 
analyses of artistic μίμησις by returning it back to the “start”. In closing, I will 
suggest that Nancy’s “mature” standing on art can be read as a highly 
complementary supplement to his early collaborative work on literature with 
Lacoue-Labarthe. This is meant only to be a preliminary indication for the direction 
of future enquiries, which I will touch on again in the conclusion of the thesis. 
 
It was noted in section (1.5.2) that in 1978, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy offer an 
analysis of the Jena Romantics’ literary ideal of the fragment. The fragment, for 
the Romantics, in its self-sufficiency, self-presence and fullness of meaning, 
reflects the absolute nature of literature, its self-containment as a world-unto-itself. 
This, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy write, represents none other than the 
‘theoretical institutionalization of the literary genre’.999 But it is an instantiation of 
                                                          
998 Nancy, The Pleasure in Drawing, pp. 93-4. 
999 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 3. 
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semantic autonomy precisely motivated by its subtraction elsewhere, for, as the 
two authors state, the Romantic movement essentially forms a response to Kant’s 
critical project, attempting to assign an availability of meaning to an artistic act in 
compensation for Kant’s reduction of the Ego to a structure representable only by 
the transcendental imagination.1000 As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have it, the 
Romantics offset the loss of a self-present Ego or subject (assuming that 
Descartes’ cogito can be considered self-present1001) by affirming the creative act 
through which any subject can assert its freedom and autonomy, and, moreover, 
present its subjectivity back to itself in and as the act.1002 
 
The requirement, then, is for an entirely autonomous artistic act, an act that rejects 
Kantian representation by reorienting art’s object back upon itself, that is, away 
from the model and toward the avant-garde, transforming it into a praxis of 
subjective process in which nothing but the act and the actor are intended. It is to 
this demand that the theoretically charged form of the Romantic fragment 
responds, as a work ‘entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete 
in itself’,1003 Schlegel’s words, cited by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy. As noted in 
the introductory chapter of this thesis, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy respond to the 
Romantic theory of the fragment, via Benjamin, by asserting that the fragment is 
indeed a reflection of the nature of literature, but absolutely not in the way the 
Romantics had thought. In a prefiguration of the topology of singularity, exposure, 
enclosure, and limit, which I have argued throughout this thesis is a fundament of 
                                                          
1000 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 30. 
1001 Nancy refutes this in a number of places and suggests that the hiatus 
designated between the “I” and its enunciation “am” in Descartes represents a 
major step in the deconstruction of subjectivity. See for example: Nancy, Ego 
Sum, and: Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), pp. 25-9. 
1002 Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, The Literary Absolute, p. 8. 
1003 Friedrich Schlegel, ‘Athenaeumsfragment 206’, in Lacoue-Labarthe & Nancy, 
The Literary Absolute, p. 40. 
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the Nancean text, Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy state that the fragment is precisely 
nothing in itself, but rather, like one element of a mosaic, montage, or maybe even 
bricolage, the literary fragment creates meaning not in its self-containment, but 
rather across the extremity of its heterogeneity. Furthermore, as I noted, by 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s and Nancy’s account, no totalizing picture emerges from the 
montage, rather, literature in general is equally as fragmentary as the fragment 
itself, it makes sense at its divisions, both internally, and at its external disciplinary 
exposures. 
 
In light of this, I would argue that it is clear that Nancy’s more recent treatments of 
μίμησις, and the μέθεξις from which it cannot be subtracted, wherein the artistic 
gesture of both the one who draws and the one who embraces the drawing shows 
not only that the world is in excess of their appropriations but that they too are 
foreign to themselves, outside of themselves, provides the exact counterpoint of 
the auto-subjective creative ideal of the Jena Romantics. For what is reflected or 
recognised in μίμησις, by Nancy’s later accounts, is nothing determinate, no 
specific totality of significations and no stable subject to whom a presentation of 
these meanings could be offered. What is presented, Nancy writes in ‘Why Are 
There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, is ‘presentation’,1004 which is to say, 
neither a subject nor an object, but instead the negotiation between the two, the 
way their mutual exposure internally and externally conditions them, making them 
what they are: 
 
One could also put it this way: art is the transcendence of immanence 
as such, the transcendence of an immanence that does not go outside 
itself in transcending, which is not ex-static but ek-sistant. A 
                                                          
1004 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, p. 34. 
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“transimmanence.” Art exposes this. Once again, it does not “represent” 
this. Art is its ex-position. The transimmanence, or patency, of the world 
takes place as art, as works of art. And that is why these works 
themselves work a definitive torsion on the couple 
transcendence/immanence.1005 
 
Now sensibility, Nancy states in The Sense of the World, as it has been 
understood since Aristotle,1006 is simultaneously ‘the act of sensing and the act of 
the sensed’,1007 which means that for Nancy ‘[e]xistence is the act internally 
differing from its own sense’, sensible ec-stasis, or as Nancy puts it in 2002’s 
Listening, ‘a feeling-oneself-feel [se-sentir-sentir]: or, if you prefer, sensing is a 
subject, or it does not sense’.1008 What art presents, by this account, is a subject. 
But entirely at odds with the Romantic conception of the artistic presentation of a 
self-present subject back to itself by way of its flexing of its creativity and liberty, 
the “subject” that art presents on Nancy’s account consists in a mutual exposure, 
the parties of which do not stake an existence claim beyond their referring to one 
another, that, is, harking back to section (1.5.3) of our introduction where the 
concept was introduced only as a stylistic-methodological device, as a renvoi. The 
sensing-itself of sensation is, for Nancy: 
 
A reference [renvoi1009], or in Baudelaire’s terms, a response from one 
touch to another. This response is neither a relation of external 
homology nor an internal osmosis, but what might be described, with 
the etymology of re-spondere, as a pledge, a promise given in response 
to a demand, to an appeal: the different touchings promise each other 
the communication of their interruptions; each brings about a touch on 
                                                          
1005 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, pp. 34-5. 
1006 See for example: Aristotle, De Anima, 418a & 415b. 
1007 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 28. 
1008 Nancy, Listening, p. 8. 
1009 Nancy, Les Muses, p. 45. 
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the difference of the other (of an other or several others, and virtually of 
all others, but of a totality without totalization). This “co-respondence” 
disengages itself from signification.1010 
 
Indeed, in our earlier remarks on the nature of the body in chapter one, the term 
renvoi was translated as “return” in Nancy’s statement that ‘the body is the return 
[renvoi1011] of the “outside” that is to this “inside” that it isn’t’.1012 And its conceptual 
import in regards to a sensuous ontology of the subject is entirely homologous with 
the mode of deployment in which we observed that renvoi named the “referring” 
between two texts, their Auseinandersetzung, a notion of semantic arrival at the 
contact point that determines the contemporaneous as its textual exposure to an 
“origin” that does not pre-exist this exposure. Here, renvoi means just the same 
thing, albeit regarding the exposure of sensibility, as Nancy puts it in 1999: 
 
What we usually call a "response" is a solution; here, though, it is a 
matter of the referral or the return [renvoi] of the promise or the 
engagement. Sense is the engagement between several beings, and 
truth always, inevitably, lies in this between or in this with.1013 
 
What this is all to say, is where philosophy, for Nancy, has the ability to make 
sense in the exposure of textual singularities, the artwork has the ability to present 
sense in the making, as the renvoi or referring that is the sensing of a subject, 
referred back to itself, a referring to a referring that discloses world and observer 
as not only indeterminate, but also irreducible from their exposure to one another, 
from the one’s ecstasis and the other’s transimmanence.   
                                                          
1010 Nancy, ‘Why Are There Several Arts and Not Just One?’, p. 23. 
1011 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 66 (parallel French text). 
1012 Nancy, ‘Corpus’ (b), p. 67. 
1013 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘Responding to Existence’ (1999), trans. by Sara Guyer, in A 
Finite Thinking, ed. by Sparks, pp.289-99, (p. 296). 
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4.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to build upon the analysis of Nancy’s ontological 
response to the concepts of μίμησις and μέθεξις in chapters two and three by 
approaching from the reverse direction, documenting the transformation of 
aesthetic notions of μίμησις that occurs in Nancy’s binding together of μίμησις and 
μέθεξις, immanence and transcendence, and, in fact, ontology and the aesthetic, 
or rather, aisthetic. For in Nancy’s thought of the ecotechnical, we saw, the 
ontological is intimately connected to the sensibility, and it was therefore the aim of 
this chapter to indicate in what way Nancy’s philosophy of art is informed by this 
emphasis on the sensory limit at which Dasein and world are mutually exposed. 
Moreover, it was my contention in this chapter that when Nancy advocates a 
rejuvenation of first philosophy by taking singular plurality as its empirical and 
theoretical starting point, what he has in mind is a first-philosophy modelled on his 
understanding of the artwork and image as phenomena in which the phenomenon 
transgresses itself, presenting the presentation of singularities in their exposure to 
each other, and indicating the excess on each side of the exposure, the 
transimmanent excesses of Dasein and world. 
 
It was noted that a dual trajectory prevailed within a certain strand of philosophical 
aesthetics, wherein not only is the representative function of μίμησις divorced from 
the sensuous moment of either the maker or the observer, but furthermore, that 
the mimetic operation is placed at the service of a communal μέθεξις, serving to 
reflect a shared identity back upon a people. Nancy, we observed, critiques this 
trajectory on the basis of its adherence to a certain Romantic nostalgic conception 
of ceremonial and theatrical μίμησις as gesturing towards a lost immanence or 
μέθεξις once attained by sacrifice or lived in myth, which can now only be 
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represented as a loss. Nancy, to the contrary, affirms the absence at the heart of 
μίμησις and, as we saw, praises Adorno’s aesthetics for treating μίμησις 
accordingly, as a tensed dialectic between creation and destruction without 
regiment or regime, and, thereby, Adorno’s understanding of art’s μέθεξις as the 
process of world forming as irreducible from the indefinite plurality of its technical 
instants. 
  
Finally, it was noted that Nancy determines the artwork to be nothing beyond its 
technical and aisthetic happenings, and, moreover, that art functions as a 
cancellation of technical teleology, opening the purposive into a gesture with no 
purpose other than its own gesturing. In this much, both the image and the artwork 
are understood by Nancy to present nothing but this presenting or gesturing, which 
is to say, the artwork gestures towards the excess and possibility of world at its 
boundaries, and the excess of self of an ec-static observer witnessing his or her 
own exposure or referring to the world, which is to say, the artwork presents 
transimmanence.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Conclusion
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5.1 Summary 
If it is indeed the case, as this thesis suggests, that the distinction of Nancy’s 
written style emerges from the ontological determination he ascribes to syntactic 
singularities, such that they are subject to the same rules of exposure as any other 
existent thing, then it might be easy to suppose that for a commentator, someone 
who seeks to cherry-pick elements of a primary text and rearrange them with a 
discussion in a way that might accommodate a reader’s understanding, Nancy’s 
work would offer a plethora of expository possibility. But to simply take a reading 
and walk away content in the receipt of a novel arrangement of meanings is 
something reserved for the primary enjoyment of reading Nancy’s books 
themselves. To attempt to do justice to the work in a commentary is a different 
matter entirely. The requirement in this case is not to relay either a particular 
transitory experience of the text or pin it down to a fixed signification, but rather to 
try and demonstrate certain potentialities that may serve as preliminary positions 
for future engagements with the Nancean text. 
 
It was the purpose of this thesis, therefore, to make two interrelated contributions 
to the body of scholarly knowledge on the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, that 
might aid such engagements. Firstly, it was to be maintained that Nancy’s 
ontological commitments require locating within the context of an already available 
connectedness of contemporary and Ancient Greek philosophies. Secondly, it was 
to be argued that identifying and articulating this connection to the Greeks via the 
contemporary, is in return the key to understanding where Nancy’s work fits in the 
contemporary scene, specifically in relation to the debate over the philosophical 
priority of immanence or transcendence, and regarding the relation between art 
and philosophy. It was suggested that as a merging of the textual notions of 
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Auseinandersetzung and renvoi, Nancy’s philosophical approach to these diverse 
epochs and regimes of thought seeks not to determine them in isolation, but to 
allow the meaning of their corresponding to arrive in the exposure that constitutes 
the contemporary. 
 
The key terms chosen for the investigation of these correspondences were μίμησις 
and μέθεξις, for two reasons. Firstly, the concepts have a long and intertwined 
history that connects the inaugural texts of ancient Greek philosophy, through 
Neo-Platonism, Scholasticism, and neo-Kantianism, into twentieth century thought 
and the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, where the terms are evoked together as 
mutually determining. Secondly, the lengthily documented relationship between 
the concepts delineates a meeting point between two regional discourses, the 
ontological interrogation of the immanence or transcendence of what is, in which 
μέθεξις regularly names a principle of transcendence and μίμησις a principle of 
immanence, and the aesthetic interrogation of the relationship between art and 
truth, in which μίμησις regularly names a resemblance or process of copying, and 
μέθεξις the participation of a community or world in that resemblance or process of 
copying. Nancy’s response, I maintained throughout the thesis, is that first of all, 
there is no μίμησις without μέθεξις (and vice versa), and that, secondly and 
concomitantly, there is no immanence without transcendence (and vice versa). I 
would like here to summarise the trajectories drawn within this thesis, before 
finishing by noting some pathways along which to extend this research. 
 
Mέθεξις and its derivatives, non-terminological words for sharing, participating and 
partaking, arrive charged with philosophical weight in the works of Plato, first 
under an ethical inflection, before taking on the more general character of a name 
for the transcendent participation of the sensible in the ideal. Moreover, the 
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Human for Plato is thus given determination as the creature existing in this 
between place, with one eye on the immanent and the other on the transcendent, 
interacting with the former with technical objects and the latter with images. Indeed 
the communication of an image is named in the concept of μίμησις, a word Plato 
sometimes uses to describe the sensible as a copy of the ideal. While this is not 
always the case, Aristotle nevertheless documents the ambiguity of the terms in 
Plato’s texts, while at the same asserting that whichever name is used, what is 
described is an extraneous principle of communication necessitated by Plato’s 
fracturing of the unity of being into ontologically distinct realms. 
 
However, μίμησις and μέθεξις, both in Plato and in Aristotle’s less polemical 
moments, are certainly not simply identical. For μίμησις names at least two other 
things in Plato’s work, namely, the productive copying of the artist and poet, and 
the emulative copying of education. Now it is certainly the case that Plato holds 
this μίμησις to a methexic standard, qualifying it according to the degree to which 
the model of emulation or teaching participates in the ideal, but in Aristotle’s 
development of the concept, where education and art are to some extent merged 
in the central position given to the theatre within the self-determination of the polis, 
μίμησις is definitively severed from the specificity of a model, and thus from 
Platonic μέθεξις,  instead referring the shared understanding of an audience back 
to itself, reflecting the group determination of the meaning of the spectacle back 
upon the people as an image of their own immanent communion in a shared 
meaning, a communion which we saw in later chapters also came to be referred to 
as μέθεξις by certain thinkers. 
 
Rather than devoting too much space to interrogating the Platonic and Aristotelian 
texts themselves, the thesis focused on documenting the contemporary reception 
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of, and response to, these concepts and their philosophical implications. Firstly, 
this agenda allowed a much more in depth discussion of the contemporary scene 
to which Nancy responds and against and into which his work can be positioned, a 
scene in which these receptions and responses are to a certain sense given in 
ready-made interpretations. But secondly, maybe more importantly, if it is indeed 
the case as I suggest it is for a Nancean methodology, that meaning arrives in an 
exposure of syntactic singularities that do not properly pre-exist their exposure to 
one another, then it makes little sense to speak of the Ancient Greek texts “in 
themselves” outside of the contemporary confluence within which Nancy goes to 
work. The focus of the thesis was therefore determined not only by its purpose, but 
also by the necessity of maintaining the internal coherence of the material it 
attempts to open up. Nevertheless, some major tenets of Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
positions have remained visible in the background of the chapters I am about to 
recap. 
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5.2 Ancient Greek themes 
Chapter two, which explored the tension between philosophy’s “immanent” social 
conditions (although as chapter four argued, these conditions are not immanent at 
all on Nancy’s reading), and the transcendent structure of its significations, 
focused on Heidegger’s and Deleuze’s responses to the traditional problematic. 
Both of these responses clearly shadowed Aristotle’s critique of μέθεξις as 
something to condemn for its invocation of separation and hierarchy, leading them 
to affirm an immanent inflection of μίμησις in its place, either as an expression of 
political communion for Heidegger, or a heterarchical principle of the distribution of 
intensities on a homogenous plane for Deleuze. For Heidegger, immanence and 
transcendence are derivative to the reduction of the real to the empirical and 
transcendental, with μέθεξις the name for the relation between these two once 
they become misunderstood by psychologistic projection as genuine realms of 
being. For subtracting this transcendence, I argued, Heidegger compensates with 
immanence, describing the articulation of beings as emerging not from a 
participation in the ideal, but from a community’s participation in a shared essence. 
In turn, μίμησις for Heidegger was a way in which this essence can be expressed. 
 
However where Heidegger affirms the Aristotelian dictum of “being” said in many 
ways, interpreting it as the philosophical challenge of hermeneutic circularity and 
ontological difference to interpret beings in their being and the being of beings in 
ongoing modification, and moreover, to account for being and non-being together 
in their ontological movement and folding, Deleuze reduces the dictum to mere 
univocity. Following Scotus, Deleuze asserts that every sense of being is the 
same, that thought and being are identical, and that all that is, is a plane of 
homogeneity, a transcendental field of pure immanence. In his project of 
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“reversing” Platonism, Deleuze rejects μέθεξις for the hierarchy and heterogeneity 
it implies, and affirms μίμησις as it is presented in Book X of the Republic, as the 
deprioritised relating of this plane to itself. 
 
Chapter three, which was concerned with the interrelatedness of hermeneutics 
and ontology both in Nancy’s work and his correspondents, focused on Gadamer’s 
response to the questions surrounding μίμησις and μέθεξις. Here, we saw that 
Gadamer already adds a layer of dialogue to the conversation this thesis is 
presenting, for Gadamer, it was noted, is already responding to Greek thought via 
Heidegger, his old master. In fact, Gadamer uses his Heideggerian induction to 
refute another of his old teachers, Hartmann, who, it was noted, interprets μέθεξις 
as an individuating principle dividing higher unified ideal objects into sub-species 
and concrete entities, by diaeresis. Gadamer presents his response to Hartmann 
as an explicit affirmation of Platonic μέθεξις as something wholly available to the 
senses and only aporetic when appropriated by language. In fact, Gadamer 
asserts that μέθεξις is the ontological precondition of language and dialectic, such 
that the impossibility of linguistic appropriation points rather to its necessity. This 
accommodation of the transcendent within the immanent provided a stark contrast 
to the immanentist accounts outlined in the prior chapter. 
 
We then saw that in his later work, Gadamer interprets μέθεξις as the temporal 
hiatus that structures Dasein’s openness to novelty. Furthermore, and, although 
he avoids describing it in these terms and claims to reject μίμησις, nevertheless, 
Gadamer also echoes Aristotle when he describes the communal self-
determination of a people through their projection of meaning upon an artwork that 
itself has no model. In this way, I suggested, Gadamer brings the two schemas, 
Platonic and Aristotelian, together.  
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However, by providing a normative communal base point of shared meaning into 
which the novelty and transcendence of μέθεξις can arrive, a political immanence 
or Teilhabe that Gadamer also calls μέθεξις, Gadamer too ends up advocating a 
reductive, immediate type of immanence. Identifying this communal type of μέθεξις 
with Mitsein, Gadamer determines it as deep connection and togetherness, most 
unlike the cleavage of its transcendent or temporal counterpart. 
 
The final chapter, four, which sought to explore the centrality of aisthetic sensibility 
and aesthetic experience in Nancy’s work, again focused on Gadamer’s and 
Heidegger’s responses to μίμησις and μέθεξις, but this time the thesis approached 
from the angle of their philosophies of art. While the two thinkers disagree both 
conceptually and textually, I suggested that their homology lies in their repetition of 
the Aristotelian trope of a political immanence structured by an origination and 
communion around a self-reflexive artwork, a trope that we noted is also taken up 
by Romantic German thought, certain anthropologists, and Jungian 
psychoanalysis. Moreover, both thinkers definitively sever art and the aesthetic 
from its relation to the aisthetic, its meaning-for-the-senses, and in this way render 
it sovereign, almost totalitarian. 
 
Heidegger disconnects μίμησις from beauty in the same way as Aristotle. For while 
the μίμησις of an artwork is for Heidegger its ability to influence the regime of what 
counts as being, the distribution of light and shade, by allowing a community to 
orient their shared world around it, beauty, on the other hand, is, as Keats has it, 
truth, which is to say, ἀλήθεια, a reminder of the sheer sensory manifestation of a 
being, already laden with meaning, prior to any reflection, use, or taxonomy. 
Where μίμησις originates a world for Heidegger, beauty discloses it. Gadamer, it 
was noted, disagrees that art is mimetic at all. For Gadamer, μίμησις is the name 
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for an archaic mode of representation in which both the model and media of 
emulation were meant to disappear in the reality of the representation itself. 
Nowadays, we saw Gadamer assert, art, and in particular tragic theatre, is a focal 
point at which the universal consensus is reflected as a cultural image, the truth of 
the audience to whom the representation makes sense, as in the case of a portrait 
of Plato. In both cases, clearly, the communal version of μέθεξις produces a 
political immanence to compensate for the absence of the transcendent. 
 
Offering an alternative in this chapter, however, was Adorno, who not only 
conceives of μίμησις as pure negativity, a nostalgic force that retrieves nothing, 
only disrupting the actuality of the present, but also rethinks μέθεξις as this rupture 
itself, an artistic participation in the redistribution of the actual that neither models 
nor presents it. Adorno as such refuses the sovereignty of art, marking it as 
nothing but the sum total of every finite instance of resistance and disruption. 
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5.3 Nancy’s position 
Nancy’s responses to this contemporary scene were outlined as follows, and all, I 
argue, revolve around Nancy’s fundamental ontological and topological insight: 
there is for Nancy no exclusive choice to be made between the figures of 
immanence and transcendence because both are disimplications or abstractions 
of one primordial, transcendental (in the Scholastic sense) law of objectuality. 
Unity, or singularity as Nancy calls it, means to be enclosed and distinguished, 
and a distinction requires something from which to be distinct. As such, for Nancy 
all beings are beings insofar as they are distinct from each other, which means 
divided from each other at a limit or boundary at which they nevertheless touch. 
For Nancy, enclosure equals exposure and to be is to be conditioned by other 
beings, mutually. 
 
As such, there cannot be absolute immanence according to Nancy’s topological 
commitments, for if the boundary between two beings were to dissolve, they would 
cease to be distinct, which means, cease to be. Furthermore, neither can there be 
absolute transcendence, because the absolutely distinct would be by Nancy’s 
account a contradiction in terms, distinct from nothing and therefore indistinct. 
Beings in exposure to one another, co-articulating their shared limits, are both 
immanent and transcendent to one another, “right at” each other. There is, of 
course, always an excess, a horizon of beings that are not in direct contact, not 
immanent to one another. But this excess does not transcend in the traditional 
sense, because it is still connected by the vast network of mediations, exposures, 
that constitute the world as the sum total of beings. In Nancy’s versions of 
immanence and transcendence there is still intimate contact and sublime excess, 
but there is no longer immediacy or absolution. 
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So in regards to chapter two’s questioning of the immanent conditions, but 
transcendent apparatus of philosophy, while Nancy does agree that we have 
indeed lost certain hierarchical structures (mythical, ideological, theological, 
political, or otherwise), he refuses to conceive of our world as the remainder of this 
loss, as an immanent horizon defined by the subtraction of some transcendence. 
For Nancy, as just stated, the world’s immanence and transcendence is comprised 
internally, as the innumerable finite hiatuses that enclose and expose every being. 
This is not the same as nihilistically affirming the absence of the absolutely 
signified, but for Nancy demands that the oriented interval that constitutes 
meaning be understood not as a signification, but as sens, across the pre-linguistic 
distribution and relatedness of beings in the continued circulation and 
renegotiation of shared limits. 
 
“Being”, for Nancy, is not one principle said in many analogical ways, nor is it the 
hermeneutic circularity modulating regional disclosures against the 
kosmotheoretical whole, and nor is it be reduced to univocity. Rather, it is nothing 
other than the plurality of beings and announcements; repeating a phrase taken 
from Nancy’s Muses that I have used time again throughout the thesis, here 
Nancy replaces a principle of the plural with the plural as principle. The sum total 
of the distribution of this heterogeneous transimmanence is the world, the 
materially, sensorially, and electronically connected circuit of singularities mutually 
enclosing and exposing. Meaning, in turn, is the being toward the world of itself, at 
every finite hiatus. 
 
Furthermore, because, by Nancy’s account, beings are produced or distinguished 
both by their internal resistance and external exposure, mutually, the Platonic and 
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Aristotelian schemas of production cited throughout this chapter are transformed. 
The negotiation of forces by which beings come to presence in a Nancean 
ontology is both natural and technical on Aristotle’s account, that is, both internal 
and external, necessary and contingent. In this regard, Nancy’s concept of 
ecotechnics, as highlighted in later chapters, requires positioning in relation to this 
Aristotelian trope and its Heideggerian reactivation. Moreover, the determination of 
the Platonic triad of divinity, craftsman, and imitator according to a methexic 
standard ceases to make sense. Because for Nancy, if the objectuality of a being 
is always a mutual condition, every production is also participation: every μίμησις 
is also μέθεξις. 
 
In chapter three’s encounter with Nancy’s interrogation of hermeneutics, ontology, 
and finitude, we noted that Dasein too is for Nancy absolutely conditioned. Indeed, 
Nancy’s critique of Gadamer, which was outlined in the chapter, stems precisely 
from this insight. For when Nancy suggests that Auslegung, Heidegger’s word for 
the prelinguistic and prereflective comprehension of a being as a being, is not to 
be conflated with determinate linguistic Interpretation in the way he thinks 
Gadamer does, Nancy is not attempting to demonstrate his superior 
understanding of a concept or text. Rather, Nancy is emphasising just how 
important and far reaching it is to understand that Dasein does not “have” a 
relation to the being of beings, but that Dasein is a relation to the being of beings, 
a relation that no subject or self pre-exists. Dasein, Nancy asserts, is absolutely 
conditioned finitude. That is, Nancy radicalises the Heideggerian interpretation of 
death by determining it to be the unfinishedness of a mutual conditioning and 
sharing of limits, which is a sharing of finitude. 
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Because on Nancy’s reading Dasein is absolutely conditioned finitude, it is also 
Mitsein, not in terms of an appendage or relationship, but in the sense that the 
same limit that encloses Dasein’s ownness is the same limit that exposes it to 
others, its Mitsein. What this insight does, I argued, is transform the concept of 
μέθεξις. There is no longer the need, as there was for Gadamer, to posit one 
transcendent form of μέθεξις that structures Dasein’s hiatus and openness, and 
another immanent communal μέθεξις that connects it to other Dasein. By Nancy’s 
account, Dasein is irreducibly Mitsein, which is to say, Dasein’s transcendent 
openness is the same as its immanent being-with, its enclosure is its exposure. 
The heterogeneity of Dasein’s vertical, temporal μέθεξις is therefore, for Nancy, 
reoriented onto the horizontal or horizonal dimension as its transimmanent contact 
with others. 
 
In the reading of Plato’s Ion that constitutes the second half of the essay ‘Sharing 
Voices’ that follows the critique of Gadamer and interpretation of Dasein just 
outlined, we saw that Nancy uses the Ion as a demonstration of how hermeneutics 
might function when stripped of transcendent or communal μέθεξις. On Nancy’s 
reading, in the chain of interpretations that connect the characters of the dialogue, 
meaning is shown to circulate through a community without any singular agent 
accessing the origin of the meaning, or communing in some shared insight. 
Rather, each linguistic transfer, that is, each μίμησις of a determinate piece of 
information, is accompanied by a finite μέθεξις, a non-linguistic negotiation of the 
shared limit. Again, then, μίμησις and μέθεξις, in mutuality. And since meaning for 
Nancy is always the meaning of being, because it is the truth of the distribution of 
the limit at which all beings codetermine in their exposure to one another, 
communication for Nancy is the sharing of being, that is, the way that “being” is the 
many ways in which it is said. 
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Finally, in chapter four, Nancy’s affirmation of the equiprimordiality of Dasein and 
Mitsein was brought to bear on the initial question of chapter two, of the tension 
between the immanent social conditions and transcendent apparatus of the first 
philosophy in Ancient Greece. Whilst, as already noted, Nancy agrees that the 
birth of philosophy coincided with the end of certain hierarchies and authorities, we 
saw in this chapter that Nancy absolutely disagrees that immanence lies at its 
foundation. Rather, it was noted, for Nancy philosophy has too often nostalgically 
projected an immanence as an object of retrieval, to which it determines itself as a 
lack or negation, rather than, as Nancy suggests it should, embracing the 
transimmanent heterology of Mitsein that opens the world and the circulation of 
meaning within it. This chapter went about presenting the Nancean response to 
this nostalgia, as it is borne in interpretations of artistic μίμησις as precisely such 
an orientation towards a lost, immanent, mythical origin, that is, a communal 
μέθεξις that such a μίμησις always fails to retrieve. Nancy advocates instead a 
discontinuous μέθεξις describing the totality of being-with, and an artistic μίμησις 
oriented toward the inimitable. 
 
Following on from chapter three’s presentation of the implication of ontology and 
hermeneutics in one another, in the exposure that Dasein does not pre-exist, the 
Auslegung or openness to the meaning of being that singularises Dasein with 
other singularities and Dasein, this chapter noted that as such, for Nancy, aisthetic 
sensibility is also implicated at this limit of exposure as pertaining to the very 
organs of exposure that mark the body as a referring to itself of a material self that 
does not precede the referring, a renvoi of outside and inside. As such, the 
regional discourses of ontology, hermeneutics, and aesthetics take up a common 
object for Nancy: sens. And for Nancy, all of these studies must take into account 
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the law of singularity that ties them together, outside of an absolute binary of 
immanence and transcendence. 
 
We saw that for Nancy, artistic μίμησις is therefore neither a representation nor 
copy, and nor even a presentation of anything determinate, it is rather a 
presentation of presentation, because the μέθεξις, the participation or deep 
involvement it desires is not a restricted origin, but rather the mutuality of the 
meaning of being in its constant circulation and renegotiation as the limit that 
exposes all beings. To copy an image or trace a line is to present the exposure of 
singularities, their very singularity, not any specific singularity or distribution of 
singularities. And in the raising of an image, for Nancy, the transimmanent excess 
of world upon which it touches is exposed in relief, not presented in its particular 
arrangement as Heidegger has it, but simply the fact of its existence and excess. 
Art, for Nancy, in this way carries a disruptive power, it counteracts any regime in 
which the world is presented as a specific world, by presenting sheer presentation, 
the excessive sublimity of the aisthetic and the aesthetic. This excessiveness is 
the inimitable toward which Nancy’s μίμησις is oriented. 
 
Moreover, the maker or observer is likewise presented to themselves as exposed 
at the limit. No common identity, no self-present identity, only the experience of a 
referral and exposure between two singularities in transimmanent excess and a 
gesturing towards the mediated swell of possibilities converging as an infinite 
bifurcation of the line drawn between them. As such, I suggested that these more 
recent considerations of art within the Nancean text form a strong rejoinder to his 
early work on literature with Lacoue-Labarthe. There, as here, the upshot is a 
theory of the artistic that does not resist the Kantian restriction of the presentation 
of subjectivity (as the Jena Romantics intended), but rather supports it. It is an art 
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that presents the impossibility of a stable presentation, by presenting the referring 
between singularities outside of which no existence claim can be made. So where 
Nancy’s philosophy makes sense between textual singularities, art, as he has it, 
discloses sense in the making, the referring between irreducibly exposed 
singularities in the world. 
 
Along the way, I made a number of minor claims regarding the relationship 
between Nancy’s texts and those of his contemporaries and predecessors. 
Fundamentally, however, the purpose of this thesis was not to detail these 
relationships so much as to mark out the importance of their existence, to argue 
that if the swell of enthusiasm for reading Nancy systematically and ontologically is 
to be maintained, it will require the support of a project resolutely engaged in 
positioning these findings as responses, or rather referrals, exposures by which 
Nancy invites meaning to be borne into the contemporary. 
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5.4 Paths for Future Exposition 
Further to the theoretically determined challenges Nancy’s philosophy places upon 
any attempt at a commentary, is the de facto matter of the corpus’ continued 
movement. Jean-Luc Nancy is a living human being. While it is always the case 
that an interpretation accepts right from the start the possibility of an as-yet 
unpublished, untranslated, or undiscovered manuscript, when commenting upon 
Nancy’s work this is less a possibility than a guarantee. This thesis already 
contains a number of references to works that have emerged since its research 
got underway in 2010, but there are also notable omissions. 
 
Nancy has rarely been one for writing monograph length works and in recent times 
he has published a number of pamphlet sized books. 2013’s  ous désirez 1014 
marks the Hegelian synonymy of the grammatically separated articles of the 
phrase “you want?”, and 2012’s L'Equivalence des catastrophes1015 continues to 
explore the interpretation of Marx noted in chapter three, wherein the fiscal 
equivalence of capitalism is described as engendering new communications and 
interactions between regional ontologies. Ivresse1016 [intoxication] continues 
another thematic trajectory in Nancy’s work, one which, I would suggest, begins 
with the interrogation of enthusiasm in Sharing Voices, and parallels the general 
investigation of the pre-linguistic circulation of meaning as sens by examining the 
subjective experience of excessive or multiplicitous meaning, in, for example, 
                                                          
1014 Jean-Luc Nancy,  ous désirez  (Montrouge : Bayard, 2013). 
1015 Jean-Luc Nancy, L'Equivalence des catastrophes (Paris: Galilée, 2012). 
1016 Jean-Luc Nancy, Ivresse (Paris: Rivages, 2013). 
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witnessing an artwork,1017 being raptured by divine inspiration,1018 falling 
asleep,1019 jouissance,1020 or, in this case, inebriation. 
Three important translations will also provide the resources of future 
investigations, and, furthermore, indicate another emergent theme in the 
secondary literature, a focus on Nancy’s thoughts on the body and subjectivity. 
Anne O’Byrne’s translation, Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality,1021 appeared in the 
summer of 2013, gathering together essays originally suggested for inclusion in 
Corpus, which, according to the team at Fordham University Press, were omitted 
to accommodate an editorial focus on Nancy’s response to Descartes. François 
Raffoul’s translation of Identité: Fragments, franchises, Identity: Fragments, 
Frankness is due for release early in 2014, and Marie-Eve Morin is currently 
working on a translation of Ego Sum, completing the Nancean triad: body- immune 
identity-enunciated subjectivity. 
 
In regard to that which was certainly available and yet is conspicuously absent in 
this thesis, it should be noted that absence of this sort is a direct consequence of 
the thesis’ focus. Firstly, for the sheer size of its scope, but also for its somewhat 
incomplete nature,1022 I have omitted to engage with the thematic project of 
                                                          
1017 See chapter four. 
1018 See section chapter three. 
1019 See: Jean-Luc Nancy, The Fall of Sleep (2007), trans. by Charlotte Mandell 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2009). 
1020 See section (3.9). 
1021 Jean-Luc Nancy, Corpus II: Writings on Sexuality, trans. by Anne O’Byrne 
(New York@ Fordham University Press, 2013). 
1022 In 2012 Nancy distances himself from a certain specification of this project, 
remarking ‘I think that I would propose in the future not to use the phrase 
“deconstruction of Christianity,” and indicate by other means – I don’t know which 
yet – that “Christianity” does not persist beyond the completion, if there is any, of 
this movement’. The auto-deconstructive force that emerges from the Greco-
Jewish-Roman melting pot that is called Christianity should not, for a more recent 
Nancy, be conflated with the theology that spawned it. See: Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘On 
the Commerce of Plural Thinking’, in Jean-Luc Nancy and Plural Thinking, pp. 
229-39, (p. 229). 
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Nancy’s two volumes of The Deconstruction of Christianity, even while referring to 
texts contained therein.1023 Such a vast discussion, which will have to remain a 
task for a later enquiry, would have added a somewhat antagonistic element to the 
mostly agreeable relationship this thesis presented between Nancy and 
Heidegger. For the broadening out of Derrida’s Greekjew and Jewgreek1024 in 
Nancy’s charged definition of Christianity as the philosophically generative ‘dis-
union’1025 of the Hellenic and the Hebraic that emerged along the trade routes of 
the Roman Empire, I would suggest, is a direct reproach of Heidegger’s distaste 
for the Latinate. It cannot escape the notice of any reader of both Nancy and 
Heidegger that only the former can be, and indeed regularly is, content with a Latin 
etymology. But the etymological relation, moreover, leads onto altogether less 
explicit bearings, and one wonders what remnants of Christian thinking Nancy’s 
project might expose in our repeated theme of the “theatrical” and its implication in 
a communal μέθεξις,1026 Adorno’s thought of “tenebrous” μέθεξις,1027 and 
Gadamer’s thought of μέθεξις as a “crux”.1028 The linguistic association of μέθεξις 
with the view from the crucifixion, its extinguishing light, and the cross itself 
respectively, are glaring. 
 
Secondly, the thematic focus of this thesis has been on a historical form of 
philosophising, but it would be, I believe, a highly rewarding exercise to explore 
what pathways are opened up by Nancy’s reading of a less historical thinker, 
namely, Husserl. Moments of the thesis have opened onto this reading and have 
                                                          
1023 See for example sections (1.3), (1.5.2), (1.5.3), and (2.8). 
1024 See: Jacques Derrida, ‘Violence and Metaphysics’ (1964), trans. by Alan Bass, 
in Writing and Difference (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 97-192. 
1025 Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘The Judeo-Christian (on Faith)’ (2000), trans. by Bettina 
Bergo, in Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, pp. 42-60, (p. 43). 
1026 See sections (1.2) and (4.4). 
1027 See section (4.6). 
1028 See section (3.4). 
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been immediately shut down to maintain the clarity of its explicit considerations. 
This was the case in the closing phases of both chapter three and chapter four, 
the former of which cut short the discussion of the essays of The Creation of the 
World or Globalization at the point at which a challenge to a Husserlian notion of 
horizonality could be discerned, and the latter of which stopped short of noting 
Nancy’s affirmation of the auto-transgressive moments of Husserlian 
phenomenology in Listening. There are three possible lines of future enquiry here. 
 
Firstly, as Lee Hardy notes in his translator’s introduction to Husserl’s 1907 The 
Idea of Phenomenology, Husserl engages his own transformation of the concepts 
of immanence and transcendence, moving from the assumption that “real” 
transcendence would provide a natural limit to what can be adequately accessed 
and known through phenomenological reduction, through a reversal of 
qualification, redefining the transcendent as that which is not accessible to 
phenomenology, that is, placing the concepts of immanence and transcendence 
onto critical, transcendental grounds, meaning, Hardy writes: 
 
In the case of essences, or more generally, universals, we now have 
entities that are transcendent in the real sense (external to 
consciousness) but not in the phenomenological sense (since they can 
be wholly given); conversely, they are not immanent in the real sense 
(since they are not real part of consciousness), but they are in the 
phenomenological sense (again, because they can be wholly given).1029 
 
Indeed, in The Sense of the World, Nancy writes of Husserlian phenomenology: 
 
                                                          
1029 Lee Hardy, ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. 
by Lee Hardy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 7. 
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in the incessant will to turn back on itself in order to appropriate its own 
process, in the reduction to the "immanence" of an origin (subject, 
consciousness) that contains all "transcendence," that phenomenology 
(and with it, in this sense, philosophy as such, which it indeed 
completes with ultimate rigor) ensures that it will miss something of the 
"transcendence" (if one must still speak in such terms) it wants to bring 
out. It misses the excess or the initial spacing of this "transcendence," 
which it nonetheless has in view.1030 
 
The points that open onto Husserl in this thesis, therefore, do not represent 
tangents or departure points for separate investigations, but would, given time, re-
engage with the core themes of the dissertation. 
 
Secondly, and continuing directly from point number one, it was noted in the 
introduction to this thesis that when, in Being Singular Plural, Nancy notes that 
there are times when ‘phenomenology itself reaches its limit and exceeds it’,1031 he 
is explicitly referring to Husserl. In fact, in Listening, it is to Husserl’s analyses of 
the phenomenology of internal time consciousness1032 to which Nancy turns for a 
resource for thinking about the sonorous and its inadherance to the optic division 
between the right-here and the over-there.1033 Husserlian phenomenology could 
therefore provide certain atemporal elements of process and method to a Nancean 
post-phenomenology. 
 
Finally, if these prior two tangents were in fact to be diverted back around to form 
tributaries to this thesis, the upshot could possibly have further value beyond its 
own explicit content. For, in light of an alternative heritage, entirely different 
                                                          
1030 Nancy, The Sense of the World, p. 18. 
1031 Nancy, ‘Of Being Singular Plural’, 200 n. 53. 
1032 Edmund Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal 
Time (1893-1917), trans. by John Barnet (London: Kluwer Academic, 1991). 
1033 Nancy, Listening, pp. 18-9. 
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interpretations of Ricoeur and Gadamer might arise via their differential relations to 
Husserl, which, in turn, in providing the context for situating Nancy’s departures, 
could only offer a yet richer exposition of where Nancy’s work is to be located. 
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